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ABSTRACT
The positive influence of subsidies on merchandise exports is well
known from international trade theory literature. However, the empirical
evidence on the relationship itself remains ambiguous. This article fills
a gap in the existing pool of research by conducting a panel data empirical
analysis over two decades for 140 countries to understand the relationship
between their overall budgetary subsidies and aggregate merchandise
export inclination. The detailed research findings of this paper underline
the importance of going beyond the "Bali Package" agreed in December
2013 and concluding the Doha Round Negotiations of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). The outline for the Bali agreement was that the
Members of the WTO would exercise utmost restraint in using any form
of export subsidy. Because of this inability to reach binding decisions,
the Bali agreement is open ended and relies on good will and restraint.
Fundamentally, this article stresses the positive impact of disciplining
subsidies in particular in no uncertain terms. The results of this article
lead to two important conclusions. First, the economic analysis shows
that developing countries should realize that a subsidy-based trade war is
more likely to put them in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the WTO
developed members; and second, the legal analysis shows that the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM")
requires urgent clarification in the negotiating tables to ensure the global
economy does not suffer major turbulences in the coming years.

I. INTRODUCTION

The objective of establishing the World Trade Organization
("WTO") in 1995 has been to enhance international trade flows through
elimination or reduction of various unfair trade practices. While the
WTO negotiations have been able to phase out the traditional trade
barriers like import quotas and have been broadly successful in reducing
the tariff barriers, limiting the trade distortions arising from subsidies still

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/1
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remains an area of concern. 1 The situation before the Ninth Ministerial
Conference2 did not look promising. 3 "[A] number of countries opposed
any legally binding decision in Bali, including lower limits on export
subsidies. " 4 The outline for the Bali agreement was that WTO countries
would "'exercise utmost restraint' in using any form of export subsidy." 5
"Because of this inability to reach binding decisions, the Bali agreement
is open ended and relies on good will and restraint." 6 "In all, the
agricultural package in the Bali agreement has moved the stakes on very
little."7 "With no legally binding arrangements, the [gray areas in the]
goodwill statements are open to abuse and the disputes' panel of the
1. To offset price advantages of imported products, states make specific monetary
payments or provide tax relief to domestic producers, allowing them to lower domestic or
export prices and obtain a competitive advantage vis-a-vis competing foreign products.
Subsidies exist in different forms (export subsidies, domestic subsidies, production subsidies
or decoupled subsidies [direct payments]). Subsidies are specific and different from general
payments, such as social security to which the public at large or large segments of the
population are entitled. See generally M.C.E.J. BRONCKERS, SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD
MEASURES IN MULTILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS: ISSUES OF PROTECTIONISM IN GATT
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED STATES LAW (1985); T. Josling & S. Tangermann,

Production and Export Subsidies in Agriculture: Lessons from GA TT and WTP Disputes
Involving the us and the EC, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES: THE EU, THE us, AND
THE WTO 207 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2003); James Rude, Under
the Green Box: The WTO and Farm Subsidies, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1015 (2001).
2. The WTO Ninth Ministerial Conference was held in Bali, Indonesia, from the 3rdto
the 6th of December 2013. See Ministerial Declaration of 7 December 2013, WORLD TRADE
ORO.,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto _ e/minist_e/mc9 _ el
bali_texts_combined_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2014)[hereinafter Bali Declaration]; see
generally Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO 's Supremacy in the

International Trade Order - A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT'L ECON. L. 9 (2013); Julien Chaisse, Compliance with
International Law as a Process- Deconstructing the Obligation ofConformity, 38 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2015).
3. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, DAIRYVIETNAMCO., LTD., available at
http://www.dairyvietnam.com. vn/en/News/World-Trade-Organisation-Truly-Delivers.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014). "In May, the G- 20 group of developing countries had called on
developed countries to [reduce in halfJ their ceilings on the money they spend on export
subsidies by the end of 2013 and phase in a 540-day limit in the repayment period for export
credit." Id. "The final target is 180 days." Id. "The G-20 also called for a limit on the
quantities of subsidized exports, at the average actually exported with subsidies for 20032005 ." Id.
4. "The United States in particular wanted to grant this exception on a temporary basis
only." Christian lgnatzi, WTO Bali Agreement Expected to Boost Growth, DW (July 12,
2013), available at http://www.dw.de/wto-bali-agreement-expected-to-boost-growth/al 7278088 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). Also, "India wanted to make sure that food would
remain affordable for its poor population of 800 million and therefore had insisted on
permission to subsidize rice and grain." Id.
5. See generally Bali Declaration, supra note 2.
6. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, supra note 3.
7. Id.
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[WTO] could be just as busy as it has been with countries arguing over
subsidies and tariffs and quotas as much as they have over the last [two
decades.]" 8
The present analysis contributes to the understanding of the
relationship between overall government financial transfers (i.e.,
budgetary subsidies) and aggregate merchandise exports as a percentage
of gross domestic product ("GDP") in two ways. First, it shows that the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM")
requires clarification in the negotiating tables. Second, developing
countries should realize that a subsidy-based trade war is more likely to
put them in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the developed WTO
members.
Provision of subsidies to local players can be explained by several
underlying motivations from the standpoint of national governments,
namely, industrial development, facilitating innovation, supporting
national champions, securing environment-related objectives, ensuring
redistribution, etc. 9 The subsidies can be provided to the local players
through interventions both in the input as well as output markets. The
efficacy of subsidy policy as a strategic trade instrument is however
crucially linked with the local industry's learning capability and the
extent to which the domestic and foreign goods are substitutable. 10 The
trade theoretic literature notes that in a scenario characterized by fast
capital mobility, imposition of import tariffs leads to better welfare
implication as compared to export subsidies. 11 Nevertheless, presence of
domestic distortions in lower income countries result to frequent
deployment of subsidy measures to further long-term goals, as they
function as more efficient trade policy instrument vis-a-vis import
tariffs. 12
8. Id.
9. See Terry Collins-Williams & Gerry Salembier, International Disciplines on
Subsidies: The GATT, the WTO and the Future Agenda, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1996); see
also Simon Lester, The Problem OfSubsidies as a Means of Protectionism: Lessons From the
WTO EC-Aircraft Case, 12 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2013).
10. See Marc J. Melitz, When and How Should Infant Industries be Protected?, 66 J.
INT'L ECON. 177 (2005); Kym Anderson, Subsidies and Trade Barriers (paper presented at a
roundtable in Copenhagen on 24-28 May 2004, as a part of the Copenhagen Consensus
project)
available
at
http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/cptradefinished.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
11. See Tanapong Potipiti, Import Tariffs and Export Subsidies in the World Trade
Organization: A Small - Country Approach (ARTNeT Working Paper No. 119, Bangkok,
ESCAP,
2012),
available
at
http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/AWP%20No.%20119 .pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2014).
12. See generally Jagdish Bhagwati & V. K. Ramaswami, Domestic Distortions, Tariffs
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Apart from the aforesaid determinants, promoting exports of
domestic players who are in competition with their foreign counterparts
in the global market is a major driving motive for providing subsidies. 13
The standard trade analysis observes that the subsidies provided by
national governments enable the domestic producers suffering from cost
disadvantage to sell their products in the international markets at a
relatively cheaper price, thereby resulting in a rise in their exports. 14 The
theoretical relationship between subsidies and exports is clearly
observed, irrespective of market structure, as the policy is capable of
delivering both in the presence of competitive, as well as oligopolistic,
markets. 15 Several export subsidy programs are operational in European
countries and the U.S., which provide their firms greater advantage visa-vis their foreign competitors. 16 The adoption of export subsidies as a
strategic policy instrument has been reported extensively in the
literature. 17 For instance, production and export subsidies in a home
country may motivate multinational corporations from abroad to locate
production facilities there. 18
The trade-distorting effects of subsidies in general, and export
subsidies in particular, are widely acknowledged to be in conflict with
core WTO principle of fair trade. The mandate of the ongoing WTO
negotiations under the Agreement of Agriculture ("AoA") and the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM") are to
ensure better discipline on both direct (e.g. direct payment) as well as
indirect (e.g. revenue foregone by preferential electricity and fuel price,
lowered interest payment on restructured loans) financial transfers. 19 As
and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 71 J. POL. ECON. 44, 44-50 (1963).
13. See generally Gary N. Horlick, A Personal History ofthe WTO Subsidies Agreement,
47 J. WORLD TRADE 447 (2013); see also James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, Export
Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry, 18 J. INT'L ECON. 83 (1985).
14. See generally Horlick, supra note 13; see also Brander & Spencer, supra note 13.
15. See Cees van Beers, Jeroen C. J. M. van den Bergh, Andre de Moor & Frans
Oosterhuis, Determining the Environmental Effects of Indirect Subsidies: Integrated Method
and Application to the Netherlands, 39 APPLIED ECON. 2465 (2007); see also Avinash Dixit,
International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries, 94 ECON . J. 1 (1984).
16. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE, NATIONAL TRADE POLICY FOR EXPORT SUCCESS,
U .N. Doc. P248.E/DCP/BTP/11-XI, U.N. Sales No. E.12.III.T.3 (2011).
17. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and
Agricultural Trade Disputes, 13 ECON. & POL. 113 (2001); see also Andrew Y. Lemon, The
Peril of Implementing Export Subsidies in the Presence of Special Interests (Feb. 21, 2003)
(preliminary draft) (on file with the Yale University Department of Economics), available at
http://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Workshops-Seminars/IndustrialOrganization/lemon-030225.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
18. See generally Davin Chor, Subsidies for FD!: Implications from a Model with
Heterogeneous Firms, 78 J. INT'L ECON. 113 (2009).
19. See generally Legal Texts: A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,
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per AoA and ASCM provisions, subsidies are classified under two broad
categories, namely, actionable (i.e. subsidies which are directly linked
with production and hence trade-distorting) and non-actionable (i.e.
subsidies which are not directly linked with production and hence have
lesser impact on trade). The goal of the current WTO negotiations is to
limit the actionable subsidies 20 ( e.g. certain forms of fisheries subsides,
amber and blue box subsidies in agriculture) and discontinuation of all
forms of agricultural export subsidies. 21 While the Doha Development
Agenda ("DDA") negotiations have been broadly successful in reforming
the export subsidies scenario, the prevalence of domestic subsidies in
several member countries remains a major concern area. 22
In this context, the present analysis intends to contribute to the
literature by exploring the relationship between government financial
transfers (i.e., budgetary subsidies) and merchandise exports as a
percentage of GDP in a cross-country framework. The aim is to provide
some policy recommendations (or at least orientation) which could guide
current negotiations for the benefit of all WTO members.
The paper is arranged along the following lines. First, a brief
discussion on the research frontier on subsidies and their potential
implications on exports is conducted. Secondly, the reflection of this
understanding in the regulatory context provided by the WTO' s
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("ASCM") is
analyzed in its key dimensions. Third, the data sources are explained and
macro trends of the principal variables are illustrated. A cross-country
empirical analysis is undertaken next for understanding the influence of
budgetary subsidies on export inclination. Finally on the basis of the
empirical results, a few policy conclusions are drawn.

WORLD
TRADE
ORO.,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#kAgreement (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
20. See generally Debashis Chakraborty, Julien Chaisse & Animesh Kumar, Doha

Round Negotiations on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures: Potential Implications on
Trade Flows in Fishery Sector, 6 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL. 201, 201-34
(2011).
21.

See Ian F. Fergusson, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha
Development Agenda, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (2011).
22. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures , (U. Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 186, 2003), available
at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/186.aos_.subsidies.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2014); see also Julien Chaisse & Puneeth Nagaraj, Changing Lanes: Trade, Investment and
Intellectual Property Rights, 37 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 223, 223-70 (2014).
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IL UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF WTO RULES ON
SUBSIDIES
Although subsidies specifically geared towards export promotion
contribute more in boosting exports, even domestic subsidies may cause
over-production and lead to enhanced exports for releasing the downward
pressure on prices in domestic market. The positive relationship between
subsidies and exports is observed both in case of agricultural and
manufacturing sectors.
A. The Agricultural Sector

Agricultural export subsidies have emerged as a major policy
instrument adopted in both developed and developing countries during
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") period and WTO
days. Both agricultural input subsidies (e.g. fertilizer subsidy, irrigation
subsidy in terms of free electricity) and output subsidies (e.g. per unit
support at higher than market price) may lead to over-production, thereby
fueling export opportunities. 23
Agricultural export subsidies have been extensively used in the U.S.
during pre-WTO days. In 1993, the payments under the Export
Enhancement Program ("EEP") crossed U.S. $1 billion. 24 The support to
U.S. players in terms of export credit arrangements, including deferred
interest payments, government guarantees for securing loans at lower
interest rates, etc. have also played crucial roles. 25 Similarly in the EU,
the primary sector (e.g. dairy and poultry sector) received export
subsidies in the order of€ 1 billion and €650 million in 2008 and 2009
respectively through the Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"). 26 It has
been noted that developing countries like Brazil, India, Mexico, South
Africa, Thailand, Venezuela, etc. also provide considerable volume of
agricultural subsidies. 27

23 . See generally Sacchidananda Mukherjee & Debashis Chakraborty, Relationship
Between Fiscal Subsidies and C02 Emissions: Evidence from Cross-Country Empirical
Estimates, ECON. RES. INT'L, Vol. 2014 (2014).
24. See Howard D. Leathers, Agricultural Export Subsidies as a Tool of Trade Strategy:
Before and After the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 83 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 209 (2001).
25. See generally James Rude, Reform ofAgricultural Export Credit Programs, 1 ESTEY
CTR. J. lNT'L L. & TRADE POL. 66 (2000).
26. See Dirk Willem te Velde et al., The EU's Common Agricultural Policy and
Development, 79 OVERSEAS DEV. INST. PROJECT BRIEFINGS 1, 3 (2012).
27. See Arvind Panagariya, Agricultural Liberalisation and the Least Developed
Countries: Six Fallacies, 28 WORLD ECON. 1277, 1285 (2005).
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B. The Industrial Sector
The subsidies given to the industrial sector and their implications for
exports constitute another major branch of literature. The positive
influence of government subsidies in Japan for promotion of progressive
industries and exports deserves mention. 28 Apart from the direct
subsidies, indirect subsidies like fuel subsidies can significantly lower the
variable cost of production in capital-intensive sectors like iron and steel
etc., which also provide them substantial edge in the export markets over
competitors. 29 Incidence of high volume of fuel subsidies both in
developed30 and emerging countries31 and their potential export
implications has been reported in the literature.

C. The Positive Relationship as Classic Analysis
The literature on the subsidy-export interrelationship in developed
countries has generally showed a positive relationship between the two.
Agricultural export subsidies have significantly boosted exports from the
recipient countries. 32 The evidence of subsidized wheat exports from the
U.S. displacing the same from competitor countries deserves mention
here. 33 Similarly, the dairy subsidies in both Canada and the U.S. have
enhanced their global exports. 34 Empirical estimates for Portugal 35 and
28. See David De Meza, Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect? , 19
CANADIAN J. ECON. 347, 347 (1986).
29. See Peter Thomas in der Heiden, Chinese Sectoral Industrial Policy Shaping
International Trade and Investment Patterns - Evidence from the Iron and Steel Industry, 18
(Inst. ofE. Asian Studies, Univ. of Duisburg-Essen, Working Paper No. 88, 2011), available
http://www.uni-due.de/in-east/fileadmin/publications/gruen/
at
paper88.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
30. See David Victor, The Politics of Fossil Fuel Subsidies, GLOBAL SUBSIDIES
INITIATIVE
11-13
(2008),
available
at
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/politics_ffs.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
31. See Reforming Energy Subsidies: Opportunities to Contribute to the Climate Change
Agenda,
UNITED
NATIONS
ENV'T
PROGRAMME
(2008),
available
at
http://www. unep. org/pdf/pressreleases/reforming_energy_subsidies. pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2014).
32. See Bernard Hoekman, Francis Ng & Marcelo Olarreaga, The Impact ofAgricultural
Support Policies on Developing Countries, in I REFORMING AGRICULTURAL TRADE FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: KEY ISSUES FOR A PRO-DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME OF THE DOHA
ROUND 100, 100-31 (Alex F. McCalla & John Nash eds., 2007).
33. See generally H. G. Brooks, S. Devadoss & W. H. Meyers, The Impact of the US.
Wheat Export Enhancement Program on the World Wheat Market, 38 CANADIAN J. AGRIC.
ECON. 253 (1990).
34. See Kenneth W. Bailey, Comparison of the US. and Canadian Dairy Industries
(The Pa. State. Univ. Dep't of Agric. Econ. & Rural Soc'y, Staff Paper No. 349, 2002),
available at http://www.agmrc.org/media/cms/staffpaper349_ 42eab l 6a91 e4f.pdf (last visited
Nov. 16, 2014).
35. See Oscar Afonso & Armando Silva, Non-Scale Endogenous Growth Effects of
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West Germany36 also confirm the positive relationship between subsidies
and exports.
The positive relationship between subsidies and exports has been
observed in several developing and emerging countries as well. In South
Korea, the implementation of a preferential tax system and subsidy
allocation for export activities led to a transformation of the export basket
of the country towards more value-added manufacturing products. 37 The
massive export growth in China has caused researchers to focus on its
subsidy policy as an explanatory variable. The firm-level panel
estimation results show that production subsidies facilitate exports, and
the effect is more evident for profit-making firms as well as capitalintensive industries. 38
The influence of subsidies on Chinese
manufacturing exports has been established under heterogeneous firm
structure as well. 39 In addition to macro-level analysis, panel data
regressions with Chinese provincial data reveal the strong influence of
subsidies on state owned enterprises ("SO Es") exports, as the government
financial devolution helps them to overcome the high production costs. 40
In the Malaysian context, the positive long-run relationship between
subsidies and exports has been confirmed through a cointegration test. 41
Interestingly, while the positive influence of firm-specific subsidies on
exports in Colombia has been observed, the impact is found to be
diminishing in subsidy size. 42
Nevertheless, a section of the literature questions the influence of
export subsidies, in particular their quantum, on exports. 43 In the East
German context, no relationship between subsidies and exports has been
Subsidies for Exporters, 29 ECON. MODELLING 1248 (2012), available at
http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2012/Programme/Papers/32.pdf (last visited on Nov. 14, 2014).
36. See Sourafel Girma, Holger Gorg & Joachim Wagner, Subsidies and Exports in
Germany: First Evidence from Enterprise Panel Data, 55 APPLIED ECON. Q. 179 (2009).
37. See Wontack Hong, Export-Oriented Growth and Trade Patterns of Korea, in
TRADE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN PACIFIC ASIA 273, 273-306 (Colin J. Bradford, Jr. &
William H. Branson eds., 1987).
38. See Surafel Girma et al., Can Production Subsidies Explain China's Export
Performance? Evidence from Firm-level Data, 111 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 863 (2009).
39. See Fabrice Defever & Alejandro Riaflo, China's Pure Exporter Subsidies (Ctr. for
Econ. Performance, London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., Working Paper No. 1182, 2012),
available at http://cep.lse.ac. uk/pubs/download/dp 1182. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
40. See generally Richard S. Eckaus, China's Exports, Subsidies to State Owned
Enterprises and the WTO, 17 CHINA ECON. Rev. 1 (2006).
41. See Bakri Abdul Karim & Shazali Abu Mansor, Subsidy and Export: Malaysian
Case, sec. 4 (Dec. 6, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/37025/1/MPRA_paper_37025.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
42. See Christian Helmers & Natalia Trofimenko, The Use and Abuse of Export
Subsidies: Evidence from Colombia, 36 WORLD ECON. 465, 481-83 (2013).
43. See Girma, Gorg & Wagner supra note 36, at 2.
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established. 44 The weak influence of export subsidies on exports has been
confirmed in Turkey45 and Japan46 as well. Empirical estimates with
respect to U.S. firms have also revealed that the effect of subsidies on
exports is not statistically significant. 47 Similarly, the firm-specific
analysis on the interrelationship between subsidies and export decisions
in Ireland fails to find any significant relationship between the two. 48
Adoption of export subsidies has turned out to be a suboptimal policy
instrument in Latin American countries like Argentina, Mexico 49 and
Costa Rica as well. 50
The absence of statistically significant relationship between
subsidies and exports in several developing countries and least developed
countries ("LDCs") can be explained by the poor implementation
performance by the national governments. Kenya had been a prominent
example of this phenomenon. 51 The underlying reason of the failure to
promote exports even after adopting the subsidization strategy in Bolivia
has been accorded to the decision of non-discretionary implementation of
the policy. Conversely, Korea and Brazil have succeeded in their attempt
by following a path of discretion and selectivity. 52

III. EXPLORING THE REFLECTION OF TRADE THEORY
PREDICTIONS INTO THE WTO REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The existing literature notes the possibility of trade diversion from
efficient producers due to an export-oriented focus and other forms of
subsidies received by their competitors, which may lead to subsidy and

44. See id. at 7.
45. See Ismail Arslan & Sweder van Wijnbergen, Export Incentives, Exchange Rate
Policy and Export Growth in Turkey, 75 Rev. ECON. & STAT. 128, 132 (1993).
46. See Hiroshi Ohashi, Learning by Doing, Export Subsidies, and Industry Growth:
Japanese Steel in the 1950s and 1960s, 66 INT'L ECON. 297, 319 (2005).
47. See Andrew B. Bernard & J. Bradford Jensen, Why Some Firms Export, 86 Rev.
ECON. & STAT. 561, 569 (2004).
48. See Holger Gorg, Michael Henry & Eric Strobl, Grant Support and Exporting
Activity, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 168, 173 (2008).
49. See Julio Nogues, The Experience ofLatin America with Export Subsidies, 126 Rev.
WORLD ECON. (WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV) 97, 104-05 (1990).
50. See generally Alexander Hoffinaister, The Cost of Export Subsidies: Evidence from
Costa Rica, 39 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 1, 138 (1992).
51. See Patrick Low, Export Subsidies and Trade Policy: The Experience of Kenya, 10
WORLD DEV. 293, 302 (1982).
52. See Dani Rodrick, Taking Trade Policy Seriously: Export Subsidization as a Case
Study in Policy Effectiveness, (Nat'] Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4567,
Dec. 1993), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w4567 .pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
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countervailing duty wars for reversing that advantage. 53 Such subsidies
are specific and different from general payments, such as social security
related expenses to which the public at large or large segments of the
population are entitled. On one hand, they can improve the returns to
domestic producers, but on the other hand, they can distort trade. 54 The
additional concern here comes from the fact that the developing country
and LDCs firms do not receive the same level of supports received by
their developed country counterparts, which significantly constrain their
market access both in home and foreign markets. 55 This is reflected in
the negotiations and the text of the ASCM. 56 The compromise at the heart
of the WTO regulation of subsidies resulted in an agreement which
required the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") to clarify a number
of concepts in the case law. Export subsidies are indeed quite susceptible
to abuse. 57
A. The Policy and the Law
The evolution on subsidy regulation in international trade system
started with the Havana Charter, which became the basis for future
agreements on subsidies, such as: the GATT, Subsidies Code of the
Tokyo Round and the ASCM of the Uruguay Round. 58 The ASCM
Agreement defines the term 'subsidy' in detail in Article 1. 59 Moreover,
it classifies subsidies into three broad categories: i) prohibited; ii)

53. See generally KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2002); see Renee Sharp & UssifR. Sumaila, Quantification of the
US. Marine Fisheries Subsidies, 29 N. AMER. J. FISHERIES MGMT. 18 (2009); Anne Tallontire,

Trade Issues on Background Paper: The Impact ofSubsidies on Trade in Fisheries Products,
(Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Project Paper No. 26109, July 2004); Donald J.
Boudreaux, Do Subsidies Justify Retaliatory Protectionism?, 31 ECON. AFF. 4 (2011).
54. The striking example of trade distorting subsidies, the upland cotton subsidies
granted by US government for local farmers which had more adverse consequences away
from its shores. The efforts of rural farmers in developing countries are being undermined by
these subsidies. However, econometric findings have questioned the compensation judgment
of WTO in Brazil's favor. For details see Kilungu Nzaku, Matt Vining & Jack E. Houston,
US. Cotton Subsidies: Are Brazil 's Accusations True? (presented at S. Agric. Econ. Ass'n
Annual
Meeting,
No.
6749,
(2008)
available
at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/6749/2/sp08nzl 1.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
55. See generally Erich Supper, Is There Effectively A Level Playing Field For
Developing Country Exports?, U.N. Sales No. E-00-11-0-22 (2001).
56. See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WORLD TRADE
ORO., available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf (last visited Nov.
13, 2014).
57. See Nogues, supra note 49, at 112.
58. See Chakraborty, Chaisse & Kumar, supra note 20, at 204.
59. See Gary N. Horlick & Peggy A. Clarke, The 1994 WTO Subsidies Agreement, 17
WORLD COMPETITION 41, 42 ( 1993 ).
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actionable; and iii) non-actionable subsidies. 60 This categorisation is
sometimes referred to as a 'traffic light' approach. Prohibited subsidies
are "red light" subsidies, which are harmful to trade per se. 61 Nonactionable subsidies are "green light" subsidies, which are considered to
be permitted on the grounds of an explicit reference in the legal text. 62
Lastly, actionable subsidies are "yellow light" subsidies, which are open
to be challenged only if they are considered to cause adverse effects on
international trade. 63
In the present ASCM, some uncertainties remain as to the meaning
and legal implications of some basic concepts. In this connection, the
ASCM architecture has been challenged at times from the perspective of
efficiency. The lack of purpose in the agreement itself has come under
heavy criticism on the ground that the countries may be forced to remove
socially beneficial subsidies as well. 64 In particular, the sensitivity of the
agreement with economic considerations is strongly questioned. 65
Questions have also been raised on the optimality of disciplining
subsidies beyond the non-violation doctrine. 66 In addition, it is held that
WTO' s subsidy rules would have yielded greater result only after
substantial tariff reductions under GATT. 67
60. Hyung-Jin Kim, Reflections on the Green Light Subsidy for Environmental
Purposes, 3 3 J. WORLD TRADE 167, 167 (1999).
61. Id.
62. Id. This category unfortunately was applied only for a period of five years beginning
with the entry into force of the WTO, since developing countries were afraid it would be
excessively used by industrialized countries. Today efforts are under way to put it back, as
the category is important for the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs")
in developing countries as well. See id.
63. Id. The definition of a subsidy within the meaning of Articles l and 3 of the SCM
Agreement (prohibited subsidies) was addressed by the Appellate Body in various cases, most
prominently in US - Tax Treatment for 'Foreign Sales Corporations' (WT/DS108/AB/R), as
well as in Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (WT/DS139/AB/R,
WT/DS142/AB/R 994). See Appellate Body Report Canada, Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R 994 (May 31, 2000), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_ e/dispu_ e/2823d.pdf; Appellate Body Report, United
States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations ", WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14,
2002),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
108abrw_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
64. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Will International Rules on Subsidies
Disrupt the World Trading System?, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 877 (2006).
65. See generally PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, PATRICK A. MESSERLIN & JASPER M.
w AUTERS, THE LA w AND ECONOMICS OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN THE WTO (Edward
Elgar Publ'g 2008).
66. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, James Kowal & Patricia Kowal, The Questionable
Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 475, 473523 (2010).
67. See David R. DeRemer, The Evolution of International Subsidy Rules, (Universite
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Hence, in recent period international trade governance has been
characterised by a progressive regulation on subsidies, tightening
disciplines over time in order to avoid such distortions. These rules
essentially seek to balance the need for redistribution and implementation
of legitimate policy goals and to avoid protectionism and unnecessary
distortions of conditions of competition on domestic markets. Traderestrictive border measures apply to countervail unlawful subsidies but
are not at the heart of legal rules relating to this important field of
international trade law.
It is argued that the subsidies are often sector-specific and their
"narrowly tailored" nature, as well as government legal arrangements
pertaining to data dissemination, may prohibit circulation of full
information on them in the public domain. 68 The problem gets further
compounded in case of the indirect subsidies (i.e., income foregone rather
than budgetary transfers). The subsidies data reporting also suffers from
a "forum bias", as several countries have reported relatively higher
fisheries subsidies figures to the OECD and APEC as compared to the
corresponding figures reported to WTO. 69 This kind of massive underreporting makes 'disciplining' of subsidies through the multilateral
negotiations all the more difficult. 70

B. The Practice of Countervailing Duty 71
The alleged continuation of subsidies in foreign countries have often
led countries to take recourse to trade remedial measures. In order to
Libre de Bruxelles: ECARES, Working Paper No. 2013-45, 2013), available at
https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/153041 /1/2013-45-DEREMERtheevolution.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014 ).
68. Government Subsidies: Revealing the Hidden Budget, PEW ECON. PoL'Y GROUP
(2013 ),
available
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/
pcs_ assets/2013/Subsidyscope20Framing20Paperpdf.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
69. Hard Facts, Hidden Problems: A Review of Current Data on Fishing Subsidies,
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND (2001); see Ussif Rashid Sumalia et al., Catching More Bait: A
Bottom-up Re-estimation of Global Fisheries Subsidies, 12 J. BIOECONOMICS 201, 201-25
(2010).
70. See Exploring the Links Between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO, WORLD TRADE
0RG.
(2006),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_ e/booksp_ e/anrep_ e/world _trade_report06_ e.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2014).
71. The analysis undertaken in this section draws from the methodology developed by
Chaisse and Chakraborty (2007) and Chakraborty and Khan (2008). See Julien Chaisse &
Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The
Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 153 (2007); see also DEBASHIS CHAKRABORTY & AMIR ULLAH KHAN, THE WTO
DEADLOCKED: UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Los Angeles and
London: Sage Publications 2008).
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further the analysis, we constructed Figure 1 in which all countervailing
duty investigations initiated from 1995 to 2013 have been reported.
Figure 1: Countervailing Duty Investigations Initiated from 1995 to
2013 (December), Worldwide
45
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Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO SCM database

Figure 1 allows us to observe that the number of global
Countervailing Duty ("CVD") initiations and CVD measures in response
to subsidies has shown a fluctuating trend during 1995-2013. The
number of CVD initiations exhibited a continuous increasing trend from
1996 to 1999 and was at its peak in 1999 with 41 initiations during that
year. Since 1999 however a cyclical pattern is being observed. The
scenario improved considerably in 2005, when the number of initiations
reached a minimum of 6. However, SCM initiations have increased ever
since and reached 28 and 25 initiations during 2009 and 2011
respectively. The trend indicates that CVD activism has been influenced
strongly by the global recession, with increase in initiation incidence
during crisis years. However, the sharp rise in CVD initiations during
2013 indicates grievances among countries, which causes serious
concern. The imposition of CVD measures has also shown a similar
cyclical pattern. While an increasing trend has been observed in CVD
measures during 1996-2000, an overall decreasing trend was noticed
during 2001-2007 with minor fluctuations. However, the number of
measures increased to 11 in 2008 and further to 19 in 2010. The CVD
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/1

22

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 42, N

2014]

Curtailing Subsidy Wars in Global Trade

15

measures, like initiations, have also shown an increasing trend during
2013.
In order to understand the SCM imposing behavior of the major
trading countries with respect to each other during the period of January
1, 1995 to December 31, 2013, Table 1 has been constructed from WTO
data. While the countries facing the SCM measures are noted row-wise,
the countries initiating the same are reported column-wise. A total of335
SCM actions have been cumulatively initiated during this period. The
United States (U.S.) topped the list by accounting for 41.19% of the total
CVD initiations, followed by the EU (21.49%). Interestingly, a
significant proportion of the initiations made by the U.S. have taken place
against major Asian economies like China (28.26%) and India (12.32%).
On the other hand, only 15 SCM initiations has been undertaken against
the U.S, of which 3 were initiated by Canada and the EU each and 4 by
China.
A similar trend has been noticed in case of the EU as well. Among
the 72 SCM cases initiated, 27.78% of the total number of cases has been
lodged against India. The other countries suffering from the EU SCM
initiations include China (11.11 %), South Korea (9.72%) and Taiwan
(8.33%), where the last two countries are not reported in the table. On
the contrary, the EU has faced only 14 initiations on SCM ground against
its exports. The lower SCM activism against the EU or U.S. can hardly
be considered as evidence signifying lesser devolution of subsidies within
their territories.
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Table 1: Subsidy and Countervailing Duty Initiation and
Measure Matrix for Major Countries (1.1.95 - 31.12.13)
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Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO SCM database

* - the figures in the parenthesis show the final measures.
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Looking at the other end of the spectrum, it is observed that China
presently tops the list of the countries suffering from the SCM initiations
(22.69% of the total cumulative initiations), followed by India (18.21 %)
and South Korea (5.97%) (not shown in Table 1). Canada, the EU and
the U.S. jointly initiated 85.53% and 70.49% of all the SCM initiations
against China and India respectively. However, other developing
countries like South Africa have also targeted Indian exports on SCM
grounds. On the whole an interesting picture emerges from the analysis;
while Canada, the EU and the U.S. account for 73.73% of all SCM
initiations, China, India and South Korea account for 46.87% of the
affected cases. If Indonesia and Thailand are also added to the list of the
affected developing countries, the corresponding figure reaches 56.12%.
Clearly the low cost economies of Asia are emerging as the major targets
of SCM activism in leading developed countries.
The SCM measures are reported in the parenthesis of the same table
and a similar conclusion emerges from the analysis. The calculations
reveal that Canada, the EU and the U.S. jointly account for 71.58% of all
SCM measures during the study period. On the other hand, among the
target economies, China, India and South Korea account for 50.00% of
the total SCM measures.
The finding underlines the need to have a closer analysis of the SCM
activism followed by Canada, the EU and the U.S., which is reported at
Harmonized System ("HS") sectional level in Table 2. Section XV,
which consists of Base Metals and articles of Base Metals, is found to
attract most of the SCM initiations for these three players. It deserves
mention that the sector is the recipient of subsidies in several countries,
especially fuel subsidies. The triad has jointly initiated 89 .31 % of the
total SCM initiations and 82.42% of the total measures in this sector. The
SCM activism for base metals is particularly high in the U.S. The other
major sectors facing SCM challenges in the triad include low-tech
products in Section VII (Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber and articles
thereof), Section Vl (Products of Chemical or allied industries) and
Section IV (prepared foodstuff, etc.). However, a relatively sophisticated
product group like machinery and electrical appliances (Section XVI) has
also been subject to SCM actions. While the EU has adopted several
SCM actions on plastic and rubber products and textile products, U.S.
actions on chemical products are significant.
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Table 2: Canadian, EU and U.S. Countervailing Initiations I
Measures by Product Type - A Comparative Analysis (1.1.95 31.12.13)*

Live Animals; Animal Products
Vegetable Products
Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages,
Spirits and Vinegar; Tobacco and
Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes
Mineral Products
Products of the Chemical or Allied
Industries
Plastics and Articles Thereof;
Rubber and Articles Thereof
Wood and Articles of Wood;
Wood Charcoal; Cork and Articles
of Cork; Manufactures of Straw, of
Esparto or of Other Plaiting
Materials; Basketware and
Wickerwork
Pulp Of Wood or of Other Fibrous
Cellulosic Material; Recovered
(Waste and Scrap) Paper or
Paperboard; Paper and Paperboard
and Articles Thereof

3 (1)
0

0

l (1)

0

Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and
Associated Transport E uipment

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/1

4 (2

0

8 (5
2 2
0

0

1 1)

28 (20)

70
45

Textiles and Textile Articles
Footwear, head ear etc.
Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement,
Asbestos, Mica or Similar
Materials; Ceramic Products;
Glass and Glassware
Base Metals and Articles of Base
Metal
Machinery and Mechanical
Appliances; Electrical Equipment;
Parts Thereof; Sound Recorders
and Reproducers, Television
Image and Sound Recorders and
Reproducers, and Parts and
Accessories of Such Articles

0

0

1
0
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Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO SCM database

* - the figures in the parenthesis show the final measures.
Table 3 looks at the other side of the coin, i.e., the distribution of
the sectors affected by SCM actions in exporting countries. Six entities,
namely, Brazil, China, EU, India, Indonesia and South Korea are
considered here for the analysis. China and India have been affected most
by SCM actions and in both cases a major proportion of the initiations
have been related to Section XV (Base Metal and articles of Base Metal).
The other affected sectors include Section VI (Products of Chemical or
allied industries) and Section VII (Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber
and articles thereof). It is observed from the data that the base metal
sector in Brazil, Indonesia and South Korea are also suffering heavily
from the SCM initiations and measures in manufacturing products.
Interestingly, the EU has faced no SCM initiation or measure against its
base metal products, but rather witnessed initiations against its Section
III (Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils) and Section IV (Prepared
Foodstuffs) exports. The emerging difference can be explained in line
with the subsidy provisions under Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP").
Despite the fact that more than half a century have passed since
trading countries started discussions on subsidies issue since the Havana
Charter in order to regulate their misuse, there exists ample room for
further development. The number of SCM related cases demonstrates
that the consequences of granting of subsidies by a government could
have serious repercussions on international trade. The DSB of WTO has
so far played a significant role in curbing the adverse effects of subsidies
on foreign countries. For instance, "successive appeals by the European
Union, the United States and other member countries at the WTO has
forced China to scrap several export support programs and preferential
treatment for its exporters. " 72 The proven WTO incompatibility of the
U.S. system for taxing foreign export earnings 73 and modifications in
Export Credit Guarantee Program for Cotton74 in light ofDSB ruling also
72. See Fabrice Defever & Alejandro Riano, China's Pure Exporter Subsidies, 1182
CENTRE FOR ECON. PERFORMANCE 1, 5 (2012).
73. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Foreign Sales Corporation Drama: Reaching the
Last Act?, PETERSON INST. FOR lNT'L ECON., No. PB02-10 (2002), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb02-1 O.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
74. See John Baffes, Cotton Subsidies, the WTO, and the 'Cotton Problem', 34 WORLD
ECON. 1534 (2011).
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deserve mention. This scenario demonstrates the necessity to improve
the existing regulations on subsidies at the multilateral level.

Table 3: Countervailing Measures by Product Type - A
Comparative Analysis of Major Affected Countries (1.1.95 31.12.13)

and Their
Cleavage
Products etc.;
Animal or
Vegetable
Waxes
Prepared
Foodstuffs;
Beverages,
Spirits and
Vinegar;
Tobacco and

0

0

3 (3

0

Products of
the Chemical
or Allied
Industries
Plastics and
Articles
Thereof;
Rubber and
Articles
Thereof

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/1

0

0

0

0

9 5

1 0)

0

l 1)

0

0

0

0

1 0

0

0

0

0)

0

0

11 6)

2 0)

1 0)
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Articles of
Wood; Wood
Charcoal;
Cork and
Articles of
Cork;
Manufactures
of Straw, of
Esparto or of
Other
Plaiting
Materials;
Baskctwarc
and
Wickerwork
Pulp Of
Wood orof
Other

Material;
Paper or
Paperboard;
Paper and
Paperboard
and Articles
Thereof

Stone,
Plaster,
Cement,
Asbestos,
Mica or
Similar
Materials;
Ceramic
Products;
Glass and
Glassware
Base Metals
and Articles
of Base
Metal
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0

0
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0
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0
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1 0)

0

0
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0
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0

7 5)

3 (1

76
14
61
52
11
34
Source: Constructed by the authors from WTO SCM database
7
8

* - the figures in the parenthesis show the final measures.

IV. REJUVENATING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The influence of government subsidies on export performance is
estimated here for 140 countries over 1990-2011. Subsidies included in
the present analysis include only direct budgetary transfers reported by
the government of a country. The indirect or implicit subsidies (i.e.,
income foregone in terms of tax rebate, fuel subsidy etc.) are not included
in the analysis due to non-availability of consistent cross-country data.
The current analysis considers subsidies provided by a country expressed
as percentage of its GDP for ensuring comparability of data across
countries, which is accessed from Government Finance Statistics
("GFS") ofIMF. 75
A. The Economic Data

As per the GFS Manual of 2001, the IMF reported data on subsidies
are:
[C]urrent transfers that government units pay to enterprises either on
75. See generally Government Finance Statistics, IMF ELIBRARY- DATA (2013),
available at http://elibrary-data.imf.org/DataExplorer.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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the basis of the levels of their production activities or on the basis of the
quantities or values of the goods or services that they produce, sell, or
import. Included are transfers to public corporations and other
enterprises that are intended to compensate for operating losses. 76

Clearly, such subsidies can include actionable transfers and may
significantly influence exports. Moreover, even de-linked subsidies,
which are provided solely based on domestic considerations, rather than
external motivations, may end up providing export boost through indirect
effects.
It is observed that GFS compiles the government subsidy figures for
countries from different government sources as per their reporting
practice. 77 Three types of government reporting have been observed in
the GFS data. 78 First, the General Government ("GG") includes all the
Central Government ("CG") transfers plus budgetary expenses of all the
Central Ministries I Departments and the same for the State Governments
("SG") (including provincial or regional) and Local Governments. 79 The
Central Government ("CG") transfers on the other hand represent the
consolidated transfers of the Central Government (including transfers of
Central Ministries I departments). 80 Finally, subsidies reported under
Budgetary Central Government ("BCG") covers, "[a ]ny central
government entity that is fully covered by the central government
budget. " 81 In addition, the GFS generally reports the budgetary statistics
for countries adopting cash accounting standards, but for several
countries, accrual (non-cash) accounting standards for extra-budgetary
units and social security funds has been reported. In order to understand
the differential effects of the data reporting differences, suitable dummy
variables have been included in the empirical model.
76Government Finance Statistics Manual, IMF 40 (2001), available at
https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/pdf/all.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
77. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material:
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, IMF (2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/intbin.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); see
generally Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75.
78. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material:
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4; see generally
Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75.
79. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material:
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4; see generally
Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75.
80. See Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material:
Instructions for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4; see generally
Government Finance Statistics, supra note 75.
81. Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 - Companion Material: Instructions
for Compiling the Institutional Table, supra note 77, at 4.
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Several control variables, e.g., the per capita income of the
countries, the share of agriculture, industry and services in their
economies, merchandise imports, inward foreign direct investment
("FDI") stock and political freedom, are included in the analysis in line
with existing literature. With the growing size of the economy, the
relative importance of trade is expected to decrease. Furthermore, the
contribution of various sectors to GDP may show interesting dynamics
with exports in the presence of subsidies in the model. Inward FDI stock
is generally favorable for enhancing exports from the recipient country. 82
In addition, merchandise imports (both raw materials and semi-processed
products) can boost exports of a country. 83 Finally, political freedom
leads to economic efficiency, which in tum may enhance exports. 84
Gross GDP figures in current prices and current exchange rates are
obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCT AD") Statistics. Merchandise exports and imports in a country
are considered in the current analysis by expressing them as a percentage
of its GDP, where all variables (at level) are measured in U.S. Dollars at
current prices and current exchange rates in millions. The same data is
accessed from UNCTAD Statistics as well. 85 The share of the three
sectors in GDP of a country has been obtained from World Development
Indicators ("WD I") database of the World Bank. 86 The data on political
freedom is obtained from Freedom House, where the country scores
range over 1 to 7 (where 1 represents the highest and 7 the lowest level
of freedom). 87
82. See Tadashi Ito, Export Platform Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence,
378 INST. DEVELOPrNG ECON. 4 (Dec. 2012).
83. See Tahir Mukhtar & Sarwat Rasheed, Testing Long Run Relationship Between
Exports and Imports: Evidence from Pakistan, 31 J. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 41, 41-42
(2010); see generally Biswajit Ng & Jaydeep Mukherjee, The Sustainability a/Trade Deficits
in the Presence of Endogenous Structural Breaks: Evidence from the Indian Economy, 23 J.
ASIAN ECON. 519, 519-26 (2012); see generally Ramona Dumitru et al., Analysis of the
Relationship between the Romanian Exports and Imports, 8 ANNALS UNIV. PETROSANI
ECON. 177, 177-82 (2008).
84. See Andre Liebenberg, The Relationship Between Economic Freedom, Political
Freedom and Economic Growth (Nov. 7, 2012) (M.B.A. thesis, Gordon Inst. of Bus. Science,
Univ. of Pretoria), available at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-02232013123 734/unrestricted/dissertation. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
85. See generally UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., available at
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (to
access data used).
86. See generally World Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, available at
http://databank.worldbank.org/databank/download/WDiandGDF excel.zip (last visited Nov.
16, 2014).
87. The country scores can be accessed using Freedom House's Index of Democracy.
See
Freedom
in
the
World,
FREEDOM
HOUSE
(2014),
available
at
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In addition, the analysis incorporates a number of constructed
dummy variables (e.g. country type dummies, financial system reporting
dummies, a dummy for the year 1999 and the year dummies) to capture
their effects on the proposed relationship. However, to avoid perfect
multicollinearity, only any two of the government dummies (GG, CG and
BCG) have been simultaneously used at a time in the estimated models.
Similarly, cash and non-cash dummies have not been used in the
regression models together. To understand the export implications of
subsidies in countries situated at different levels of economic
achievements, four country group dummies are considered separately in
the model on the basis of Per Capita Gross National Income ("PCGNI",
atlas method, in current U.S. dollars). The four country groups are as
follows: low-income economies ("LIE") (PCGNI: US $1,005 or less),
lower-middle-income economies ("LMIE") (PCGNI: US $1,006-3,975),
upper-middle-income economies ("UMIE") (PCGNI US $3,976-12,275)
and high-income economies ("HIE") (PCGNI US $12,276 or more). 88 To
avoid perfect multicollinearity, UMIE was dropped from the analysis.
B. The Macro Trends

The macro scenario in the two key series considered in the current
analysis, namely, budgetary subsidies and merchandise exports, are
illustrated with the help of Figures 2-4. The time period is divided into
four equal segments for understanding the temporal perspective. It is
observed from Figure 2 that the average allocation ofbudgetary subsidies
(expressed as percentage of GDP) has understandably been higher in
UMIE and HIE countries as compared to their LIE and LMIE
counterparts during all four periods reported in the diagram. The average
subsidy figure in 1995-2000 declined vis-a-vis the corresponding 19901995 figures, but the same increased both during 2001-2005 and 20062011 as compared to the preceding periods. In addition, the gap between
the two groups of economies has widened during 2006-11.

http://www. freedomhouse. org/report-types/freedom-world#.VDr7 OmRdWi2 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2014).
88. Income brackets are in line with the World Bank classification. See Data-Countries
and Economies, WORLD BANK (2014), available at http://data.worldbank.org/country (last
visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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Figure 2: Subsidy Scenario in Countries Under Different Income
Group
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An annual time trend reported in Figure 3 reveals that from 1999
onwards, the average subsidy devolution in proportional terms has
intensified in the developed countries (HIE and UMIE). A similar
upward trend is noted in their relatively poorer counterparts (LIE and
LMIE) from 2000 onwards. The trend line drawn for both series (not
shown in figure) reveals a clear upward trend from 1999 onwards, as a
result of which a 1999 year dummy ( 1 for year 1999 onwards, 0 for
others) has been incorporated in the regression models. Another
important observation from the figure is that for both developed and
developing countries alike, budgetary transfers (as % of GDP) increased
in the face of recession (2008). Though the size of the bailout package
was larger for developed countries, increase in budgetary transfers for
developing countries also increased substantially. Nevertheless, given
budgetary constraints, the withdrawal of special package for recession
was faster for developing countries from 2009 onwards.
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Figure 3: Time Trend in Subsidy Figures Across Country
Groups by Income
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Figure 4 reveals the average merchandise export scenario
(expressed as percentage of GDP) for the two groups of countries. The
exports have increased for UMIE and HIEs for all the four periods.
However, there has been a marginal decline in proportional importance
of exports for LIE and LMIEs during the last period, 2006-2011. The
proportional importance of exports in GDP has been higher in UMIE and
HIEs as compared to their LIE and LMIE counterparts during all four
periods reported in the diagram.
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Figure 4: Merchandise Export Scenario in Countries Under
Different Income Group
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Finally, Table 4 illustrates the data availability for the present
analysis as per the government data reporting practices (i.e., GG, CG or
BCG). The first three columns segregate the total observations as per the
cash and non-cash (accrual) reporting practices, while the next three
columns summarize the average subsidy scenario (as percentage of GDP)
as per the country groupings. The last three columns represent the
average export figures expressed as percentage of GDP. It is observed
that the subsidies and export inclination figures are generally higher for
countries reporting GG data as compared to corresponding ones
following CG and BCG reporting practices, barring the exception of
UMIE and HIE countries in case ofBCG data on average subsidy.
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Table 4: Description of Data by Availability

Noncash

Tota

UMI
E&

LIE
&

UMI
E&

1

HIE

All

LMIE

HIE

All

309

554

863

1.68

1.64

1.65

28.35

36.01

33.85

659

37

696

1.28

1.56

1.40

26.94

34.04

30.00

508

102

610

1.12

2.28

1.47

22.85

33.59

26.13

1.31
1.73
1.52 24.88 34.72 29.10
693 2169
Source: prepared by the authors from the constructed dataset

V. RUNNING THE EMPIRICAL TESTS
Currently, the WTO member countries are engaged in multilateral
negotiation so as to limit the usage of actionable subsidies in international
trade, which needs to draw from empirical findings on this front. A crosscountry empirical analysis is undertaken next for understanding the
influence of budgetary subsidies on export inclination. First, the
regression model is explained, while the empirical results are
subsequently presented.
A. Empirical Model for the Cross-Country Empirical Analysis
The following panel data regression model is estimated here in order
to analyze the effect of subsidies on export performance. The advantage
of using the log-linear model in the current context is that the estimated
coefficients can be interpreted as the elasticity between budgetary
subsidy and exports.
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LMERXit= a + B LPCGDPit+B2LPCGDPit2+ B3LSUBSID Yit+ B4
LMERMit+B5LGDPINDit+ B6LGDPSERit+ B7LGDPAGRIit+ B8
LFDIINSTKit+ B9LFHIPRit+ GOVDUM + Non-Cash +
Duml 999 + Tt + Eit......... .. (1)
where,

a

represents the constant term

Bs

are coefficients

LMERXit

represents log of Merchandise Export (expressed as
percentage of GDP) of country i for year t
represents log of Per Capita Gross Domestic Product
LPCGDPit
(PPP, current international $) of country i for year t
represents
log ofbudgetary subsidy (as percentage of
LSUBSIDYit
GDP) of country i for year t
represents the log of Merchandise Import (expressed as
LMERMit
percentage of GDP) of country i for year t
represents the log of share of industry in GDP
LGDPINDit
(expressed as percentage of GDP) of country i for year t
represents the log of share of services in GDP
LGDPSERit
(expressed as percentage of GDP) of country i for year t
LGDPAGRIit represents the log of share of agriculture and allied
activities in GDP (expressed as percentage of GDP) of
country i for year t
LFDIINSTKit represents the log of inward stock of Foreign Direct
Investment (expressed as percentage of GDP) of country
i for year t
represents the log of Freedom House Index of Political
LFHIPRit
Rights of country i for year t
GOVDUM
represents government dummy, of which
GG represents a dummy for countries, when the
subsidy data is reported by the general
government
CG represents a dummy for countries, when the
subsidy data is reported by the central government
BCG represents a dummy for countries, when the
subsidy data is reported by the budgetary central
government
Cash
represents a dummy when countries practice cash
accounting standards for budgetary reporting
Non-Cash
represents a dummy when countries practice accrual
accounting standards for budgetary reporting
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/1
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is a dummy whose value is O before 1999 and 1 for 1999
onwards
represents the time dummies (i.e., T1=l for 1990 and O
otherwise)
represents the disturbance term
B. Results

A panel data regression analysis has been undertaken here with help
of the STATA software (version 10.1). To understand the working of the
model for the proposed relationship in equation ( 1), a Hausman
specification test is first conducted. It is observed that the Chi-square test
statistic of 125.13 (Prob>chi2: 0.0000) is statistically significant. The
Hausman test suggests the presence of a fixed effect model. Next, we
have conducted a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and
the test statistics is 78.815 (Prob>F: 0.0000), which implies the presence
of autocorrelation of first order. A Breusch-Pagan I Cook-Weisberg test
is conducted next and the test statistic is 109.67 (Prob>chi2: 0.0000),
which points to the presence of heteroskedasticity. The mean Variation
Inflation Factor ("VIF'') is 2.88, which indicates that the variables
included in the model are within the tolerance level of multicollinearity.
Based on these diagnostics, the present analysis estimates Feasible
Generalized Least Square ("FGLS") regressions with time and country
group fixed effects and reports results for equation (1) with
heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation [AR(l)] corrected
coefficients and standard errors in Table 5.
The estimation results summarized in Table 5 clearly indicate the
positive influence of government subsidies on export performance across
country groups. In both the Fixed Effect ("FE") and FGLS regression
models, the coefficient of logarithmic transformation of subsidies is
observed to be positive and significant.
The results indicate that in both lower and higher income countries,
the devolution of subsidies are helping them to promote exports, in line
with the theoretical predictions. The LIE, LMIE and HIE dummies
included in most of the regression models are all found to be positive and
significant, implying that all countries, irrespective of their income levels,
benefit from the provision of subsidies. Interestingly, the coefficient for
the LIE dummy is found to be non-significant in the fixed effect model,
but larger as compared to the corresponding figures for LMIE and HIE
country group dummies under the FGLS models. In addition, the
coefficients of the LMIE dummies are found to be larger than the HIE
dummies. In other words, greater devolution of subsidies in lower
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income group countries leads to greater export growth. The result can be
explained by the structural (e.g., poorer infrastructure, imperfect factor
markets) and operational bottlenecks (e.g., lower margins, scale
disadvantages) prevalent in LDCs and other poorer economies, and
greater devolution of budgetary support can overcome these constraints
and effectively promote exports from their territories. However, the
dummies are found to be statistically non-significant under some model
specifications.

Table 5: Estimation Results on the Relationship Between Subsidy
and Merchandise Exports
Dependent Variable: LMERX

Independent

Variables
Constant

1.4188**
(0.5793)

lpcgdp

-0.1894***
(0.0514)

lpcgdp2

0.8255
(0.6103)
-0.5537***
(0.1478)
0.0395***
(0.0082)

/subsidy

0.01 73***
(0.0048)

lmerin

0.6772***
(0.0304)

lgdpind

0.5435***
(0.0575)

/gdpser

-0.2284***
(0.076)

0.0069*
(0.0036)
0.7222***
(0.01 59)
0.7816***
(0.0425)
-0.2913***
(0.0609)

2.1654***
(0.7556)
-0.3933**
(0.1753)
0.0303***
(0.0096)
0.0093**
(0.0039)
0.7163***
(0.017)
0.5601 ***
(0.0534)

0.6783

0.7779

(0.6282)

(0.6634)

-0.8073***
(0.1456)
0.0509***
(0.0083)
0.0067*
(0.0037)
0.7036***
(0.0168)
0.9097***
(0.0315)

-0.5681 ***

0.0374***
(0.0088)
0.0088**
(0.0037)
0.6768***
(0.0174)
0.7859***
(0.0457)
-0.284***

(0.0778)

lgdpagri

-0.518***
(0.1593)

(0.0636)
-0.025
(0.0156)

Ifdiinstk

0.0208**
(0.0092)

ljhipr

0.0436***
(0.0062)

0.0262***
(0.0051)

0.0367***
(0.0061)

0.0415***
(0.0064)
0.0105
(0.0139)
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-0.0692***

cg

(0.0212)

beg

-0.0529*
(0.0287)

noncash

0.0182
(0.0214)
0.0021

lie

(0.0407)

lmie

0.0611 ***
(0.0233)
0.0472*

hie

(0.0259)
0.1102***

dum/999

0.0201

0.0132

0.0182

0.0188

(0.0138)

(0.0137)

(0.0149)

(0.0139)

-0.0293

-0.0074

-0.0105

-0.0196

(0.0192)

(0.0189)

(0.0197)

(0.0193)

0.0363**
(0.0146)
0.0765***
(0.0295)
0.0451 ***
(0.0157)
0.0352*
(0.019)

0.0638***

0.0246*
(0.0142)
0.0429
(0.0332)
0.0418**

0.0312**
(0.0153)
0.0691 **
(0.0309)
0.0449***

0.027*
(0.0148)
0.0639**
(0.0302)
0.0445***

(0.0164)

(0.0171)

(0.0158)

0.0139

0.023

0.0272

(0.0181)

(0.0187)

(0.019)

0.0598***

0.064***

0.0763***

(0.0397)

(0.0227)

(0.0223)

(0.0244)

(0.0242)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No. ofObs

1792

1788

1573

1773

1764

No. of Grs

139

135

120

134

133

WaldChi2

44.67#

4846.05

3517.11

4194.69

3807.22

0.0000@

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Time Effects

Prob

(Wald chi2)

Notes:# implies F-Stat (instead of Wald chi2 for Model 1)
@ implies Prob (F-Stat) (instead of Prob (Wald chi2) for Modell)

Figure in the parenthesis shows the heteroskedasticity and first order
autocorrelation [AR( 1)] corrected standard error of the estimated coefficient
***,**and* implies estimated coefficient is significant at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10
level respectively.

Among the control variables, log of per capita GDP of a country is
found to be negatively related with log of export inclination, while the
square term is positively significant. The result implies that the growth
rate of exports declines with rise in growth rate of GDP, which is higher
for the low income countries starting from a lower base. The result is in,
line with the coefficient of country dummies and clearly signifies that
higher economic size is more favorable for outward orientation. Log of
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merchandise import ("LMERM") bears a positive coefficient with the
dependent variable, indicating that higher merchandise import growth
rate leads to higher merchandise exports. The relationship can be
explained by the fact that deeper association with integrated production
networks with trade partners lead to higher import of quality raw material
and semi-processed inputs, which contributes to the rise in value-added
final exports.
The independent variable GDPIND is positively related with export
inclination, as generation of greater manufacturing (including mining,
construction, electricity, water supply and gas) output leads to higher
export surplus. Share of agriculture is, however, not significant in any of
the regression models. As per expectation, FDI inward stock variable is
positively related to export inclination, signifying presence of "exportplatform" FDI in the cross-country framework. Finally, political freedom
variable is found to be non-significant, owing to the fact that both
countries characterized by deeper democratic practices (e.g. U.S.) and
more stringent regimes (e.g. China) demonstrate higher export
inclination.
Capturing the influence of the level of government that provides
budgetary subsidy for a particular country is important. Following the
GFS reporting principle, in absence of information on GG budgetary
subsidy for a country, the current analysis considers CG or BCG in the
estimated model. It is observed that in all reported models the coefficient
of both CG and BCG bear a negative sign. The result strongly underlines
the significance of the reported layer of government subsidies on exports,
as CG and BCG subsidies are associated with differential intercept shifts.
The dummies represent the information at a more disaggregated level of
government, which are associated with lesser export inclination. The
coefficient of the non-cash dummy is found to be positive in sign. The
result underlines the importance of the accounting system and implies
that adoption of accrual accounting across the countries is desirable. The
coefficients of both the set of support category dummies strongly indicate
that the layer of government data reporting system and their accounting
technique considerably influence the relationship. The 1999 dummy has
been found to be positive and significant, indicating that subsidy-export
relationship received a boost in the post 1999 period. 89 Finally, the
reported coefficients of the time dummies are also significant.

89. It may be noted that the year 1999 has been marked by the failure of the Seattle
Ministerial meeting of the WTO.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: LESSONS FOR THE CURRENT
WTO NEGOTIATIONS
The waves of globalization during the last decade have led to
deepening of international trade flows in general and in manufacturing
products in particular.90 On one hand, the evolving trade dynamics have
created an urge in developing countries and LDCs to enable the domestic
players to enjoy a level-playing field in the international markets and also
to actively attract production-related foreign investment. Provision of
subsidies for augmenting advantages for local players has played a crucial
role in this context. On the other hand, declining competitiveness has
forced their developed counterparts to contemplate continuation of
subsidy policies within their territories. In addition to the direct export
subsidies, the indirect subsidies may also positively influence export
pattern. The empirically observed subsidy-exports interrelationship in
the current analysis needs to be viewed in this wider context.
Firstly, the number of cases in international trade practice
demonstrated that the consequences of granting of subsidies by a
government could have serious adverse effects on international trade.
This situation strongly underlines the necessity to improve the regulation
on subsidies at the multilateral level. Despite the fact that more than half
a century passed since trading countries started negotiations on subsidies
issues, it seems international trade law still have room for further
development. The discussion of the completed disputes on ASCM
indicates that several major provisions of the agreement have been
liberally misused by WTO members by targeting low-cost Asian
countries. As a result, the CVD activism effect has been felt more
seriously by the middle income developing countries and the emerging
economies, who have also witnessed an increasing share of
manufacturing sector in their respective GDP. Therefore, the current
negotiation on rules should attempt to prevent such misuse through
relevant modification of the ASCM text.
In particular, the data reporting practices across countries differ
widely, often providing some economies with the flexibility to hide the
quantum of subsidies devolution to the local players. The negotiation on
fisheries subsidies is a case in point, where such data reporting practices
mismatch largely contributes to the delay in curbing the 'Article 1'
subsidies. Hence, the subsidies data reporting framework of countries
needs to be harmonized. The empirical observations of the current

90. See Julien Chaisse, 'Exploring the Confines of International Investment and
Domestic Health Protections', 39 AM. J. L. AND MED. 332, 332-361 (2013).
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analysis, underlining the importance of data reporting framework in
determining the 'export-effect' of the subsidies, is of crucial policy
relevance in that context.
Secondly, supporting the domestic players through subsidy policy
has been a traditional policy tool adopted by both developed and
developing countries. The developed countries, with their greater
financial strength, has enabled the local players to have an edge vis-a-vis
the foreign players, not only in the domestic market, but also in the third
markets. Such policies have been practiced in Australia, Canada, the EU
and the U.S., i.e., the Quad countries, for a long time. These
developments have motivated several developing and emerging countries
since the 1970s onward to mimic the subsidy-led export success of their
developed counterparts. The empirical results indicate a successful
adoption of the subsidy-led export growth policy in both lower-income
and lower-middle income economies as well.
The empirical results underline that continuing subsidies makes
economic sense from the selfish standpoint of an individual country,
irrespective of its development status. However, given the economic
discrepancy between developed and developing country exports, a
subsidy-based trade war is more likely to put the latter group in a
disadvantageous position vis-a-vis their developed counterparts. In
particular, continuation of subsidy policies in developing countries and
LDCs end up only providing moral justification for the higher SCM
activism in their developed counterparts. The evidence presented from
the base metal sector is a case in point. Moreover, provision of subsidies
create diverging influence on exports of countries belonging to different
income groups, as evident from the significance of the country group
dummy coefficients, adds further to the disadvantages of the poorer
economies. The empirical findings of the current paper therefore
underline the importance of concluding the Doha Round Negotiations of
WTO in general and disciplining subsidies in particular in no uncertain
terms.
"The third major issue that has caused political turmoil in the
negotiations surrounding the Doha Agreement and the post Uruguay
round of talks at the WTO is in the area of export refunds and subsidies.
At Bali, the ministers agreed to ensure export subsidies and other
measures with similar effect are [reduced]." 91 "With no legally binding
91. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, supra note 3; see also Ministerial
Conference of7 December 2013, WT/MIN(l3)/40-WT/L/915 (2013), WORLD TRADE 0RG.,
available
at
http://wto.org/english/thewto e/minist_e/mc9 el
balipackage_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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arrangements, the good will statements are open to abuse and the
disputes' panel of the [WTO] could be just as busy as it has been with
countries arguing over subsidies and tariffs and quotas as much as they
have over the last [two decades] ." 92 "The fact that the U.S. has opted out
of the tariff quota arrangements also forewarns of arguments and trouble
and it appears that the current trend for bilateral negotiations for free trade
agreements will be the route forward and the work in the WT0." 93

92. World Trade Organisation Truly Delivers, supra note 3.
93 . Id.
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LEGAL CASES ON POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND
POSTHUMOUS PRIVACY: HISTORY CENSORSHIP,
LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE
Dr. Bo Zhao
"One's good name determines the manner in which one perceives
oneself and how one's peers and society relate to one. In effect, the
only asset of many people, both public servants and those working in
the private sector, is their reputation, which they cherish as life itself.
This applies to both the living and the dead. We must protect the
dignity of the deceased and their good name." 1
"The dead have no rights, and they suffer no wrongs." 2
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ABSTRACT
It is a well-established doctrine in common law countries that law
does not protect the reputation and privacy of the deceased. However,
many countries, including W estem European democracies, protect them
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to various extents by confining free expression and exchange of
information and ideas regarding the dead and the past. Such an
instrumental use of defamation law and privacy law can provide
censorship of history with justifiable legal grounds. Based on an
analysis of representative legal cases on posthumous reputation and
posthumous privacy collected across the world, this article tries to offer
a thorough analysis of the phenomenon of how legal protection of
posthumous reputation and privacy can be used to carry out censorship
of history.
After a brief introduction, Section II will explain the concepts of
posthumous reputation and posthumous privacy and their relationship
with history censorship in theory, so that it is clear why history
censorship can be achieved via protection of the two posthumous
interests. Section III will briefly discuss the related legal apparatuses
that can be used to protect the deceased's reputation and privacy in
different jurisdictions, whose abuse or misuse may lead to history
censorship. Section IV will classify the collected legal cases on
posthumous reputation and privacy into eight categories and discuss the
circumstances of history censorship in each category. Section V will
deepen the case analysis by illustrating the international criteria of free
speech right protection, defining the icons of history censorship,
explaining the dilemma between historical truth and judicial truth
confronted by judges, and clarifying the negative impacts on law itself.
Section VI will further explore the interactions among law, politics and
culture, which may account for the differentiated legal treatments of the
two posthumous interests in different jurisdictions.
The article
concludes with an invitation to re-consider the law's role in resolving
posthumous defamation and privacy controversies when historical
narratives are involved, and proposes how to achieve better decisions in
future cases.

I. INTRODUCTION

In Responsible History, Antoon De Baets drew a vivid scenario of
how history censorship can be achieved in three effective ways. They
are control of history archives, censorship of school history textbooks,
and legal protection of the dead's reputation and privacy. 3 According to

3. See ANTOON DEBAETS, RESPONSIBLE HISTORY 14 (2008) (explaining censorship of
history is a category of abuse of history, which in more abstract sense, according to De
Baets, is "the use of history with intent to deceive"); MARGARET MACMILLAN, THE USES
AND ABUSES OF HISTORY xiii (Profile Books Ltd. 2010)(2008) (explaining that the abuse of
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the author, defamation law functions, in particular, "as disguised
instruments of censorship,"4 creating "a chilling effect on the expression
and exchange of historical information and ideas. " 5 This is well
observed in the author's detailed analysis of twenty-two legal cases on
posthumous defamation and privacy invasion collected from eight
Western European countries from 1965 to 2000. 6
Beyond these legal cases and across the world, posthumous
reputation and posthumous privacy under many circumstances are never
simple or trivial issues, as they seem to be at first sight. To regard the
two in such a way is both naive and a blind denial of the complexity of
communal life. In reality, they involve too many other important issues
beyond merely the dignity and respect of the deceased, ranging from
collective memory, family repute and honor, monetary interests, group
honor, national identity, religious dignity, diplomatic controversies,
posthumous justice of war crime victims, biography writing, history
controversies, free expression rights, euthanasia, etc. They do matter,
especially for many communities where legal cases on reputation and
privacy of the deceased have been brought before courts for resolution
on the following grounds.
First, families of the deceased usually care not only about the
dead's reputation and privacy, but also more about their own reputation
or honor and privacy affiliated with the dead' s, not even mentioning the
economic interests in connection with the deceased' s names, which is
particularly true in the case of dead public celebrities. Family members
thus are the most strongly motivated protectors of the deceased's
reputation and privacy. Second, people like close friends, colleagues or
even unknown strangers who enjoyed benevolence and friendship of the
deceased, admired their past achievements, or shared similar beliefs and
memories with the deceased, or those who once participated in and
supported joint projects, may all defend the deceased's reputation and
honor to various extents against destruction of such goodness that they
cherish in life. Furthermore, when leading politicians, national heroes
(or heroines), military or religious martyrs, and public celebrities are
affiliated with collective honor or reputation of a social, religious or
political group, their reputations will not be only a personal or family
issue, but rather a constituent of group honor and identity. Their

history is defined as for the purposes of "creating one-sided or false histories to justify
treating others badly, seizing their land, for example, or killing them.").
4. See DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 3.
5. See id. at 90.
6. See id. at 3.
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reputation will be under close monitoring and protection of the social
group, or even political state.
Lastly and most importantly, the protection of posthumous
reputation and privacy depends eventually on how a society treats the
deceased in general. If a society treats them seriously with considerable
respect, dignity, and authority, and the society is willing to follow the
traditions and conventions well established in communal life, it will
have stronger protection of posthumous interests, including reputation
and privacy of the dead. In general, a society with an individualist
nature prefers less protection of the dead than one of communal nature.
Moreover, moving from morality to legality, while common law
countries in general firmly deny protection of posthumous reputation
and privacy, this is not the case in other countries. For instance, in
Germany, France, Malta, China, Israel, Taiwan, and Spain, the
deceased' s reputation and privacy are protected under the fundamental
right to human dignity, or under more general rules protecting leaders of
political state, or under memory laws, etc. Other countries, like
Thailand and Turkey, even have specific regulations forbidding
defamation of dead monarchs and political leaders. Albeit being taken
as fundamental to democracy, free speech does not always win the
battle against reputation and privacy - including those of the dead even in democracies such as Germany and France. While protection is
the case, how such laws balance the two posthumous interests with the
right of free speech, and what make up the boundaries of protection
deserve more detailed analysis. Though such legal practices and the
underlying rationales seem eccentric to common law lawyers, they can
be well explained and justified in specific political-social contexts.
In light of this, a discussion of the above issues will help illustrate
the fact that while law has its own internal morality and logic, 7 it can
never be separated from specific political contexts, social ethos, and
cultural backgrounds. It makes sense to analyze the related various
legal apparatuses for protecting posthumous reputation and privacy,
ranging from traditional blasphemy law, insult law and sedition law, to
defamation law and privacy law, and to modem memory law and
oblivion law. In explaining and comparing different approaches to
posthumous reputation and privacy across the world, what is well
observed in legal development is a general tendency shifting from
privileged protection of reputation and privacy of the nobles and
aristocrats, to more equal protection of ordinary people, from protection
of the collective and political state, to more liberal protection of
7. See generally LON L. FULLER,
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individuals.
Following De Baets' initiative, this paper intends to bring his
research of legal protection of posthumous reputation and privacy in
history censorship a step further in three directions. First, it will
broaden his analysis beyond Western Europe by analyzing more
representative legal cases collected from across the world. Second, it
will provide a more structured analysis of the law's potential role and
various mechanisms in implementing history censorship via protecting
posthumous reputation and privacy, as well as the accompanied
problems. It will also explain the political and cultural backgrounds
that have shaped the use of law for this purpose. Third, this paper will
offer a more thorough explanation of the phenomenon by engaging in
theoretical discussion of posthumous reputation and privacy and their
general role in the social order. Thus, this paper is both analytical and
descriptive, both theoretical and practical, with the main purpose to
offer a thorough analysis of how legal protection of the deceased's
reputation and privacy can be used to restrict free speech and achieve
history censorship.
Section II will explain the concepts of posthumous reputation and
posthumous privacy and their relationship with history censorship in
theory, so that it is clear why history censorship can be achieved by
protection of the two posthumous interests. Section III discusses the
legal apparatuses that can be manipulated to protect the deceased' s
reputation and privacy in law development, whose abuse or misuse may
lead to history censorship to different extents. Section IV will classify
the collected legal cases on posthumous reputation and privacy into
eight categories and discuss the circumstances of history censorship in
each category. Section V will deepen the case analysis by discussing
regional and international criteria of free speech right protection,
defining the icons of history censorship in such legal cases, illustrating
the dilemma confronted by judges between historical truth and judicial
truth, and explaining the negative impacts on law itself. Section VI will
further explore the interactions of law, politics and culture, which can
account for the differentiated legal treatments of the two posthumous
interests in different jurisdictions. It concludes with an invitation to reconsider law's role in resolving posthumous defamation controversies
when history narratives are involved, proposing how related history
controversies should be resolved in the future.
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II. POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND HISTORY CENSORSHIP

A. Reputation and Posthumous Reputation

An individual's reputation is the societal-moral judgment of the
person based on facts considered to be relevant by a community; such
facts include personal acts and characteristics, and these judgments are
based on certain moral standards of that community. 8 Reputation lies in
reputational networks of various agents including friends, family
members, colleagues, and all those who know a particular agent, even
those who only read about the person but never meet him or her, or
friends' friends. 9 Reputation is important to a community in terms of
mutual trust and cooperation formation, mutual treatment, social
learning, social control etc. 10 According to Robert Post, reputation can
be understood as personal honor, indicating an individual's social status
in a community, as intangible property consequent to personal
achievements, and as human dignity based on equal respect. 11
Reputation is a concept related to, or somewhat overlapped with
other concepts such as honor, dignity, respect, privacy, and personal
identity in general. An important aspect of reputation is identity.
Identity comes into being usually when a sort of reputation of an
individual or a social group becomes strong enough for one to be
distinguished from others. Therefore reputation is vital to identity
formation in individual life. Privacy as information control also plays a
role in identity formation in individual life. 12 In particular, reputation
and privacy cannot be separated from each other since both are effective
means of personal information management and personal boundary
control. 13
8. See LAWRENCE McNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 21 - 22 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2007).
9. See KENNETH H. CRAIK, REPUTATION: A NETWORK INTERPRETATION 6-9 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2009) (noting in Craik's terms, social networks and "the outer tires").
10. JOHN WHITFIELD, PEOPLE WILL TALK: THE SURPRISING SCIENCE OF REPUTATION 7,
64, 102, 121 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2011 ).
11. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 700 (1986); see also JAMES BOWMAN, HONOR: A
HISTORY (Encounter Books 2007) (explaining a more detailed discussion of honour history
and culture developments).
12. See, e.g., Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy and Identity, in PRIVACY AND THE
CRIMINAL LA w 43 (Erik Claes et al. eds., 2006); Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal
Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. Rev. 371 (2011); Clare Sullivan,
Privacy or Identity?, 2 INT'L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 289 (2008); Lisa M. Austin, Privacy,
Shame and the Anxieties of Identity (Jan. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=2061748 (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
13. See generally Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & Pub. AFF. 3
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Plainly, they are just two opposite presentations of one's self. 14 In
many cases, disclosure of private matters that deviate from commonly
accepted social morals, 15 can harm reputation, 16 even if such disclosure
is true, as seen in common law torts of public disclosure of private
issues and false light. 17 "Still, some invasion of privacy causes of
action," according to Iryami, "do primarily involve loss of reputation
and may inevitably lead themselves into defamation action." 18
Reputation and privacy are closely affiliated with each other in that both
are crucial components of human dignity, protected by constitutions and
international treaties as fundamental human rights. Under the European
Convention of Human Rights ("Convention"), a right of reputation is a
right derived from Article 8, which prescribes the protection of family
life or private life, or the right to privacy. 19

(1998).
14. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(Anchor 1959) (explaining the external self and internal self).
15. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(1978); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1977) (arguing
privacy is meant for personal secrecy that shall not be protected by law in general since it
increases costs of market exchanges).
16. A telling example is the American Steinbuch case in which Steinbuch's graphic
bed stories were disclosed by his ex- girlfriend Jessica Cutler in her blog and publicized on
the Internet before millions of people. Steinbuch sued for invasion of privacy, which
damaged his reputation meanwhile. See Steinbuch v. Cutler, 463 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C.
2006).
17. See ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 103- 29 (Thomson West 2007).
Disclosure of private matters and false lights are two of the major aspects of privacy
invasion according to Prosser; the other two are appropriation of images and the like, and
the trespass of private spheres. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389
(1960).
18. Raymond Iryami, Give the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause of
Action for Defamation of the Dead from Criminal Libel Statues, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2006).
19. Since Chauvy v. France, the right to reputation has been gradually established by
the Eur. Ct. H.R. under Article 8, which was followed in its sequent rulings. See Pfeifer v.
Austria, App. No. 12556/03, para 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 15, 2008), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["12556/03"],"itemid":["OO
1-83294"]} (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); see White v. Sweden, App. No. 42435/02, para. 26
available
at
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
Sept.
19,
2006),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-76894 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014). The judgment was followed and strengthened later. White, App. No. 42435/02,
para. 26. In the most recent Lindon v. France, for instance, Judge Loucaides in his
concurring opinion criticized the over protection of freedom of speech in past cases by the
Court and expressed the right to reputation should always be considered as safeguarded by
Article 8, "as part and parcel of the right to respect for one's private life." Lindon v. France,
App. Nos. 21279/02, 36448/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2007), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-82846 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
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Posthumous reputation, by analogy, is the social evaluation and
Plainly,
assessment of the deceased's acts and characteristics.
posthumous reputation is what we think about the dead and their past
acts. Our reputations "outlive us," Whitfield noted, "advancing or
damaging our interests[, just as they did during our lives, for instance,]
influencing the way people treat our children." 20 Posthumous
defamation accordingly refers to the communications or expressions
that bring disrepute or dishonor to the deceased, degrading their social
status, or making others think less of them. Posthumous reputation has
been used to support the concept of posthumous harm in philosophical
debates. 21 According to the proponents, the deceased's reputation could
be damaged. 22 However, the philosophical arguments of posthumous
harm is apparently not enough to provide a justification for legal
protection in Westem democracies, unless the dead occupy a special
status so that their reputations must be protected for other reasons like
social ordering or public order. 23
After death, one's reputation in general will diminish or disappear
gradually, as his or her reputational networks become weakened,
information regarding the dead stops disseminating, and less and less
people know the deceased. In certain circumstances, however, the
deceased's reputation could grow even stronger. 24 Similar to the living,
the dead's reputation closely relates to concepts of privacy, honor,
respect, and dignity. For instance, the disclosure of the deceased's
private issues can alter their posthumous reputations in significant ways,
in particular, the reputations of public figures and celebrities. 25 When
we discuss posthumous reputation and the related legal issues, those
20. WHITFIELD, supra note 11, at 7.
21. See generally DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 15- 23 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (discussing the philosophical debate of
posthumous harm); JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 53, 126, 160, 17983 (Stanford Univ. Press 1993).
22. See Joel Feinberg, The Rights ofAnimals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43, 57-60 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974); 1 JOEL FEINBERG,
Harm to Others, in THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 79-82 (Oxford Univ. Press
1984).
23. See generally infra Section VI.B.
24. For instance, through biography and "the chorus of survivors", the deceased may
be known by more people than before their death. See CRAIK, supra note 10, at 173-99.
25. A more recent example is the swift of the public attitudes to Jimmy Savile, the
famous British entertainer, after the posthumous disclosure of his sexual abuse cases. See
Savile Abuse Claims: BBC Must 'Command Credibility', BBC NEWS (last updated Oct. 8,
2012, 11: 13 PM), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-south-east-walesl 9878433 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); see generally Bo Zhao, Public Figures and Their
Posthumous Reputation, 59-60 STORIA DELLA STORIOGRAFIA 87 (2011) (discussing public
figures posthumuous reputation).
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concepts are usually mentioned in plaintiffs' complaints and court
verdicts to justify their claims. The big difference is that after death, the
dead are no more and have no control of their own reputation and
privacy in person, which mostly are at the mercy of the living.

B. Posthumous Reputation and History Censorship
"The dead belong to history[,]" 26 and "history is replete with tales
of people[,]"27 in particular dead people. This is true first with respect
to dead public figures, especially political figures. When a defamation
claim concerns a public figure, the related truth is relevant to narratives
of public history. 28 No one would deny that human history is made by
such persons and filled with their names and stories, although unknown
ordinaries certainly are no less important. It is not exaggerated to say
that the study of our past is the study of those who have left traces in
history and memory. 29 Therefore history is in a sense the narrative
composed of reputations of the deceased, the record of their past deeds,
and the assessment of such deeds and their characteristics by the living.
Intentional control of speeches and expressions regarding the dead' s
reputation, either facts or opinions, may lead to censorship of history in
different degrees on the following grounds.
Posthumous reputation matters to the dead' s family and
acquaintances in view of individual memories. 30 Changes in individual
reputations of the deceased can threaten or alter the memory of their
family members, which is possibly not satisfactory and therefore will
encounter the living' s resistance and interference. Another important
dimension of posthumous reputation lies in a collective sense. It is true
that not only do individuals have personal reputations, but many
collectives such as commercial institutions and NGOs also have
personal reputations. 31 We also talk about reputation of a people or a

26. See Pierre Guillaume, Law and History, VHO 31 (2008), available at
http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres7 /PGLawhistory. pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
27. RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE
AMERICAN DEAD 119 (2010).
28. Daphne Barak-Erez, Collective Memory and Judicial Legitimacy: The Historical
Narrative of the Israeli Supreme Court, 16 CAN. J. LAW & Soc. 93, 95 (2001).
29. See Ariela J. Gross, The Constitution of History and Memory, in LAW AND THE
HUMANITIES 416, 416-23 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2010) (explaining the relationship
between memory and history is controversial among historians and sociologists).
30. See id. at 416-31 (discussing collective memory and individual memory and law's
role in their formation).
31. For instance, reputation of the American FDA was regarded as a powerful
instrument in drug regulation. See generally David T. Zaring, Regulating by Repute, 110
MICH. L. REV 1003 (2012).
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national state, in more collective sense, such as the reputation of Jews
and Chinese, or the Americans, or the French. Here, reputation is more
related to collective identity or collective honor in that it can distinguish
one ethnic group of people from another. The victim status of the Nazi
Holocausts, for example, has been deemed a strong collective identity
of the Jewish community. 32 Even for private associations, such as local
clubs, collective reputation and honor matters when members act in
improper ways, posing threats to internal order. 33
In some cases, individual reputations and identities are regarded as
heritage or legacy of ethnic groups, social groups or religious groups, so
that as the representatives of collective identities, such reputations and
identities deprive protection from well-accepted mores and ethics. In
this regard, strong historical figures, such as Mao and Stalin, are not
always approached in negative ways by their own nationals; many hold
great respect for the two deceased and regard them as inviolable, great
heroes. Similarly, Washington and Lincoln are icons of the American's
national characters and their reputations are public goods, albeit still
under public scrutiny. 34 Their posthumous reputations are significant
parts of national history and national identities.
Since the dead are important to our understanding and assessment
of the past, 35 they are important targets of history censorship. Thus an
unavoidable part of history censorship is the "systematical control" of
posthumous reputation. This includes a control of both factual accounts
of the dead' s past behaviors and the related judgments. This includes a
twist of "well established truth of the past", or as selective use of the
past, or as intended blurs of facts or opinions, etc. Political states are
not the sole censor. Posthumous reputation is related to history
censorship in the following ways.
First, the dead themselves are the censors of post mortem
32. Amit M. Schejter, 'The Pillar of Fire by Night, to Shew Them Light': Israeli
Broadcasting, the Supreme Court and the Zionist Narrative, 29 MEDIA CULTURE Soc. 916,
929 (2007) (arguing the significance of Holocaust victims status in the creation of a shared
collective identity for the Jewish community).
33. In Bath Club, the plaintiff was expelled for his defaming another member's
deceased father, which was deemed as injurious to the character and interests of the club.
See generally F.P. Walton, Libel upon the Dead and the Bath Club Case, 9 J. COMP. LEGIS.
& INT'L L. 1 (1927); see also Gotz Bottner, Protection of the Honour of Deceased Persons A Comparison Between the German and the Australian Legal Situations, 13 BOND L. REV. 5
108, 116 (2001).
34. Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 743, 745 (1986).
35. For instance, see Craik's explanation of how biography studies relate closely to
cultural history and their relationship with posthumous reputation. See CRAIK, supra note
10, at 194-99.
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reputations. Before death, those who cherish their own names would
destroy, hide, or alter the materials and information that may have
negative impacts on their reputation afterwards. Such efforts include
autobiography or biography writing under the control of the
protagonists themselves, so that their desired portraits or images can
preclude the negative judgment of others after death. 36 This is a kind of
self-censorship for self-protection, or for a protection of their legacy and
family interests, when the deceased's names matter a lot to surviving
families.
Second, close relatives, family members, and heirs have direct
interests in the dead's good reputation. Not only will they protect the
dead's reputation, but they also are more willing to protect their own
and their family's reputations that are in most cases closely-affiliated
with the deceased. 37 Those people may encounter mental distress and
personal, emotional harm consequent to defamation of their beloved
deceased.
There are monetary interests involved in the dead's
reputation and privacy as well. 38 The dead's family may be the most
motivated censors and they can intimidate critics who dare to stand out
against their memory of the dead. This is especially true when the
deceased's families hold high social status that may be even more
degraded by posthumous defamation, were there no strong defense from
the families before the public. Such families can censor negative
information regarding the dead with considerable economic and
political resources available. 39
Third, many people other than family members and designated
heirs bear no less strong motivations to defend the deceased's
reputation. Numerous foundations, institutions and associations of nongovernmental nature are ready to take necessary steps to protect the
dead for whose remembrance they have been established. They are

36. Id. at 190; see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of
Biography, 43 STAN. L. Rev. 299 (2011) (discussing the relation between law and biography
writing in the U .S.).
37. Following Brewer, family is the first natural honor groups, which we are all,
affiliated with. See BOWMAN, supra note 12, at 4.
38. Especially in the cases of publicity rights and copyrights involve. See MADOFF,
supra note 28, at 130-51.
39. According to Post, there is a shift from government silencing powerless people to
powerful people silencing the powerless behind state power. See ROBERT POST, CENSORSHIP
AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURE REGULATION (Getty Research Inst. 1998).
MacKinnon has a similar expression: "The operative definition of censorship accordingly
shifts from government silencing what powerless people say, to powerful people violating
powerless people into silence and hiding behind state power to do it." CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 10 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996)(1993).
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history museums, private foundations, war crime memorial associations,
victims associations, religious groups, and even commercial
institutions. 40 This also includes determined individual supporters of
deceased politicians, war heroes (heroines), religious martyrs, or even
celebrities like Diana, Princess of Wales. They make open protests on
streets, 41 publish advocates in newspapers, 42 initiate petitions against
defamers of their religion, 43 and participate in litigation. 44 In many
cases, their motivations could be their love of and trust in the deceased
politicians, such as Gandhi, and dead religious leaders, such as the
Vatican Pope, 45 or merely sympathy and determination to seek justice
for the deceased, or shared contribution to the same ideal or project, 46
etc.
Fourth, a community as a whole can play the role of censorship in

40. For example, to protect Jobs' likeness, Apple considered suing in California
against a Chinese company that made toy products by illegal appropriation of Jobs' likeness.
Tecca, Apple May File Lawsuit Against the Makers of Disturbingly Realistic Steve Jobs
Doll,
YAHOO
NEWS
(Jan.
6,
2012,
9:06
PM),
available
at
http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/technology-blog/apple-may-file-lawsuit-against-makersdisturbingly-realistic-020637702.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
41. As seen in the recent popular protests against describing Trayvon Martin as a
potential killer and a convict, as well as George Zimmerman's acquittal. Lizette Alvarez &
Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in Killing of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES (July 14,
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07 /15/us/george-zimmerman-verdicttrayvon-martin.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
42. As seen in Lehideux and lsorni v. France, in which the plaintiffs published an
advertisement on the local newspaper to remind the French people of Philippe Petain, the
formal collaborator of Nazi occupation. See Lehideux & Isorni v. France, App. No.
available at
24662/94,
para.
45
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
Sept.
23,
2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-58245 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
43. As seen by the numerous protests of Muslims against defamations of their religious
prophets.
44. Across the world, many associations consisted of lawyers, activists, academics and
veterans are actively supporting the victims of comfort women from Japan, Korea, China
and other Asian countries to seek legal remedies in Japan. For a detailed discussion of the
international support, see PEIPEI QIU, CHINESE COMFORT WOMEN: TESTIMONIES FROM
IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEX SLAVES 184- 90 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
45. See the libel trial of Robert Katz regarding the accused silence of Pope Pius XII in
Nazi occupation. See Bruce Weber, Robert Katz, Who Wrote of Nazi Massacre in Italy,
77,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2010),
available
at
Dies
at
http://www.nytimes.com/201 Oil 0/22/arts/22katz.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (the case
will be further discussed in Section IV(H)).
46. As such in the military struggles of the Partisans in Spain, Italian and France
against German occupation, which were overlooked or underestimated during the Cold War
Period, many partisans have sued to correct the "wrong version" of the past military
conflicts. See, e.g., Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
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order to protect its collective identities and honor, so that the past may
only be portrayed in a much-favored way and the deceased are
forbidden to be criticized. In this context, collective morals are a firm
source and confirmation of potential censorship. For instance, a
German local community tried to silence a young researcher who
investigated its previous support of the Nazi regime, and her research
would downplay the previous collective identity of resisting Nazi
policies. 47 Another situation involves "vulnerable" racial or religious
communities (groups) that are sensitive and paranoid to certain
expressions and speeches about their past, so that they need official
protection for control. 48 Such collective identity and emotional interest
may generate a strong atmosphere or ethos to support censorship.
Finally, the strongest censors are the political state in abstract.
Political states and ruling parties need political legitimacy and
justification of their ruling. For totalitarian or dictatorial states, history
plays a considerable role in providing legitimacy for political leaders
such as Stalin and Saddam Hussein. 49 In China and North Korea,
history has been tightly controlled for political use. 50 In such countries,
open discussion of the dead's name, and of dead political figures in
particular, is not allowed. Some countries, such as Turkey, even have
direct statutes to protect dead leaders' reputation and honor. In sharp
contrast, most democracies draw legitimacy from ballots and rule of
law. They do not have a strong motive to censor history for legitimacy.
This, however, does not say that they do not conduct history censorship
or similar activities. It only means that there is no systematic history
4 7. See the story of German author Anja Rosmus-Wenninger, which will be discussed
below. Corinna Coulmas & Saul Friedlander, Memory and Identity Problems in Post-War
Germany According to Age Groups, available at http://www.corinna-coulmas.eu/memoryand-identity-problems-in-post-war-germany-according-to-age-groups.html (last visited Dec.
3, 2014).
48. For instance, Canadian Human rights jurisprudence supports the concept that
"Islam needs singular protection against defamatory speech." Allison G. Belnap,
Defamation of Religions: A Vague and Overbroad Theory that Threatens Basic Human
Rights, BYU L. Rev. 635, 676 (2010).
49. MACMILLAN, supra note 4, at 17-18.
50. For example, children of North Korea were taught that the South started the
Korean War in 1950s and was defeated by the North; with the interference of Soviet Unions
and China also not mentioned as the critical support of its war efforts. See Sarah Buckley,
North Korea's "Creative" History, BBC (July 25, 2003), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3096265.stm (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). China's
official history is no better than the North Korean's version, however. Howard W. French,
China's Textbooks Twist and Omit History, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/intemational/asia/06textbook.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2014). As the high school history teacher Chen Minghua said in Shanghai, the closer the
Chinese history gets to the present, the more political it becomes. Id.
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censorship in Westem democracies. Instead they have been troubled by
other problems of a different nature at different historical periods. 51

III. THE LEGAL APPARATUSES FOR PROTECTION
Be it interests of the dead, their surviving families, their associates,
affiliated social groups, special communities, or political states,
nowadays the control (or censorship) of speeches and information
regarding the past has to be carried out through legal means; otherwise,
it lacks legitimacy and cannot be accepted in modem politics. In the
following, different legal apparatuses that can be used to protect
posthumous reputation and privacy will be briefly discussed for the
further case analysis.
A. Blasphemy Law, Insult Law and Sedition Law

As an old legal instrument, blasphemy laws protect religious belief
and dead religious figures in many countries. 52 Many Westem
countries, such as the United States, have abolished blasphemy laws
while others keep such laws merely on paper, a step away from
abolishment. 53 Some countries, such as Ireland and Russia, have
recently enacted blasphemy laws. 54 As Uta Melzer noted, such laws
exist in Asia and the Middle East, particularly in Islamic countries that

51. For instance, history can be controlled to strengthen national identity formation
and to enhance political transition by avoiding hatred and revenge among previously
conflicted social groups in a community. See Josep Maria Tamarit Sumalla, Transition,
Historical Memory and Criminal Justice in Spain, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 729 (2011). For
example, see the court's role in Israeli state formation (Barak-Erez) and the use of oblivion
law in Spain's restoration of democracy. See id.; Miren Gutierrez, Spain: Historical
Amnesia on Display, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (Nov. 28, 2012), available at
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2012/11 /spain-historical-amnesia-on-display/
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
52. They "act as a sanctioned limitation on the right of expression." Belnap, supra note
49, at 670-71. Note that many UN commission resolutions over years "have asked state
governments and international bodies to provide protection against defamation of religions
in increasingly robust terms." Id. at 664.
53. See generally id. at 670-79 (discussing such laws in most OIC (Organization of
Islamic Cooperation) member states and other western countries). For a country-to-country
list of Blasphemy laws in the Middle East see Country-by-Country Blasphemy Laws in the
Middle
East,
SELFSCHOLAR
(Dec.
19,
2012),
available
at
http://selfscholar.wordpress.com/2012/12/19/blasphemy-laws-in-the-middle-east/
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
54. Though Ireland decriminalized defamation, Article 36 of the 2009 Defamation Act
introduced blasphemy as an offense. PATTI McCRACKEN, INSULT LAWS: INSULTING TO
PRESS FREEDOM-A GUIDE TO EVOLUTION OF INSULT LA ws IN 20 I 0, at 16 (Ronald Koven ed.,
2012), available at Freedom House.
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campaign to criminalize defamation of religion, and such laws usually
reach beyond religious protection, restricting calls for political reform. 55
For religious reasons, dead religious figures are not allowed to be
criticized and commented about negatively, which is a strong category
of repression of free speech.
Some jurisdictions directly protect honor and reputation of the
nobles by insult laws without even concealing the intention, which
criminalizes posthumous defamation.
Such laws usually protect
monarchs, kings or state heads (nowadays) not necessarily in nondemocracies. Rulers, as De Baets commented, "have recorded [certain]
version[ s] of history to secure their posthumous fame[ s,] and their
successors often abide by [such] version[s]." 56 For instance, the 1959
Thai legislation protects the deceased Monarchs, 57 the 1951 Turkish law
secures the legacy of Ataturk, 58 and Iranian law punishes insults against
the memory of Imam Khomeini. 59 Meanwhile, Kings and emperors
"proved sensitive" in other countries such as Morocco, Kuwait and
Bahrain. 60 Furthermore, insult laws also protect the honor of political
figures and public officials in some European countries, including the
dead. For example, Article 490 and Article 491 of the Spanish Penal
Code punish insults of the royal family and use of their images,
including the king's ancestors. 61 French law prohibited insult of heads
of state under its 1881 legislation for a long period until the annulations
by European Union ("EU") judges that French law has violated a
protester's right to freedom of expression. 62 In general, as Whiteman
55. UTA MELZER, INSULT LAWS: IN CONTEMPT OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO EVOLUTION OF
INSULT LAWS IN 2009, at 8-11 (Ronald Koven ed., 2010), available at World Press Freedom
Committee.
56. DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 77.
57. MELZER, supra note 56, at 165-69.
58. See id. at 40 (describing the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatiirk (Law No.
5816)).
59. See id. at 192 (describing Article 514 of the 1991 Islamic Penal Code oflran).
60. Id. at 9.
61. C6DIGO
PENAL
[C.P.]
art.
490,
491
(Spain),
available
at
https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-l 995-25444 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
62. A Parisian bystander at a parade uttered the words "Hoohoo" when President
Charles de Gaulle passed by, and this merited a conviction for insult under article 26 of the
1881 Law on Freedom of the Press. But this law has been challenged by the verdict of the
ECtHR in March 2013 in that France has violated a protester's right to freedom of
expression by fining him. See Eon v. France, App. No. 26188/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. March 14,
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO l -1177 42 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014); see also Peter Allen, French President Insults no Longer an
Automatic Criminal Offence, TELEGRAPH (Jul.
25,
2013),
available at
http://www. telegraph .co. uk/news/worldnews/francois-ho llande/10203 142/French-presidentinsults-no-longer-an-automatic-criminal-offence.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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pointed out, there is a long tradition in European countries of protecting
the nobility of upper classes, which is represented by France and
Germany. 63
With a long tradition, sedition law, in particular seditious libel and
seditious words, 64 can be manipulated for history censorship while
sought to protect reputations of selected people to prevent social
disorder and public incitement. "The point of sedition law was to
protect the status quo, the regime-and the reputation of elite people,
respectable people in general."65 As Mayton said, the law of seditious
libel has shifted its emphasis from protecting "government or
governmental officials" to restricting "the potential of dissident speech
to bring about illegal acts" in modem times. 66 "In most of the mature
democracies, the law of sedition has now either formally been rescinded
or is largely defunct", 67 but some democracies still keep such a law or
even revive it. 68
B. Defamation Law

Defamation is both a criminal offense and a civil offense, 69 and can
be conducted by means of libel in written forms and slander in spoken
forms. Defamation of the dead can be punished in some jurisdictions.
63. See James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 Yale
L.J. 1279 (2000).
64. Post, supra note 12, at 736.
65. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 54 (Stanford Univ. Press 1st ed.
2007).
66. William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 91 (1984).
67. Memorandum on the Malaysian Sedition Act 1948, ARTICLE 19, at 6 (2003),
available at http://www.article 19 .org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/malaysia-sedit.03.pdf (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
68. For instance, the Australian Federal Parliament passed a law about sedition in late
2005, which was criticized by scholars. See, e.g., George Williams, Op-Ed., Speak up in
Defence of Free Speech, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 30, 2006), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/speak-up-in-defence-of-free-speech/2006/05/29/1148
754937566.html?page=fullpage (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). For a list of these countries,
mostly common law countries, updated to 2010 at the official website of Australian Federal
Parliament see Roy Jordan, In Good Faith: Sedition Law in Australia, PARLIAMENT OF
AUSTRALIA (2010), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_
Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/archive/sedition (last visited Dec.
3, 2014).
69. There are only about a dozen of countries that decriminalize defamation while the
majority keeps it, even if for most democracies they are merely laws on paper. See an
analysis of criminal defamation by ARTICLE 19. See Defamation Maps, ARTICLE 19,
available at http://www.articlel9.org/defamation/map.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014)
(analysis of criminal defamation).
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In the first instance, when there are no particular laws protecting the
deceased's reputation and honor, they might still be protected by courts
under ordinary defamation law. In general, continental law jurisdictions
protect the deceased' s reputation and dignity to different extents. For
instance, French courts protected the deceased's reputation and privacy
especially when public figures are involved. 70 Maltese courts protected
the reputation of the deceased Prime Minister, Dr. Bofa, when he was
alleged by Journalist Mizzi of abusing power in land planning for
private interest. 71
In the second instance, there are direct clauses in criminal law and
civil law to protect the deceased's reputation and privacy in some
jurisdictions. For instance, the Indonesian Penal Code explicitly
protects the deceased's reputation and likeness. 72 Sections 305 and 306
of the Cameroon Penal Code prescribe that defamation of the dead is
punishable if the intent is "to injure the honor or reputation" of a living
spouse or heirs. 73 Similar laws can be found in Turkey, although the
intention is to protect the affiliated living's reputations. 74 One may also
note that the Sudanese Penal Code punishes any person who "imputes to
any honorable living or dead person by express words, implicitly, by
writing or via indicative signs accusations of Zina or Sodomy, or
illegitimacy commits Qadhf."75 This is not limited to developing
countries. Article 188 of German Penal Code prescribes that the
deceased's parents and children have the legal standing to sue 76 ; Article
175 of the Swiss Criminal Code punishes defamation of the dead who
have been deceased no less than thirty years. 77 Israeli defamation law
70. For instance, see the French Pion case regarding the late President Mitterrand. See
Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00, para. 71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 18, 2004),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-617 60 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014) (case regarding the late French President Mitterrand).
71. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 22, 2012),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec.
4, 2014).
72. MELZER, supra note 56, at 157- 58.
73. See id. at 74.
74. See id. at 37-40 (highlighting Article 130 of the Turkish Penal Code).
75. Id. at 211 (quoting Article 157 of the Sudanese Penal Code).
76. See, e.g., Hannes Rosier, Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights - An
Analysis of US. and German Constitutional and Tort Law, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 153
(2008); Gotz Bottner, Protection of the Honour of Deceased Persons-A Comparison
Between the German and the Australian Legal Situations, 13 BOND L. REV. 121, 121 (2001),
available at epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= l 199&context=blr (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
77. SCHWEIZERJSCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB], CODE PENAL SUISSE [CP] [CRIMINAL
CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, AS 311 (2014), art. 175 (Switz.), available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/311_0/a175.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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also accepts complaints against defamation of the dead. 78
In contrast, common law countries do not protect posthumous
reputation and privacy. The rationale is that since the dead are no
longer living, they cannot be harmed after death. 79 In common law
jurisdictions, particularly in the U.S., reputation is a personal matter and
the right cannot be inherited by the living.80 "Though most rules in
modem defamation law defy mechanical application, the centuries-old
rule
against
liability
for
defamation
of
dead
people kicks in automatically." 81 Family members or heirs of the dead
have no legal standing to sue on the deceased's behalf. 82 Also,
"defamation of a deceased person generally does not give rise to a right
of action at common law in favor of the surviving spouse, family, or
relatives who are not defamed." 83 However, they can initiate lawsuits to
protect their own reputation and privacy, so that the deceased's name
could be restituted to some extent. 84
78. Section 5 of the 1967 Defamation Law (amended version) prescribes that
"[ d]efamatory statements regarding a Deceased Person that are published after his or her
death shall be treated as the defamation of a living person, but do not constitute cause for a
civil claim or a private criminal complaint, and no indictment shall be submitted for an
offense under this section unless it is requested by the deceased's spouse or one of his
children, grandchildren, parents, brothers or sisters." Defamation Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI
254, Sec. 5 (1967) (Isr.), available at www.nevo.co.il/law_html/LawOl/019_002.htm (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014); see also Elad Peled, Israeli Law of Defamation: A Comparative
Perspective and a Sociological Analysis, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 735, 753
(2011 ), available at www.uiowa.edu/-tlcp/TLCP%20Articles/20-3/Peled%20Final.pdf (last
visited Dec. 3 2014).
79. See Iryami, supra note 19, at 1088 ("the rule on defamation of the dead is
consistent through-out common law jurisdictions.").
80. Libel. Defamation ofDead Person. Injury to Reputations ofSurviving Relatives, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 1267, 1268- 69 (1940), available at www.jstor.org/stable/1117780 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014) (describing the rationales underlying the denial in majority of
American cases).
81. Lisa Brown, Dead but not Forgotten: Proposals for Imposing Liability for
Defamation of the Dead, 67 TEX. L. Rev. 1525, 1525 (1989).
82. Iryami supra note 19, at 1089- 95.
83. Smolensky, supra note 82, at 23 (quoting 50 AM. JuR. 2o Libel and Slander§ 336
(2014)).
84. This indirect approach is successful at least in the U.S. in some occasions. See
Iryami, supra note 19, at 1095-96. In the UK, there are a couple of cases in which the living
family of the dead won in exceptional cases. For instance, Mrs. Sukarno won an apology in
court from a publisher alleging her husband having sexual relations with a call girl when he
was a guest of the British Government. See News in Brief Mrs. Sukarno Wins Libel Suit,
MILWAUKEE J., June 21, 1974, part 1 pg. 3, available at http://news.google.com/
newspapers?nid= 1499&dat= 19740621 &id=TwgqAAAAIBAJ&sjid=8SgEAAAAIBAJ &pg
=4238,14080 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). The case was the first time in British court that any
one not directly implicated in the publication successfully sued over defamatory statements
made about a dead person. Id. (Mrs. Sukarno won an apology in court from a publisher
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C. Privacy Law and Others
Reputations during life are also protected by the right of privacy. 85
Due to the close affiliation of privacy with reputation, 86 the dead's
privacy is also closely related to their posthumous reputation. In
particular, laws regarding public disclosure of private affairs and false
lights may protect the dead' s reputations to a certain degree. 87 After
death, disclosure of private issues can have a great impact on the dead' s
reputation, which we can observe in many real cases. 88 To put the dead
under a false light by disclosing their names, private activities, or their
likeness can be against the dead' s will to be left alone post mortem and
can create a misleading impression of the dead, harming their dignity
and reputation, and in many occasions, also the honor and dignity of the
dead's family in the eyes of the living. 89
In continental law countries, the dead' s privacy may have been
protected and the living family members are allowed to sue on their
behalf. For example, French courts protect the dead's privacy and
reputation even if there is no statutory law explicitly protecting the
interest of the dead. 90 Another example is that privacy laws of the
Czech Republic and Slovakia; both protect the privacy of the dead on
the ground of human dignity. 91 However, common law countries do not
protect the privacy of the dead, since privacy is a personal issue and one

alleging her husband having sexual relations with a call girl when he was a guest of the
British Government. The case was the first time in British court that any one not directly
implicated in the publication successfully sued over defamatory statements made about a
dead person).
85. MADOFF, supra note 28, at 123.
86. See supra Section II.A.
87. For a more detailed discussion of posthumous privacy in light of Prosser's
categorizations, see DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 124-26.
88. Again, for example, see that case of the British Jimmy Savile. See Reuters, Jimmy
Savile: NSPCC Say Report May Help Victims to Come to Terms with Abuse, TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 12, 2013), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/jimmysavile/9796852/Jimmy-Savile-NSPCC-say-report-may-help-victims-to-come-to-terms-withabuse.html (last visited Dec.3, 2014).
89. See Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, App. No. 71111/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June
14, 2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-81066
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (see for instance, the French case in which a dead local
politician's death scene pictures were published by a newspaper after his assassination).
90. Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 2004),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014).
91. Analysis and Translation by Martin Duchac, Student Research Assistant (June 23,
2011) (on file with author).
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cannot sue on the dead's behalf. 92 Obviously the dead cannot feel
humiliation and shame post mortem. 93 The living may lodge cases
because their own privacy is directly involved or they may suffer from
emotional distress upon privacy invasion of the dead. 94 In this regard,
even the American law protects the living family's privacy involving
death-scene photographs to provide "refuge from a sensation-seeking
culture. " 95
Privacy laws that can indirectly protect the dead's reputation are
laws protecting publicity rights after death, including illegal
appropriation of the dead's likeness, illegal use of the dead's names,
false lights, and publication of private affairs.
Closely related to illegal appropriation of personal likeness are the
right to publicity and copyright that make it possible to generate
revenue after one's death. The first allows a person to control the
exploitation of his image and the later to control his creations. 96 For
example, the protections from the right to publicity and copyright can
continue after death in the U.S. In recent years such protections
(rights), according to Madoff, "have grown in strength and duration,
providing posthumous protections never before seen in history", though
strictly limited to economic interests, as opposed to reputational
interests. 97 But, as the author argued, in the U.S. context at least, both
rights co-exist with reputation and personality, and they cannot be
separated from each other with clear-cut lines. 98
Furthermore, confidentiality rules of some special professions
request service providers to keep personal data of the deceased from

92. Iryami, supra note 19 at 1097- 99 (arguing "the common law rule that prohibits a
cause of action for defamation of the dead is analogous to its rule for invasion of privacy
upon the dead", and "courts and authorities have long assumed that one's legal interest in
privacy ends upon death.").
93. Paul Roth, Privacy Proceedings and the Dead, 11 PRIV. L. & PoL'Y REP. 50
(2004); see also Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian
Privacy Law and Practice, AUSTRALIAN L. REFORM COMMISSION 355 (2008), available at
http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/8.%20Privacy%20of%>20Deceased%20Individuals/intr
oduction#_ftnl (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
94. See also Daily Mail Reporter, Westboro Baptist Church Vows to "Quadruple' its
Protests at Military Funerals After Supreme Court Rules in its Favour, MAILONLINE,
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1362288/Westboro-Baptist-Churchvictory-Supreme-Court-rules-favour-protests-military-funerals.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2014) (describing the story of Matthew Snyder, a deceased American soldier).
95. National Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
96. See MADOFF, supra note 28, at 131 for Madoff's account of the two rights under
the U.S. law that protects the dead's interest.
97. Id. at 131.
98. Id. at 131-40, 148-49.
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unintended disclosure, which can pose potential harm to the dead and
their families. For example, medical data of the deceased and personal
information of customers in hands of their lawyers is under protection
of confidentiality law, so that those professions would not be destructed
by such breach. 99
D. Memory Law and Oblivion Law

Privacy law and defamation law are the two major legal
instruments to protect the deceased's reputation. Their locus is at the
individual level. In contrast, there are also legal instruments protecting
the dead's reputation in a collective sense.
Such laws protect
reputation, honor, identities, or dignity of various social groups and
communities whose degradation naturally lowers the reputation and
honor of their members as a consequence.
The first category includes memory laws that are widely criticized
as against international human rights law. For instance, the 1990
French Memory Law criminalizes denial of the Jewish Holocaust. 100
The law, on the one hand, punishes the denial of the Holocaust that
particularly amounts to a rejection of the Jewish victims' social status
and harm to their dignity. On the other hand, a court-supported
historiography functions as a tool to combat racism, negationism, and
revisionism. 101 Similar laws can be found in European countries such as
Belgium, Poland, Germany, Austria, Lithuania, and the Czech
Republic. 102 Other countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, and
Switzerland, take a more general approach to cope with denials of all
99. For medical data confidentiality, see D.S. James & S. Leadbeatter, Confidentiality,
Death and the Doctor, 49 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 1, 1--4 (1996); Jessica Wilen Berg, Grave
Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality, 84 CONN. L. REV. 81
(2001); Mary Donnelly & Maeve McDonagh, Keeping the Secrets of the Dead? An
Evaluation of the Statutory Framework for Access to Information About Deceased Persons ,
LEGAL STUDIES (2010).
100. Loi 90-615 du 13 juillet 1990 tendant a reprimer tout acte raciste, antisemite ou
xenophobe [Law No. 90-615 of 13 July 1990 on the Punishment of All Racist, Anti-Semitic
or Xenophobic], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETIE
OF FRANCE], Feb. 24, 2004 (also known as the Gayssot Act, Law No. 90-615 of July 13,
1990); see also Roger W. Smith, Legislating against Genocide Denial: Criminalizing
Denial or Preventing Free Speech, 4 ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 128, 133 (2009).
101. Raffi Wartanian, Memory Laws in France and Their Implications:
HUMANITY
rN
ACTION,
available
at
Institutionalizing
Social
Harmony,
http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/117-memory-laws-in-france-and-theirimplications-institutionalizing-social-harmony (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
102. See Jacqueline Lechtholtz-Zey, The Laws Banning Holocaust Denial, GPN
BULLETIN (2012), available at http://www.genocidepreventionnow.org/Portals/O/docs/
Holocaust_Denial_Updated_2.8.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing such domestic
laws and international treaties).
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crimes against humanity, including the Holocaust. 103
Protection of posthumous reputation and dignity can be found in
rehabilitation laws that aim to relieve the deceased victims and their
surviving families from unjust political accusations. In the early 1990s,
most former communist countries in Eastern Europe promulgated
rehabilitation laws. 104 Since then, family members of the dead victims
have started to bring justice to the deceased, trying to restore their honor
and dignity by law. 105 In addition, posthumous rehabilitation also
involves the dead victims of atrocities and massacres such as Katyn,
who are still denied victim status by the Russian authority. 106
A similar situation involves the truth commissions established in
many countries by law after political traumas and military conflicts.
Whether the dead victims can be offered restoration and justice, and the
dead perpetrators would be prosecuted, is crucial not only for future
peace construction, but also for the dead victims' dignity and reputation,
and their remaining families.
In this respect, however, amnesty laws may function as a shield to
retroactively exempt political leaders and military leaders from criminal
charges of their past crimes against humanity and human rights abuses.
For instance, the Spanish Amnesty Law was democratically voted and is
still valid today. 107 In the deeply wounded Spanish community,
reprisals and revenges would have led to social disorder and distracted
its transition to democracy without this law. 108 In some truth
103. Id. (under the rubric of hate speech, incitement speech, and racial discrimination).
104. LAVINIA STAN, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA: THE
POLITICS OF MEMORY 163- 65 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). For instance, the Russian
Rehabilitation Act's purpose is "the rehabilitation of all victims of political repression who
were prosecuted on the territory of the Russian Federation after 7 November 1917, and
restoration of their civil rights." Id.; see Janowiec v. Russia, App. nos. 55508/07 &
29520/09
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
Oct.
21,
2013),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-127684 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
105. Kurzac v. Poland, App. No. 31382/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2001) (for instance,
a brother of the dead victim of the political conviction by the previous Polish Communist
regime, appealed before the ECtHR for a violation of his right to fair trial under Article 6 of
the Convention and won).
l 06. See Janowiec v. Russia, App. nos. 55508/07 & 29520/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 21,
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-127684 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
107. Ackar Kadribasic, Transitional Justice in Democratization Processes: the Case of
Spain from an International Point of View, 1 INT'L J. RULE L., TRANS'L JUST. & HUM. RTS.
132, 132- 33 (2010).
108. Id. at 132- 33 (in contrast, the Chilean amnesty law is a product of the military
before the end of totalitarian ruling in contrast to exempt military leaders from future
charges).
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commissions' reports, even names of the perpetrators were not
mentioned because of the existence of such amnesty law. 109 This means
that the dead perpetrators cannot be singled out or named responsible
for past crimes and their reputations remain somehow intact.
However, the recent practice of international law has challenged
such an approach to promote political transition at the price of justice
and human rights. The Special Court for Sierra Leone decided that the
amnesties granted by a peace agreement are no bar to prosecutions
before it. 110 Also, the 2005 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147
prescribes, as one of the ways of giving satisfaction, "an official
declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation
and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the
victim." 111
What's related to the deceased's reputation in a fundamental sense
is human dignity and respect, which have been protected by the laws
both at the national level and at the international level. The idea is that
even if the dead are no longer living, they still deserve the minimum
respect and decent treatment as passed human beings. 112
In
constitutions of many Western countries, in particular European
countries, human dignity has been regarded as the fundamental right to
include individual honor, reputation and private life (family life). For
example, German law recognizes dignity of human beings covering not
only the living, but also the dead. 113
A last note is the legal protection of the dead' s dignity and
reputation after enforced disappearance that has been recognized in an
important international treaty promulgated in December 2010: The
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance. Article 24, clauses 4 & 5( c), of the law
prescribe that "the victims of enforced disappearance have the right to
obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation", and
109. Id. at 132.
110. See Simon M. Meisenberg, Legality of Amnesties in International Humanitarian
Law: The Lome Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 86 INT'L Rev. RED
CROSS 837, 843 (2004) (as the first decision to deny the validity of amnesty law, this
decision is of critical importance for the development oflnternational Humanitarian Law).
111. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. AIRES/ 4/1 (Mar. 21, 2006).
112. A reason why in most communities we are asked to keep silence in graveyards
and cannibalism is regarded as against humanity even in times of war and famines . See DE
BAETS, supra note 4, at 124- 25.
113. See Hannes Rosler, Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights An Analysis of
US. and German Constitutional and Tort Law, 26 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 153, 196 (2008).
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reparation includes not only material and moral damages, but also other
forms such as "satisfaction, including restoration of dignity and
reputation." This law defines victims as "the disappeared person and
any individual who has suffered harm as the direct result of an enforced
disappearance." 114
The above are the relevant domestic laws and international laws
regarding protection of the dead's reputation, privacy and dignity from
different perspectives. Laws protecting the free speech rights of
individuals shall also be considered in this context, since on the
contrary, their stronger protection means a weaker protection of the
dead's reputation and dignity. Protection of free speech and its
relationship to posthumous reputation protection will be further
discussed in Section V.

IV. LEGAL CASES ON POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND
PRIVACY
History censorship has been conducted by state authority not only
in totalitarian and authoritarian countries, but also in democracies. This
is reflected in legal cases in which state authority tries to support
official versions of history, and restrict its critics to protect public
figures, in particular political leaders. The state has done this by
passing special laws to prevent public scrutiny, by protecting religious
identity by punishing certain expressions, and by refusing rehabilitation
of victims of crimes against humanity for national pride, etc.
Since it is impossible to discuss all the cases that have been
collected by this research, this section will classify them into eight
categories for analysis. It will try to explain the circumstances of such
cases, including the disputed history at stake, complaints of plaintiffs,
political-social settings, court rulings with regard to interference, etc. to
check possible history censorship involved and the underlying
reasoning.
A. Posthumous Reputation and Collective Memory
Posthumous reputation is an important element to national identity
formation, national history, and collective memory. 115 This is the
114. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance art. 24(1), Dec. 23, 2010, 2715 U.N.T.S (validated since Dec. 23, 2010, with
92 signatories and 38 parties).
115. Though history and collective memory are perceived differently by many
historians. See GROSS, supra note 30, at 6- 9.
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reason why many states demonstrate great interest in its protection.
First of all, reputations of deceased heroes, heroines, or martyrs, who
are regarded as icons of the national identities by their communities, are
good targets for recounting the stories of history.
In the Israeli case of Szenes, the deceased heroine is "one of the
prominent icons of the Zionist narrative." 116 Fifty years after her brave
death in 1944, Chana Szenes was ridiculed and defamed by the
Broadcasting Authority and others posthumously in a fictional drama. 117
The petitioners claimed the tale of Szenes' bravery belongs to the
history of the Jewish nation and is part of national folklore, 118
demanding protection of the dead's reputation for public interest. Chief
Justice Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, on behalf of the majority,
first explained the importance of posthumous reputation to the Israeli
community, expressing that "the only asset of many people, both public
servants and those working in the private sector, is their reputation,
which they cherish as life itself. This applies to both the living and the
dead." 119 He further explained "[w]e must protect the dignity of the
deceased and their good name." 120 He recognized that the alleged
paragraph "offended the memory of Chana Szenes[,] ... maligned her
dignity and the myth surrounding her", and injured the feelings of the
public in general and that of Holocaust survivors in particular, and also
injured those who "cherish the memory" of the dead Szenes. 121 Also,
Chief Justice Barak confirmed that the defamation of Szenes harmed
national values 122 and the public interest for Israeli law to protect
includes collective identity and national history. 123
Justice Cheshin, in the dissenting opinion, clarified that human
dignity and the right to liberty, the right to reputation and the right to
freedom of expression are of equal legal status under the Israeli Basic
Law. 124 He further stated that "human dignity includes a person's
reputation", 125 while stressing the importance of Freedom of speech as

116. Schejter, supra note 33, at 924.
117. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority [1999] (Isr.).
118. See id. para. 4.
119. Id. para. 12.
120. Id.
121. See id. para. 12-14.
122. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority para. 12-14 [1999] (Isr.).
123. See id. para. 13-14 ("Each state has its own collective identity; each state has its
national history and its own social goals, the realization of which forms part of the public
interest.").
124. Id. para. 18, 21, 26 (Cheshin, J. dissenting).
125. Id. para. 29 (Cheshin, J. dissenting).
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one of the State of Israel's fundamental values as a democratic state. 126
Cheshin ruled that "[w ]e are dealing with a right of dimensions
struggling against a smaller right. The dignity and reputation of Chana
easily prevail over the rights of the playwright and the Broadcasting
Authority." 127 However, the majority of the court disagreed that only a
near certainty of grave and severe harm to public interest, the reputation
and dignity of the deceased and public feelings, can warrant the court's
intervention. 128 Since this is not the situation in the instant case, the
majority refused to protect the dead's reputation, even noting the
importance of the dead's reputation to Israeli collective memory. 129
Justice M. Cheshin made an important distinction between persons
and historical figures of the Israeli Deformation Law (1967) regarding
protection of the diseased. 13 Cheshin explained that the law protects
only the dead persons' reputations and dignity, not historical figures. 131
Cheshin explained that persons are those dead who have relatives to sue
for protection of their interests, namely heirs, family members and close
relatives. 132 Another criterion to define a dead person is whether there
are people alive who knew the dead personally; if there are persons still
knowing him or her, the dead continues to be a person. 133 The two
criteria can define the confine of the protection of posthumous
reputation and dignity by the Israeli law.
In contrast, following Justice Cheshin's distinction, Taiwanese
courts went too far in 1976 to protect a Chinese poet's reputation, who
died a thousand years ago. 134 The poet Han Yu holds an iconic status in
Chinese classical literature and has been highly respected for his
contribution to traditional Chinese culture. He was "defamed" by a
historian in the latter's journal article that described the dead as a
Lothario who died from abuse of poisonous chemicals. A distant
descendent accused the author of libelling the dead and damaging the
respect and memory of his ancestor. Both the trial court and the appeals

°

126. See id para. 9.
127. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority para. 37 [1999] (Isr.)
(Cheshin, J., dissenting).
128. See id para. 20, 28, 34.
129. See id para 24 (the court concluded: "However, a democratic society does not
preserve the image of its heroes by repressing freedom of expression and artistic creation.).
The legend must flow from free exchange of ideas and opinions. See also id para. 27.
130. Id para. 24 (Cheshin, J. dissenting).
131. Id
132. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority para. 19, 24 [1999] (Isr.)
(Cheshin, J., dissenting).
133. Id para. 24 (Cheshin, J. dissenting).
134. See YANG RENSHOU
FAXUE FANGFA LUN
1-6 (1999).
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court found the accused guilty, partially due to the reason that the
defamation was a threat to the Chinese cultural identity.
The
posthumous protection has its deep origin in the long Chinese tradition
to respect dead ancestors. 135
After the death of many dictators and the collapse of their regimes,
they have been re-evaluated by new communities with transformed
morals and political ideologies. Their supporters have conflicted with
dissenters over the problem of how to handle the memory and legacies
of the deceased dictators. Many have lodged defamation cases in court.
For instance, Franco, the deceased Spanish dictator, was recently
mocked by an artist who put a sculpture of him in a refrigerator,
indicating his still "being fresh" in modem Spain. 136 The artist was
accused in 2012 by an organization called the Francisco Franco
Foundation, claiming defamation of Franco and seeking 18,000 euros in
damages. Supporters and opponents also bear different memories to the
dead dictators and they have much departed views of the past. In such
cases, judicial decisions are critical in confirming which view is
justified before the public.
Under many circumstances, historians' research and publication
regarding the deceased' s reputation have challenged the memory and
identity of local communities that have constructed a desired memory
and identity by means of voluntary forgetting or hiding some dark past.
When historian Anja Rosmus-Wenninger stood up to investigate what
had happened to the Jews at her hometown Passau, Germany, she was
shocked by her findings of the close cooperation of the locals with the
Nazi regime. Instead, the local community, contrary to her findings, has
proclaimed an identity of strong resistance against the Nazi policy. She
discovered that two distinguished Paussau priests, whose names were
under data protection, denounced Jews to the Gestapo in 1936, but one
died with the reputation of a saint and the other as a resistant to the Nazi
regime. The revelation of the facts led to the accusation of monstrous
defamation by the locals. She was watched, molested and assaulted by
her co-citizens. Though her victory in court helped her regain
confidence in the German community, 137 she eventually migrated to the
U.S.
135. See XIAO ZESHENG
MUDI SHANG DE XIANFA QUANLI
AXUE
70- 79 (2011).
136. Guy Hedgecoe, Spanish Left Cold over "Franco in a Fridge", DW (Aug. 19,
2013), available at http://www.dw.de/spanish-left-cold-over-franco-in-a-fridge/a-l 7029255
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014)(the case was first rejected by a Spanish judge in July 2013 and
now is pending on appeal).
137. See COULMAS, supra note 48.
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B. Political Figures and History Controversies
As noted above, Anja Rosmus-Wenninger only conflicted with her
local community. Reputations of dead political figures that bear more
substantial connections with present politics will be under much closer
watch by many, including the dead's families and their political allies,
who are usually powerfully equipped with sufficient social resources to
win defamation battles.
In the French case of Editions Pion, the family of the dead French
President Mitterrand accused his former private physician of breaching
medical confidentiality, and therefore invading the privacy of the dead
and his family, 138 degrading the deceased's reputation and honor. 139 In
his book Le Grand Secret, which was published shortly after
Mitterrand's death, Dr. Gubler wrote that the dead president had been
diagnosed with cancer a few months after his first election, but he
ordered concealment of his illness and issued false health bulletins. 140
The French courts upheld the accusations and restricted the book's
distribution with an interim injunction in the first instance. 141 The
family also brought civil proceedings against Dr. Gubler and others,
prohibiting the resumption of the book's publication, or deleting certain
pages and paragraphs as altemative. 142
The European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") found a
violation of Article 10 of the Convention in that the legal measures
restricting the publication of the book were not appropriate to the ends
of the French law in pursuit after balancing them with the author's free
speech rights protected by Article 10. 143 The Court recognized the
interim injunction as a justified legal measure to protect the plaintiffs'
privacy. It is rather clear in this case that posthumous publication
would have big influences on the late President's reputation and his
family pride. But, the Court defined that the disclosure is of public
interest, "in particular the public's right to be informed about any
serious illnesses suffered by the head of State, and the question whether

138. See Editions Plon v. France, App. No. 58148/00, para. 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2004),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014). A breach of confidentiality in France is a criminal offense under Article 226-13 of
the Criminal Code. See also id. para. 3.
139. Id. para. 34.
140. Id. para. 6.
141. Id. para. 12.
142. Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00, para. 14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18,
2004), available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
143. Id.
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a person who knew that he was seriously ill was fit to hold the highest
national office." 144 The information is important to transparency of
government and there is no "pressing social need" to take the prescribed
measures against the publishing company. 145
In Mizzi v. Malta, the ECtHR quashed the judgements of Maltase
courts, finding a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 146 The Court
did not directly reject the protection of the dead Prime Minister's
reputation by the domestic courts. However, it argued that the
protection is disproportionate, particularly in the view of the dead as a
former politician and a public figure, who should be subject to wider
limits of acceptable criticisms and that the disputed article covered a
subject of public interest. 147
In the Spanish case Rosa MariaL6pe & Gutierrez, the author and
editor of a newspaper were accused of violating the right of honor of the
Moroccan King Hassan II due to their report of a drug trafficking issue,
of which the ECtHR found the Spanish state violated the free speech
rights under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights
("Convention"). 148 The Spanish courts took measures to restrict the
publication of the newspaper article that reported the suspicious
connection of the then-living King to a drug smuggling caught by
Spanish police. 149 The Court quashed the domestic decisions and ruled
that the measures taken by the Spanish authority cannot be proved that
the interference claimed was "necessary in a democratic society" and
could not meet "a pressing social need"; it simply did not find that the
144. Id. para. 44.
145. Id.
146. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-107530 (last visited Dec.
4, 2014).
147. Id. para. 38; see also Lombardo v. Malta, App. No. 7333/06, (Eur. Ct. H.R. July
27, 2007), available at http://www.pfcmalta.org/uploads/l/2/l/7/12174934/7333-06.pdf
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (ruling "the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a
politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former Correct
inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their words and deeds by
journalists and the public at large, and they must consequently display a greater degree of
tolerance").
148. The monarch filed the case himself but later died during domestic proceeding.
Gutierrez Suarez v. Spain, App. No. 16023/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012). Hereinafter, the
English version of the verdict will be referenced. Victory of Spanish Journalist at European
Court Is Final, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM COMM., Nov. 30, 2010, available at:
http://www.wpfc.org/?q=node/447 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
149. The alleged article mentioned similar reports that were also published in El
Mundo, Le Monde, and Herald Tribune, which stated that drug trafficking was the main
source of foreign currency for Morocco and pointed to some Moroccan politicians close to
the king. Id. para. 6.

Published by SURFACE, 2014

75

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1

2014] Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Privacy

69

information disclosed was capable of causing injury to the personal
reputation of the king. 150 The Court prescribed that while journalist
reports can be presented in different ways, "it is not for the Court of
Justice or for the national jurisdictional authorities to otherwise replace
the press to say what technique must the journalists adopt." 151
The author and editor involved in the Spanish case above are not
the only authors and journalists who were punished for defaming
deceased kings and their families. In 2007, Swiss citizen Oliver Jufer
was sentenced to ten years imprisonment in Thailand for insulting King
Bhumibol Adulyadej by vandalising portraits of the monarch with black
spray-paint during a drunken spree. 152 Citizens of democracies might
have problems with the rationales to protect dead kings and state heads,
as discussion of their past activities is of public interest and important
for public discourse of state policy. Political figures of high status, such
as state heads, are obviously important historical figures (or persons in
the Israeli term), and shall be under public scrutiny. When defamation
cases concern public figures, the truth that the defendants claimed to
have spoken is relevant to the narration of public history. 153
As indicated above, re-assessment of the dead's reputation can
modify our view of the past and collective memory. In Lehideux &
lsorni v. France, 154 the French judicial authority convicted the authors
of an advertisement published in Le Monde. The text was read as
defending the memory of Marshal Petain, the famous collaborator of the
Nazi Party who was responsible for the death of many French Jews in
Nazi concentration camps. The ECtHR overruled the French decisions
and found the criminal conviction unnecessary in a democratic
society. 155 It made an important distinction between clearly established
historical facts, such as genocide and Holocaust, and historical facts that
are not clearly established, as in the instant case. 156 As a leading case,
the Court set out the rule that denial of the Holocaust and atrocities
150. Id. para. 36.
151. Id. para. 33 (reiterating its previous ruling in Bladet & Stensaas v. Norway [GC],
App. No. 21980/93, para. 63 (E. Ct. H.R. 1999)).
152. World Briefing I Asia: Thailand: Man Who Insulted King Pardoned, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
13,
2007),
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9AOOE4D9 l 33FF930A25757COA96 l 9C8B63&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3 As
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
153. Barak-Erez, supra note 29, at 95 (arguing that defamation cases in which the
defendant claims to have spoken the truth, may sometimes be the background for judgments
of historical significance).
154. Lehideuz & Isomi v. France, App. No. 55/1997/839/1045, (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1998).
155. Id. para. 58.
156. Id. para. 47.
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should be excluded from protection of Article 10 of the Convention. 157
By denying protection of revisionists and Holocaust deniers, the
Court has obviously promoted a judicial narrative and forbids further
challenges, which leads to a further question of the proper roles of court
in general. Many have doubted the roles of courts in handling cases
regarding historical controversies, questioning if courts are the right
locus to address historical events. As Barak-Erez noted, courts may
choose three roles to play: as judges and arbiters of historical events; as
narrators of history; and as students and teachers of historical lesson. 158
In my view, courts of law can nevertheless avoid to play such roles
either singly or simultaneously in handling defamation cases regarding
historical events, though their capacities are under doubt.
We observe a similar role played by a Japanese court to affirm the
official narrative, like the ECtHR, in reaffirming Japan's dark past
during the WWII. Shortly before the notorious Nanjing massacre, two
Japanese officers participated in a killing contest with swords to prove
their military bravery or brutality. Both were executed after the war in
Nanjing for their committed war crimes by the Nanjing War Crimes
Tribunal. The story was reported in 1971 by two Japanese newspapers,
Mainichi Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun. The dead's families sued for
posthumous defamation, claiming fabrication of the story. 159 The
Japanese court rejected their claims and confirmed the trueness of the
reports, despite some minor mistakes. The case concerns Japan's war
crimes in China that are well-established historical facts and unable to
be overturned in the defamation case.
It is no doubt that the dead's families are the strongest defenders of
their reputation since they are directly impacted in their daily life.
Negative reputation of the dead will have passive influence on the
living's life and repute. In the French case, Fondation FrancoJaponaise dite Sasakawa vs. Karoline Postel-Vinay, 160 Sasakawa
Franco-Japanese Foundation accused French historian Karoline Postel157. Id. (prescribing that denial or revision of "clearly established historical facts such as the Holocaust - ... would be removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article
17.").
158. Barak-Erez, supra, note 29, at 91-100.
159. Mainichi Shimbun and another newspaper Asahi Shimbun. Suit Denying Pair 's
Wartime Beheading Spree Fails, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE (Aug. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2005/08/24/national/suit-denying-pairs-wartimebeheading-spree-fails/#.Uee836xoVtO (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
160. Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court oforiginal jurisdiction] Paris,
Sept.
22,
2010
(Fr.),
available
at
http://www.concemedhistorians.org/content_files/file/LE/l 84.pdf (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
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Vinay for slurring on its respectability. Postel-Vinay sent an e-mail to
participants of a symposium held on the big social event of the 150th
anniversary of the diplomatic relations between Japan and France, of
which the Foundation was a sponsor. The controversial e-mail was
entitled "Sasakawa, a war criminal to celebrate 150 years of FrancoJapanese Diplomacy?" 161 The author explained that together with other
sixteen historians and academics, she felt it was "quite inappropriate
that a foundation fashioning its own name after that of a class A war
criminal should sponsor such a gathering." 162 The Paris District Court
found part of the e-mail text libellous, but dismissed the case due to a
successful defense of good faith by the author. 163
C. Rehabilitation and Posthumous Justice
As noted above, the Japanese court rejected the defamatory
accusation of the journalists and affirmed the war crimes of the two
executed military officers. However, Japanese courts have been very
reluctant to deliver judgments in favor of the victims of Chinese
comfort women, as some survivors have sued for remedies of past
suffering. 164 In a collective sense, whether victims of war crimes,
atrocities and the Holocaust are recognized by their victim status and
offered proper compensations is important not only as a matter of
justice, but also as a matter of human dignity and respect. The living
victims should not be hurt a second time and those dead should not have
their names lost in the dust of history. This is especially true for the
dead victims of war atrocities during the Second World War, either
conducted by Nazi Germany or by the former Soviet Union.
The Katyn tragedy shocked the world by the annihilation of almost
a whole generation of Polish elites by the Russian military after its
invasion. The tragedy left a deep wound in Polish people and human
history. It is after the collapse of the Soviet Union that the truth came
out. On November 26, 2010, the Russian State Duma issued a formal
161. Id.
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
164. After 1996 such victims are defined by United Nations as forced slaves. Many
Korean victims acquired remedies and formal apology from the Japanese government. See
Japan Court Backs 3 Brothel Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1998), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/l 998/04/28/world/japan-court-backs-3-brothelvictims.html?src=pm (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). However, the law suits lodged by Chinese
victims ended only with recognition of the historical tragedy, but without any compensation
since, among other justifications, the Japanese Supreme Court deferred to a 1972 bilateral
treaty signed by the Chinese Communist government to abandon war compensation. PEIPEI
QIU, supra note 45, at 175.
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statement on the tragedy, declaring that "[i]t is necessary to continue
studying the archives, verifying the lists of victims, restoring the good
names of those who perished in Katyn and other places and uncovering
the circumstances of the tragedy." 165 However, when some surviving
family members of the deceased victims tried to seek the whereabouts
of their beloved, time and again they were confronted with obstacles
from the present Russian authorities. They were refused further help
and serious replies from the Russian authorities, 166 and an official
investigation ended prematurely and the related documents were
classified afterwards. The case finally ended up in ECtHR to which the
Russian state authorities still refused to provide key documents relating
to the case upon the Court's request. The Chamber first found
violations of some applicants' rights not to be subjected to inhumane or
degrading treatment protected under Article 3 of the Convention, as
well as a violation of Article 38 of the Convention. 167 The Chamber
commented that the Court "is struck by the apparent reluctance of the
Russian authorities to recognize the reality of the Katyn massacre"
noting the fact that after the discontinuation of the investigation, "the
Russian prosecutors consistently rejected the applicants' requests for
rehabilitation of their relatives." 168 The Grand Chamber upheld the
Chamber decision on a violation of Article 38, but overruled its decision
of an Article 3 violation by the Russian State authorities. 169
It seems that requesting rehabilitation from a foreign state is not
easy for many reasons. Rehabilitation of dead victims consequent to
communist political convictions was not an easy thing either even in
their motherlands. In Kurzac v. Poland, a Polish-American tried to
rehabilitate his deceased brother - a victim of the Polish Communist
suppression - and to restore his own family's reputation. 170 However,
the legal procedures had lasted for five years and were unbearable to the
applicant, so that the case was eventually brought to ECtHR for a
violation of Article 6-1 (hearing within a reasonable time). 171 In the
admissibility judgment, the ECtHR decided that "the result of the
165. See Janowiec v. Russia, App. nos. 55508/07 & 29520/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-127684 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
166. See id para. 39.
167. See generally id
168. Id. para. 45-46.
169. Id. para. 50.
170. Kurzac v. Poland, App. No. 31382/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 2001), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
171. Id para. 1. In this case, the Court considered the possibility of extending its
jurisdiction to cases of atrocity that happened more than half a century ago.
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proceedings in issue was decisive for rights which by their very nature
were civil, namely, the applicant's right to enjoy a good reputation and
his right to protect the honour of his family and restore its good
name." 172 The Court therefore puts the reputation of a surviving family
under its consideration in the case of rehabilitation of dead victims.
In Spain, the 1977 Amnesty Law has blocked the road both to
rehabilitate the deceased victims of the brutal Civil War and long
dictatorship, and to condemn the responsible perpetrators, whether dead
or alive. The law has been passed consequent to a compromise made
among different social forces to facilitate the democratic transition. 173
But the amnesty law was defined by the UN as incompatible with the
International Human Rights law with respect to crimes against humanity
that should enjoy no statute oflimitations. 174
A Spanish judge's effort to apply such international human rights
law was impeded when the Spanish Amnesty Law was under scrutiny.
Judge Garzon issued the historical arrest warrant of former Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet and contributed to legal proceedings against
the perpetrator. 175 He also tried to apply the same standard to Spain's
historical crimes, when some family members of the missing asked the
Audiencia Nacional (National Court) to investigate the whereabouts of
their remains for a decent burial. 176 Garzon conferred his jurisdiction to
the local courts to answer such inquiries. 177 But this caused chaos and
he was accused of flouting the Amnesty Law and committing the crime
of prevaricaci6n. 178 He was eventually exonerated by the Spanish
Supreme Court, but the decision ended the legal approach of Civil War
172. Decision as to the Admissibility of Application no. 31382/96, para. 6 (Eur. Ct.
R.R.
May
25,
2000),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ sites/eng/pages/ search.aspx?i=OO 1-5 297 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
173. Or the pact of oblivion (el pacto de olvido). See Teresa Fernandez Paredes,

Transitional Justice in Democratization Processes: the Case of Spain from an International
Point of View, 1 INT'L J. RULE L., TRANSITIONAL JUST. & HUM. RTS. 124, 125 (2010);
Sumalla, supra note 52, at 733- 37. This law was counter-balanced recently by a new
Historical Memory Law in Spain (Ley de la memoria historica). See Sumalla, supra note
52, at 737-43.
174. See the relative comment from the UN Human Rights Office. See Spain Must
Lift Amnesty for Franco Era Crimes-U.N, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Feb. 10, 2012),
available at http://www.trust.org/item/?map=spain-must-lift-amnesty-for-franco-era-crimesun (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
175. Naomi Robt-Arriaza, The Spanish Civil War, Amnesty, and the Trials of Judge
16
AM.
Soc'v
INT'L
L.
(July
25 ,
2012),
available
at
Garzon,
http://www.asi l .org/insights/volume/ 16/issue/24/spanish-civil-war-amnesty-and-trialsjudge-garzon (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Era claims. 179
This reaction indicates the difficulties in the
implementation of the 2007 Law of Historical Memory, which
addresses the need to honor the victims of the Civil War and Franco
dictatorship and to provide them with reparation. 180
What the living sought for the deceased are posthumous dignity
and justice in the sense that they should have not been wronged. The
deceased victims' names should be cleaned of political smears. The
deceased should not die with wrongly charged crimes. In this sense,
rehabilitation of the deceased victims relates more to the concept of
justice, or historical justice, and historical truth or correct historical
narrative. 181 Even deceased victims have the moral rights to truth,
justice and reparation in a fair community and this explains why the
British Government recently decided that the army should not have
executed soldiers for cowardice in WWI and posthumously pardoned
the deceased. 182 Similarly, the Americans have apologized for the
mistreatments of Japanese migrants during WWII and of indigenous
Indians for past injustice. 183
Lastly, one must note that the rehabilitation of the dead victims in
the above cases is possible because of changed social morals or ethos
consequent to political changes or the advancement of humanity. This
will be discussed further in Section VI, which illustrates how political
change and cultural shift have influenced posthumous reputation and
our understandings of the past.
D. Posthumous Privacy and Individual Dignity

The dead may be no more, but their past deeds are kept among the
memories of those who know them in person or who have heard of
them, or who read their diaries, letters or memoranda.
More
importantly, their images and likeness, as a crucial part of their past
existence and the living's impression, can be kept in various forms such
as photographs, newspapers, archival documents, films, or most
recently, in digital forms on the Internet. In particular, their names and
voices can be used commercially; their images and likeness may be
179. Id.
180. See Sumalla, supra note 52, at 743-44.
181. In this regard, reparation of injustice, according to the United Nations, includes
five forms, namely: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-repetition,
and satisfaction. Satisfaction includes symbolic reparation or posthumous rehabilitation. See
G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 112 at para. 22(d).
182. MACMILLAN, supra note 4, at 28.
183. See generally Janna Thompson, Historical Injustice and Reparation: Justifying
Claims of Descendants, 112 ETHICS 114 (2001).
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exhibited in history museums for public knowledge; or statues and
monuments may be erected to keep their memory alive in community
life; or foundations, cities and streets may be named after the deceased
for their remembrance or collective memory.
In many occasions, such uses may cause conflicts with their
surviving family's interest as well as the dead's privacy and reputation
(or in abstract, dignity). For instance, the likeness could be used in a
defamatory way, or the dead's families are not willing to disclose such
materials to the public, whether for commercial use or for public
knowledge; or they are reluctant for such disclosure because the end
products are not in favor of the dead. The most extremist version of this
category of "defamation" is the defamatory treatment of the likeness of
political figures to present political opinions. When the deceased are
treated as the icons or pride of a national state and under protection,
such "mistreatment" can be handled seriously.
During the 1989 Beijing Student Protest in June, to advocate their
anti-dictatorship opinion, three young Chinese threw ink-filled eggs to
deface the great portrait of Mao hung on the Tian'an Gate overseeing
the Tiananmen Square. They were caught and sentenced to long-term
imprisonments for crimes of anti-revolution and defamation of the
founder of the communist state. 184 We can find a similar situation in
Turkey where acts against the late Ataturk were punished by Law No.
5816 with harsh imprisonment. 185 Many journalists and historians have
been accused of defamation of Ataturk in the past under this special
legislation, which has been criticized by international society. 186

184. Mao was and still is the icon and pride of the national state to many Chinese
today. The three convicts got, respectively, sixteen, twenty and life imprisonment. China Is
Accused of Torturing 3 Who Defaced Mao Portrait, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 1992), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/01 /world/china-is-accused-of-torturing-3-who-defacedmao-portrait.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); Mao Portrait Protesters Reunited, RADIO FREE
ASIA (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/portrait062 l 2010110340.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
185. McCRACKEN, supra note 55, at 31.
186. See Prosecutor Investigates A TV Show For Defamation Of Ataturk, BIANET (June
13, 2008, 11 :30 AM), available at http://www.bianet.org/english/religion/107620prosecutor-investigates-a-tv-show-for-defamation-of-ataturk (last visited Dec. 3, 2014);
Julia Wetherell, EU Fines Turkey for Blocking Google Sites, TECHPRESIDENT (Dec. 19,
2012), available at http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/23289/eu-fines-turkey-blockinggoogle-sites (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); Nagehan Alci, Journalist to Sue for Defamation
After Ataturk Remarks, TODAY'S ZAMAN (Nov. 11, 2011, 5:30 PM), available at
http://www.todayszaman.com//news-262347-joumalist-to-sue-for-defamation-after-ataturkremarks.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). For a more detailed discussion, see Antoon De
Baets, Defamation Cases Against Historians, 41 HIST. & THEORY 346, 349
(2002)(particularly note 12).
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The likeness of the dead can be well protected by law in Western
democracies under privacy law, especially when the proprietary
interests of the dead's likeness and name are of concern. In the U.S.,
the dead's images or likeness could be protected indirectly, as surviving
families claim invasions of their own privacy or reputation against
disclosure or appropriation. Journalist Allen Favish was denied access
to posthumous photographs taken of the late Vincent Foster at the death
scene and during the autopsy. 187 Foster was a high-ranking White
House lawyer involved in the investigation of Clinton family's scandal
of Whitewater Real Estate Venture. He was found to have committed
suicide following the official investigation. Favish suspected that the
denial to the requested photos of the deceased was part of a cover-up of
the murder. The U.S. government refused his request on the ground of
protection of the privacy of Foster's family. They explained that
disclosure of such photographs would traumatize the family and invade
their privacy. The Supreme Court of the U.S. ruled that the privacy
interests of the family trump the public's interest in seeing the pictures
of his death scene. 188
But, the dead's privacy and reputation were not without
consideration of the Chief Justice. In Swidler & Berlin v. United
States, 189 Justice William Rehnquist, on behalf of the majority,
concluded that to assume a dead person's interest in reputation ends
upon his death is unreasonable, which the dissenting Justice Sandra
O'Connor also agreed on. 190 In MacDonald v. Time, District Judge
Sarokin said that such an idea, that a man's defamed reputation dies
with him, is to ignore the realities of life and the bleak legacy which he
leaves behind. 191
Many European jurisdictions offer direct protection by statutory
law. Appropriation of the dead's likeness as invasion of posthumous
privacy is forbidden in Italy. The Italian magazine Chi purchased the
exclusive right to publish the pictures taken shortly after Princess
187. See generally Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
188. See id. at 170-72.
189. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); see also Raymond
Iryami, Give the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause of Action for
Defamation of the Dead from Criminal Libel Statues, 9 FORDHAM lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition for decedents'
reputation).
190. See generally Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 411 (O'Connor, J. dissenting)
(agreeing that normally the attorney-client privilege survives the death of a client).
191. MacDonald v. Time, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (D.N.J. 1983) ("Why should a
claim for a damaged leg survive one's death, where a claim for a damaged name does not.
After death, the leg cannot be healed, but the reputation can.").
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Diana's fatal accident and obtained the findings of the autopsy. The
Italian court regarded it as a violation of the dead's dignity and found
that the disclosure was not justified by the need of free information of
the public. 192 Further dissemination of such information may face
criminal punishments, such as imprisonment for up to two years. 193
According to Madoff, after the death of Saddam Hussein, even the
Italian special authority gave a press release to caution the media to
respect the dead's dignity. 194
Protection of the deceased's last dignity, in particular their death
scene pictures, has been recognized by other EU countries. In Hachette
Filipacchi Associes v. France, the dead's widow and children accused
several companies of an infringement of the right to respect of their
private life after the companies disclosed a photograph of the murdered
Prefect Claude Brignac in Ajaccio for commercial use. The photograph
was supplementary to an article and displayed his dead body lying on
the ground. 195 The French Court of Cassation concluded that because
the photograph clearly indicated the body and face of the murdered, the
publication showed disregard for human dignity and therefore the
publication was illegal. 196 In replying to the ECtHR, the French
Government explicitly expressed that though the publication of that
article concerned a matter of public interest, it affected the dignity of a
civil servant, which is part of "the hard core" of his rights, as well as the
private life of his family. 197
In the Slovak Republic, courts judged in similar ways to protect the
privacy of the dead and their family. For example, in Weiss vs. R., a. s.,
several photographs of a mother's dead body and others ante mortem
were published, together with some excerpts of her suicide letter. The
deceased was Ms. Marcela Weissova, wife of Slovak politician Mr.
Peter Weiss. Her son accused the publisher of violating his own and his
late mother's personality rights. The Slovakia judiciary authorities
acknowledged that the publication of photographs of the dead body
violated Article 15 CC of the Civil Code, which protects posthumous

192. MADOFF, supra note 28, at 128.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, App. No. 71111/01, para. 7-11 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. June 14, 2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=OOl-81066 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
196. Id. para. 19.
197. Id. para. 11 (finding no violation of free speech rights of the applicant company
under Article 10 of the Convention).
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personality rights and therefore ordered remedies. 198
Not only is dignity of the dead under legal protection when the
dead's likeness is in controversy, but also when the related economic
benefits are of much closer concern of the living families. This
concerns the economic perspective of the dead's name, likeness, etc.
Again, Princess Diana would be bothered if she had the chance to know
the fierce legal battles fought under the name of her remembrance, of
which millions of dollars were at stake. 199 A similar story happened to
Martin Luther King, whose family charged heavily on the use of his
likeness, name and the famous "I have a dream" speech. 200
German law, as Rosler suggested, differentiated more clearly
between protection of reputation and privacy as dignity and as property
in particular in the 1999 Marlene Dietrich Decision. 201 It is the first
time that the German Federal Court rendered damages to posthumous
invasion of personality on the ground of commercial exploitation of the
decedent's name, voice or image, which was part of marketing strategy
about Marlene Dietrich. This involved various products such as bags, tshirts, watches, calling cards, pins, etc. The Constitutional Court of
Germany upheld the decision and affirmed the inclusion of commercial
aspects of personality rights under constitutional protection. 202

E. Biography Writing and Posthumous Disputes
Biography writing matters not only to the living, but also to the
dead because this is an important means to recount their life and

198. The Constitutional Court upheld the decision with a monetary compensation for
the invasion of the deceased mother's privacy Weiss vs. R., a. s., 7.07.2009 (US), III. US
185/09-24 (Slovak Republic) (the case is briefed to the author by his student research
assistant, Mr. Martin Duchac ).
199. See Matthew Magee, Court Rules that Newspaper does not have to Identify
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
1,
2011,
9:54
PM),
available
at
Commenters,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/mar/01 /sue-commenters-libel-daily-mail (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014); Heather Timmons, Diana Charity Halts Grants, Citing Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES
(July 12, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07 /12/world/diana-charity-haltsgrants-citing-lawsuit.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); Marius Meland, Princess Diana Fund,
Franklin Mint Settle Trademark Dispute, LAw360 (Nov. 11, 2004, 12:00 AM), available at
http://www.law360.com/articles/2540/princess-diana-fund-franklin-mint-settle-trademarkdispute (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
200. Jonathan Turley, Cashing in on Martin Luther King Jr., Los ANGELES TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/22/opinion/oe-turley22
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (King's family winning landmark case against USA Today and
CBS for the illegal use of King's speech without paying them); see also MADOFF supra note
28, at 9-10.
201. Rosler, supra note 77, at 181.
202. Id.
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achievement. As Craik pointed out, many dead even got more famous
after their death through successful biographies. 203 Some people will
get their autobiographies ready before death to prevent defamatory
statements; others may hire professional writers to put down their
stories before death, 204 as Apple's founder Steven Jobs made such an
arrangement with the author of his biography. 205 After death, living
families may also hire professional writers to complete the story of the
deceased for many reasons. Or, biographies of the dead could be
written by many without the consent of the dead before death and of
their families after death. These two circumstances can both lead to
controversies.
The Canadian case Turgeon v. Michaud lasted for seven years
because of the vague assignment of the author's rights upon writing a
biography for a famous Quebec businessman. The dead' s family
commissioned author Pierre Turgeon to write Desrosier's biography in
order to promote business by telling the stories of the founder and how
he managed to establish a commercially successful enterprise. 206 The
timeline set out in the initial agreement was not respected and the
writing was delayed several times. At last the author's manuscript was
not to the heirs' satisfaction, who decided not to publish it.
Nevertheless, the author sought to publish the draft at another
publishing company other than the agreed one. The Quebec Superior
Court issued a permanent injunction against Turgeon, halting him from
publishing the manuscript. The trial judge claimed that the deceased's
heir had the right to refuse to publish the manuscript and the author
could not publish any content that is based on the confidential
information provided by the deceased's family. 207
Biographers are likely to disclose private matters that others would
have no chance to know. This influences the deceased's' reputations as

203. CRAIK, supra note 10, at 182-86 (arguing that biography may extend a dead's
reputational network and biographical reputational network ultimately serves as the major
locus of the posthumous reputational network).
204. Id. at 190 (an example of "pre-posthumous tasks" is Thomas Hardy, who spent
years ghostwriting his official biography and then covered it as his wife's memoir).
205. With an agreement that Jobs would not interfere with the contents of his own
biography. Nick Bilton, One on One: Walter Isaacson, Biographer of Steve Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES:
BITS
BLOG
(Nov.
18,
2011,
9:41
AM),
available
at
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011 /1 l /18/one-on-one-walter-isaacson-biographer-of-stevejobs/?_r=O (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
206. Alexandra Steele, Once Upon a Time, There was a Manuscript, CETNRE CDP
CAPITAL, available at http://www.robic.ca/admin/pdf/537/173.14.pdf (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
207. Id.
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well as their families' reputations. Francis Russell, an American writer
and biographer, was confronted by the heirs of ex-president Harding
who sought injunction from Ohio court to exclude the use of love letters
of the dead in his book The Shadow of Blowing Grave regarding
Harding. These love letters were from Mrs. Phillips who had had an
affair with Harding for more than fifteen years and was persuaded by
Russell to relent. These letters were confiscated by an Ohio Court and
they remained under a protective order until 2014. 208 They cover the
controversial period regarding Harding's nomination for the Republican
presidency in 1920, when it was too late to change the nominee upon
knowledge of the affair by the Republican Party, which sought ways to
cover the affair. 209 The author protested by leaving the spaces for the
citations from the letters merely blank in his published book. 210 Yet
during Harding's full term, voters never knew anything about his
extramarital affairs, though he suffered multiple posthumous
indignities. 211
The above two cases show the importance of using unpublished
materials in biographical writings and the big impacts of legal
interferences on historical studies under copyrights. 212 Still, if a
biography is not written in favor of the dead, their families may seek
damages, injunctions, remedies and an obligatory formal apology to
protect themselves and the dead. In China, the children of the deceased
ex-prime minister Cheng Y onggui sued historian Wu Shi and won the
case with remedies of emotional distress and a formal apology from the
author and publisher. 213 Wu described the deceased as "the peasant of
Chairman Mao" and listed his previous deeds unknown to the public in

208. Francis Russell, A Naughty President, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (1982),
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/l 982/jun/24/a-naughty-president/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
209. John H. Summers, What Happened to Sex Scandals? Politics and Peccadilloes,
Jefferson to Kennedy, 87 J. AM. HIST. 825, 836 (2000).
210. The letters are confiscated under the protection of common law copyright
interests of the heirs. See John Dean, The Harding Affair: Evidence or Racism Rising,
FINDLAW (Sept. 18, 2009), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20090918.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (detailing the story regarding Harding in his interview).
211. Summers, supra note 210, at 836.
212. For a general discussion regarding unpublished expressions in biographical
writing without consent of the copyright holders in the United Stated, see Bilder, supra note
37.
213. Chen Mingliangyu Beijing qingnianbao he Wu Shi QianfanMingyuquan An
[Chen Mingliang V. Wu Shi & Beijing Youth
Newspaper] (Beijing No. 1 Interm. Ct. Dec. 29, 2003) (China), available at
http://www.qinquan.info/138v9.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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a biography. 214 Chen's living family would not accept such a negative
account of the former politician with a good repute. Even if true, such
writing denigrates the reputation of the dead. The adjudicating court
ruled that the author used sources, such as private memos, personal
interviews, etc., which are not official and un-authoritative. 215 Although
the author had been cautious and acted with due care in selecting
materials and writing, the Chinese courts still demanded the use of
certain sources and materials in favor of the deceased. 216
Closely related to biographical writing are novels or fictions that
are based on real stories of the deceased, but taken as defamatory
against the deceased by their families. Such writings and narratives
attract disputes from the dead's families or even agitate them because
many audiences know clearly whom those characters are in real life. In
a famous German case regarding the Klaus Mann's novel MephistoNovel of a Career, Mann portrayed a character attributed to the wellknown, controversial German actor and theatre director Gustaf
Griindgens (1899-1963). 217 The heir of Griindgens filed a defamation
suit and the German Constitutional Court judged in favor of the dead,
finding that the defamation overrided constitutional values. 218 The
problem of such artistic works lies in the blurs of facts and imaginations
that may mislead the audience to mistake fictions as reality of the
past. 219
No wonder Rosier questioned: "what would happen if such a
fusion of fiction and fact took place on a large scale, changing even the
perception of history"? 220 This is the rationale behind the Brazilian
Civil Code, which requires works of a biographical nature to have
consent from their subjects before public release. This obviously
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. In another case, a young Chinese biographer, based on accessible university
archives, depicted some notorious acts of a famous scholar, the former president of that
university, during China's Culture Revolution. The presiding judge in this case explicitly
expressed that memos included in such archives putting down people's self-and-mutual
criticisms shall not be used for historical studies like author's work. Feng Boqun
3 DANGAN
Yinyong Dangan Rechu de Yichang Guansi
CHUNQIU
10- 15 (2006).
217. Rosler,supranote 114,at 154-55, 174-78.
218. Id. at 155.
219. Take the Oscar-winning film Braveheart for example, which has been criticized
by many historians of its inaccurate narrative. See Elizabeth Ewan, Braveheart.; Roy Roy, 4
AM. HIST. REV. 1219, 1219-21 (1995), available at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/
burt/Medieval%20cinema%20recommended/AHR%20Braveheart. pdf (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
220. Rosier, supra note 114, at 156.
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influences contents of biographical works so that they "end up being
eulogistic to the people they portray." 221 For instance, Ruy Castro was
accused by the relatives of the late footballer, World Cup champion
Garrincha, of libel for his description of the deceased' s penis length. 222
Defamation suits are a big threat to journalists and biographers who are
willing to reveal the secrets and realities of the deceased that were once
hidden for various reasons.
If biographers are restricted in their writings in using unpublished
expressions, then the value of biographical writings - in particular in
view of their contribution to history - is shaky on the whole.
F. Religious Honor and Group Identity

With respect to defamation of religion, many will recall the Danish
newspaper Jyllands-Posten that printed cartoons portraying Muhammad
in a less favorable way. The case was defeated by the Danish court, 223
although publishers of the same cartoon were punished in Jordan,
Indonesia and Belarus224 which shows a different tolerance of free
speech. The recent example is an Egyptian Christian teacher who was
accused of defamation of Mohammed and Islam by her students and
their parents. 225 She was eventually removed from her job. No doubt,
defamation of the dead prophet and religious leaders is somehow
defamation of the accusers' religious identity, and therefore themselves.
In jurisdictions where defamation of religion is punished, historians
have been silenced and journalists have to conduct self-censorship to
221. Rafael Spuldar, New Law Set to Ease the Way for Biographies in Brazil, XINDEX
(May 9, 2013), available at http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/05/new-law-set-toease-the-way-for-biographies-in-brazil/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
222. ALEX BELLOS, FUTEBOL: THE BRAZILIAN WAY OF LIFE 105 (Bloombury Publ'g
Pie. 2009) (ironically, it was regarded by the adjudicating judge not as degrading, but as a
pride of most Brazilians in that country).
223. AFP, Muslim Cartoon Case Fails to Reach Denmark's Top Court, CANADA.COM
(Oct.
21,
2008),
available
at
http://www.canada.com/topics/
news/world/story.html?id=c25b9b8a-2906-453f-a67 l-l a4a 13 7fe6 l f (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
224. Meagan McElroy, Denmark Court Dismissed Lawsuit Against Editors over
Muhammad Cartoons, JURIST (Oct. 26, 2011, 12:00 AM), available at
http://jurist.org/thisday/2011 I I 0/danish-court-dismissed-lawsuit-against-editors-overmuhammad-cartoons.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); see also L. Bennett Graham,
Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism?, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 69, 69-73 (2009);
see also Belnap, supra note 49, at 638-42.
225. Pamela Geller, Sharia in Action: Christian Teacher in Egypt Accused of
'Defaming Islam' Goes on Hunger Strike, ATLAS SHRUGS (May 13, 2013, 8:43 AM),
available at http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_ shrugs/2013/05/sharia-in-actionchristian-teacher-in-egypt-accused-of-defaming-islam-goes-on-hunger-strike.html
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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avoid troubles. 226 Such official reaction can even influence publishers
from Western democracies who have to take into account negative
consequences. For instance, a student editor from University of Illinois
and an author from Cambridge University confronted aftereffects of
their reproduction of the famous cartoon against Muhammad,
implicating potential self-censorship by both university authorities. 227
We shall not be surprised to observe similar cases even in
European democracies that should have been more tolerant to extreme
speeches. These cases usually stir up agitation and sentimental distress
within religious communities. In the controversial Giniewski v. France,
the author published an article in a Paris newspaper that was deemed
racially defamatory against the Christian community. 228 The author
was accused for condemning Christianity's historical anti-Semitism
while claiming a direct :relation to the horrors at Auschwitz with the
core doctrines of Catholic faith, which undermines "the honour and
character of Christians and, more specifically, the Catholic
community."229 In the subsequent legal proceedings, the criminal
charge was dropped, but the civil complaint was upheld with remedies
awarded and a public statement of court ruling ordered. 230
The case went to the ECtHR for breaching the author's free speech
rights. The applicant claimed that his speech was subject to stricter
control regarding a sensitive religious matter and the French judicial
interpretation of his article was not in accordance with the original texts,
whose intention was to contribute to the public debate on the origins of
anti-Semitism and the extermination of the Jews. 231 The ECtHR
admitted that the interference was prescribed by law, and followed a
legitimate aim to protect the reputation of others (the Christian
community at stake). 232 The Court realized the fact of the broadened
margin of appreciation of its contracting states, due to the "absence of a
uniform European conception of the requirements of the protection of
226. See Graham, supra note 225; see also ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, ENDING THE CHILLING EFFECT: WORKING TO REAL CRIMINAL LIBEL
AND INSULT LA ws 97 (2004) (in many Eastern Europe and Central Asia countries, journalists
are actively convicted and prosecuted by state authorities to encourage self-censorship).
227. IVAN HARE & JAMES WEINSTEIN, EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 312 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2010).
228. Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00, para. 14 (E. Ct. H.R. Apr. 31, 2006),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-72216 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
229. Id. para. 15.
230. Id. para. 18-23.
231. Id. para. 27-28.
232. Id. para. 38-42.
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the rights of others in relation to attacks on their religious
convictions. "233 It admitted that a proper decision was within its
jurisdiction to decide on the pressing social need and proportionality of
interference in balancing different interests. 234
The Court concluded that the defamation accusation is ill grounded
on the texts of the article. It held that the author made a contribution to
the debate of a particular doctrine, which is open to further discussion
by others. 235 The Court could not find attacks on religious beliefs even
though it involved a religious doctrine and the gravity of the matter such
as the Holocaust, and the author's article is not gratuitously offensive,
or insulting, and did not incite disrespect or hatred or cast doubt on
clearly established historical facts. 236 Therefore, in the Court's view,
the interference was not necessary in a democratic society and the
charge of defamation of the Christian community did not confront a
pressing social need. 237 Though the criminal charge was acquitted and
the civil decision ordered a remedy of merely 1 FRF in damages and
publication of a notice of the ruling, the involvement of a criminal
offence per se amounted to a deterrent effect and the sanction appeared
to be disproportionate in the Court's view. 238
Though this case did not involve the dead' s reputation, it
eventually reflects the never-modest reactions from religious groups,
including threatening dissents with defamation petitions, either criminal
or civil. In this case, Christians are no different from Muslims in
defending their beliefs. Not so long ago, Robert Katz wrote in his book
Death in Rome, which was subsequently turned into a film Massacre in
Rome (1973), that then deceased Pope Pius XII knew the planned
executions of Italians nineteen hours before the event. The killings
were in reprisal of the deaths of Germans in Rome due to a partisan
attack. The Vatican denied Katz's allegation of the Pope's silence. 239 A
niece of the Pope lodged the case in the Italian courts claiming
defamation of her uncle's memory. Katz lost his criminal case and was
sentenced to fourteen months imprisonment, which was eventually set

233. Giniewski, App. No. 64016/00, para. 44.
234. Id.
235. See id. para. 50.
236. See id. para. 51-52.
237. See id. para. 53.
238. Giniewski, App. No. 64016/00, para.14.
239.
See
Robert
Katz,
TELEGRAPH,
available
at
http://www.telegraph.eo.uk/news/obituaries/religion-obituaries/8144130/Robert-Katz.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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aside following an amnesty in 1980. 240
The Italian judges in charge carried out an investigation of
historical event themselves for two years, trying to find out what really
happened on March 23rd and 24th of 1943. They travelled around Italy
and Germany to interview witnesses. 241 The local court concluded that
the "one and only truth" is that Pius XII did not know anything about
the planned reprisal, at least no proof could be shown to the court. 242
The Appeal Court quashed the decision of the first instance court and
decided not to get into any historical ascertainment of truth. It granted
the historian "an almost absolute immunity on the basis of Article 3 3 of
the Italian Constitution." 243
However, the Court of Cassation
overturned this ruling and Katz's immunity was abolished. The case
was sent back to the Appeal Court of Rome, which ruled against Katz
and restated the "truth" established by the local court. According to
Resta and Zeno-Zencovich, the final decision is extremely long and
more like a historical treatise than a judicial opinion, and the court has
somehow established an official, authoritative version of the story to
rep lace Katz's findings. 244
G. Holocaust Deniers and Revisionists

We must, when appreciating Rosmus-Wenninger's courage and
achievements in revealing historical truth, 245 pay attention to a different
category of historical studies that are not favoured by many state laws
and communities, as well as historians. History revisionists and
Holocaust deniers belong to this category in advocating different
versions of the dark sides of human history such as war crimes,
genocides and atrocities against humanity and concluded with clearly
established historical facts. 246 Their expressions have been strictly
240. See id.; see also WEBER, supra note 46 (another version of the story is that the
Supreme Court of Italy threw out the case after several appeals ten years later); see also
Emma Brown, Robert Katz, 77, Wrote History of WWII Massacre in Italy, WASH. POST,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/2 l/AR2010102105984.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
241. See Giorgio Resta & Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, Judicial Truth and Historical
Truth : The Case of the Ardeatine Quarries Massacre , 31 L. & HIST. Rev. 844, 877 (2013)
for a more detailed analysis of the case.
242. See id. (the Court's role in finding historical truth would be under critiques of
many historians and lawyers); see also discussion infra Section VI.
243. Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 877.
244. See id. at 878.
245. See discussion infra Section IV.A for her story.
246. See Lehideux & Isomi v. France, App. No. 1045/839, 1997 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on
H.R. 55 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (ruling speeches denying Holocaust are not protected by
Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights).
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restricted in most W estem democracies whose laws directly treated such
expressions as crimes against humanity and human dignity, 247 even in
the case that such expressions are presented as academic discourse or an
extreme form of freedom of expression. This is in particular the case in
countries whose people experienced such tragedies.
When Garaudy challenged the orthodoxies of the Holocaust
against Jews and the existence of Hilter's final solution in his book The
Founding Myth of Modern Israel, he was found guilty of denial of
crimes against humanity, racially defamatory statements, and incitement
to racial hatred. 248 Before the ECtHR, Garaudy claimed that his views
were not revisionist and his book was a political piece of work, instead
of historical, questioning Israeli policies. He also complained that his
book had been misunderstood and distorted by French Courts. 249
Garaudy submitted to the Court that the 24 bis of Act of 29 July 1881
Law, the French Freedom of Press Act, created "a censorship
mechanism that wrongfully restricted freedom of expression. " 250
The Court reiterated that justification of a pro-Nazi policy is
against the Convention's fundamental values and could not be allowed
to enjoy the protection afforded under Article 10. 251 It regarded the
author's expressions and ideas in the book not as historical research
akin to a quest for the truth, but as trying to rehabilitate the NationalSocialist regime and accusing victims of falsifying history. It concluded
that "denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most
serious forms of racial defamation of Jews and of incident to hatred of
them."252
But the latest decision of the Court shows a different tendency on a
similar issue: the Armenian genocide, which has been long debated by
history scholars all through the world and the official history of Turkey
247. See Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment The Quest for
Truth in a Free Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV 35, 77 (1997).
248. See Garaudy v. France, App. No.65831/01 (E. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2003), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-23829 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014). Exclusion of protection of free speech rights of Holocaust denial and other similar
speeches from Article 10 of the Convention, according to some scholars, is not justified and
the case law of ECtHR shall be changed. See, e.g., Hannes Cannie & Dirk Voorhoof, The
Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human Rights Convention: An
Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection?, 29 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM.
RTs. 54, 83 (201 l)("Applying the abuse clause in order to deal with and legitimize the
criminalization of the worst kinds of speech is not a desirable project for the future
development of democracy in Europe.").
249. See Garaudy, App. No.65831/01, para. 17-18.
250. Id. para 20.
251. See id. para. 22.
252. Id. para. 23.
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is under constant criticism. In Perincek v. Switzerland, the Court denied
the genocide from falling into the legal concept of "genocide" precisely
defined by the International court of Justice and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and thus not convinced by the Swiss
court's decision. 253 It regarded the plaintiffs as engaging in speech of a
historical, legal and political nature as part of a heated debate. 254
Many jurisdictions have special memory laws to punish speeches
of deniers of the Holocaust, atrocities, war crimes and massacres and
In Europe, negationism is punishable in
related revisionists. 255
countries such as Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Portugal
and Switzerland. 256 Regarding revisionism in Europe, Germany and
France use different legal terms to cover revisionist views, including
approval or justification, and contestation. 257 This includes, in the
European context, three verbs - to deny, to justify, and to minimize repeatedly used to define negationism and revisionism. 258
Memory law can be used by new democracies to declare a clearcut departure from the past, although possibly at the cost of free
expression, which they should respect and protect more. Consequent to
the recent democratization process, Cambodia has recently passed the
Law Against Non-recognition of the Crimes Committed during the
Democratic Kampuchea Period, which attracted criticism from
ARTICLE 19, a NGO defending free speech rights across the world and
taking its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The law's purpose is to punish those who do not recognize,
downplay, deny, or dispute the existence of the massive crimes in the

253. See Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Criminal Conviction for
Denial that the Atrocities Perpetrated Against the Armenian People in 1915 and Years After
Constituted Genocide was Unjustified ((E. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17, 2013), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4613832-5581451#{%22itemid
%22:[%22003-4613832-5581451%22]} (last visited Dec. 3, 2014)[hereinafter Judgment
Perincek v. Switzerland Press Release].
254. See id. at 3.
255. Revisionist perspective does not deny the Holocaust but rather aims to challenge
the conventional view of responsibility for it; Negationist perspective denies the existence of
holocaust, disregards settled historical norms, and distorts the relationship between the
Holocaust and historical reality. See Emanuela Fronza, Punishment of Negationism: The
Difficult Dialogue Between Law and Memory, 30 VT. L. Rev. 609, 613- 14 (2005); see also
Pascale Bloch, Response to Professor Fronza 's the Punishment of Negationism, 30 VT. L.
REV. 627 (2005).
256. See Fronza, supra note 256, at 614-17.
257. See id. at 618.
258. Id. at 619.
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Democratic Kampuchea period. 259
Other jurisdictions, in contrast, are more tolerant and do not punish
such expressions as Guraudy' s that, according to ECtHR, are certainly
against humanities and lead to racial defamation of Jews. In these
jurisdictions, free speech rights are more respected and better protected,
with the protection extending to extreme expressions.
The Canadian Supreme Court decided so in the famous 1992 Case
of R. v. Zundel. 260 Ernst Zundel was very determined in voicing doubts
over the Holocaust of Jews in his self-published pamphlet called Did Six
Million Really Die ?261 He was convicted for spreading false news
contrary to Section 181 of the Canadian Criminal Code. 262 Regarded as
revisionist history, the pamphlet proposed: inter alia, the amount of
Jewish victims is exaggerated and the Holocaust is a myth made by the
Jewish conspiracy. 263
After convicted twice in lengthy legal
proceedings, Zundel appealed and the Canadian Supreme Court held
that the appeal shall be admitted and Section 181 is unconstitutional. 264
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing on behalf of the Court, said that
Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects
all expression of non-violent form, and the content of Zundel's
pamphlet is irrelevant in the instant case. 265 Furthermore, "[ t]his Court
has repeatedly affirmed that all communications which convey or
attempt to convey meaning are protected by [Section] 2(b ), unless the
physical form by which the communication is made (for example, by a
violent act) excludes protection." 266
One may compare Zundel with an earlier 1990 case Keegstra. The
Canadian Supreme Court ruled differently, upholding Keegstra's
259. Cambodia: Law Against Non-Recognition of the Crimes Committed During
Democratic
Kampuchea,
AR TIC LE
19
(June
2013 ),
available
at
http://www.article 19 .org/data/files/medialibrary/3 7127/13-06-27-cambodia-LA.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 3 2014).
260. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (Can.).
261. See id. at 743.
262. See id. at 744.
263. See id.
264. Seeid.
265. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (Can.). Zundel was also involved in two other
cases regarding Holocaust denial and finally was denounced by the Canadian authority as a
threat to national security who denied his application for Canadian citizenship. Deported
back to Germany, he was convicted of repeated Holocaust denials and sentenced to five
years imprisonment in 2007. Associated Press, German Activist Ernst Zundel Gets 5 Years
for
Denying
Holocaust,
Fox NEWS
(Feb.
16,
2007),
available
at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/02/16/german-activist-emst-zundel-gets-5-years-fordenying-holocaust (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
266. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 753.
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conviction of hate propaganda and dissemination. 267 In this case,
Justice McLachlin, as the dissenting judge, opined in similar lines as in
Zundel that the alleged speeches conveyed a meaning or a message of
non-violent nature. 268 Thus, it is under the protection of Section 2(b),
which protects the fundamental rights to free expression and thought. 269
It "protects all content of expression irrespective of the meaning or
message sought to be conveyed, no matter how offensive it may be."270
She reasoned that "Section 319(2) does not constitute a reasonable limit
upon free speech" and "lacks the required degree of proportionality.'' 271
In the United States, freedom of expression extends even to a much
wider scope including hate speeches and Holocaust denial. As
Persinger noted, "[ o]ne of the principles this country holds dear is the
opportunity to express and receive information regardless of how
unpopular it may be. " 272 This broadened free speech protection covers
civil public discourses, including hate speeches and speeches denying
Lasson noticed that the only
Holocaust for various reasons. 273
jurisprudential remedy against Holocaust denial was by means of
contract law. 274 The related case is about a Holocaust survivor who
won back his denied award of $50,000 for providing successful
evidence for the death of Jews at Auschwitz offered by the Institute for
Historical Review. 275
The American Constitution, said Lidsky, does not allow the State
to "punish citizens for holding anti-Semitic beliefs nor prevent them
from receiving information likely to foster such beliefs." 276 It is
strongly argued that rebuttal of such speeches should be combated in
markets of free speech and the State should be out of this terrain, since
potential censorship may follow state interference in public discourses

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 795-96 (Can.).
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 703, 706.
Jason Persinger, The Harm to Student First Amendment Rights When School

Boards Make Curricular Decisions in Response to Political Pressure: A Critique of
Griswold v. Driscoll, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 291, 312 (2012).
273. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where's the Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation
of Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2008) ( arguing "unlike other countries, the
United States has never justified the regulation of verifiably false speech on the grounds of
that it poses a generalized threat of dignitary harm," such as Holocaust denial speeches).
274. See Lasson, supra note 248, at 77.
275. Id.
276. Lidsky, supra note 274, at 1095.
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that are critical to a democracy. 277
For many, the protection of free speech by the Americans probably
goes too far sometimes, in particular for those who regard such
unpopular, distorted speeches as a means to engrain critical thinking for
students and provide bad examples. When Myers sought to remove
books of Holocaust-denial nature at Texas A&M University Library,
worrying about their influences among students, he was only able to get
them removed from the category of Holocaust and Jewish History to a
different sub-category called Errors and Inventions. Even worse, he
attracted criticisms from fellow scholars across the country, arguing that
any suppression of books is wrong, no matter how repugnant their
message, since no fine line can be drawn on the issue. 278 Even his
sympathizers agreed that such books should not be removed so that they
could be used to study anti-Semitism. 279
The popular fear among the Americans of a slippery road to state
censorship of free expression bears a heavier weight than their impulse
to prevent dignitary harms, mental distress, incitement, and social
disorder consequent to such expressions. 280 The First Amendment right
of free expression has been worshiped on the sanctuary altar by many
Americans as an absolute right. 281
H. Immortality in the Information Age
The Information Age has fundamentally changed the situations of
posthumous reputation and history studies. Online defamation and
privacy invasion cases have attracted attentions of legal scholars to
debate their impact on defamation law and privacy law all over the
world. Due to the information persistence on and easy access to the
Internet, 282 on the one hand, the dead' s reputation can be kept longer
277. See id. at 1095-99 (illustrating the reasons to allow the breathing space for lies);
see also Lasson, supra note 248, at 52-64 (discussing the First Amendment consideration
regarding Holocaust denial speeches in U.S. law).
278. See Mary Ann Roser, A&M Professor Stirs Debate over Holocaust Denial Books,
H-NET
(Apr.
11,
1996,
11: 15
PM),
available
at
http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl ?trx=vx&list=hho locaust&month=9604&week=b&msg=MvFTsuPctbrs 1hgNxSzTTQ&user=&pw=
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
279. Lasson, supra note 248, at 43.
280. See id. at 68 (Lasson argued that "anything which restricts this right (freedom of
self-expression) is a step on the road toward tyranny.").
281. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245 (1961).
282. See SIMSON GARFfNKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (O'Reilly Media 2001) (discussing the threat of the Internet to personal data
protection for information persistency); see also Jean-Francois Blanchette & Deborah G.
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and become known via the Internet, and therefore becomes more
connected with history. On the other hand, the popular use of the
Internet makes defamation of the dead much easier because everyone
has the chance to speak to the whole world on social media and social
networks. While the Internet has posed a new threat to the reputations
of the deceased, it also provides a new forum for public discussion of
the past. The Internet has escalated the conflict between free expression
and protection of the dead's reputation and privacy.
Disclosure of the dead' s information, even for good purposes,
attracts complaints from surviving families. In 2003, Dutch citizen
Eiseres, as the only daughter of her Jewish parents and one of the socalled child survivors, sued in Amsterdam for the publication of
information of her dead parents and her family. The Foundation of
Digital Monument of the Jewish Community in Netherlands (Stichting
Digitaal Monument Joodse Gemeenschap) was founded in 2000 for the
purposes of keeping alive the memory of the dead victims of the Nazi
Holocaust and for promoting scientific research and use of educational
materials. 283 The plaintiff complained that the online publication of her
family's data caused her psychological damage and invaded the privacy
of the family. 284 The Amsterdam court judged in favor of the
foundation after considering the facts that the deceased victims'
information has already been disclosed online and such publication is
not in violation of their honor and reputation in reality. It ruled that the
publication is not unlawful and does not lead to abuse of right, 285 so that
in the instant case "the importance of freedom of expression shall
prevail. " 286
In some jurisdictions, the dead's online reputation has been well
secured, which leads to censorship of history from state authorities. The
Thai government, for instance, blocked the domestic access to the Yale
University Press website in 2006 when the latter planned to publish Paul
Handley's The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol
Adulyadej. 287 The book portrayed a disfavored image of the dead king
Johnson, Data Retention and the Panopticon Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness,
18 INFO. Soc'Y 33 (2002); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L.
REV . ONLINE 88 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacyparadox/right-to-be-forgotten (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
283. HR 12 november 2003, KB 2003, 1363 m.nt GJ (Eiseres/ Stichting Digitaal
Monument Joodse Gemeenschap in Nederland en Gedaagde)(Neth.)[hereinafter Eiseres].
284. Id. at 6.1.
285. Id. at7.4.
286. Id. (" ... moet het belang van de uitingsvrijheid de doorslag geven.").
287. James Warrick-Alexander, Thailand Bars Univ. Website, YALE DAILY NEWS,
available at http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2006/02/06/_-31649/ (last visited Jan 9, 2015).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/1

98

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 42, N

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

92

[Vol. 42:1

in contrast to the popular official image and encountered many
obstacles in publication and dissemination from the Thai state
authority. 288 In 2011, Joe Gordon, a Thai-born American, was punished
with two and a half years' imprisonment for his defaming the royal
family after he posted translated sections of the book online on
American territory. 289 In such jurisdictions, the Internet has become a
new battlefield to suppress criticisms of official history and national
honor, of which posthumous defamation is a handy cause of action
ready for use.

V. FREE SPEECH AND HISTORY CENSORSHIP
Many may regard the American law's strong protection of free
speech, including hate speech and revisionism or negationism, as
radical. But from another point of view, such protection draws a clean
line to prevent the potential instrumental use of defamation law and
privacy law to introduce history censorship by political power. As the
protection of posthumous dignitarian personality rights covers the
dead's reputation and privacy, we have observed the disproportional
restrictions of free expression of journalists or historians by European
domestic courts that were overruled by ECtHR. 290
In this regard, the common law's general rejection of protecting
posthumous reputation has wiped out the possibility totally, unless it has
a strong connection to the living's legally protected interest. One has to
admit that the American approach is the approach to best meet the
international standards promulgated by abovementioned international
human rights law.

A. International Standards
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
("UDHR") protects the right to free expression and the rights to seek,

288. Jane Perlez, A Banned Book Challenges Saintly Image of Thai King, N.Y. TIMES
(Sep.
25,
2006),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/world/asia/25thailand.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
289. Thai Judge Gives American Two Years' Jail for "Insulting Monarchy",
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
7,
2011),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011 /dec/08/thai-american-jail-insulting-monarchy (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
290. See generally Editions Pion v. France, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 (2004);
Lehideux v. France, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998); Mizzi v. Malta, Chamber Judgment Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2006).
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receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds. 291 Article 19 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")
prescribes in particular the right to freedom of expression and freedom
to access to information and ideas, and recognizes relative duties and
responsibilities carried with such rights, like to respect others'
reputation, etc. 292 Article 20 of ICCPR excludes expressions of
"propaganda of war, advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence" from its
The rights to freedom of expression under such
protection. 293
international treaties are broad enough to include and extend to "almost
everything intended to covey meaning", including "information and
ideas of all kinds", 294 even speeches regarded as "deeply offensive."295
According to these international treaties, expressions of historical
research nature shall be protected by domestic law - in the same way as
expressions of political discourse, 296 political canvassing, 297
journalism,298 cultural and artistic expression, 299 teaching, 300 religious
discourse, 301 etc. 302 In particular, General Comment No. 34 of the
Human Rights Committee pointed out that "[ a]11 forms of opinion are
protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or
religious nature. It is incompatible with paragraph 1 to criminalize the
holding of an opinion." 303 If such standards can be strictly taken into
291. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res 217 (III), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
292. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, G.A. Res 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/Res/2200A(XXI), (Mar. 23, 1976).
293. Id. art. 20.
294. Id. art. 19.
295. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 on Art. 19: Freedoms of
Opinion and Expression, Sept. 12, 2011, para. 11, CCPR/C/GC/34, 102 Sess., (July 2011 ).
296. See generally Essono Mika Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, Communication No.
414/1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990 (1994).
297. Concluding Observations on Japan, Human Rights Comm., 94th Sess., Oct. 30,
2008, para. 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/C0/5, (Oct. 2008).
298. Mavlonov and Sa'di v. Uzbekistan, Human Rights Comm, 95th Sess., March 16Apr. 9, 2009, para. 8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004 (March 19, 2009).
299. Hak-Chul Shin v. Republic of Korea, Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., March
15-Apr. 2, 2004, para. 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR//C/80/D/926/2000 (2004).
300. Ross v. Canada, Human Rights Comm., May 1, 1996, para. 11.1,U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (2000).
301. Id. at 11.5.
302. See generally Cambodia: Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review,
ARTICLE
19,
(June
24,
2013),
available
at
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37121/en/cambodia:-joint-submission-tothe-un-universal-periodic-review (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (discussion of International
standards).
303. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 on Art. 19: Freedoms of
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account by the contracting states of the ICCPR, they shall have not
criminalized Holocaust deniers and revisionists. In practice, most such
laws are justified by prevention of racial discrimination, racial
incitement, to "national security or of public order (order public), or of
public health or morals", as prescribed by Article 19. 304
The strong tune of these important international laws, of which
most western countries are signatories, has been much softened in legal
realities even in European democracies. As discussed in the above
Section IV (G), European democracies such as France, Spain, Germany
and Belgium have adopted memory laws regarding Nazi Holocausts,
atrocities and other crimes against humanity. Furthermore, recently the
new democracies in Eastern Europe have passed laws condemning the
past sins of the communists, including the Ukrainian Famine. 305 Even
the European Union proposed a legislative framework for Member
States that certain forms of conducts committed for a racist or
xenophobic purpose such as, among others, "'publicly condoning,
denying or grossly trivializing crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes' should be punished with between one and
three years' imprisonment. " 306
This attitude can be witnessed in ECtHR judgments. For example,
in Garaudy, the Court unanimously ruled that speech in justification of
a pro-Nazi policy could not be protected under Article 10, since it
belongs to the clearly established historical facts and is "against the
Convention's underlying values." 307 But similar laws are not without
criticisms. 308 Even in France, which has taken to more memory laws
than others with respect to Holocaust denial, Armenian genocide, slave
trade and French colonialism, the French Constitutional Council
announced the Armenian Genocide Law to be unconstitutional in a
Opinion and Expression, Sept. 12, 2011, para. 9, CCPR/C/GC/34, 102nd Sess., (July 2011)
(emphasis added by author).
304. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 293, art. 19
305. Josie Appleton, Freedom for History? The Case Against Memory Laws, FREE
SPEECH
DEBATE
(April
3,
2013),
available
at
http://freespeechdebate.com/en/discuss/freedom-for-history-the-case-against-memory-laws/
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
306. Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA,
2008
O.J.
(L328/55)
Art.
l(l)(c),
Art.
3(2),
available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008F0913 :EN :NOT (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
307. Garaudy V. France, HUMAN RJGHTS AND PUB. LAW UPDATE, available at
http://www.lcor.com/1315/?form_l 155.replyids=875 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
308. See Gerald Tishler, When Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech Confront
Holocaust Denial and Group Libel: Comparative Perspectives, 8 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 65
(1988).
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2012 decision. 309 The protection of free speech regarding the Armenian
genocide has been supported most recently in a ECtHR judgment on
December 17th, 2013 which overruled his criminal conviction under
Swiss Criminal Code for "racialist discrimination." 310

B. Historical Truth or Judicial Truth
While expressions regarding clearly established historical facts
lead to controversies, it is easy for courts of law to make decisions,
since there is no need to decide the truth of alleged expressions such as
Holocaust denial and past atrocities. The court's role is to analyze the
desired aims, the deployed methods and the content of the expression,
and then decide whether or not such expression denies clearly
established historical facts. 311 Whether memory laws are really a threat
to free speech rights of the public, in particular historians, deserves
more analysis when they restrict dissents of clearly established facts.
Still, it is important to consider the common law approach that a clearcut line is the best to protect free speech and to prevent state
interference of free expression in posthumous defamation cases from
sneaking into history censorship.
However, when controversies involve historical facts that are not
clearly established, adjudicating courts will face difficulties, first in
checking if such alleged expressions are true, and second, in balancing
free speech rights with posthumous reputation protection.
Most courts will refuse to engage themselves in investigating
historical facts or truth, because courts are neither composed for such
purposes nor suitable for such tasks, 312 when truth is an absolute defense
in many jurisdictions. 313 The argument from historians that historical
309. Nicholas Vinocur & Jon Hemming, French Court Rules Armenian Genocide Law
at
available
2012),
28,
(Feb,
POST
NAT'L
Unconstitutional,
http ://news.nationalpost.corn/2012/02/28/french-court-rules-armenian-genocide-lawunconstitutional/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
310. Judgment Perincek v. Switzerland Press Release, supra note 254.
311. Garaudy v. France, App. No.65831/01, para. 2 (E. Ct. R.R. June 24, 2003),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-23829 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014) (highlighting the French government's replies to the ECtHR).
312. The ECtHR in Chauvy explicated "it is an integral part of freedom of expression
to seek historical truth and it is not the Court's role to arbitrate the underlying historical
issues, which are part of a continuing debate between historians that shapes opinion as to the
events which took place and their interpretation." Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01,
at
available
2004),
29,
Sept.
H.R.
Ct.
(Eur.
69
para.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
313. An exception, for example, is Israeli Defamation Act that does not recognize
truthfulness as a defense except a case is of public concern, though in practice "the courts
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truth should be settled among historians themselves instead of in court
is popularly supported and catches the nerves of judges. 314 Due to the
vagueness of truth in historical study, judges are uncomfortable with
truth defenses and will try to avoid questing controversial content at
stake. 315 And if they cannot consider the truth-value of facts and
opinions, 316 judges can only rely on the facts and opinions brought up
by parties whose reliability is within their expertise. 317 Judges will
decide on other standards that qualify such speeches to be under
protection, such as qualified professional methods, fair comment, public
interest, balanced opinions, prudence, and good faith. 318
But some judges do go that far to verify the truthfulness of
defamation. In the above-discussed Italian case in 1970s, the Italian
court conducted a two-year-long investigation in order to find what had
happened, so that the dead Vatican Pop Pius XII was proved innocent of
Katz's allegation of moral defects in being a bystander to the Ardeatine
Quarries Massacre in Rome. 319 If courts involve themselves in such
activities, then "the feasibility and desirability of authoritative judicial
resolutions in matters of truth and falsity" is continuously under
doubt. 320 The Israeli Supreme Court, in Sharon v. Benziman, ruled that
given other grounds to decide the case exists; judges shall avoid
determining historical truth. 321 The fallout of court-decided historical
truth is that any potential mistakes in the future can impair the judiciary
authority before the public. However, the Israeli courts have performed
such a role in seeking historical truth in past decisions. According to
Barak-Erez, the courts' recounts of the past have served as the official
history of the Israeli state and its official institutions within which the
state organs operate including the judiciary. 322
If misjudgments were made, they have to be followed in later cases
and this puts courts in a passive position when new evidence or new
facts may emerge regarding the same historical controversy. The
judiciary' s independence, very much dependent on the separation of its
seem to find public concern in the bulk of true publications". But cf Peled, The Israeli Law
of Defamation: A Comparative Perspective and a Sociological Analysis, 20 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 735, 757 (2012).
314. See DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 86.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See id. at 87.
319. Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 877.
320. Peled, supra note 79, at 756.
321. Id. at 757.
322. Barak-Erez, supra note 29, at 100-01.
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authority over legal issues from political power, will be diminished.
Resta and Zeno-Zencovich observed this in their research concerning
the dilemma between historical truth and judicial truth confronted by
Italian courts. 323 As in the Katz case, when new evidence was released
by the CIA and the Vatican Archives, new doubts raised, which proved
that courts may not be the appropriate place to settle historical
disputes. 324 The two authors in particular noted that when facts and past
behaviors were evaluated in a court trial, the judgment made a judicial
version of history and it entered the judicial circuit, influencing sequent
decisions in a circular and self-referential way. 325 As the authors
observed in Italian cases regarding historical controversies, judicial
truth "starts to work as an external limit on the freedom of the media to
report about an historical event. " 326
C. The Icons ofHistory Censorship
Because it is an integral part of freedom of expression to seek
historical truth, 327 a total ban on contesting speeches against official or
popular history- including those with well-established historical facts may lead to censorship of history, even in case of the Holocaust and
atrocities. While totalitarian states use censorship to gain legitimacy by
forbidding open debate over historical lies, democracies should be
confident in open discourses of dark past in order to protect free speech
in abstract sense, avoiding any slippery move toward state interference,
and protecting the breathing space even for lies. 328 Constitutional courts
should have a more active role to play in striking down such laws, as the
French Constitutional Council's recent move in quashing the French
government's peppy intervention of history, though somehow at the
price of mental distress to Armenian people. History is not the stuff of
justice, as Wartanian warned, "it belongs to historians who rectify lies,
not to politicians. " 329 As courts cannot decide on the truthfulness of the
323. Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 880-86.
324. Id at878- 79.
325. Id at 874- 78. In multiple related cases regarding the Ardeatine Quarries
Massacre in Rome, Italian courts offered different evaluations of historical facts. Id
326. Id at 874.
327. Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01, para. 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 29, 2004),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
328. Lidsky, supra note 274, at 1095.
329. See Raffi Wartanian, Memory Laws in France and their Implications:
HUMANITY
IN
ACTION,
available
at
Institutionalizing
Social
Harmony,
http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/l 17-memory-laws-in-france-and-theirimplications-institutionalizing-social-harmony (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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presented evidence by different parties, they have to ask for testimony
from historians as expert witness. 330
Courts should act more carefully in defamatory cases that involve
historical facts that are not so clearly established but are of public
interest. Courts shall leave historical facts for open discussions by
others including historians. In such cases, courts also need to balance
the dead's dignity, including their privacy and reputation - as well as
their family's interests, both dignitary and commercial - with free
speech rights of others. Since interference of free speech may be
justified by protecting posthumous reputation, which is a legitimate goal
in many laws, the focus of courts should be on seeking good balance,
not investigation of truthfulness of the alleged expressions. But how
can we judge the existence of potential chilling effects in court's
balancing process or, more generally, in a judicial system? What are
the possible criteria to define possible history censorship in court
verdicts?
Above all, in my view we may look at how many categories of
defense are available to defendants in defamation cases. The more
defenses are allowed, and the higher the threshold of restriction of free
expression, the less opportunity for censorship of history in court
decisions.
As the oldest defense for defamation, truth defense has not been
allowed as complete defense in some criminal charges. 331 When truth
does not matter in defamation convictions, the purpose of the law is to
protect the political authority or social ordering. 332 In criminal
procedures, a combination of presumption of innocence and truth
defense will obviously offer the charged a strong protection against
defamation accusations. In Colombani & Others v. France, the ECtHR
330. There are critics against historians' role in court testimony. See Richard J. Evans,
History, Memory, and the Law: The Historian as Expert Witness, 41 HIST. & THEORY 326
(2002) (commenting on Henry Rousso's book, the author argued that historians shall only
elucidate the historical context and avoid being involved in judging whether an individual
was guilty or otherwise of a crime).
331. See Elaine Pearson, Criminal Defamation Laws in Indonesia Stifle Democracy,
HUM. RTS. WATCH, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/10/criminal-defamationlaws-indonesia-stifle-democracy (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing the fact that in
Indonesian law, truth is not a defense if an official found your expression to be insulting);
Friedman, supra note 66, at 54 (noting that the truth only became an absolute defense in
more democratic time; and authoritarian governments do not like criticism since truth hurts,
so that in many ways the situation would be even worse if such charges were true, as said in
the old maxim).
332. Elizabeth Samson, The Freedom to Speak Truth to Power, GUARDIAN, available
at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2012/apr/20/1 ibel-law-tourismreform (last visited Dec. 3 2014).
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regarded the rejection of the French judiciary of the applicant's use of
truth defense as "beyond what is required to protect a person's
reputation and right, even if that person was a head of a state or
government. " 333
Another important defense widely adopted in most Westem
democracies is the public figure rule in particular in the U.S., which
offers more protection over speeches regarding public figures. 334 The
Chinese defamation law has not recognized such a doctrine though
some judges have mentioned it in the latest verdicts. 335 This means that
Chinese public figures, especially political figures, will enjoy equal
protection of law with average people, while holding higher social
status offers them more influence on public affairs. In Europe, the
public figure doctrine (or rule) has gained more support at least in some
ECtHR decisions. As in recent Joe Luis, the Court ruled that the limits
of acceptable criticism in view of the press "are accordingly wider with
regard to a politician acting in his public capacity than in relating to a
private individual"; and politicians "must display a greater degree of
tolerance. " 336 Again, in Lehideux & lsorni v. France, the Commission
emphasized the importance of historical debate about a public figure
and the related different opinions. 337 In Suarez v. Spain, it stated that
"[ e]xceptions to freedom of expression must be interpreted
333. Colombani & Others v. France, App No 51279/99, para. 66 (E. Ct. H.R. Sept. 25,
2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-60532 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
334. For an explanation of the public figure doctrine in U.S. law; see Scott
Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public
Figures, 49 AM. Bus. L.J. 125-208 (2012); George E. Stevens, Local and Topical Pervasive
Public Figures After Gertz., 66 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 463 (1989); Catherine Hancock,
Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First Amendment Defamation Law, N.Y. INT'L L.
REY. 81 (2006); James C. Mitchell, The Accidental Purist: Reclaiming the Gertz: All
Purpose Public Figure Doctrine in the Age of "Celebrity Journalism", 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 559 (2002); John J. Watkins, The Demise of the Public Figure Doctrine, J. COMMC'N:
A PUBL'N NAT'L Soc'y FOR STUDY COMMC'N 47 (1977).
335. Hou Shoujin yu Zhongguodianying Jituan Gongshi Deng Qinhaimingyuquan An
I]!
Huo Shoujin v. China Film Group et al.]
available
at
(Beijing
High
Ct.
2007)
(China)
http://www.fsou.com/html/text/fnl/1176753/l l 7675388.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
336. Gutierrez Suarez, App. No. 16023/07, para. 26 (2010); Case of Jerusalem v.
Austria, App. No. 26958/95, para. 38 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 27, 2001), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-59220 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
337. Lehideux, App. No. 24662/94, para. 45; see Von Hannover v. Germany (No.2),
App. Nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, para. 64, 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-109029 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014) (explaining wider protection of privacy for public figures' awarded even when no
public interest is involved in publication).
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restrictively." 338 In the 2013 Eon v. France, it emphasised on the wider
range of criticism of politicians than ordinary people, since they
willingly subject themselves to public and media scrutiny. 339
In addition, the Assembly Resolution of the Council of Europe on
the Right to Privacy prescribes that the right to privacy of public figures
is lucrative and often invaded, but they must recognize that the social
position they occupy in society automatically entails increased pressure
on their privacy. 340 Also, most recently, the Council of Europe adopted
a rule similar to public figure doctrine to restrict the extra-protection of
public figures in their privacy (family life) and reputation. 341
The admission of opinions and fair comment for defense are
important for free speech protection. After Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co., 342 the U.S. defamation law has moved away from the long doctrine
since Sullivan, 343 and a defense similar to opinion privilege has been
adopted by the ECtHR when opinions or fair comments are "on a matter
of public interest which was underpinned by a sufficient factual
basis. " 344
In addition, courts should allow historians and journalists the
defenses of professional standards, sufficient prudence, good faith, and
participation in academic debates. 345 Once courts are willing to accept
338. Gutierrez Suarez, App. No. 16023/07, para. 26. Also, note a series of recent
cases judged by ECtHR regarding the analysis of term of public figures in its verdicts. See
also Verlagsgruppe News GmbH & Bobi v. Austria, App. No. 59631/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr.
3, 2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-115013
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014); 000 'Vesti' & Ukhov v. Russia, App. No. 21724/03 (Eur. Ct.
H.R.
Aug.
30,
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=OO 1-119969 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
339. ECtHR: Eon v France, ARTICLE 19 (Aug. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37188/en/ecthr:-eon-v-france (last visited
Dec. 3 2014).
340. EUR. PARL. Ass., Res. 1165 - Right to privacy, 24th Sess., at para. 6 (1998),
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta98/eres 1165 .htm
(last
visited Nov. 17, 2014).
341. EUR. PARL. Ass., Res. 15 77 - Towards decriminalization of defamation , 34th
Sess.,
at
para.
6,
17.6
(2007),
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta07/eres 1577 .htm
(last
visited Nov. 17, 2014) (describing resolutions regarding defamation and privacy laws).
342. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (ruling the First
Amendment does not require a separate "opinion" privilege limiting the application of state
defamation laws).
343. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
344. Jucha & Zak v. Poland, App. No. 19127/06, para. 45 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 23,
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-113919 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
345. See DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 87.
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such defenses, even if the alleged narratives or accounts of historical
events bear some falsity, judges in general will rule in favor of free
speech. For instance, French historian Jean-Luc Einaudi was found
guilty, but with no remedy awarded because his research is of a
"serious, relevant and comprehensive" nature according to the court. 346
In contrast, rejection of justifiable defenses in courts is a clear sign
of potential censorship in posthumous defamation cases. As De Baets
pointed out in his study, historians were found as defamers on the
following grounds: "they did not interview eyewitnesses, overestimated
the value of certain texts or acts of the complainant, did not consult
original sources but literature only, or attached [more] importance to a
De Baets' observations of the posthumous
single source. " 347
defamation cases find a parallel pattern in Chinese cases. In many
cases, Chinese judges upheld defamation petitions because the authors
did not use authoritative sources, 348 did not verify the sources used with
the deceased's family before publication, 349 did not verify the sources
such as oral history and published individual memoirs, 350 or did not
work with due care in some cases, 351 etc. Also, there was no distinction
between opinions and facts in historians' alleged texts made by Chinese
courts. 352 It proved that the more defenses that are accepted by courts,
the more that professional methods are respected, and the less that
censorship will occur in court decisions.
Secondly, courts may restrict free expression on obviously weird
grounds in some cases, when procedural requirements prevent other
ways of protecting the deceased's reputation. In Mizzi v. Malta, the
controversial text that was accused of being defamatory was a simple
sentence "Dr. Boffa wanted to build there," which was read by the
deceased's son as "attribut[ing] false and despicable intentions to his
father," 353 and by the Maltase Court of Appeals as "it implied that Dr.
346. Ariane Chemin, Long History of a Forgotten Massacre, LE POINT INT'L (Nov. 5,
2011 ), available at http://www.lepointintemational.com/it/cultura/europa/765-long-historyof-a-forgotten-massacre.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). Due to the brave historians' works
on the subject, the killings of Algerians in France in 1961 were recognized by the French
government and a plaque was put on the bridge where the event happened to commemorate
the dead. Id.
347. DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 87.
348. See Bo Zhao, Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy in China: The
Dead, the Law, and the Social Transition, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 269, 323 (2014).
349. See id. at 347.
350. See id. at 341.
351. See id. at 347.
352. See id. at 347-48.
353. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec.
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Boffa had taken advantage of his position as head of the civil
administration," a reading supported by the Constitutional Court. 354 It
was denied by the ECtHR since such a reading "made it very difficult, if
not impossible, for the applicant to provide direct corroboration of it." 355
In the Spanish Gutierrez Suarez, the Spanish Supreme Court, was
unable to declare defamation on solid grounds, pointed to the headline
of the alleged article instead of body content, as violating the honor of
the then deceased Moroccan King. 356 The ECtHR rejected this decision
that headlines, whose aim is to call the attention of readers, must be read
in combination with body context; and that "journalistic freedom also
covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even
provocation. " 357 Both interpretations of such texts were strange even to
ordinary readers.
Lastly, censorship of free speech in posthumous defamation cases
may generally be found in the disproportionality of court verdicts. This
is seen either in improper protections given to posthumous reputation or
privacy, while obviously it is not in great danger; or in the legal
measures restricting free speech, such as injunctions, and remedies and
damages awarded to plaintiffs, which are unusual, exceeding necessity.
While posthumous reputation is recognized as legitimate, it is a
delicate issue for courts to balance the deceased' s interests and their
families' with the free speech of others, in particular when public
interest is involved. As a fundamental value to democracy, free speech
rights shall have certain priority, unless exceptional occasions are at
stake.
Take Szenes for example, where Justice Cheshin even claimed the
equal legal status of reputation to free speech in democracy and the
Jewish community in particular, including reputation of the dead. 358 It
defined that among others, the realization of collective identity of the
state, its national history, and its own social goals form part of public
interest. 359 The Israeli Supreme Court pointed out that the petition was
filed under the public law to protect public interest, such as protecting
the dignity and good name of the dead, protecting historical truth and
3, 2014).
354. Id. para. 12, 15.
355. Id. para. 35.
356. The Constitutional Court of Spain upheld the decision. Gutierrez Suarez, App.
No. 16023/07, para. 10 ("It stated that the headlines of the information led the average
reader to believe that the Moroccan royal family had been an accomplice to illegal
trafficking in hashish.").
357. Id. para. 36.
358. Szenes, 53(3) PD 817 at para. 9, 12.
359. Id. para. 17.
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honoring national values, as well as the rights of defendants. The court
judged that regarding the circumstances that can justify curtailing
freedom of expression, expressions that are offensive to other's feelings
are not a strong ground, because "if every such offense was to justify
infringement, surely these freedoms and indeed democracy itself would
be emptied of meaning. " 360
The court admitted that a democracy should be sensitive to such
feelings, but "[a] democratic society is based on the recognition that the
feelings of some will inevitably be offended by their fellows' exercise
of their respective freedoms." 361 The court stated explicitly that in
explaining the protection of heroes and collective memory, law in a
democracy does not preserve the image of its heroes by repressing
freedom of expression, and that truth shall reject falsehood in the free
market of ideas. 362 In conclusion, the court rejected protection of the
dead's name under public law, but ruled that the requested remedy
could only be sought in private law, where the balance could be made
differently. 363
In the above reasoning, we observe a clear but high threshold of "a
compelling or urgent need" to justify the restriction of free speech. 364
This can be regarded as a standard to gauge potential censorship in
relevant court decisions. At this point, the ECtHR carries out its
balancing processes in a similar way when facing appeals from largelydiversified social-cultural backgrounds, by interpreting the adjective
"necessary" in Article 10 (2) as implying the existence of a pressing
social need. " 365 On the whole, the Court balanced different interests in
a much-fixed pattern, in particular when it takes into account the margin
of appreciation of Contracting States, so that it will not interfere with
domestic affairs. 366 The Court usually checks if state interference with
free speech has a legitimate aim prescribed by law, if such restriction is
necessary to a democracy, and if it is in accordance with the
360. Id. para. 20.
361. Id. para. 22.
362. Id. para. 27-28.
363. Szenes, 53(3) PD 817 at para. 28.
364. In Justice Mazza's words, "a concrete and imminent danger of uprooting the
public order." Id. para. 28. (quoting HCJ 2888/97 Novik v. Channel Two Television &
Radio PD 51(5)193, 202 (Isr.)).
365. See Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 29, 2004),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014); see Editions Plon v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18,
2004), available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-61760 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
366. See Chauvy, App. No. 64915/01; see Editions Pion, App. No. 58148/00.
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proportionality standard, not exceeding necessity. 367
In Chauvy, the Court noted that it must consider the public interest
in being informed of the circumstances of the previous French
Resistance leader, and the need to protect the reputation of Mr. and Mrs.
Aubrac in the impugned betrayal of the book. 368 Furthermore, the Court
prescribed that it "must verify whether the state authorities struck a fair
balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention",
namely the right of expression and the right of others to reputation. 369
As pointed out already, the Court did not judge the legitimacy in
protecting posthumous reputation or honor by contracting states, since
this is a matter within margin of apperception. 370 It merely executed its
supervisory role to verify the proper use of legal measures in limiting
free speech, and the proportionality of the interference contingent on the
nature and severity of the penalties imposed. 371
In Pion, the Court pointed out the circumstance of time distance as
an important element in striking a good balance. 372 The Court found the
book ban in violation of Article 10 in that the more time elapsed after
the President's death, the more the public interest in debating the
President's two terms of presidency prevailed over his interest to
medical confidentiality, in particular when the duty of confidentiality
was breached and there was already dissemination in traditional media
and the Intemet. 373 Another important ruling from the ECtHR is that
posthumous reputation is a much weaker interest in balancing different
values under its protection. 374
The discussion of the proportionality standard brings us to
available measures used by courts to restrict free speech in posthumous
defamation cases. Usually this could be monetary damages awarded to
plaintiffs or defamation victims, and injunctions (prohibitory or
367. See Chauvy, App. No. 64915/01; see Editions Pion, App. No. 58148/00.
368. Chauvy, App. No. 64915/01, para. 69.
369. Id. para. 70.
370. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012), available at
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
371. Chauvy, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 78 ("Assessing the proportionality of the
interference, the nature and severity of the penalties imposed.").
372. See Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 2004),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-61760 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014).
373. Id. para. 53.
374. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014) (ruling that "in this respect, although the possibility of bringing such an action
existed in the Maltese legal system .. . it is of the view that this element should have been
considered by the domestic courts when assessing the proportionality of the interference.").
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mandatory). Since defamation of the dead should generally cause less
harm than defamation of the living, damages awarded accordingly
should be comparatively lower. As seen in Mizzi v. Malta, the awarded
damages were a symbolic amount of 700 euros. 375 Interim injunctions
are more acceptable for prevention of potential harm when the real
circumstances are unclear. 376 If a book has a small defamatory part
about a deceased historical figure and can be corrected by deletion or
change of text, banning the whole book after publication is obviously an
indication of potential censorship by state. 377
In many occasions, an obligatory publication of apology or court
verdict will be ordered to restore the deceased's reputation. Though this
might be an insult to authors, its real impact is doubtful in social reality.
Bans and publication of apologies on widely circulated media or on the
Internet could bring even more public attention because of the famous
Streisand effect. 378 In the history of censorship, many times banning
books did not stop circulations; instead the bans even brought more
readers to banned authors.
D. A Threat from Law or to Law?

A last point to make is that whether a law implements history
censorship - or censorship of expressions regarding the past of the dead
- has to be defined more carefully, not denoted in a few cases regarding
posthumous defamation and privacy-invasion. It has to be found in a
series of similar cases in which judges have constantly restricted free
speech rights with respect to historical expressions, by upholding
defamation convictions, awarding large damages, and imposing
unnecessary injunctions. It has to be demonstrated that the pursued
legal aims are not just and prescribed by law. It has to be demonstrated
that free expression has been given less weight than they should have
been, if following the proportionality standard endorsed by the
ECtHR. 379 However, if a jurisdiction always decides in favor of
375. See id. para. 39. Also, an award of eighty-eight Euros in damages is more or less
symbolic in the famous Flux v. Moldova. See also Flux v. Moldova (No. 6) App. No.
22824/04
(Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
Oct.
29,
2008),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-88063 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
376. For instance, European Court of Human Rights accepted interim injunctions in
general. Editions Pion, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 35, 48.
377. As pointed out by the ECtHR in Pion. See id.
378. See Mario Cacciottolo, The Streisand Effect: When Censorship Backfires, BBC
(last updated June 15, 2012, 11 :19 PM), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk18458567 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
379. See discussion supra Section V(C).
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posthumous defamation regarding deceased political figures with
impact in history, while it awards no such protection to the ordinary
deceased, we may observe possible censorship of history conducted in a
legal system.
While historians and free speech rights advocators criticize
censorship of history via legal protection of the dead's reputation and
privacy, proponents of posthumous dignitary rights may argue that the
presumed chilling effects are not only imaginary, but also practically
not true. For example, for Hannes Rosier, the idea that a posthumous
personality right could deter valuable historical research is not well
justified. 38 First of all, Rosler argued, since truth is the commonly
acceptable defense of libel charges, it will motivate historians to publish
more accurate, factually-based statements. 381 A second reason, he
argued, is that adoption of the narrow dignitary personality right could
encourage free speech instead of chilling it. 382 If one knows that his
lifetime achievement and reputation in the public memory can be
protected, he would participate more actively in public discourse and
disclose more personal information. 383 A third reason is that due to the
failure of the marketplace of ideas, there is public interest to protect
reputation against defamatory statements, in particular those against the
deceased and defenseless minorities. 384 Other arguments include the
lack of societal interest in false communication, potential exceptional
protection only for severely infringements, and proportional restriction
via balanced decisions. 385
Rosler's arguments cannot be denied in abstract. In reality,
however, counter examples can be found in some ECtHR cases
regarding posthumous defamation and privacy invasion. For many
contracting states, protection of the dead's dignity and personality
nevertheless ended up in decisions that were overturned by the Court for
free speech protection. 386 The threat from the deceased's families with
a defamation suit, whether criminal or civil, causes authors to selfcensor before publication. The legal recognition of posthumous dignity

°

380. Rosler, supra note 77, at 190.
381. Id. at 190.
382. Id. at 188.
383. Id. at 188-89.
384. Id. at 189.
385. Rosier, supra note 77, at 188-91.
386. See Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 2004),
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited Dec.
3, 2014); Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012), available at
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107 530 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014 );
Gutierrez Suarez v. Spain, App. No. 16023/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012).
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(including reputation, privacy, honor, etc.) per se provides a legal
avenue to incorporate potential state censorship. This lies in the use of
law to police the bounds of certain speeches, in particular speeches
regarding Holocaust denial, which shall draw our caution. When state
authority can regard all Holocaust or genocide denial or similar
speeches illegal, it may exclude other speeches from protection of free
speech as well, if not monitored closely by the public. Thus "a
government that can tell us what not to say can also tell us what we
must say", 387 which is detrimental to democracy holding free speech as
the most fundamental value. In a more general sense, the law's
protection of the dead' s dignitary interests and the related interest of the
living may cause a threat or chilling effect on free speech for
democracy.
With respect to law's instrumental use within this context, the
threat is not only from law, but to law itself. According to Douglas,
"certain features that define law as a formal discourse" concerning
harm, culpability, proof and jurisdiction, have "distort[ed] ... the very
history record that law has been asked to [protect]. " 388 Even worse is
that when law serves the end to protect certain kinds of information and
suppress others, especially when involving historical facts that are too
long to be investigated, law reaches its limit, as seen in the
controversies around truth commissions in many post-war countries.
With impossible missions, the real threat is to law itself, not only to
historical research. Law cannot risk its independence, authority, and
trust from the public to impose threat on free expression that is crucial
to a democracy.

VI. LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE
Law is vulnerable before politics. The Russian authority's passive
attitude to the rehabilitation of Katyn tragedy victims showcases that a
political state can have difficulties confronting its dark past. 389 The
unexpected termination of the official investigation of the tragedy in the
1990s especially reveals the law's weakness in handling sensitive,
political events. When history has a significant role to play in politics,
387. Smith, supra note 101, at 137.
388. Lawrence R. Douglas, Policing the Past: Holocaust Denial and the Law, in
CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 67, 68 (Robert C. Post
ed., 1998).
389. See 000 'Vesti' & Ukhov v. Russia, App. No. 21724/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 30,
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-119969 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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censorship of history becomes feasible and law might be a victim of
political suppression of those who talk frankly about the past. Law is
also a product of a particular culture. While in Germany and other
continental law countries the dead's dignity and honor is significant and
protected as fundamental values by law, common law countries offer
almost no protection of such posthumous interests. This section tries to
interpret, following the above case analysis, the political and cultural
rationales underpinning potential history censorship within different
conceptual and cultural embeddings.

A. Politics and Law
Authoritarian regimes and dictatorial states have the most and
strongest motives to censor history. The primary reason is to gain
legitimacy and support of the public by use (misuse or abuse) of history
of which censorship and control of the past is a necessity. Dictators
know well the power of history and lie to distort the reputation of many
deceased opponents. For example, Stalin removed Leon Trotsky out of
books to dehumanize him because the true record of Trotsky denied
Stalin as the true heir of Lenin, showing no crucial role in the
Bolsheviks' victory. 390 The extreme use of history for legitimacy is the
distortion of the North Korean War by North Korean dictators who
described the West as the invader, diminished external military aids,
and advocated "a total victory" on its own. 391 The past is usually cast as
miserable and dark by a new political regime, so that a new community
can be promoted and cherished for development and achievement.
Second, the deceased can be forged either as a moral model for
others to follow, or as negative examples punished for political
purposes. But, such distortion or fabrication of posthumous reputation
can cause serious distrust of the regime in eventual disclosure of facts.
The famous Chinese moral model Lei Feng set up by communist
propaganda recently has been under serious scrutiny by a new
generation of historians. 392 In contrast, many landlords who are

390. MACMILLAN, supra note 4, at 25.
391. A similar story happens to USSR's support in North Korean's version of the War.
Sarah Buckley, North Korea's 'Creative' History, BBC NEWS ONLINE (July 25, 2003, 14:30
GMT), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3096265.stm (last visited Dec. 3,
2014); Korean Independence: A History Re-Written by North Korea, NEW Focus INT'L
(Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://newfocusintl.com/independence-day-in-north-koreachanging-with-the-times/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
392. The defamer of the dead hero was detained by Beijing police recently in China's
new wave to crackdown online social media which threats official authority in various
fields. Questioning of Lei Feng's Frugality Leads to Detention, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21,
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regarded as notorious and blood-sucking and who died during China's
numerous political movements, have been later found out to be merely
fabrications for political ends by the Chinese Communist Party. 393
Even dictators themselves who have been worshipped by the
populace are products of such powerful propaganda machines. Secrets
and sins deliberately covered from being known would shock the public
later. Mao's real characteristics nowadays gradually emerge before the
public because of the disclosure of his brutal political decisions and
policies from two sources: the declassification of some archives of
former the Soviet Union regarding China, 394 and the recently published
stories of Mao's private life by the individuals who worked for or
around him. 395
When public figures' reputations are so closely affiliated with the
official history of a state, to protect their reputations is to protect the
official history. Turkey's special law directly protects the honor and
dignity of the dead Ataturk. 396 The Egyptian penal code criminalized
and allowed detention for insulting the president before the Arab
Spring. 397 In these countries, law has been openly used for suppression
of speeches concerning the late public figures as direct censorship of
history per se.
"As social norms change, laws that touch on reputation and privacy
change along with them." 398 The shift in Stalin's reputation in Russia
after his death reflects the influences of political change on social
morals and ethos in Russian community. With the fall of communism
in particular, the Russian authority to some extent allowed the

2013 , 8:00 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/08/21/four-detainedfor-questioning-lei-fengs-frugality/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
393. For example, Liu Wencai was a fabricated figure of the communist propaganda
machine, which is totally against his real personality, to incite political hatred between
classes during the Culture Revolution. Gao Wenqian & Regina Hackett, Revisiting the
Past: Insights from the Art of the Cultural Revolution, HUMAN RTS. IN CHINA (Oct. 21,
2009), available at http://www.hrichina.org/content/3824 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
394. See ALEXANDER v. PANTSOV & STEVEN I. LEVfNE, MAO: THE REAL STORY (Simon
& Schuster reprint ed. 2013).
395. Mao's personal doctor, for instance, wrote a book portraying a different private
life from the official version, which can lower the great leader's honor. See LI ZHI-SUI, THE
PRIVATE LIFE OF CHAIRMAN MAO (Random House 1996).
396. Law Concerning Crimes Committed against Ataturk No. 5816, U.S. FOUNDATION,
INC (2014), available at http://www.usefoundation.org/view/878 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014);
see MELZER, supra note 56, at 40.
397. MELZER, supra note 56, at 188.
398. FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 5.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/1

116

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 42, N

110

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 42:1

discussion of Stalin's cruel ruling by historians and witnesses. 399
Attitudes to Stalin are polarized between supporters and dissents, and
between the Russian state authority and many EU countries that often
compare him with Hitler. Recently top Russian leaders reclassified the
related archives and portrayed him as an effective crisis manager. 400
The earlier popular, liberal trend among Russian politicians after the
collapse of communism seems to have been replaced with a strong
sentiment of national pride and honor. This may somehow explain the
Russian authority's reluctance to rehabilitate the deceased Polish
victims of the Katyn tragedy, although Russia itself has a rehabilitation
law to restore the reputations of those who died under communist
repression.
However, there is no turning back in Eastern European countries
that have joined the EU and willingly embraced Western political
ideology after the collapse of communism. Many countries in Eastern
Europe passed rehabilitation laws, investigated previous politically
charged suppressions, and convicted political criminals. Posthumous
reputations that were tarnished under previous communist regimes got
the chance to be restored and remedied. For instance, relatives of the
deceased Latvian peasants, who died in hands of paramilitary
combatants led by communist partisans and supported by the Russian
during the WWII, accused the surviving partisan of war crimes for
killing innocent civilians. 401 Similar cases emerged especially after the
collapse of the Berlin Wall, involving re-evaluation of communist
resistant activities during WWII against Nazi occupation. In France, the
Chauvy case involves the defamation of surviving communist resistant
forces with suspicion of their potential betrayal. 402 In Italy, public
debate on the values of the communist resistance was dramatically
reopened and the sudden increase in civil actions concerning violations
of personality rights was an immediate byproduct of the changed
political climate and of a new phase of public confrontation with the

399. Anne Garrels, Libel Case Sparks New Focus on Stalin's Reputation, NPR (Sept.
8,
2009,
3:18
PM),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=l 12642329 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
400. Id.
401. See Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 17, 2010),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-98669 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
402. See Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 29, 2004),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
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past. 403
Political change can cause re-evaluation of the past and reputations
of the deceased in new democracies such as Spain, Peru, Chile,
Argentina, etc. These countries went through political transition from
dictatorship or totalitarian states to democracy. In these countries, it is
possible to investigate political leaders' past sins and hidden secrets of
militaries in previous oppression. Therefore, many people's reputations
including the deceased could be altered in the context of political
transition. Posthumous reputation can be protected by laws strongly
supported by politicians who survived collapsed regimes or by their
families and supporters who still stay in power. Further complicating
the situation, amnesty laws may block the way to seek historical truth.
To prevent opening old historical wounds, which may detain the
restoration of democracy, the Spanish community reached compromise
and passed the 1977 Amnesty Law after Franco's death. 404 Though the
treatment of the legacy of Franco's long dictatorship is still
controversial, defamation of Franco cannot yet be tolerated by the
deceased' s proponents. 405
In a sense, we may take Spanish Amnesty Law as a form of forced
silencing or censorship of history. The 1977 Law is incompatible with
international human rights law that overrides the imprescriptibility
principle in criminal law. In addition, the Spanish Law to Historical
Memory also brings the legal principles of irretroactivity and
predictability into question. Both principles are critical to establishment
of rule of law in new democracies. 406 If such fundamental legal
doctrines or principles can be ignored, even for higher values like
justice and human dignity, the authority of law and its independence
from political power would be under threat of political whims and
sensations, which escalate easily during political change.
More importantly, Spain's Amnesty Law is the pact of different
social forces that compromised their interests to have a better future.
The law is of the nature of a social contract that should bear binding
force over generations.
A breach under political pressure can

403. In Italy there are cases against the communist resistant force concerning the
Ardeatine Quarries Massacre. See Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 861-64.
404. Kadribasic, supra note 108, at 132.
405. It seemed that both supporters and the opponents have not been satisfied with the
ways that the memory and legacy of Franco has been handled so far. Guy Hedgecoe,
Spanish Left Cold Over 'Franco in a fridge,' DW (Aug. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.dw.de/spanish-left-cold-over-franco-in-a-fridge/a-17029255 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
406. For a general discussion of internal principles oflaw see FULLER, supra note 8.
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deconstruct mutual trust within the Spanish community. The idea that
promise must be kept is essential for the existence and dignity of all
human communities in the long run. This compromise or mutual trust
should not be broken to meet short-term political needs. Otherwise, law
is merely an instrument under the manipulation of politicians or the
masses. 407
Recently, Spanish law made a significant move in Garzon in which
law stayed away from political whim, 408 indicating that Spain now has a
firm democracy and rule of law. In similar political context, the Israeli
Supreme Court judged Szenes in favor of free speech, instead of being
motivated by the political consideration to promote Israeli identity for
state construction. 409 In this case, national identity represented by the
deceased heroine is of political importance to collective memory and
collective identity, but the defamatory threat is not high enough to
require more protection than free speech. The decision would have
been different before in the formative stage of the Israeli State, when the
Israeli law had played a significant role in state-construction and
identity establishment. As Bilsky noticed, this transformation period
lasted until the 1990s since the Zionist revolution, and many of the
constitutional moments involved transformation trials of a more
political nature. 410
In mature democracies, law is more independent from political
power and is strong enough to rebut the political need of history
censorship. Free speech rights are regarded as fundamental to a wellfunctioning democracy and are well protected by its constitution.
Furthermore, political states draw legitimacy from ballots, not from
history. Another notable reason that we see less censorship of history in
democracies is that in democracies, citizens are treated equally as
mature fellows, capable of making rational decisions themselves with
free access to information. A political state is not assumed to be in the
position to tell people what and what not to believe; which is contrary to
authoritarian states, where there is a paternalist approach to think on
behalf of subordinates. In addition, we have to note that democratic
communities are more tolerant due to multiculturalist nature,
407. For a discussion of the independence oflaw and rule of law in Modem state from
politics see PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW & SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW (1978).
408. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 176.
409. See generally HCJ 6126/94 Szenes v. Broadcasting Authority 53(3) PD 817
[ 1999] (Isr. ).
410. LEORA BILSKY, LAW, MEANING & VIOLENCE: TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE ISRAELI
IDENTITY ON TRIAL 7-10 (Univ. of Michigan Press 2004).
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recognizing and treating different cultures rather equally. 411
These are the reasons why most countries that have decriminalized
defamation are mature Western democracies. However, this is not to
say that rule of law and democracy, both respecting free speech as a
fundamental value, can eradicate potential history censorship even in
Western democracies. But, the non-protection of the dead's reputation
and dignity in common law countries can block history censorship as
justified by protection of the dead as a whole. Though the deceased's
living family may sue to protect their own interest affiliated with the
deceased, it offers no big chance to control information regarding the
dead in a more systematic way.
Protection of the dead' s dignitary interest by some continental law
countries, in contrast, leaves a legal avenue open for state interference
with history, even if such cases have to be waged by private parties.
The disproportional interference of free speech rights, discussed above
with respect to Pion, Mizzi, Lehideux, Kurzac, Gutierrez Suarez, etc.,
denotes possible history censorship, even by European democracies via
the protection of posthumous interests. Such cases, however, verify the
importance of a transnational court in securing free speech rights and
preventing state censorship of history. The critical role for the ECtHR
is to make decisions from a neutral position, away from the compelling
pressures of domestic politics, national identities, and cultural traditions.
The contribution of the Court, therefore, lies in its juridical authority to
bring difficult cases beyond the political and cultural limitations of
domestic laws to meet higher standards.
We have to understand that protection of the dead's dignity is a
well-justified end, since in many cultures the dead and their dignity are
important, and law has to protect the related interests both of the living
and the deceased. Law is a product of culture, and the values and
morals of a particular culture should be respected in pursuit of human
rights. The next section explains the reasons why reputations of the
dead are important in some cultures, but not in others, as well as the
resulting influence on law.
B. Law and Culture
The living law, Friedman said, "has its messages and functions ...
and one purpose is to protect the people who matter in society", and
such a protection "prevents society itself from severe structural

411.

CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF

RECOGNITION

27 (Amy Gutmann ed., 6th ed. 1994).
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damage."412 Whether reputation and dignity of the dead deserve legal
protection depends on a particular culture that defines social functions
of reputation in that community. Reputation in general, according to
Post, can be analyzed from the perspectives of honor, intangible
property and dignity. 413 Reputation, as personal, intangible property,
corresponds more to a community of individualist nature that
comprehends reputation as individual achievements on the free market.
In contrast, both the understandings of reputation as honor and as
dignity reside in communities of a more collective nature, though in
different ways. 414
The European continental laws represented by German law and
French law have been established on a similar base of a communitarian
or collective nature, stressing the value of human honor and dignity in
more hierarchal communities. 415 Reputation as honor has deep roots in
the two communities through their aristocratic traditions and has been
leveled up from privileged, minority social groups, to the concept of
mutual respects among all community members. 416 Actually, this kind
of honor in reputation represents individuals' social status in a
community that cannot be achieved by individual "effort and labor, [but
as] a right to it by virtue of the status with which society endows his
social role". 417 And "the loss of honor is a loss of status and personal
identity; the value of a good name 'ought to be more precious' than
life. " 418
This emphasis on honor has been reflected in insult laws and
memory laws that are popular in Europe, providing special protection
for reputation of special groups, although as in Germany, it is "a kind of
living fossil." 419 The emphasis on human dignity and honor in
412. FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 12.
413. Post, supra note 12, at 693 (discussion of the concept of reputation as honor,
personal property and dignity, which in the author's view co-exist in reputation but to
different extents).
414. Id. (though Post talked about common law countries, his analysis can be applied
to other communities equally).
415. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1284-85 (arguing that "the European culture of honor
and dignity reaches very deep into everyday social life, covering what to us seem
astoundingly trivial matters of civility" and describing "the dignitary cultures of civility that
reign in both France and Germany today and traces the sources of those cultures to old
traditions of social hierarchy."); see also Peled, supra note 79, at 779- 82 (arguing the
communitarian tradition in German defamation law).
416. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1384-90 ("a commitment to the broad distribution of
honor or dignity throughout society.").
417. Post, supra note 12, at 700.
418. Id. at 703.
419. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1314.
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European jurisdictions can be witnessed both in Article One of the
European Union Charter of Fundamental rights, and in the constitutions
of many European countries. 420 Protection of human dignity has been
recognized by the ECtHR in past judgments, 421 and the Court regards
human dignity as supporting other Convention rights. 422 Following
McCruden, "[h]uman dignity has also been incorporated judicially as a
general principle of European Community law, deriving from the
constitutional traditions common to Member States. " 423
Since honor and dignity refer to social status of individuals,
protection of the dead' s reputation is more comprehensible against such
legal-social backgrounds. The dead still need to be respected because
of dignity as past human beings, and because their social status previous
to death shall be cherished. As the German Constitutional Court
pointed out long ago in Mephisto, "the human dignity of the deceased
was of overriding constitutional value" and "it would be incompatible
with the constitutional command of the inviolability of human dignity,
if individuals could be freely disparaged after death." 424 In the decision,
as Brugger commented elsewhere, an apparent communitarian concept
could be found in German constitutional law. 425
A similar treatment can be found in the Israeli Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty in 1992. According to the Supreme Court of Israel,
the right of human dignity includes not only honor, but also reputation,
privacy and property, among others; 426 and both the right to reputation
and the freedom of speech are derived from the mother right of human

420. Rosier, supra note 77, at 170; see also Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of
Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 201, 216-17 (2008) (explaining Rao's
accounts of constitutional commitment to human dignity in Germany, France, South Africa,
and Canada, as well as in international laws).
421. First mentioned in Tyrer v United Kingdom by the Court, involving corporal
punishment, as against Article 3 protecting a person's dignity and physical integrity. See
Tyrer v United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, para. 33 (E. Ct. H.R. Apr. 25, 1978), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-57587 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
422. Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, para. 65 (E. Ct. H.R. July 29,
2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-60448 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014) (ruling "the very essence of the Convention is respect for human
dignity and human freedom); see also Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial
Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 655, 683-84 (2008) (discussing the
ECtHR's protection of human dignity).
423. McCrudden, supra note 423, at 683.
424. Rosier, supra note 77, at 177-78.
425. See Winfried Brugger, Communitarianism as the Social and Legal Theory Behind
the German Constitution, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 431, 433 (2004).
426. Peled, supra note 79, at 743-44.
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dignity. 427 In analyzing the jurisprudential foundations of Israeli
defamation law, Pe led noticed the moral influences of Jewish Law that
"attaches significant weight to the right of reputation and treats
defamation with great severity", and whose protection of the dead has
been absorbed by Israeli defamation law. 428
Peled found that the Jewish majority, as the dominating force in
shaping the country's culture and politics before late 1970s, "was
characterized . . . by communitarianism, collectivism and internal
solidarity." 429 He concluded that communitarianism and solidarity
parallel with each other with an ideology that values honor greatly and
limits freedom and liberty "in the name of moral commitment to
society", and demands individuals' compromise. 430 However after the
late 1970s, Peled noticed the Israeli law gradually witnessed a decline in
such collective and communitarian tendencies for a variety of
reasons. 431
We have to distinguish the two concepts of reputation which both
originated from such collective communities: reputation as honor and
reputation as dignity, which in Post's view refer to different things. 432
Reputation as honor concerns unequal social status in honor
communities with a deferential, hierarchical nature,433 while reputation
as dignity refers to equal social status of community members and equal
participation in communal issues. 434 According to Whitman, European
communities represented by France and Germany have leveled up the
protection of honor (reputation) of higher social classes to other social
classes after the Second World War, so that dignity and honor belong to
each member of a community. 435 In contrast, many societies protect the
dead's reputation more for the dead's honor and their related social
status. The stress is to secure social order and a hierarchical structure.
427. Id. at 748. It is worth of mentioning the plausible distinctions between
posthumous dignity and human dignity made by Antoon De Baets. See Antoon De Baets, A
Successful Utopia: The Doctrine of Human Dignity, 7 HISTOREIN 71 , 80- 82 (2007).
428. Peled, supra note 79, at 773.
429. Id. at 782-83 (pointing out three sources of the communitarianism before 1980s:
Jewish tradition, Jewish immigrants from European societies and Arab societies which
contained communitarian features, and the Zionist ideology with strong collectivist and
communitarian themes).
430. Id. at 783.
431. Id. at 787.
432. Post, supra note 12, at 715.
433. See BOWMAN, supra note 12 (discussing honor cultures and communities both in
the East and the West).
434. Post, supra note 12 at 715.
435. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1323, 1384 (In Whitman's terms: "an equal honor for
all" or "a minimum of honor for all.").
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Their laws have not yet shifted to the stage of protecting dignity of each
human being of equal status, including equally protecting dignity of the
deceased regardless of previous social status.
This doctrine is well explained in honor societies in which female
victims of rape crimes are dishonored even within their own families.
In communities where honor killings are popular, a woman's reputation
or honor belongs to her husband or her father, who regard her tragedy as
a big dishonor or disrespect of their incapacity to control or protect
her. 436 As David Pryce-Jones commented, honor acts as a kind of social
glue in a shame society and the acquisition of honor brings high status
to the individual and the avoidance of shame is a guarantee of low
status. 437 For John Davis, the essential character of honor is a system of
stratification, describing distribution of wealth, prescribing appropriate
behavior of people of various social positions, entailing the acceptance
of subordination and super-ordination. 438 Reputation as honor concerns
simply not only the individuals whose reputation is under direct
consideration, but also their families and relatives. Such an approach
influences social rules or civility norms in Post's terms. 439
In addition, attention shall be paid to the connection between honor
society and collective identity. At this point, honor of a state or a
particular racial group is collectively owned and appreciated, not
allowed to be degraded by others. The escalating negative attitudes of
many Russian authorities toward the Kytan tragedy, and the complaints
from the Polish families of the deceased victims can be explained by
changed political-cultural circumstances. Though Russia has been more
democratized in past years, the new regime still needs a new national
identity of self-pride and self-appreciation for unity. The overdisclosure of past massive murders of other peoples, as in the Katyn
tragedy, though commanded by a few communist leaders, is still a big
shame to the new identity. 44° From this perspective, it is easy to
436. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: How MORAL REVOLUTIONS
HAPPEN 18 (W. W. Norton & Co. 2010).
437. David Pryce-Jones, Shame and Honor, Terribly Twisted, NAT'L REV., (Apr. 21,
2003) (citing Bowman, supra note 12, at 27).
438. Post, supra note 12, at 700 (citing JOHN DAVIS, PEOPLE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN:
AN ESSAY IN COMPARATIVE SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 98 ( 1977)).
439. Id. at 710 (" ... when rules of deference and demeanor are embodied in speech,
and hence are subject to the law of defamation, I shall call them rules of civility.").
440. See Anne Garrels, Libel Case Sparks New Focus On Stalin's Reputation, NPR
(Sept.
8,
2009,
3:18
PM),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=l 12642329 (last visited Dec. 3,
2014); Andrew Osborn, Josef Stalin's Grandson Loses Legal Attempt at Rehabilitating
Soviet Dictator's Reputation, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 13, 2009, 8:29 PM), available at
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understand why a Russian historian was arrested when he invested the
fate of German soldiers imprisoned by Russian Security Services, 441 as
just part of a "' [p ]utinite campaign against freedom of historical
research and expression. "'442
In sharp contrast, communities of an individualist nature take
reputation as personal, achieved by personal efforts and labor. It can be
lost and regained on free market as personal, intangible property. An
individual can reconstruct his or her own reputation and therefore,
reputation is different from personal identity. 443 It is against this
cultural concept that the deceased have no legal protection of reputation
after death and their relatives and heirs cannot sue on their behalf to
benefit from other's good reputation. 444 The American approach to
reputation is a typical individualist one hatched in an individualist
culture. 445 The individualist approach can collapse or wear out the
collective nature of honor in reputation, given that free market and
democracy become the dominating aurae. Market economy will recalculate the value of personal reputation as products of personal efforts
and available for market exchange, while democracy requires equal
respect of individuals in participating public issues regardless of their
social status.
This explains the shift of reputation concept in many societies.
Since the late 1970s, for instance, Israeli society has witnessed the
decline of communitarianism, collectivism and solidarity and a
concurrent rise of individualism, at least among those people whose
influence on the character of the State of Israel is the greatest. 446
Among other factors, that the economic growth especially during the
1990s increased living standards - together with the process of the
Americanization - has strengthened individualism in Israeli community.
This has helped maintain a liberal majority in the Supreme Court to
attribute greater weight to freedom of speech and to embrace a liberal

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/6319755/Josef-Stalins-grandsonloses-legal-attempt-at-rehabilitating-Soviet-dictators-reputation.html (last visited Dec. 3,
2014).
441.
Lydia Harding, Russian Historian Arrested in Clampdown on Stalin Era,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
15,
2009,
l :38PM),
available
at
http://www.guardian.co. uk/world/2009/oct/ 15/russia-gulag-historian-arrested (last visited
Dec. 3, 2014).
442. Id.
443. Post, supra note 12, at 700.
444. Iryami, supra note 19, at 1088.
445. See Bellah, supra note 35, at 743 ("Arguing that 'America is a culture that
focuses on the individual, a culture in which 'individualism' is a central value.").
446. Peled, supra note 79, at 787.
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interpretation of the constitutional protection of dignity. 447
In China, we observe a similar tendency. The rise of "a free
market" and capitalism has helped with prioritizing individual interests
in daily life after the 1980s, albeit collectivism is still the official
ideology.
Nowadays more people are likely to gauge other's
achievement (reputation) by economic achievements, and individualism
becomes the dominant morals than collectivism. 448 Reputation is not
only understood as honor denoting personal social status among the
Chinese, but more as the appreciation of personal economic
achievements and human dignity. 449 Moreover, the ordinary Chinese
have gradually recognized the economic interest in reputation and
privacy of the dead. 450 Therefore, even the ordinary Chinese start to
resort to law for protection. 451 The growth of individualism enriches the
understandings of reputation in China. And it motivates the Chinese to
speak out what they think about the past communist rulings and the late
political figures, which have caused many troubles. 452
It is in the communitarian culture that individuals are requested to
compromise their free expression right to protect the collective identity
or reputation, or human dignity for public interest. Laws of such
communities accordingly provide protection of posthumous reputation,
when reputation is more taken as either personal honor or individual
dignity. 453 While the emphasis on both concepts could be accepted by
447. Id. at 789- 90.
448. See Liza G. Steele & Scott M. Lynch, The Pursuit of Happiness in China:
Individualism, Collectivism, and Subjective Well-Being During China's Economic and
Social Transformation, Soc. INDICATORS Res. 442-51 (arguing that after decades' market
economy in China, Chinese people are increasingly prioritizing individualist factors in
assessments of their own happiness and life satisfaction, suggesting that Chinese society
becomes increasingly individualistic in social realities).
449. No wonder, the introduction of rule of law and the popularity of the idea of
human rights among the public play a role in promoting the idea of equality and dignity of
individuals. See id.
450. Many posthumous privacy cases are about the illegal appropriation of the dead's
likeness and the unconsented use of their names for commercial purposes. See Zhao, supra
note 349, at 298.
451. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation: An Empirical
Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT'L L. J. 34, 103 (2006) (arguing
that the "increased use of defamation litigation by powerful parties in recent years may also
be encouraging more ordinary individuals to assert their rights" and "Permitting such cases
to be used to entrench local interests may be a necessary corollary or prerequisite to the
effective use of litigation by ordinary people.").
452. See Zhao, supra note 349, at 338.
453. At this point, I won't discuss Muslim communities, for which the collective
identity is of fundamental importance, in particular regarding the dead prophets and
religious leaders. See id.
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members of a society, it might be used as a good justification to limit
free speech of others. Eventually, this becomes a matter of balancing
different social interests by courts of law, which might lead to potential
chilling effects and history censorship.
It is better to conclude the discussion of the relationship between
culture difference, posthumous reputation protection, and legal
interference by quoting an observation of Rosler that "the conceptual
and cultural embedding is decisive. " 454

VIL CONCLUSION: DEAD BUT NOT FAR AWAY
This article has discussed the relationship between legal protection
of posthumous reputation and history censorship, explaining the
interplays of law, politics and culture that contribute to the complexity
of many posthumous defamation cases in different communities. On
the whole, the crux of the issue is how we shall treat the dead and their
posthumous interests, and how much compromise a community is
willing to make to protect the deceased? As discussed above, different
approaches can be interpreted by the characteristics of politics and
culture of a particular community.
Totalitarian and dictatorial states protect the dead's reputation, in
particular the reputation of political leaders, on the ground of their
social status, collective memory, and political legitimacy. Reputation
and honor of the dead therefore are important values to be protected by
their laws and free speech is usually compromised. It is also likely in
religious communities that strictly forbid defamation of religious
leaders and prophets. But, this is not to say that in Western democracies
there exists no history censorship or censorship of speech regarding the
past, or no official history or narrative is officially protected. We have
observed that in many circumstances speeches regarding dead leaders
and kings have been limited to different extents and some of which
were overturned by the ECtHR as violating the right to free speech.
This shows that free speech concerning the past may be restricted
sporadically for various reasons in Western democracies.
Other reasons include the protection of national honor or dignity
by preventing insults of state leaders, or protecting national identity.
However, the tendency in mature democracies is that there is no
systematic censorship of history, and that with the abolition of criminal
defamation, insult law and blasphemy law, there will be less violation of

454. Rosier, supra note 77, at 186.
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free speech rights of historians and journalists. Of course, the best
practice in this regard is from common law jurisdictions, whose strong
rejection of the protection of the dead's reputation and privacy has
erased the potential to abuse defamation law and privacy law for history
censorship.
This, however, does not mean that the strong tradition in some
European countries to respect and protect the dead's dignity shall not be
appreciated such as in German law and Maltese law. The point is that
there is a big danger to violate the proportionality principle when
balancing the posthumous protection with free speech right. Protection
of the right to free speech may yield under accumulating exigent public
needs and political whims, as seen in memory laws in Europe, opening
the door for future state censorship. The safest way is to walk far away
from the slippery water bank with a clear-cut line by resembling the
common law approach. 455 Even when protection of the dead's
reputation and dignity are regarded as highly important to a community,
courts of law shall make judgments in favor of free speech rights, unless
there exists real, compelling social needs, or the offense is grave and
serious enough to endanger the fundamental value of a society affiliated
with posthumous reputation and privacy.
To prevent potential history censorship under this avenue, judges
have to pay more attention to the following two issues: First, law is the
last means, but not the best to resolve history's controversies. Judges
are not well-equipped professional historians who can dig deep into the
dusts of history. Actually, historians themselves run into difficulties too
often in seeking historical truth (or facts). Though courts may dance
with politicians to achieve certain critical, political ends, such as
helping with the formation of Israeli state and Zionist identity, it should
be crystal clear that they must avoid such a political role and protect the
independence of law, so that law's authority and independency will not
melt down before prevailing political whims and public outcry.
Otherwise, what comes with the postponed suspicion of judicial truth
(or historical truth) offered in court is eventual distrust of the judiciary.
Therefore, second, when courts have to settle posthumous defamation
disputes regarding sensitive history, their discretion should be strictly
455. A reason why the author is against the recent proposal to protect the dead's
reputation by some law reform commissions in western democracies. See, e.g., Report On
The Civil Law Of Defamation, LAW REFORM COMM'N (1991), available at
http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Reports/rDefamation.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2014);
Death of a Good Name Defamation and the Deceased: A Consultation Paper, SCOTTISH
Gov'T, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/01/11092246/0 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2014).
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limited to decide whether the accused authors have sufficient evidence
to support controversial statements, and whether they have conducted
research according to acceptable academic manners.

Published by SURFACE, 2014

129

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1

A NUCLEAR KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT: PROPOSING
A TREATY FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR
WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY
David A. Ko plow
Si vis pacem, para helium ("If you want peace, prepare for war")
- Roman adage
Si vis pacem, para pacem ("If you want peace, prepare for peace")
- Inscription on the ceremonial pen used to sign the Kellogg-Briand
Pact
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INTRODUCTION
The Kellogg-Briand Pact has gotten a bum rap. That bold 1928
agreement, formally known as the General Treaty for the Renunciation
of War as an Instrument of National Policy, 1 represented the height of
post-World War I idealism. Under it, the leading powers of the day,
with the United States in the vanguard, condemned recourse to war and
pledged themselves to resort only to pacific means for the resolution of
all their future disputes.
Unfortunately, the treaty has been widely derided for a generation
as foolhardy in the extreme. Critics have portrayed Kellogg-Briand as
the ultimate illustration of legal and diplomatic hubris, in pretending
that something meaningful could be accomplished by purporting to
"outlaw" a phenomenon as pervasive as international combat. We can't
simply legislate this scourge away, proclaim the realists; idealistically
waving a piece of solemnly signed parchment did not prevent World
War II, and it would be similarly ineffectual against any modem
outbreak of hostilities, too.
Such harsh assessments have some merit; Kellogg-Briand can
seem quixotic when viewed with the hindsight of nearly a century of
1. See generally General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (entered into force Jul. 24, 1929)
[hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact].
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unrelenting, increasingly bloody, often widespread, war. But this article
argues that Kellogg-Briand was, in truth, a great success - it marked a
crucial turning point in the intellectual history of warfare, if not a
watershed in its actual conduct. In earlier years - into World War I war was widely regarded as something inevitable, an ineluctable
phenomenon of the human condition. War was an expensive and nasty
business, to be sure; it was uncomfortable and possibly fatal, but it was
inherent in life, part of the "settled order of things," much as a harsh,
cold winter might be. Neither circumstance was, as a practical matter,
avoidable; neither needed a "justification"; certainly neither was subject
to close or effective regulation by law.
In the inter-war period, however, attitudes around the world about
war were transformed. Populations and their leaders came to see
warfare as something extraordinary, something subject to human
volition.
Especially (but not only) in the democracies, a new
appreciation grew that war could, and should, be controlled and
regulated; that states should not resort to war easily and for transient
reasons. Most dramatically, the leading statesmen of the era proclaimed
that going to war required a certain type of justification - in particular,
it must have an acceptable legal rationale.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact - originally proposed modestly as a
bilateral France-United States accord, but quickly expanded to embrace
dozens of key states all around the world - played a central role in that
transformation. This short instrument - still in force today, although
largely superseded by the Charter of the United Nations 2 - captured the
zeitgeist and substantially deepened and broadened its pervasive
influence. Kellogg-Briand is a political, social, and legal inflection
point - it catalyzed a lasting change in the way people and states think,
talk, and act about war.
This article further argues that the time has come to extend that
success to an additional realm, to adapt Kellogg-Briand to twenty-first
century conditions and needs, by proposing a "nuclear version" of the
monumental accord. Under that structure, the states of the world would
unite to renounce nuclear war in particular; to declare that they will not
resort to, or threaten, that apocalypse; to insist that they will always find
alternative mechanisms for resolving international disputes; and exceeding the accomplishments of Kellogg-Briand - to undertake
specific steps, unilaterally and in concert, to reduce the likelihood of
any outbreak of nuclear hostilities. The article proceeds as follows:
2. See generally Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.
993, 3 Bevans 1153 [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
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After this introduction, Section I provides an in-depth analysis of
the text of the Kellogg-Briand accord, dissecting its provisions and
noting both what it includes and what its drafters intentionally or
unconsciously omitted. The drafting architecture of the document
reflects its era; it is not styled as modem treaties on such critical topics
would be today, but there are lessons nonetheless.
Section II then provides more background about the evolution of
the treaty, noting its kindred antecedents and numerous other
contemporaneous instruments pursuing similar objectives. It also
describes several subsequent lawmaking tools, including a chain of likeminded "confidence-building" accords that reaches into the modem era,
and critically assesses their impact. This part of the discussion
concludes by summarizing the key features of Kellogg-Briand,
highlighting a number of aspects that resonate into contemporary arms
control efforts.
Next, Section III turns to nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation
and the specter of nuclear war. It focuses, in particular, on the potential
military, legal, and political "usability" of nuclear weapons, and on a
series of "negative security assurances" and "no first use" pledges,
through which the states that possess nuclear weapons have undertaken
(more or less) to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear
weapons against states that have foregone their own possible nuclear
aspirations. It suggests that the world already has, to some extent,
promulgated something akin to a partial "nuclear version" of KelloggBriand, but without the deliberative process and the comprehensive,
negotiated text that would make it most meaningful.
Section IV then presents the heart of the matter: a proposed new
treaty to renounce nuclear war as an instrument of national policy. The
draft text includes numerous footnotes that explain the provisions,
highlight the drafter's options, and cite precedents. The accompanying
discussion elaborates multifarious suggested steps to "operationalize"
the outlawry of nuclear war - features of a type that were notably absent
from Kellogg-Briand - and to insinuate the commitments into the
practices and plans of the nuclear weapons-possessing countries.
Finally, Section V offers some concluding observations. Overall,
the thesis of the article is that states should now commit, with renewed
vigor, to the imperative of avoiding nuclear war, and they should
undertake immediate, legally binding steps to reduce the likelihood of
that civilization-threatening catastrophe.
These measures would
complement the "Getting to Zero" campaign for global nuclear
disarmament, but could and should be undertaken independently and
promptly, even if the ultimate objective remains elusive. In short, a new
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approach to nuclear weapons - inspired by the 1928 cognitive shift
established in Kellogg-Briand- should now be reflected in international
law, moving the world in a safer, more secure direction.

I. PARSING THE TEXT OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT

Kellogg-Briand does not look like a modem arms control treaty.
The official text of the instrument is largely "procedural," in identifying
the participating states and their respective representatives. 3 The
document includes four preambular paragraphs; 4 only two "operational"
articles; 5 and a third "boilerplate" article describing the procedures for
ratification, accession, and entry into force. 6 The two operational
3. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, at introduction (the treaty records the names of
the plenipotentiaries who negotiated the instrument on behalf of the nine participating
sovereigns: Germany, the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain [with separate
recognition of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland and India], Italy,
Japan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia).
4. The preamble describes the parties as
"[d]eeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of
mankind; Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation
of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end
that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their
peoples may be perpetuated; Convinced that all changes in their
relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and
be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory
Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by
resort to war a should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;
and Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of
the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the
present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within
the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations
of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their
national policy."
Id. at preamble (italics added).
5. Article I provides: "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of
their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another." Article II provides: "The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or
solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means." Id. arts. 1-11.
6. Article III provides:
"The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties
named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their
several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at
Washington. This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as
prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be
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articles, each consisting of just a single sentence, combine for only
seventy-eight words. 7 There are but five active verbs.
In contrast, arms control treaties today are behemoths, 8
incorporating expansive provisions that specify the obligations with
precision, often accompanied by reams of exquisitely crafted legal
definitions. 9 Modem negotiators elaborate the exact scope of the
undertakings and provide detailed timetables for the mandated actions. 10
They frequently create new international organizations to oversee and
implement the agreement, and they specify all the institutional

necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every
instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at
Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become
effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers
parties hereto. It shall be the duty of the Government of the United
States to furnish each Government named in the Preamble and every
Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy
of the Treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It
shall also be the duty of the Government of the United States
telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the
deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence."
Id. art. III.
7. James T. Shotwell, one of the leading advocates for the outlawry movement
culminating in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, commented that "[s]eldom had so important an
event so little text behind it or so direct and simple a history." JAMES T. SHOTWELL, WAR AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY AND ITS RENUNCIATION IN THE PACT OF PARIS 189
(Harcourt Brace & Co. 1929).
8. Consider, for comparison, three major modem arms control agreements, the 1991
START I nuclear weapons treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union (Treaty on
the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Jul. 31, 1991, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 102-20) [hereinafter START I]; the multilateral 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 103-219, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317) [hereinafter CWC]); and the multilateral 1996
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Sept. 10, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439 (not in force)
[hereinafter CTBT]. START I includes nineteen articles, as well as six attached protocols,
an annex of thirty-eight "agreed statements," and several other related instruments; the
CWC includes twenty-four articles, three annexes, and other documents; and the CTBT
includes seventeen articles, two annexes, a protocol and other items. But see Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty, U.S.-Russ., May 24, 2002, 944 U.N.T.S. 3 (demonstrating a
very brief U.S.-Russia arms control treaty that incorporated provisions of START I).
9. See, e.g., START I, supra note 8, at Annex on Terms and Their Definitions
(defining 124 terms); CWC, supra note 8, art. II (defining fourteen terms).
10. See, e.g., START I, supra note 8, art. II (requiring parties to reduce nuclear
weapons in three stages, with benchmarks at three, five, and seven years); CWC, supra note
8, at Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A)C.17 (specifying the timetable
for destruction of chemical weapons, with interim deadlines at two, five, seven, and ten
years).
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arrangements. 11
Importantly, weapons-related treaties nowadays
demonstrate fastidious attention to provisions for "verification" of
parties' compliance with the commitments, and drafters stay at the
bargaining table until they have hammered out minute details about data
reporting, confirmatory inspections, and mechanisms for resolution of
disputes. 12 Unsurprisingly, these modern arms control agreements are
prolix: the 1991 START I Agreement, for example, is 257 pages long;
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention ("CWC") runs to ninety-seven
pages; and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ("CTBT") is sixtyone pages. 13
The gestation period for these documents reflects their length and
overall state of development. The Kellogg-Briand pact was crafted in
about eight months, via a series of exchanges of diplomatic notes; 14 it
entered into force eleven months after signature. 15 In contrast, the
United States and the Soviet Union brokered START I over a period of
nine years; 16 the negotiation of the CWC required only a slightly less
extended process; 17 and the CTBT talks consumed about two and one
half years. 18 After signature, the hiatus before entry into force for
START I was three and one half years; 19 for the CWC, more than four

11. See, e.g., START I, supra note 8, art. XV (establishing a Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission); CWC, supra note 8, art. VIII (establishing the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons); CTBT, supra note 8, art. II (establishing the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization).
12. See, e.g., START I, supra note 8, art. XI; CWC, supra note 8, at Annex on
Implementation and Verification; CTBT, supra note 8, art. IV.
13. Page lengths are taken from THOMAS GRAHAM, JR. & DAMIEN J. LAVERA,
CORNERSTONES OF SECURITY: ARMS CONTROL TREATIES IN THE NUCLEAR ERA (2003)
(START I is found on pages 889-1145; CWC is found on pages 1170-1266; and CTBT is
found on pages 1380-1440). Published in this format, the Kellogg-Briand Pact would be
less than one page.
14. HANS WEHBERG, THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR: A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED
BEFORE THE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE HAGUE AND IN THE INSTITUT
UNIVERSITAIRE DE HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES AT GENEVA 72-74, 78 (Edwin H.
Zeydel trans., 1931 ).
15. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed on August 27, 1928 and entered into force on
July 24, 1929. Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928, YALE UNIV. AVALON PROJECT, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)[hereinafter
YALE UNIV. AVALON PROJECT].
16. GRAHAM, JR. & LAVERA, supra note 13, at 884-85 (START negotiations began in
July 1982; the treaty was signed on July 31, 1991 ).
17. Id. at 1168-70 (CWC negotiations began in earnest in 1984; the treaty was signed
on January 13, 1993).
18. Id. at 1377-79 (CTBT negotiations opened in early 1994; the treaty was signed on
September 24, 1996).
19. Id. at 885-87 (START I was signed on July 31, 1991 and entered into force on
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years; 20 and the CTBT is still not in force, despite having been opened
for signature on September 24, 1996. 21
Kellogg-Briand thus manifests the benefits and disadvantages of
brevity. In it, the parties (acting "in the names of their respective
peoples"22 ) "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and [reciprocally] renounce it as an instrument of
national policy." 23 They further agree that all disputes or conflicts
among themselves, of whatever nature or origin, shall be resolved
exclusively via "pacific means. " 24
And that's essentially it. The treaty does not define "war" or
explain exactly what it means to condemn or renounce it; it does not
enlighten the reader regarding the notion of rejecting war specifically
"as an instrument of national policy." 25 Importantly (as elaborated
December 5, 1994).
20. Id. at 1170 (CWC was signed on January 13, 1993 and entered into force on April
29, 1997).
21. Id. at 1379 (date of signature ofCTBT).
22. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. I; see Edward A. Harriman, The Effect of
the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, 9 B.U. L. Rev. 239, 240 (1929) (noting that this is a novel phrase
in treaties; it has no legal effect, but symbolically suggests a change in the general theory of
statehood, with governments now acting as agents of their people).
23. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. I; see WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 82-83
(arguing that this language in the Kellogg-Briand Pact amounts to "outlawing" war; the
phrase "'outlawry of war' is hardly more than a catch-word repeated by everyone," but the
vocabulary of condemnation and renunciation expresses more clearly what is desired);
SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 103, 07 (discussing the American origins of the concept of
"outlawry," and its modification by Briand).
24. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. II.
25. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 76, 85, 98-99 (noting that this phrase could be
interpreted to permit a war undertaken for a purpose other than "national policy," such as a
means of "international policy," to assert a "religious" dogma or a philosophy of life, or to
crush the communist Soviet Union); see Harriman, supra note 22, at 246 (arguing that war
"as an instrument of national policy" includes all wars undertaken in pursuance of national
claims or in promotion of national interests, other than wars of self-defense); DIPLOMATIC
NOTE FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONTAINING ITS ADHESION TO THE PEACE PACT,
AUGUST 31, 1928, reprinted in J.W. WHEELER-BENNETT, INFORMATION ON THE
RENUNCIATION OF WAR 1927-1928, at 181, 184 (1928) (official comments of Soviet Union,
objecting to the "national policy" phrase in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and asserting that all
wars should be forbidden, including those undertaken for the purpose of oppression of
national liberation movements); DAVID HUNTER MILLER, THE PEACE PACT OF PARIS: A
STUDY OF THE BRIAND-KELLOGG TREATY 38-42 (1928) (contrasting the early French focus
on renouncing wars of aggression with the U.S. focus on war as an instrument of policy);
ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIME: THE ORIGINS OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT 66
(1968) (suggesting that the phrase "as an instrument of national policy" might have
originated as a derivative from the famous dictum of Karl von Clausewitz that war is an
instrument of policy, a continuation of politics by other means); SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at
209-19 (emphasizing that the structure of Kellogg-Briand amounts to "defining war without
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below) the negotiators fully appreciated that "defensive" war - waged
in opposition to an enemy's aggression - would remain legitimate, yet
they never alluded to that distinction in the text, and nowhere attempted
to explicate the crucial offensive/defensive bifurcation. Kellogg-Briand
has no provisions for verification or enforcement of compliance; there is
no institutional mechanism to monitor parties' performance or inflict
coordinated sanctions on violators. Moreover, the treaty did nothing to
mitigate the vast and growing war-making capabilities of its parties - it
has no arms limitation or reduction provisions. Nor did it specify or
suggest what is included in the obligatory "pacific means" or create any
new dispute-resolution institutions or avenues.
The treaty does specify some of the legal procedural provisions
that are now common in modem agreements - it requires ratification by
the original signatories and allows other states to join subsequently as
well, and it entrusts to the United States the specified duties of a
depositary26 - but it is bereft of any provisions for duration, withdrawal,
or amendment.
Kellogg-Briand was ratified by its original fifteen parties and by
thirty-two others by July 24, 1929, when it entered into force; eight
more joined shortly thereafter. 27 Today, the treaty has seventy parties,
including representatives from every continent except Antarctica. 28
The most significant sleight-of-hand in crafting Kellogg-Briand
was the juxtaposition of the seemingly "absolute" rhetoric (apparently
renouncing all war without exception or limitation) together with a sub
silentio preservation of a right to respond with force against a
neighbor's unprovoked aggression, and even a recognition of the
obligations, imposed by other balance-of-power agreements of the age,
to come to the aid, by military means if necessary, of an allied state that
had been victimized by an enemy's unwarranted use of military force. 29
a definition.").
26. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. III.
27. YALE UNIV. AVALON PROJECT,supra note 15.
28. Treaties in Force 2013, U.S. DEP'T ST. at 467, available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/218912.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (listing treaties in force for
the United States on January 1, 2013).
29. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 34-36, 73-77, 85 (treaty negotiators agreed that
defensive war would be permitted, without reflecting that consensus in the text of the
document); Diplomatic note from Mr. Kellogg to M. Claudel, February 27, 1928, reprinted
in WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 85; General Pact for the Renunciation of War:
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 70th Cong. 2 (Dec. 7 and 11, 1928)
(statement
of Frank
B.
Kellogg,
Secretary
of State),
available
at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbhear.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter
Hearings] (affirming that a party to the Locarno Treaty could lawfully come to the aid of a
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In addition, the participants understood that other important "escape
hatches" persisted - the United Kingdom made clear that it would
continue to fulfill what it regarded as special obligations regarding its
vast overseas empire, 30 and the United States retained Monroe Doctrine
rights that might seem inconsistent with complete outlawry of war. 31
But the text nowhere addresses these ineffable complexities. 32

II. THE ANTECEDENTS AND SEQUELAE OF KELLOGG-BRIAND
How did the world get to the 1928 treaty? The social history of the
convention was, of course, grounded in the trauma of World War I - the
supposed "war to end all wars" that did not quite work out that way.
Three factors, in particular, stand out. First, the epochal horror and
absurdity of that senseless blood-letting - the planet stumbling into a
conflagration that seemingly no one wanted and no one benefitted from
- propelled a consciousness that future pyrrhic conflicts: a) must be
avoided and b) could be avoided. 33 Warfare had become so devastating,
treaty partner who had been attacked; the Kellogg-Briand Pact would not inhibit that act of
cooperative self-defense, but would also not require the United States to join it); see also
Vilho Harle, The Implementation of Peace Ideas: The Case of Outlawry of War, 10 HIST.
EUR. IDEAS 677, 684 (1989) (arguing that because the Kellogg-Briand Pact permitted
defensive war, "it was a total failure" for the idea of outlawry.)
30. See SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 200-08 (discussing the "British Monroe
Doctrine"); WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 77, 86; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 3640; Diplomatic Note Reply of the British Government, May 19, 1928, reprinted in
WHEELER-BENNETI, supra note 25, at 115; Hearings, supra note 29, at 4 (Kellogg
describing the British position on defending interests throughout the empire); FERRELL,
supra note 25, at 180.
31. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 85 ("There is also no doubt that America does not
look upon disputes concerning the Monroe Doctrine as matters of purely national policy.");
see Harriman, supra note 22, at 249 (noting that the report of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee interpreting the Kellogg-Briand Pact asserted that the Monroe Doctrine is part of
the U.S. system of national defense); see Hearings, supra note 29, at 10-11; Congressional
Record vol. 70-a, 70th Cong. 2, Jan. 15, 1929, p. 1730 (quoting report of Senate Foreign
Relations Committee).
32. Hearings, supra note 29, at 6 (colloquy between Senator Reed and Secretary
Kellogg regarding the reliance upon diplomatic notes to alter the plain meaning of the
treaty); Henry Cabot Lodge, The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact: A Contemporary Criticism,
TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG 2 (Dec. 1928), available at http://teachingamerican
history.org/library/document/the-kellogg-briand-peace-pact-a-contemporary-criticis
m-1928-29/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (criticizing the use of diplomatic notes, sent prior to
conclusion of the treaty, as expressions ofreservations to the text).
33. J.M. WINTER, THE EXPERIENCE OF WORLD WAR I, at 202-21 (Oxford Univ. Press
1989) (1988); SAMUEL HYNES, A WAR IMAGINED, 269-352 (1990); Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim
Southey & Steve Thompson, The Human Cost of World War I, ALPHA HISTORY, available
at http://alphahistory.com/worldwarl/human-cost/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (estimating at
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so expensive in blood and treasure, that it could no longer be sustained;
the habit or tradition of armed combat simply had to be abandoned. 34
Populations could exert control, or at least influence, over their
sovereign decision-making, and could unite to banish too-easy recourse
to international violence. 35
Second was a growing appreciation for the efficacy of international
law - a new belief that legal tools, institutions, and procedures could
play a leading role in the world's escape from warfare. The 1919
Covenant of the League of Nations 36 provides the most vivid illustration
least twelve million deaths and twenty million serious injuries from World War I, as well as
a significant social psychological sense of loss); John Simkin, Financial Cost of the First
World War, SPARTACUS EDUC. (Sept. 1997), available at http://spartacuseducational.com/FWWcosts.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (calculating a total of over
$185 billion costs of World War I to the combatant states). But see MICHAEL HOWARD, THE
INVENTION OF PEACE: REFLECTIONS ON WAR AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 55-59 (2000)
(arguing that World War I was not "accidental"; many people welcomed it with
enthusiasm).
34. SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 36 (asserting that war "is no longer a safe instrument
for statesmanship ... it is too dangerous to employ."); Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of
America, 3 CAMBRIDGE HIST. AM. FOREIGN REL. 103 (1993) (describing the peace
movement of the 1920s as a global "hegemonic ideology"); Jacob Heilbrunn, The Case for
Normal Angell, NAT'L INT. (Sept. Oct. 2013).
35. SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 14-15 (discussing the "recognized principle of
international law" in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that a sovereign state "is
entirely free to strike at any adversary or to work its will by force and to accept no curb
upon its power save only such as it may agree to in the exercise of its very sovereignty.");
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1,
36 (1946) (explaining that prior to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, a central idea of international
law was that a state had the right to resort to war not only to defend its legal rights, but to
destroy the legal rights of others; according to Machiavelli, any war which is necessary is
just); Robert H. Jackson, The Legal Basis of Our Defense Course: We Are Creating
(March.
27,
1941 ),
available
at
Important
Precedents
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/194 l/1941-03-27a.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(arguing that under the traditional view, there is no law to keep the peace, so all wars are
legal; this view was swept away in the twentieth century); FERRELL, supra note 25, at 14
(observing that "The 'intrusion' of public opinion into foreign policy nonetheless was a
notable fact of the period after the 1918 Armistice, which professional diplomats had to
reckon with whether they liked it or not."); John Norton Moore, Strengthening World
Order: Reversing the Slide to Anarchy, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 1, 9 (1989) (saying that
Kellogg-Briand "reflected a fundamental shift in the history of conflict management that
may have been the single most important intellectual leap in history."); Barry Kellman, Of
Guns and Grotius, 7 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & PoL'Y 465 (2014) (surveying evolving trends
in legal history regarding international warfare); WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 32 (suggesting
that education of American and global public opinion became a moral force strongly
promoting the Kellogg-Briand Pact); see also WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 2-5 (discussing
the ancient "just war" tradition, which maintained that a just war had to have a just cause).
36. See generally Treaty of Versailles Part I, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 235, 13 A.J.I.L.
Supp. 151 [hereinafter League of Nations Covenant]; see also James Barros, The League of
Nations and Disarmament, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT 605
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of this conv1ctton. That instrument not only established the first
permanent global security institutions (a Council of leading states,
supported by a more inclusive Assembly and a permanent Secretariat), 37
it specified that any war or threat of war would be an emergency of
concern to all states; 38 that mandatory dispute resolution procedures
would apply to all discord that might lead to a rupture of the peace; 39
and that a three-month "cooling off period" would have to intervene
before an aggrieved state could resort to war. 40 These sinews of legal
process, it was hoped, could abate any rush to war, providing additional
opportunities for diplomacy to intervene, and could deter aggression by
assembling a staunch front of nations united in opposition. 41
Another critical manifestation of the newfound affinity for law was
the burgeoning "outlawry" movement in the United States and
elsewhere. 42 Faith grew that a public declaration that war was now
illegitimate could make a difference - that the labels and concepts of
law were impactful. The hypotheses that war should be officially
condemned as "illegal," and that such a designation mattered, were hot
topics in public international discourse, and various drafts of an
outlawry instrument were eagerly circulated and vigorously debated. 43
(Richard Dean Bums ed., 1993 ).
37. League of Nations Covenant, supra note 36, arts. 2, 4.
38. Id. art. 11.
39. Id. arts. 12, 13, 15.
40. Id. art. 12.
41. Moore, supra note 35, at 7 (noting that under the Covenant of the League of
Nations, "the lawfulness ofresort to war was primarily defined in procedural terms.").
42. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 5-9 (describing peace and outlawry movements just
before and after World War I); id. at 17-20 (discussing the origins of the American outlawry
movement); FERRELL, supra note 25, at 31-37; Sandi E. Cooper & Lawrence S. Wittner,
Transnational Peace Movements and Arms Control, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA ARMS CONTROL &
DISARMAMENT 491 (Richard Dean Bums ed., 1993); Harle, supra note 29, at 678 (asserting
that "[t]he movement for the complete outlawry of war originated in the United States.").
43. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 7-8 (describing early draft treaties); id. at 64-67
( discussing prominent proposed outlawry treaty drafted by American professors); FERRELL,
supra note 25, at 86-87 (describing catalytic drafting role of American professors James T.
Shotwell and Joseph P. Chamberlain); SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 53-70, 271-78
(presenting influential early draft outlawry treaty); see also Aristide Briand, Speech at the
Signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Aug. 27, 1928) (official translation), reprinted in
WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 171, 174 (emphasizing that war, which had
previously been a "divine right" and an "attribute of sovereignty" was now being deprived
of its legitimacy; emphasizing that solemn international legal process constituted "a direct
blow to the institution of war, even to its very vitals."); Frank B. Kellogg, Address to the
Council on Foreign Relations, New York (Mar. 15, 1928), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68889/frank-b-kellogg-secretary-of-state/the-warprevention-policy-of-the-united-states [hereinafter Kellogg Address to the Council on
Foreign Relations] (noting that treaties alone cannot "afford a certain guarantee against
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Third, 1t 1s noteworthy that the contemplated legal and political
undertakings were to be public and multilateral. Reflecting the first of
President Woodrow Wilson's celebrated 1918 "Fourteen Points"
("Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at" 44 ), this notion rejected
backroom transactions and private balance-of-power bargaining
between selected state partners. Self-serving "special deals" between
particular sovereigns were suspect - this was one of the leading reasons
why the United States insisted upon expanding the original French
proposal for a bilateral treaty into the global Kellogg-Briand accord. 45

A.

Three Types ofAnti-War Treaties.

The first decades of the twentieth century therefore proved a fertile
period for the progressive development of international law in
opposition to war.
Three noteworthy streams of international
agreements emerged (with some documents contributing to more than
one objective), and each resonates into the modem era: dispute
resolution, disarmament, and outlawry.
First, the era witnessed a vivid flowering of alternative disputeresolution mechanisms and fora. For example, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration - "the first global mechanism for the settlement of disputes
between states"46 - was established in 1900, pursuant to the First Hague
Peace Conference. A companion institution, the Permanent Court of
International Justice - the first "world court" - was created as part of

those conflicts between nations," but asserting that legal implements help the world make
great strides toward pacific adjustments of international disputes); Joseph Preston Baratta,
The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA ARMS CONTROL &
DISARMAMENT 695, 699 (Richard Dean Bums ed., 1993) (noting that supporters likened the
outlawry of war to the abolition of dueling, which had once been commonplace, but
eventually lost its "aura of honor" and was finally "put down as an odious abuse.").
44. Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, Address to the Joint Session of
Congress: Fourteen Points (Jan. 8, 1918), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
20th_century/wilson 14.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) [hereinafter President Woodrow
Wilson, Fourteen Points]. Point I states "[o]pen covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after
which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall
proceed always frankly and in public view" and the first paragraph of the presentation
introducing the fourteen points asserts that the day of "secret covenants entered into in the
interest of particular governments" is gone by. Id.
45. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 72-73; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 20-26.
46. Permanent Court of Arbitration: History, PERMANENT CT. ARBITRATION, available
at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=l044 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); The
Court: History, INT'L CT. JUST., available at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/
index.php?pl=l&p2=1 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (tracing the history of international
arbitration to the 1794 Jay Treaty between the United States and Great Britain; observing
that the name "permanent court" does not accurately describe the arbitration institution).
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the Covenant of the League of Nations, becoming operational in 1922. 47
International arbitration of all types and formats was greatly in fashion
in this period, with a series of multilateral and bilateral engagements
committing countries to pursue exclusively non-violent reconciliation. 48
For the United States, a flurry of "Bryan treaties" (named for Secretary
of State William Jennings Bryan, who fostered the negotiations,
beginning in 1913) ultimately grew to forty-eight international
agreements binding the parties to conciliation processes and to refrain
from resorting to hostilities while talks were pending. 49
Second, regarding disarmament, Wilson's fourth "Point," as
elaborated in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
recognized that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of
national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national
safety." 50 The most prominent successes in this sector were the 1921-22
Washington Naval Conference and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 51 The
Washington Conference generated a fistful of interlocking treaties
limiting the naval assets of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and
other key players, principally by establishing a 5:5:3 ratio for the
tonnage that the three chief protagonists could deploy. 52
This
47.
The Court: History, INT'L CT. JUST., available at http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?pl=l&p2=1 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); League of Nations
Covenant, supra note 36, art. 14; Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993.
48. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 14 (discussing several treaties concluded in the 1920s
among European states containing provisions for mandatory arbitration to resolve disputes);
Manley 0. Hudson, The Inter-American Treaties of Pacific Settlement, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct.
1936) (describing arbitration and conciliation treaties establishing a system of pacific
settlement for the Americas); David J. Hill, The Second Peace Conference at The Hague, 1
AM. J. INT'L L. 671, 681-84 (1907) (listing arbitration treaties).
49. Bryan Treaties, in WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, (2nd ed. 2005) (also
noting that few disputes were actually submitted to these arbitral procedures); Harold
Josephson, Outlawing War: Internationalism and the Pact of Paris, 3 DIPLOMATIC HIST.
377, 383 (Oct. 1979) (reporting that President Hoover negotiated twenty-five arbitration
treaties and seventeen conciliation treaties); see Hudson, supra note 48; Kellogg Address to
the Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 43 (discussing eighteen Bryan treaties then in
force, as well as two multilateral conciliation treaties with Central and South American
states).
50. President Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, supra note 44, at point IV; League of
Nations Covenant, supra note 36, art. 8.
51. See Iriye, supra note 34, at 78 (concluding that the 1920s was the only recent
decade in which actual arms reductions took place; "there was in the world less armament in
1929 than in 1919.").
52. Treaty for the Limitation of Armament, Feb. 6, 1922, 25 T.S. 201 (also referred to
as the Five Power Treaty/Agreement); The Washington Naval Conference, 1921-1922, U.S.
DEP'T ST., available at http://history.state.gov/milestones/l 92 l -1936/naval-conference (last
visited Jan. 9, 2015); 1921-1922 Washington Naval Conference, GLOBAL SECURITY,
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instrument led to the scrapping of several capital ships by each country
and the cancellation of plans for what would otherwise have become an
expensive and destabilizing arms race in battleship construction. 53 The
Geneva Protocol, 54 responding to the particularly loathsome use of
chemical weapons in the trenches of World War I, 55 created a
prohibition on "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of
bacteriological methods of warfare. " 56
It attracted widespread
adherence and remained for half a century the world's strongest legal
bulwark against those insidious forms of combat. 57
Finally, the particular concept of outlawing or renouncing war was
expressed in several treaties, resolutions, and other commitments.
Noteworthy in this regard were the 1925 Locamo treaties, 58 the most
important of which (the "Rhineland Pact" 59 ) incorporated reciprocal
promises by Germany and Belgium, and by Germany and France, "that
they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/naval-arms-control-1921.htm (last
visited Jan. 9, 2015); Thomas H. Buckley, The Washington Naval Limitation System 19211939, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDlA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 369 (Richard Dean Bums
ed., 1993). In addition to the Five Power Treaty, separate overlapping agreements were
concluded as the Four Party Treaty, the Nine Power Treaty, and others. Under the Five
Power agreement, the United States and Great Britain were each allowed to deploy capital
ships totaling 525,000 tons displacement; Japan was allowed 315,000 tons, and Italy and
France 175,000 tons each. Additionally, battleships and aircraft carriers were limited in
size.
53. lriye, supra note 34, at 75-78 (reporting that these agreements would result in the
United States destroying thirty of its forty-eight large ships (in being or under construction),
Britain would reduce its navy from forty-five to twenty warships, and Japan would destroy
seventeen of its twenty-seven warships).
54. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
55. See generally L.F. HABER, THE POISONOUS CLOUD: CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE
FIRST WORLD WAR (1986); ROBERT HARRIS & JEREMY PAXMAN, A HIGHER FORM OF
KILLING: THE SECRET HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (1982); JONATHAN
B. TUCKER, WAR OF NERVES: CHEMICAL WARFARE FROM WORLD WAR I TO AL-QAEDA
(2006); see also GRAHAM, JR. & LAVERA, supra note 13, at 7-8.
56. Geneva Protocol, supra note 54.
57. See GRAHAM, JR. & LAVERA, supra note 13, at 7-10. The Geneva Protocol was
eventually supplemented by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction), April 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015
U.N.T.S. 163, T.I.A.S. No. 8062 and the CWC, supra note 8.
58. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 32-40 (emphasizing the Locamo treaties as a major
accomplishment); FERRELL, supra note 25, at 48-49 (discussing the hopeful "spirit of
Locamo" generated by those treaties).
59. Treaty of Mutual Guarantee Between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain,
and Italy, Oct. 16, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 305.
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each other,"60 with Great Britain and Italy acting as guarantors of the
peace. 61 In the Western Hemisphere, the Fifth International Conference
of American States, meeting in Santiago, Chile in May 1923, adopted a
Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts, 62 and the sixth such conference, in
Havana in February 1928, passed two resolutions similarly expressing
the participants' unqualified condemnation and prohibition of war in
their mutual relations. 63
B. The Evolution of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
The peripatetic French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand (who had
shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926 for his work on the Locarno
treaties 64 ), attempted to build on that European success by proposing a
cognate U.S.-France peace bond. 65 His interlocutor in the Coolidge
Administration, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, 66 welcomed the
initiative, but insisted upon multilateralizing it, to embrace all the key
international players of the era. 67 A draft treaty quickly took shape, via
a series of diplomatic notes - Kellogg preferred correspondence to faceto-face meetings, fearing that a formal conference would inevitably
engage legions of lawyers, who would jeopardize the enterprise by
burdening it with unnecessary details and complexity. 68
60.
The Locarno Pact, Av ALON PROJECT art. 2. (2008), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/locamo_001.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). These
commitments would not apply in the case of legitimate defense against an unprovoked act of
aggression. See id.
61. Id. arts. 1, 5. In case of a flagrant violation of article 2, the other parties to the
treaty agree to come to the aid of the victim. Id. art. 4 (3).
62. Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between the American States, May 3, 1923,
33 L.N.T.S 25.
63. WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 25; WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 68-72;
Kellogg Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 43.
64. See Aristide Briand - Biographical, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, available at http://www.
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1926/briand-bio.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2014); FERRELL, supra note 25, at 62-65.
65. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 64, 72-73; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at
19; SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 41-52, 71-77; FERRELL, supra note 25, at 68-83; MILLER,
supra note 25, at 7-12.
66. See Biographies of the Secretaries of State: Frank Billings Kellogg, U.S. DEP'T
ST., available at http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kellogg-frank-billings
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014 ); see FERRELL, supra note 25, at 79-83.
67. See WEHBERG, supra note 14 at 73-74; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 2123.
68. See Hearings, supra note 29, at 4 (Kellogg explaining that a multilateral meeting
of lawyers "would be the end of any treaty"); SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 128-44
(describing the early Franco-American negotiations); MILLER, supra note 25, at 20-37, 15483 (French and U.S. diplomatic notes); WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25; YALE UNIV.
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When the draft treaty was ready for prime time, Kellogg circulated
it to two tiers of countries: first, those fifteen who would be stylized as
original High Contracting Parties, whose ratification would be required
for entry into force; 69 and second, a miscellaneous wider array, who
would be invited to affiliate immediately or at any subsequent time. 70
Remarkably, all the solicited first wave of countries joined on with
alacrity; few if any modifications in the original text of the document
were proposed. 71 The imperative for speed was pronounced, prompted
by agitation from national publics, who were well aware of the contents
and progress of the negotiations, and impatient that the articulation of a
basic outlawry agreement was taking so long. 72 In fact, when the Soviet
Union was invited to participate, among its complaints was the
apprehension that the Kellogg-Briand ratification process might be
unacceptably prolonged. Therefore, the Soviet Foreign Minister,
Maxim Litvinov, negotiated a companion instrument, joined by Estonia,
Latvia, Poland, and Romania, as well as the U.S.S.R., which
accomplished an immediate effectuation, on substantially identical
terms. This Litvinov Protocol entered into force on March 16, 1929,
four months before Kellogg-Briand. 73
Av ALON PROJECT, supra note 15 (collection of diplomatic notes leading to Kellogg-Briand
Pact).
69. The original participants were selected to reach the major powers and additional
states that had been engaged in conflicts with them, while not including so many states that
prompt conclusion and entry into force of the treaty would be delayed. See WEHBERG,
supra note 14, at 78-80; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 43; SHOTWELL, supra note 7,
at 145-58, 172-76; MILLER, supra note 25, at 80-111.
70. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 78-79.
71. See WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25 , at 28-51; WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 79;
FERRELL, supra note 25, at 138-43, 192-200; SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 192-93 (describing
British reaction). Russia asserted numerous complaints about the text of the agreement (its
failure to prohibit all war, its lack of disarmament commitments), but agreed to join.
SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 78-79; see Diplomatic Note from the Soviet Government
Containing its Adhesion to the Peace Pact, supra note 25. Many additional states signaled
their willingness to join soon; only Argentina and Brazil remained aloof. WEHBERG, supra
note 14, at 80.
72. See WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 52 (noting public criticism of perceived
dilatory policy of United Kingdom government dealing with Kellogg-Briand); SHOTWELL,
supra note 7, at vii, 83-92 (highlighting the growing power of public opinion); FERRELL,
supra note 25, at 177, 183-85.
73. See Protocol for the Immediate Entry into Force of the Treaty of Paris arts. I-II,
Feb. 9, 1929, 89 L.N.T.S. 370. The Kellogg-Briand Pact is attached as an annex to the
Litvinov Protocol; the effect of the Protocol is to bring Kellogg-Briand into force as soon as
individual states ratify the Protocol, without waiting for all the original parties to the Pact to
ratify it. Id. arts. I, II. The Litvinov Protocol was later extended to include Turkey, Persia
and Lithuania. See WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 54-58; WEHBERG, supra note 14,
at 79.
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Subsequent lawmaking and interpretation 74 regarding all three
themes of alternative dispute resolution, disarmament, and outlawry,
continued unabated for another decade, before being punctured by the
Noteworthy
rise of Nazi and associated totalitarianism.
accomplishments included the 1928 General Act for Pacific Settlement
oflnternational Disputes, 75 the 1933 Argentine Anti-war Treaty of NonAggression and Conciliation among the United States and Latin
American partners, 76 and others. 77
C. The Post-World War II Legacy.
After World War II, including in the depths of the cold war,
reminders of the spirit of Kellogg-Briand can be discerned in a variety
of "confidence-building" measures (sometimes expanded into
transparency-,
confidence-,
and security-building measures).
Noteworthy in the roster of such accords would be bilateral U.S.U.S.S.R. instruments, such as the 1963 agreement to establish the
"hotline" and its 1971 and 1984 upgrades; 78 the 1971 Agreement on
74. In September 1934, the International Law Association, meeting in Budapest,
offered a weighty commentary of interpretation and reinforcement of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, emphasizing the stringency of its prohibitions. See generally International Law
Association, Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris, Budapest Articles of Interpretation, 20
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS Soc'y 205, 205-06 (1934); see also Josephson, supra note 49, at
381-82; Hersch Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Articles of Interpretation,
20 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS Soc'y 178 (1934).
75. See generally General Act for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Sept.
26, 1928, 71 L.N.T.S. 101 (replaced by 1949 revision).
76. See generally Anti-war Treaty of Non-aggression and Conciliation, Oct. 10, 1933,
U.S.T.S 906, 163 L.N.T.S. 394 (also known as the Saavedra Lamas Treaty, terminated and
replaced in 1948); see also Hudson, supra note 48.
77. See Philip C. Jessup, Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 AM. J.
INT'L L. SUPP. 819, 824-25 (1939) [hereinafter Harvard Research] (concluding that of
seventy-one states in the world, sixty-nine had accepted obligations to refrain from resort to
armed force under some circumstances); id. at 848-52 (collecting treaties that deal with
aggression); id. at 872 (concluding that "practically every State of the world, except perhaps
Lichtenstein, Yemen, and one or two others of like magnitude, are parties to either the
Covenant of the League, the Pact of Paris or the Argentine Anti-War Pact.").
78. See generally Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a
Direct Communications Link, U.S.- U.S.S.R., June 20, 1963, 472 U.N.T.S. 163; Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Measures to Improve the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link, September 30,
1971, 806 U.N.T.S. 402; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics to Expand the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link,
July 17, 1984, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4786.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
This sequence of agreements created, and sequentially upgraded, mechanisms for quick and
reliable communications between the superpowers, to reduce the dangers of accidents or

Published by SURFACE, 2014

147

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1

2014]

A Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact

141

Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War; 79 the 1972
Incidents at Sea Agreement; 80 the 1973 Prevention of Nuclear War
Agreement; 81 the 1987 Agreement on the Establishment of Risk
Reduction Centers; 82 and the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification
Agreement. 83 Among multilateral instruments, the 1986 Stockholm
Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe 84 and the associated Vienna Documents of 1990
and thereafter85 stand out.
These agreements, for the most part, do not require countries to
miscalculations that might cascade into nuclear war. See sources cited supra.
79. See generally Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear
War, U.S.- U.S.S.R., Sept. 30, 1971, 807 U.N.T.S. 57. This instrument included reciprocal
pledges to maintain and improve organizational and technical arrangements to prevent the
accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and to notify each other in case of
related incidents. See id.
80. See generally Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention
of Incidents on and over the High Seas, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 25, 1972, 852 U.N.T.S. 152.
This treaty addresses the problem of near-collisions between the states' ships and aircraft,
by adopting safety measures and signals and by avoiding provocative maneuvers. See id.
81. See generally Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, U.S.- U.S.S.R, June
22, 1973, 917 U.N.T.S. 86. In this agreement, the two countries stated their objective "to
remove the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons." Id. art. I. The two
countries also agreed, "that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the
other Party." Id. art. II.
82. See generally Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers,
U.S.-U.S.S.R, Sept, 15, 1987, 1530 U.N.T.S 387. The Risk Reduction Centers supplement
the hotline agreements, which arc reserved for use by heads of the two governments, by
providing a secure, reliable and routine mechanism for communication of non-crisis
information, including the frequent notifications that must be exchanged pursuant to nuclear
arms control agreements. See id.
83. See generally Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R, May 31, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 1200. Under this agreement, the parties provide twenty-four hours advance notice of
the planned date, launch site and impact area of any launch of an intercontinental ballistic
missile or submarine-launched ballistic missile. See id.
84. See generally Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the
Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Sept. 19, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 190. The Stockholm
Document contains a variety of measures such as notification of upcoming military
exercises, invitation of observers to monitor those exercises, and aerial and on-site
inspections. See id.
85. Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures, COM (1999) 1/99 final (Nov. 16, 1999). The Vienna Document called for
increased transparency of military assets and activities, annual exchanges of information,
and improved consultation procedures. See id.
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limit or reduce their armed forces or armaments; they do not directly
restrict participants' military deployments or operations. They do,
however, enhance regional and global stability and security by
committing the parties to a modicum of prudential self-restraint, mutual
respect, and concern for how their ambiguous actions might be
perceived by the other side; by reducing accidents, miscommunications,
and misunderstandings that could cascade into calamity; and by
instituting practices, exchanges, and transparency that can help reassure
nervous countries that their neighbors and erstwhile foes are not secretly
preparing an armed attack. 86
Kellogg-Briand was the pathbreaker for these agreements, and
reflected a remarkable degree of social consensus, inside the United
States and around the world. The U.S. Senate, for example, provided its
advice and consent to the treaty on January 16, 1929 by a resounding
vote of 85-1. 87 The pact drew vigorous support from even the
"Irreconcilables," such as Idaho Republican Senator William E. Borah,
who had zealously opposed the Treaty of Versailles and U.S.
participation in the League of Nations, but who considered legal
abolition of warfare to be propitious. 88 Kellogg was awarded the Nobel
86. Confidence-building measures of various sorts are employed in a wide variety of
contexts, to promote peace and stability, even without directly reducing arms. See, e.g.,
U.S. Dep 't of St., Rep. of the U.S. Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, 21 of the 2010 Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference Final Doc., U.S. DEP'T. ST. 12-14 (2014), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225580.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
[hereinafter Actions Report] (summarizing transparency and confidence-building measures
adopted by the United States and others in response to demands from non-nuclear
countries); U.S. Rep. to the Org. of American States on the Application of Confidence and
Security Building Measures for 2009 and 2010, AG/RES.2447, U.S. DEP'T. ST. (2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/187741.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Rep. of
the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building
Measures in Outer Space Activities, A/68/189, UNITED NATIONS (2013), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=N68/189 (last visited Dec. 11, 2014);
Daryl Kimball, Open Skies Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N (Oct. 2012),
available at http://www.annscontrol.org/factsheets/openskies (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
87. Congressional Record vol. 70-a, 70th Cong. 2, Jan. 15, 1929, p. 1731 (Senate vote
on Kellogg-Briand); see FERRELL, supra note 25, at 252 (noting that John G. Blaine
(Republican from Wisconsin) was the lone dissenter); Josephson, supra note 49, at 378-79
(explaining that Kellogg-Briand united diverse political constituencies; it promoted the
interests of multiple factions); Herbert Hoover, U.S. President, Remarks Upon Proclaiming
the Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact) (July 24, 1929)
(characterizing the treaty as "a proposal to the conscience and idealism of civilized nations.
It suggested a new step in international law, rich with meaning, pregnant with new ideas in
the conduct of world relations."); Baratta, supra note 43, at 703 (noting that the KelloggBriand Pact was displayed in post offices across the United States, "creating the impression
that a historic event was afoot.").
88. JOHN CHALMERS VINSON, WILLIAM E. BORAH AND THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR 59-70,
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Peace Prize for his leadership of the treaty process, and was later
appointed to the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"). 89
The NGO community - perhaps best represented by Andrew Carnegie's
Endowment for International Peace, which had sponsored sequential
high-visibility iterations of an anti-war treaty- was never stronger. 90
President Calvin Coolidge enthused, as the Kellogg-Briand
negotiations neared conclusion:
Had an agreement of this kind been in existence in 1914, there is
every reason to suppose that it would have saved the situation and
delivered the world from all the misery which was inflicted by the great
war . . . . It holds a greater hope for peaceful relations than was ever
before given to the world. If those who are involved in it, having
started it will finish it, its provisions will prove one of the greatest
blessings ever bestowed upon humanity. 91
Barely a decade later, however, World War II - a different kind of
war, with different causes and stakes - dealt a lasting blow to the whole
concept of outlawry, and to Kellogg-Briand in particular. 92 The treaty
continued to be frequently cited, 93 and the spirit animating the peace
122-32, 149-75 (Univ . of Ga., 1st ed. 1957); William E. Borah, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
(2014 ), available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/73 799/William-E-Borah
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014); WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 18, 133 (reprinting one ofBorah's
Senate resolutions in support of outlawry); see also FERRELL, supra note 25, at 33.
89. See Biographies of the Secretaries of State: Frank Billings Kellogg, supra note 66.
90. Carnegie founded the Endowment for International Peace in 1910, to "hasten the
abolition of war, the foulest blot upon our civilization." Carnegie at JOO: A Century of
Impact, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT'L PEACE (2014), available at http://carnegie
endowment.org/about/?fa=centennial (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). Experts affiliated with
the Carnegie Endowment provided much of the public intellectual support for the concept of
outlawry of war and drafted alternative versions of a treaty. See Josephson, supra note 49,
at 379 (discussing contributions of James T. Shotwell and Joseph P. Chamberlain); see
WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 19; see FERRELL, supra note 25, at 21-23.
91. FERRELL, supra note 25, at 208 (Calvin Coolidge spoke about the Kellogg treaty in
Wassau, Wisconsin on August 15, 1928).
92. See Josephson, supra note 49, at 387-88 (as World War II approached, most
internationalists abandoned support for Kellogg-Briand, concluding that armed force was
required to protect international peace and security against the dictators); Iriye, supra note
34, at 131-48 (the rise of totalitarianism threatened democracies in ways that institutions
such as Kellogg-Briand could not address).
93. See Josephson, supra note 49, at 383 (U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson
"invoked the Kellogg-Briand pact in the Sino-Russian conflict in Manchuria in 1929 and
then again in the Sino-Japanese conflict during the early 1930s."); id. at 386 (President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State Cordell Hull invoked the pact on numerous
occasions in the late 1930s); Jackson, supra note 35, at 7 (calling the Kellogg-Briand Pact a
cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and stating that the United States had invoked it
repeatedly); Baratta, supra note 43, at 696; Richard N. Current, Consequences of the
Kellogg Pact, in ISSUES AND CONFLICTS: STUDIES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/1

150

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 42, N

144

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 42:1

movement never fully retreated, but it was never again the centerpiece
of international attention and diplomacy. After World War II, the
conceit of Kellogg-Briand provided essential intellectual and legal
underpinnings for the Nuremburg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals,
substantiating the doctrine of prosecuting aggressors for "crimes against
the peace."94
In its ninth decade, however, the legacy of the Kellogg-Briand pact
is often portrayed as one of abject failure and misguided idealism - the
treaty is the poster child for those who would deride the whole concept
of marshaling legal instruments to help constrain pernicious national
behaviors. Of course we can't meaningfully outlaw war, skeptics laugh
- aspirational legal instruments are a weak reed against the tenacity of
determined evil-doers. Only armed might, backed by eternal vigilance,
counts for much in modem international confrontations; unverifiable
and unenforceable declarations are not worth the parchment they're
written on, and serve only to lull the soft-hearted into a false sense of
security. 95 Even those inclined to be sympathetic with the ambitions of
the Kellogg-Briand enterprise tend to conclude, sadly, that it was
DIPLOMACY 210, 212-15 (George L. Anderson ed., 1959).
94. Josephson, supra note 49, at 388 (allied prosecutors at Nuremburg emphasized the
crime of conspiring to wage aggressive war in violation of Kellogg-Briand); Baratta, supra
note 43, at 696-97; Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38,
54, (1947); Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN AFF.
179, 183-84 (Jan. 1947).
95. See, e.g., Richard Perle, Yes, Nukes: The Global Zero Utopia, WORLD AFFS. J.
(Mar./Apr. 2011 ), available at http://www.worldaffairsjoumal.org/article/yes-nukes-globalzero-utopia (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (describing "the illusion created by Kellogg-Briand"
as one of the factors precipitating World War II; asserting that utopianism does not make the
world more idealistic and may bring about the very evils the advocates are attempting to
eliminate; and comparing the current effort to abolish nuclear weapons to Kellogg-Briand);
Charles Krauthammer, The Age of Obama: Anno Domini 2, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 1,
2010), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-age-of-obama-annodomini-2 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (describing Kellogg-Briand as "an absurdity" and a
''useless treaty"); Andrei Shoumikhin & Baker Spring, Strategic Nuclear Arms Control for
the Protect and Defend Strategy, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 4, 2009), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/05/strategic-nuclear-arms-control-for-theprotect-and-defend-strategy (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (criticizing Kellogg-Briand as
"ambitious and ultimately unachievable," "utopian grandeur," flawed in confusing ends with
means, and giving the United States an "unfounded faith" that impeded effective response to
Japanese aggression; also comparing modem arms control initiatives to Kellogg-Briand);
Josephson, supra note 49, at 377 (noting the views of historians, journalists and
commentators who deride Kellogg-Briand as naive, feeble, a worthless piece of paper, or a
diplomatic charade); Matthew J. Morgan, A New Kellogg-Briand Mentality? The AntiPersonnel Landmine Ban, 13 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 97, 98 (2002) (commenting
about Kellogg-Briand that "The futility of this endeavor cannot be exaggerated" and
criticizing the effort to ban land mines as reminiscent of it).
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largely a benighted, utopian failure. 96

D. Principal Attributes ofKellogg-Briand
In concluding this section, the article attempts to extract some of
the key features of Kellogg-Briand that may be relevant for twenty-first
century conditions - especially nuclear conditions. These highlights
might not rise to the level of "lessons learned" - and the article certainly
does not contend that Kellogg-Briand was a flawless success - but there
are at least "suggestions" from the heady 1928 experiences about traits
that a nuclear version of the treaty might try to replicate (or to avoid).
1.

Kellogg-Briand is Legally Binding.
The aspirations of the drafters were lofty and their rhetoric was
bold, and they chose to express their ambitions in the form of a written,
legally binding treaty, rather than a hortatory "agreement in principle," a
joint statement of intentions, or a series of grand policy speeches.97
Legally binding tools are not necessarily more important or more
enduring, nor are they automatically more likely to be complied with,
but this choice is not merely one of style. 98 The formalities of law both international law and the domestic legal processes that individual
states must follow in order to affiliate - signify a special depth of
commitment and seriousness of purpose. 99
96. See FRANK.LIN D. ROOSEVELT, OUR FOREIGN POLICY: A DEMOCRATIC VIEW 573,
585 (1928) (emphasizing that "war cannot be outlawed by resolution alone"); Josephson,
supra note 49, at 385 (noting that prior to his election as president, Roosevelt considered
Kellogg-Briand to be harmless but unrealistic); Baratta, supra note 43, at 698.
97. Under Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation." Here, the critical factor is that
Kellogg-Briand is "governed by international law." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. II, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331 (U.S. not a party).
98. Harriman, supra note 22, at 239, 252 (arguing that the legal effect of KelloggBriand is not as important or interesting as its political effect, but is noteworthy
nonetheless); see Emily Cumberland, The End of Treaties? An Online Agora, AJIL
UNBOUND (Apr. 28, 2014), available at http://www.asil.org/blogs/end-treaties-online-agora
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (discussing the possible decline in formal treaties as a
mechanism of cooperation in international law); see also Treaty Survival, GEORGE WASH.
UNIV.
(Apr.
9,
2014),
available
at
http://www.law.gwu.edu/News/20132014events/Pages/TreatySurvival.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (panel discussion of
continued effectiveness of treaties in modem era).
99.
See Circular 175 Procedure, U.S. DEP'T ST. (2014), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/cl75/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (noting that in U.S.
practice, the Department of State oversees the "Circular 175 process," which determines
whether a particular international agreement will be structured as a legally binding
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Moreover, Kellogg-Briand was not just any treaty, but an
aggressively multilateral one, attracting the participation of virtually all
the critical global players, and it was a fully public enterprise, in which
civil society populations looked eagerly over the shoulders of the
drafters. 100 The treaty both drew strength from, and reciprocally helped
reinforce, the world-wide, populist anti-war zeal.

2.

Kellogg-Briand is, in Effect, a "No First Use" Commitment.
Despite sometimes being advertised as a comprehensive, full-scope
non-war undertaking, the true upshot of Kellogg-Briand is limited in
this important - and realistic - way. Although the text of the document
is not explicit, the parties were completely clear among themselves that
the function was to outlaw aggressive or offensive war; each state
necessarily retained the inherent right to defend itself and its allies. 101
At the same time, the document utterly failed to define the core
distinction between (prohibited) offensive war and (permitted)
defensive engagement, or to offer any line-drawing assistance in
resolving what could frequently be problematic and intensely contested
Kellogg refused to attempt any
international fact patterns. 102
negotiations toward a definition of the term "aggression" 103 - an effort
that would inevitably lead the diplomats down a hopeless rabbit hole 104
instrument, and if so, whether it will be handled for domestic purposes as a treaty or an
executive agreement).
100. See WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 21-24 (noting rapid public and media
responses to the evolving negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact).
101. See WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 107 (reprinting Frank B. Kellogg,
Speech to American International Law Association, Washington, D.C., April 29, 1928)
("There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in
any way the right of self-[defense].").
102. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 46-51 (describing the 1925 conflict between
Greece and Bulgaria that raised difficult issues in defining the distinction between offensive
and defensive war); id. at 100-08 (discussing defensive war, war undertaken to sanction a
country, and war to punish aggression); id. at 81 (concluding that despite definitional
problems, the Kellogg-Briand Pact succeeded in reversing the burden of proof about the
legitimacy of a use of military force); see also WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 59
(noting that the Kellogg-Briand Pact permits the use of force "in the case of Great Britain, in
[defense] of certain places or strategic points which are vital to the safety of the Empire.").
103. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 72-76; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 24-25;
Kellogg Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 43, at 90; Hearings , supra
note 29, at 8 (Kellogg testifying that "nobody on earth, probably, could write an article
defining 'self-defense' or 'aggressor' that some country could not get around"); see
Matthew Lippman, The History, Development and Decline of Crimes Against Peace, 36
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 957, 986-90 (2004).
104. See Harvard Research, supra note 77; see also Report of the Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, infra note 120 (regarding the difficulty of negotiating text
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and the Americans insisted that the treaty would not contain any
commitments (as in the Treaty ofVersailles 105 and the Locamo Pact 106)
to come to the aid automatically of a state that found itself victimized by
another. 107
3. Kellogg-Briand Does Not Address Disarmament, and Contains no
Implementation Mechanisms or Diplomatic Infrastructure.
Many of Kellogg-Briand's proponents earnestly advocated
disarmament, of course, seeing weapons programs as exorbitantly
expensive, wasteful and provocative; they wanted to rein in the
"merchants of death." 108 But Kellogg-Briand is a specialized, singlepurpose instrument, content with the solo function of condemning
recourse to war; the arms reductions would be addressed separately, in a
different series of instruments. 109
In the same vein, it must be noted that Kellogg-Briand is also
bereft of specifications about the intended concrete meaning of a
general "renunciation" of war; it contains no subsidiary obligations
pursuant to which states would give operational content to the abstract
commitment. After joining the agreement, parties were not required to
concerning the definition of the crime ofaggression for the International Criminal Court).
105. Under the League of Nations Covenant in Part I of the Treaty of Versailles, supra
note 36, Article 11 states that any war or threat of war is "declared to be a matter of concern
to the whole League [of Nations]," and Article 16 declares any state that resorts to
unwarranted war "shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all
other Members of the League." League of Nations Covenant, supra note 36, arts. 11, 16;
see WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 11, 22 (noting American resistance to the obligation
imposed upon members of the League of Nations to use force in response to aggression
against another member); Hearings, supra note 29, at 3-4 (colloquy between senators and
Secretary Kellogg regarding contrasting types of obligations in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and
other treaties of military alliance).
106. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 32-40 (analyzing parties' commitments to use
military power to enforce the Locarno commitments); WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at
32-33 (noting American suspicion of other treaties under which European states committed
to use military force to assist each other against aggression).
107. See Iriye, supra note 34, at 63, 69, 80 (noting varying opinions in the United
States regarding committing to participation in international affairs, especially regarding the
use of force); see also Lodge, supra note 32, at 3-5 (questioning the value of the KelloggBriand Pact, if it does not really constitute a pledge of military support); Josephson, supra
note 49, at 380 (some saw Kellogg-Briand as a door that would open the United States to the
League of Nations and the world court); see also Current, supra note 93, at 221-23.
108. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 97 ("The great importance of a radical disarmament
for the idea of the outlawry of war can hardly be overemphasized.").
109. The Soviet Union strongly complained that Kellogg-Briand should do more to
reduce arms; Foreign Minister Litvinov emphasized this as a priority. See Diplomatic Note
from the Soviet Government Containing Its Adhesion to the Peace Pact, reprinted in
WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 181-87.
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undertake any particular follow-up steps to substantiate their act of
outlawry. The treaty does not indicate any possible day-to-day
measures that would assist in making international armed conflict less
likely or more avoidable, or create any "firebreaks" that could impede
adverse developments.
Nor does the treaty establish any fresh
diplomatic infrastructure - no new organization or international
institutions are elicited. 110

4. Kellogg-Briand Reinforces the Parties' Commitment to Peaceful
Dispute Resolution.
The one partial exception to the observation made in the
immediately preceding paragraph is the treaty's insistence that any
future disputes or conflicts shall be resolved exclusively via "pacific"
means. 111 Again, Kellogg-Briand does not itself establish or enlarge
any international mechanisms for this purpose, but multiple companion
instruments had proliferated an array of judicial, arbitration, conciliation
and related services. These alternatives were intended to provide
practical, readily available surrogates for armed force in the resolution
of disputes (although, in practice, these opportunities were only rarely
exploited). 112
5.

Kellogg-Briand is Reciprocal.
The treaty extends its protection only to states that join the club parties renounce war only "in their relations with one another." 113 This,
of course, is a pregnant political choice, and the drafters expressed their
hope that all states would "join in this humane endeavor," 114 but it
would certainly have been possible to condemn all war, including war

110. Harriman, supra note 22, at 240 (arguing that Kellogg-Briand's condemnation of
war "is, of course, merely an expression of opinion and does not call for any action by the
parties.").
111. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note I, art. II; see also Harriman, supra note 22, at
243-46 (arguing that in this context, "'pacific' does not mean "amicable"; the treaty would
allow all measures of redress that fall short of war, including retorsion, reprisal, embargo,
etc.).
112. In this connection, note especially article 12 of Part I of the Treaty of Versailles,
which requires that any serious international dispute be submitted either to arbitration or to
the Council of the League of Nations, and that parties not resort to war until three months
after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council. League of Nations Covenant,
supra note 36, art. 12; see also SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 255 (identifying four formal
institutional alternative mechanisms for resolving international disputes); Current, supra
note 93, at 216-18.
113. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, at preamble para 3, art. I.
114. Id. at preamble para 4.
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launched against states that had not yet, for whatever reason, signed and
ratified the document. 115
6.

Kellogg-Briand is Permanent.

Unlike many treaties, Kellogg-Briand has no fixed duration; it has
avoided sunset (and even any amendment) to the present day. 116
Moreover, the document has no "withdrawal" clause, of the sort that has
become commonplace in more recent arms control treaties. 117 The
Charter of the United Nations has, for most practical purposes, come to
supersede Kellogg-Briand, 118 and the 1928 restraints would be
suspended (or inapplicable) if a party were attacked by another state, so
there is a type of "escape hatch," but it has never been formally or
overtly exercised.
7.

Kellogg-Briand is Not About Criminal Law.

Despite invoking the rhetoric of "outlawry," the treaty is not
concerned with imposing criminal sanctions on countries or individuals.
Today, the crime of aggression might be prosecuted in an international
tribunal, such as a successor to forums established at Nuremburg and
Tokyo, or more recent variations, 119 or perhaps, in the future, the
International Criminal Court. 120 Likewise, pursuant to "universality"
115. See Harriman, supra note 22 at 247 (concluding that under Kellogg-Briand, an
aggressive war of conquest against a non-party is permitted).
116. See MILLER, supra note 25 , at 146 (highlighting as "perhaps the most striking
feature" of Kellogg-Briand the fact that the treaty is permanent; saying that "the significance
of such perpetuity is almost impossible of overstatement.").
117. See, e.g., START I, supra note 8, art. XVII.3; CWC, supra note 8, art. XVI.2;
CTBT, supra note 8, art. IX.2 (each establishing a party's right to withdraw from the treaty
if it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject of the treaty have jeopardized
its supreme national interests).
118. Under the Charter, a country may use military force in self-defense or pursuant to
authorization from the Security Council. U.N. Charter, supra note 2, arts. 2.4, 42, 51. In
the event of a conflict between the Charter and any other treaty, the obligations of the
Charter prevail. Id. art. 103. See also Robert J. Delahunty, Paper Charter: Self-Defense and
the Failure of the United Nations Collective Security System, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 871, 88889 (2007).
119. See DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (Princeton Univ. Press 2012) (discussing various international and
mixed war crimes tribunals); UN Tribunals Crucial for Delivering Justice for Rwanda,
Former Yugoslavia, Security Council Told, UN NEWS CENTRE (June 5, 2014), available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47968#.U5DMGoUI3bk (last visited Dec.
18, 2014) (assessing the impact of ad hoc war crimes tribunals established by the U.N.
Security Council for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia).
120. The International Criminal Court, established pursuant to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court exists to prosecute individuals for "the most serious crimes of
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jurisdiction, perhaps any state could prosecute an individual guilty of
the most serious crimes against the peace. 121 But those eventualities
were not in prospect in 1928. 122
8.

Fundamentally, Kellogg-Briand Represents a Psychological Shift.
That is, the radical spirit behind the treaty is to effect a change (or
to reflect a change that was already occurring in the 1920s) in the way
people (military and civilian leaders, kings and elected officials, and
their general populations) thought about war. The objective was to deemphasize war as a normal mode of operation of the international
community; to no longer understand war as something that "just
happens"; to characterize war as extraordinary and aberrational, and as a
phenomenon that requires a justification, including a basis in
international law. The proponents wanted to see war, and preparations
for war, differently it would not be something that countries would
possess an untrammeled right incessantly to prepare for, threaten, and
conduct; instead, it would be something perpetually to be avoided, to be
circumnavigated via alternative, better processes.
The entire field of modem }us ad helium, regulating the
circumstances under which a state may now lawfully initiate
international hostilities, thus owes its genesis (or at least its renaissance
from an earlier "just war" tradition) to this paradigm shift. Of course,
the treaty was far from perfect, and alterations in international law
cannot by themselves fully extirpate war from the human experience
any more than a massive, armed combat can truly "end all wars" but
new patterns of thought can make an important difference. 123
concern to the international community as a whole" including genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and aggression. UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37
I.L.M. 1002 (1998) (entered into force July 1, 2002). However, the court's jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression has not yet been activated. Report of the Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, RC/11, 11-E-O 11110 45, Annex III, Dec. 22, 2010, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/RC-11-Annex.III-ENG.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014).
121. See AM. LAW INST., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN REL. LAW OF THE U.S.
§ 404 (1987) (discussing the small category of offenses "recognized by the community of
nations as of universal concern," enabling any state to assert jurisdiction; the crime of
aggression is not listed, but might be considered of equivalent status).
122. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 20, 107 (discussing the possibility of criminal
prosecution of states or individuals for violations of Kellogg-Briand); see also sources cited
supra note 94 (noting the role that Kellogg-Briand played in underpinning the post-World
War II criminal trials of Nazi and Japanese aggressors).
123. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 82 (emphasizing the "moral value" of the treaty);
Josephson, supra note 49, at 384 (U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson believed that if
global public opinion desired to make Kellogg-Briand effective, it could become
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III. NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PROLIFERATION, AND WAR
The devastating power of nuclear weapons, the precarious dangers
of nuclear proliferation, and the catastrophic effects of nuclear war are
now so well-appreciated that little elaboration here is required. 124 In
response to these extraordinary hazards, the world community has
undertaken a series of multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral arms control
initiatives - but no one can pretend that this present conglomeration is
adequate to meet the appalling threats. 125

A.

The Current Threat.

Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger in the world today;
indeed, the greatest danger humanity has ever confronted. A single
nuclear weapon (the standard model of which is now many times more
powerful than the devices that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945) could annihilate a city. Even a relatively "small," limited nuclear

irresistible); Harriman, supra note 22 at 241-42 (prior to Kellogg-Briand, every state had an
absolute right under international law to make war; that has changed); Harvard Research,
supra note 77, at 857 (noting that in the 1890s, it was not possible to say that state's
decision to go to war could be illegal - it was either permitted by international law or simply
unregulated by it); see Moore, supra note 35, at 9; Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War
and the Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT'L. L. 365, 369 (1953) (arguing that the moral, social, and
psychological change effected by the Kellogg-Briand Pact would require generations, not
merely decades, to succeed); HOWARD, supra note 33, at 9 (discussing St. Augustine's
concept of 'just war"); Christopher M. Petras, The Use of Force in Response to CyberAttack on Commercial Space Systems-Reexamining "Self-Defense" in Outer Space in Light
of the Convergence of US. Military and Commercial Space Activities, 67 J. AIR L. & COM.
1213 (2007); Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International Law, 19 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 69 (2003).
124. See Nuclear Weapons Effects Technology, Militarily Critical Technologies List:
Sec. VI, Nuclear Weapons Effects Technology, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/p2sec06.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); The Effects
of Nuclear War, U.S. OFFICE TECHN. ASSESSMENT (May 1979), available at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/7906/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); U.S. DEP'T
DEF. & ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. ADMIN, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Samuel
Glasstone & Philip J. Dolan eds., 1977), available at http://www.fourmilab.ch
/etexts/www/effects/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014 )[hereinafter THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS]; Scientific Aspects of Nuclear Explosion Phenomena, TRINITY ATOMIC WEBSITE,
available at http://www.abombl.org/nukeffct/enw77b3.html#foot_7 (last visited Dec. 18,
2014); Nuclear Detonations: Contemplating Catastrophe: Development and Disarmament
Roundtable, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (2013), available at http://thebulletin.org/nucleardetonations-contemplating-catastrophe (last visited Dec. 18, 2014 ).
125. See generally STEVEN PIFER & MICHAELE. O'HANLON, THE OPPORTUNITY: NEXT
STEPS IN REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS (2012); OLIVER MEIER & CHRISTOPHER DAASE, ARMS
CONTROL IN THE 21st CENTURY: BETWEEN COERCION AND COOPERATION (2013); WARD
WILSON, FIVE MYTHS ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2013); GRAHAM, JR.& LAVERA, supra
note 13.
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war would inflict devastation of historic proportions on a country (or
several). A massive nuclear exchange would jeopardize the planet's
civilization and quite possibly eradicate all human life on earth. For the
United States, nuclear weapons pose an existential threat - they are the
only mechanism that could inflict sudden, massive, inescapable societal
destruction. 126
Nine countries are known to possess nuclear weapons: China,
France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Many more states hold the potential to
join that club; they have the intellectual, industrial, and managerial
capability, as well as access to the necessary raw materials.
Proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries (and, a fortiori,
to terrorist organizations) could be calamitous, further destabilizing
international political relations and empowering localized disputes to
mushroom to global dimensions. 127
126. See Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, U.S. DEP'T DEF. (June
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DoD_Strategy_for_ Countering_
2014),
Weapons_of_Mass_Destruction_dated_June_2014.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); see
Nuclear Posture Review Report, U.S. DEP'T DEF. 3 (April 2010), available at
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report] (discussing
threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism); PAUL BRACKEN, THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE:
STRATEGY, DANGER AND THE NEW POWER POLITICS (Henry Holt & Co. LLC 2012);
MICHELLE BENTLEY, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND US FOREIGN POLICY: THE
STRATEGIC USE OF A CONCEPT (2014); MARK A. HARWELL, NUCLEAR WrNTER: THE HUMAN
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR (1984); Alan Robock & Owen
Brian Toon, Self-Assured Destruction: The Climate Impacts of Nuclear War, 68 BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 66 (2012); Michael J. Mills et al., Multidecadal Global Cooling and
Unprecedented Ozone Loss Following a Regional Nuclear Conflict, AGU PUBLICATIONS
(Apr. 1, 2014), available at http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/MillsNWeft:224.pdf (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014).
127. See Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 126; see
Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N (last updated June
23, 2014), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswho
haswhat (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (estimating the nuclear weapons stockpiles of nine
countries: China 240; France fewer than 300; Russia 1512 deployed strategic warheads, plus
3000 others; United Kingdom 225; United States 4804; India up to 100; Israel 75-200;
Pakistan 90-110; North Korea 4-8); Status of World Nuclear Forces, FED'N AMER.
SCIENTISTS (last updated Apr. 30, 2014), available at http://fas.org/issues/
nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (providing
slightly different numerical estimates); Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, US Nuclear
Forces, 2014, 70 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 85 (2014); Press Release, Stockholm Int'/
Peace Research Inst., Nuclear Forces Reduced Whole Modernizations Continue, Says
SIPRI
(June
16,
2014),
available
at
http://www.sipri.org/media/
SIPRI,
pressreleases/2014/nuclear_May_2014 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Hearing before the S. Armed Services
Comm., l 13th Cong. (2014) (statement of John R. Clapper, Dir. of National Intelligence),
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Blocking the further spread of nuclear weapons has always been a
top global priority, but it is a strenuous challenge. Nuclear weapons
technology is now decades old; the very nature of technology is to
propagate, and the basic secrets of bomb-building are now welldispersed. The "trick" to avoiding further proliferation, therefore, must
lie in politics, not in denial or force. As Jonathan Schell observed:
The world's safety ultimately depends not on the number of
nations that want to build nuclear weapons but cannot, but on the
number that can but do not. If the spread of nuclear weapons is to be
prevented over the long run, it cannot come through restrictions on
nations' capacity. Instead, it must come by influencing their will. 128
Unfortunately, the world at the moment seems a bit "stuck" in its
efforts to influence the most relevant nations' respective willingness to
reduce the dangers of nuclear possession and proliferation. The global
stockpile of nuclear weapons has, blessedly, been greatly reduced: by
the leading estimate, the world has produced some 125,000 nuclear
weapons (ninety-seven percent manufactured by the United States and
the Soviet Union/Russia) since 1945; today, approximately 10,000
remain in active military stockpiles, with thousands more awaiting
dismantlement. 129 But the reductions process seems to have fallen into
hiatus: there are no major nuclear arms control negotiations under way
or in prospect, and several participants are currently ramping up and
modernizing, rather than winnowing, their strategic forces. 130
available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014%20WWTA%20SFR_SASC_l l_
Feb.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (providing the U.S. intelligence community's judgment
that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a major threat to the security of
the United States and its allies); Edward A. Friedman & Roger K. Lewis, A Scenario for
Jihadist Nuclear Revenge, FED'N AMER. SCIENTISTS (2014), available at http://fas.org/pirpubs/scenario-jihadist-nuclear-revenge/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Matthew Bunn et al.,
The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment of Nuclear Terrorism, BELFER CENTER FOR Sci. &
INT' L AFF. (2011 ), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Joint-ThreatAssessment%20ENG%2027%20May%2020 l l.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). But see
Kenneth N. Waltz, Why Iran Should Get the Bomb Nuclear: Balancing Would Mean
Stability, 19 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2012) (arguing that proliferation is inevitable and can be
stabilizing).
128. Jonathan Schell, The Folly of Arms Control, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 28 (2000); see
also R. Scott Kemp, The Nonproliferation Emperor has no Clothes: The Gas Centrifuge,
Supply-Side Controls and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation, 38 INT'L SECURITY 39, 39
(Spring 2014) (arguing that export controls and economic sanctions are insufficient to
prevent a country from developing or acquiring the capability to develop nuclear weapons;
political and cultural factors must play the leading roles).
129. Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories,
1945-2013, 69 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 75, 75 (2013), available at http://bos.sage
pub.com/content/69/5/75.full.pdf+html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Inventories].
130. See id. (reporting that Russia is undertaking a major transformation of its nuclear
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The concept of complete nuclear disarmament has only
episodically been on the front burner of international politics. 131 This
iconoclastic notion experienced an abrupt resurgence with the
publication, beginning in January 2007, of a series of vigorous
advocacy columns in the Wall Street Journal penned by four of the
most prominent senior U.S. statesmen, George P. Shultz, William J.
Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. 132 The momentum for
"getting to zero" suddenly intensified, with a torrent of supportive
opinion pieces, analytical conferences, books and articles; diverse
countries and NGOs vigorously took up the cause. 133 President Obama
posture and deploying fewer, but newer, weapons; China is likely to double its force of
intercontinental ballistic missile warheads in the next fifteen years; and India and Pakistan
are in an arms race to deploy new weapons types); see also Kristensen & Norris, supra note
127, at 88-92; Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?,
44
ARMS
CONTROL
TODAY
8
(May
2014),
available
at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/Nuclear-Weapons-Modemization-A-Threat-to-theNPT (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); see Ray Acheson, Modernization of Nuclear Weapons:
Aspiring to "Indefinite Retention"?, 68 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 88, 88 (2012); The NPT
Action Plan Monitoring Report, REACHING CRITICAL WILL 31-40 (2014), available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Pub I ications/2010-Action
-Plan/NPT_Action_Plan_2014.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter REACHING
CRITICAL WILL] (assessing status of world nuclear forces); see generally Assuring
Destruction Forever: Nuclear Weapon Modernization Around the World, REACHING
CRITICAL WILL (Ray Acheson ed., 2012), available at http://www.reaching
criticalwill.org/images/documents/Publications/modemization/assuring-destruction
-forever.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Assuring Destruction].
131. At their summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland October 11-12, 1986, President
Ronald Reagan and Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev came astonishingly
close to an agreement to abolish all their nuclear weapons; at the last minute, such a
breathtaking accord dissolved, and was not subsequently pursued. See generally REYKJAVIK
REVISITED: STEPS TOWARD A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (George P. Shultz et al.
eds., 2008); see generally IMPLICATIONS OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT ON ITS TWENTIETH
ANNIVERSARY (Sidney D. Drell & George P. Shultz eds., 2007); see Thomas Blanton &
Svetlana Savranskaya, Reykjavik: When Abolition Was Within Reach, 41 ARMS CONTROL
TODAY 46 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_10/
Reykjavik_When_Abolition_Was_Within_Reach (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
132. George P. Shultz et al., A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
2007, at A 15 (proposing "setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working
energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal"). Additional op-ed pieces by this
group followed in 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2013. See PHILIP TAUBMAN, THE PARTNERSHIP:
FIVE Cold WARRIORS AND THEIR QUEST TO BAN THE BOMB (2012).
133. See GETTING TO ZERO: THE PATH TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (Catherine
McArdle Kelleher & Judith Reppy eds., 2011); RUSSIA AND THE DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Alexei Arbatov et al. eds., 2012); ELEMENTS
OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREATY (Barry M. Blechman & Alexander K. Bollfrass eds.,
2010); CULTIVATING CONFIDENCE: VERIFICATION, MONITORING, AND ENFORCEMENT FOR A
WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Corey Hinderstein ed., 2010); STEVEN PIFER AND
MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, THE OPPORTUNITY: NEXT STEPS IN REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS
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famously endorsed the concept of nuclear abolition in his celebrated
Prague speech on April 5, 2009, 134 and the Security Council of the
United Nations did likewise in resolution 1887 on September 24,
2009. 135 But the bubble of enthusiasm for disarmament seems to have
deflated in the past couple of years, as fickle international politics
zigzagged toward other topics. 136

(2012); NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROGRESS (P.M. Karnath ed.,
2013); Ivo Daalder & Jan Lodal, The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear
Weapons, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 80 (2008); Christopher Ford, A New Paradigm: Shattering
Obsolete Thinking on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 38 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 12
(Nov. 2008), available at http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2008_11/ford (last visited Jan. 9,
2015); ABOLISHrNG NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE (George Perkovich & James Acton,
eds., 2009) [hereinafter Perkovich & Acton]; Michael Krepon, Ban the Bomb. Really., 3
AMERICAN INTEREST, at 88 (Winter 2008); NUCLEAR ABOLITION FORUM, MOVING BEYOND
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TO A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE WORLD (Rob van Riet ed., 2013);
JAMES M. ACTON, Low NUMBERS: A PRACTICAL PATH TO DEEP NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS
(2011), available at http://camegieendowment.org/files/low_numbers.pdf (last visited Dec.
18, 2014); TAUBMAN, supra note 132, at 338-40 (discussing non-governmental groups
focused on nuclear disarmament, the Nuclear Threat Institute (headed by Sam Nunn) and
Global Zero (headed by Bruce Blair, Matt Brown and Barry Blechman)); G.A. Res. 67/56,
U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/56 (Dec. 3, 2012) (creating an "open-ended
working group" to develop proposals for the achievement of a world without nuclear
weapons); MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE, available at http://www.middlepowers.org/
about.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (collection ofNGOs working with "middle" states to
promote nuclear disarmament).
134. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by President Barack
Obama at Hradcany Square in the Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-InPrague-As-Delivered/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (stating "America's commitment to seek
the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons"); see also SIDNEY D. DRELL &
JAMES E. GOODBY, A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS: END-STATE ISSUES 1-2 (2009)
(quoting 2009 joint statement by President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
pledging both countries to pursue a nuclear weapons-free world).
135. S.C. Res 1887, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1887 (Sept. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1887%282009%29
(last
visited Dec. 18, 2014).
136. See William J. Perry, Commentary, My Personal Journey at the Nuclear Brink,
EUR. LEADERSHIP NETWORK (June 17, 2013), available at http://www.europeanleadership
network.org/my-personal-joumey-at-the-nuclear-brink-by-bill-perry_ 633.html (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014) (commenting that "in 2011 that progress and forward momentum [toward
dealing with the nuclear legacy of the cold war] began to stall out and even reverse.");
George P. Shultz et al., Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks: The Pace of Nonproliferation
Work Today Doesn't Match the Urgency of the Threat, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2013)
(observing that "[t]he continuing risk posed by nuclear weapons remains an overarching
strategic problem, but the pace of work doesn't match the urgency of the threat."); Ward
Wilson, The Myth of Nuclear Necessity, in NUCLEAR ABOLITION FORUM, MOVING BEYOND
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TO A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE WORLD 1 (2013) (noting that "the
abolition movement seems stalled."); GEORGE PERKOVICH, Do UNTO OTHERS: TOWARD A
DEFENSIBLE
NUCLEAR
DOCTRINE
2
(2013),
available
at
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The International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), the successor under the
U.N. Charter to the PCIJ as the leading global judicial institution for the
resolution of international legal disputes, 137 has addressed nuclear
weapons in depth once, 138 and is now poised to do so again. In 1994,
the General Assembly requested an "advisory opinion" from the court
on the question, "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstance permitted under international law?" Participating states'
disparate briefings and arguments on the matter, and the various ICJ
judges' voluminous separate opinions, reveal a stark array of
contradictory perspectives on point, but several key principles stand
out. 139 The ICJ determined that: a) traditional standards of the law of
armed conflict apply fully to nuclear weapons, as to all others; 140 b) a
threat to conduct an illegal use of force is itself illegal under the U.N.
Charter, even before it is carried out; 141 c) because nuclear weapons
carry such widespread, severe and long-lasting effects, their use is
"scarcely reconcilable" with the legal requirements of proportionality
and avoidance of civilian casualties; 142 and d) nevertheless, the court
was unable to conclude definitively that all possible uses of nuclear
weapons would be categorically illegitimate - perhaps a detonation
against an isolated military target far removed from civilian areas, or in
circumstances where a nation's very survival depended upon the
application of such overwhelming force could be legally tolerable. 143
In 2014, nuclear weapons re-appeared on the ICJ docket. The
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/do_unto_others.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(asserting that "progress stopped" on nuclear disarmament in 2012).
137. U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice,
art. 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179.
138. See also Nuclear Tests, (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457, 458 (Dec. 20)
(concerning the legality of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by France in the South
Pacific); see also Nuclear Tests, (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 97 (Dec. 20).
139. See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226-28 (July 8) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons]; see also
Dean Granoff & Jonathan Granoff, International Humanitarian Law and Nuclear Weapons:
Irreconcilable Differences, 67 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 53, 53-62 (2011); Charles J.
Moxley, Jr., John Burroughs & Jonathan Granoff, Nuclear Weapons and Compliance with
International Humanitarian Law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 34 FORDHAM
INT'L L. J. 595 (2011); Ken Berry et al., Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons, MONTEREY INST.
INT' L STUDIES 1, 30-33 (2010).
140. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 139, para. 105(2)(C)-(D)
(unanimously concluding that the provisions of the U.N. Charter and of international
humanitarian law apply to the threat or use of nuclear weapons).
141. Id. para 47.
142. Id. para 95.
143. Id. para 105(2)(E) (by seven votes to seven, with the president of the court casµng
the deciding vote).
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Republic of the Marshall Islands filed nine cases, one against each of
the nuclear-weapons-possessing countries, alleging that they had failed
in their obligations, pursuant to treaty and customary international law,
to pursue nuclear disarmament. 144 Six of these cases, brought against
countries that have not accepted the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the
ICJ, have not been entered onto the court's registry, and seem destined
to go nowhere, 145 but the suits against India, Pakistan, and the United
Kingdom may provide additional grist for nuclear arms control judicial
machinery for years to come. 146
Underpinning all these debates is a continuing dialectic about the
"usability" of nuclear weapons. For some, a nuclear weapon is,
basically, just a weapon like any other - it can be prudently deployed,
brandished, and used against military targets to achieve desired
Although nuclear weapons are immensely
warfighting goals. 147
powerful, and they unleash a variety of novel and persistent types of
effects, a clever design team could construct a very small, precisely144. Press Release No. 2014/18, International Court of Justice, The Republic of the
Marshall Islands files Applications against nine States for their alleged failure to fulfill their
obligations with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear
disarmament,
April
25,
2014,
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/presscom/files/0/18300.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
145. To be amenable to suit under the "contentious case" docket of the International
Court of Justice, a state must "accept" the jurisdiction of the court. Three of the relevant
countries have done so in the broadest fashion, pursuant to Article 36 (2) of the Statute of
the Court, supra note 47. See generally Basis of the Court's Jurisdiction, INT'L CT. JUST.,
available at http://www. icj-cij .org/jurisdiction/index. php?p 1=5&p2= 1&p3=2 (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014).
146. See Cases, INT'L CT. JUST., available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
index.php?pl=3&p2=3 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (listing contentious cases on the court's
docket). Of these three countries, only the United Kingdom is a party to the 1968 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, so the claims against India and Pakistan are grounded in
customary international law.
147. See Al Pressin, Rumsfeld Endorses Research on Earth Penetrating Weapon,
VOICE AM. (April 27, 2005), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/
news/usa/2005/usa-050427-327d6blf.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (quoting thenSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as advocating development of small, precise nuclear
weapons for attacking an enemy's hard and deeply buried targets, saying "The only thing
we have is very large, very dirty, big nuclear weapons. So the choice is, do we want to have
nothing and only a large dirty nuclear weapon, or would we rather have something in
between. That is the issue."); Ann Scott Tyson, Nuclear Plan Changes Calculus of
Deterrence, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/03 l 4/pO 1s03-usmi.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(quoting defense expert Loren Thompson saying "Most of the nuclear options at our
disposal now are so gross that their use is not credible ... To deter, we must have options
that the enemy believes we will use."); Thomas Dowler & Joseph Howard III, Countering
the Threat of the Well-Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons, 19
STRATEGIC REV. 34 (1991).
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targeted nuclear weapon, which would occupy a range not very different
from that of the largest conventional weapons, and the radiation and
other unique effects could be tailored to particular types of combat
missions. 148 For these advocates, it is a mistake to consider nuclear
weapons to be categorically different from other ordnance; muddled
thinking about a single, inviolable "nuclear threshold" simply impedes
rational strategizing about deterrence in all its manifestations. 149
Others, however, conclude that nuclear weapons are, indeed,
"different," and people should continue to think of them as lying outside
the realm of usability. In this view, nuclear weapons are irrelevant for
any task other than deterring another actor's potential use of nuclear
weapons. 15
For all other applications, they are simply too big

°

148. See Nuclear Posture Review Report, U.S. DEP'T DEF., (2002), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci2 l lz/2.6/NPR2001 leaked.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2014) (calling for greater flexibility in U.S. nuclear forces, seeking "Nuclear attack options
that vary in scale, scope, and purpose."); Keith B. Payne, The Nuclear Jitters, 55.12 NAT'L
Rev. 22 (2003); Charles D. Ferguson, Mini-Nuclear Weapons and the U.S. Nuclear Posture
Review, JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES (Jan. 8, 2002), available at
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020408.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (reporting controversy
regarding concept of nuclear "bunker buster"); Task Force Report: Resilient Military
Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat, DEPT. DEF.: DEF. SCI. BOARD 8 (2013), available
at http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cyber-war-racket-0014.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(suggesting that a first use of nuclear weapons might be a suitable response to a cyberattack); Julian Coman, Pentagon Wants "Mini-Nukes" to Fight Terrorists, TELEGRAPH (Oct.
26,
2003,
12:01
AM),
available
at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/northamerica/usa/1445165/Pentagon-wants-mini-nukes-to-fight-terrorists.html
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
149. See Michael S. Gerson, No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy, 35
INT'L SEC. 7, 12-13 (2010); see McGeorge Bundy, George G. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara
& Gerard C. Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 753
( 1982) [hereinafter Bundy et al.]; Barry Watts, Nuclear-Conventional Firebreaks and the
Nuclear Taboo, CTR. STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 5-28 (2013), available at
http://www.csbaonline.org/pub Iications/2013/04/nuclear-conventional-firebreaks-and-thenuclear-taboo/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Colin Powell, Nuclear Weapons Are Useless,
THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 27, 2010, 5:30 PM), available at http://thinkprogress.org/
security/2010/01 /27 /175869/colin-powell-nuclear-weapons-are-useless/ (last visited Dec. 18,
2014) (quoting former Secretary of State Colin Powell as concluding that nuclear weapons
were "useless."); HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS (2009)
(regarding the concept of limited, winnable nuclear war and the possible multi-rung nuclear
escalation ladder).
150. See PERKOVICH, supra note 136, at 45-52, 73-74; Bundy et al., supra note 149, at
757 (arguing that "no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to believe
that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to
remain limited."); Daalder & Loda), supra note 133, at 80, 81 (arguing that the sole purpose
of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter use by others; other functions "are no longer realistic or
necessary for the United States."); Watts, supra note 149, at 1-2 (presenting as conventional
wisdom the perception that nuclear weapons are "special" and qualitatively different from
other weapons); Berry et al., supra note 139, at 47-49 (reporting views of U.S. and other
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militarily; their effects are legally too indiscriminate, disproportional
and long-lasting; and politically, the stigmatization from crossing this
brightest of "red lines" would be intolerable. 151

B.

Efforts to Reduce the Threat ofNuclear Weapons.

As noted above, the world has already undertaken numerous
valuable, albeit limited, steps to abate the threat of nuclear
Armageddon. 152
The most important multilateral instrument is
undoubtedly the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT"). 153
Under it, the "non-nuclear-weapon states" ("NNWS") (i.e., almost all of
the treaty's 189 parties) agree never to manufacture or acquire nuclear
weapons; they promise additionally to submit to rigorous international
inspection to verify their continued non-possession. 154 In return, the
five "nuclear-weapon states" ("NWS") (i.e., China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States) agree, among other
commitments, 155 to rein in their own nuclear armadas. In particular, in
Article VI, "[ e Jach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control." 156
military leaders regarding utility ofnuclear weapons).
151. See Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, Address Before a
Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 25, 1984), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40205 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(asserting that "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in
our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But
then would it not be better to do away with them entirely."); Sidney D. Drell & James E.
Goodby, What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Restructuring U.S.
Strategic Nuclear Forces, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N REPORT (Oct. 2007).
152. See supra notes 8, 78-85 and accompanying text; see also Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY Doc No. 111-5
(2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter New START Treaty].
153. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 168 [hereinafter NPT].
154. Id. arts. II, III.
155. The treaty also specifies the inalienable right of all parties to use nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes, and commits all parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and information for those purposes. Id. art. IV.
156. Id. art. VI. Note that four states, each of which possesses nuclear weapons, are
not parties to the NPT: India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. See David S. Jonas,
Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the "Final Four" Join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States While Retaining Their Nuclear Weapons?, 2005
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The profound global controversy eating at the heart of the nonproliferation enterprise - a challenge that has strained the NPT regime
for decades - concerns the extent of NWS compliance with their Article
VI obligations. Several NNWS have vigorously complained that the
NWS have consistently failed to "pursue negotiations in good faith" on
the most critical of the anticipated "effective measures" toward nuclear
arms control and disarmament. NNWS cite the fact that more than forty
years after the conclusion of the NPT, nuclear weapons still exist in the
thousands; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not in force; other
associated instruments are not even under negotiation; and the nine
nuclear powers seem no closer to a complete and permanent
abandonment of their privileged position. 157
Several of the "review conferences" for the NPT, held at five-year
intervals, have been roiled by vigorous disputes over the NWS fidelity
to Article VI; some of them have virtually broken down in discord. 158
In 1995, when the original twenty-five year duration of the NPT was
MICH. ST. L. REV. 417 (2005); DANIEL H. JOYN ER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
PROLIFERATION OF W EAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 56-76 (2009) (discussing article VI and
the NPT regime).
157. NPT Review Conference, U .N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), para. 80-86
(June 2010) (noting concern about large number of nuclear weapons deployed and
stockpiled, and calling for further progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in
security policies); NPT Review Conference, Apr. 24 - May 19, 2000, U.N. Doc.
NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Vol. I), para. 2 (2000) (expressing deep concern about nuclear
weapons policies and accomplishments) (hereinafter NPT 2000 Review Conference Final
Document]; Acheson, supra note 130, at 92; Kristensen, supra note 130; George Bunn &
Roland M. Timerbaev, Nuclear Disarmament: How Much have the Five Nuclear Powers
Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty? , in JOHN RHINELANDER & ADAM SCHEINMAN , AT
THE NUCLEAR CROSSROADS 11 (1995); Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, Slowing

Nuclear Weapon Reductions and Endless Nuclear Weapon Modernizations: A Challenge to
the NPT, 70 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 94 (2014).
158. See Alexander Kmentt, How Divergent Views on Nuclear Disarmament Threaten
the NPT, 43
ARMS
CONTROL TODAY
8
(Dec.
2013),
available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_12/How-Divergent-Views-on-Nuc lear-DisarmamentThreaten-the-NPT (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); George Bunn & Jean du Preez, More Than
Words: The Value of US. Non-Nuclear-Use Promises, 37 ARMS CONTROL TODAY
(July/ Aug.
2007),
available at http ://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21935/Bunn_ More
_Than_Words_The_Value_of_U.S._Non-Nuclear-Use_Promises.pdf (last visited Jan. 9,
2015) (reporting that "An acrimonious debate about security assurances was among the
reasons for the failed 2005 NPT review conference."); Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Rough
Seas Ahead: Issues for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, 44 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 20
(Apr.
2014),
available
at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_04/Rough-SeasAhead_Issues-for-the-2015-NPT-Review-Conference (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); Tom Z.
Collina, Lance Garrison, & Daniel Homer, Stage Set for 2015 NPT Review Conference, 44
ARMS CONTROL TODAY 25 (Apr. 2014), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2014_06/News/Stage-Set-for-2015-NPT-Review-Conference (last visited Jan. 9, 2015);
John Burroughs, International Law, in Assuring Destruction, supra note 130, at 115.
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extended indefinitely, 159 the NNWS insisted upon faster progress and
greater accountability. 160 In subsequent sessions, a series of thirteen
"practical steps" and a roster of sixty-four "action items" were
negotiated, in the so-far-futile effort to specify time-bound
implementation of the NWS progress on point. 161
C.

No First Use Statements and Security Assurances.

The principal vehicles through which the NWS move toward
fulfillment of their Article VI obligations are the series of agreements
and unilateral actions that directly limit and reduce their respective
nuclear firepower. As noted above, substantial success has been
registered in capping these inventories, although the process is so far
from complete that the NNWS are, reasonably, unsated.
An important subsidiary or associated set of measures in pursuit of
the "basic bargain" of the NPT therefore consists of a series of
additional promises or declarations that the NWS make regarding their
plans and commitments about the future possible use and threat of
nuclear weapons. These prominently include "no first use" ("NFU")
pledges and related "security assurances." An NFU declaration is
simply a statement that the country will not be the first to initiate a use
of nuclear weapons; it could be formed as a revocable statement of
intention, a political commitment or a legally binding undertaking.
NFU attestations could be phrased in varying ways; typically they
would (explicitly or implicitly) reserve the right to use nuclear weapons
"second," if necessary to respond to an enemy's prior exercise of
159. The NPT had an initial duration of twenty-five years, so in 1995, the parties
convened a conference to determine its fate. NPT, supra note 153, art. X.2. The conference
decided to extend the treaty "indefinitely," and in the process, generated a series of
commitments and understandings, including those related to article VI and nuclear arms
control. See THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 257-93 (2002).
160. 1995 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 23-25, U.N. Sales No. E.96.IX.1 (decision of 1995
Conference on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,
including provisions on nuclear weapon free zones and security assurances) [hereinafter
1995 RevCon decision].
161. NPT 2000 Review Conference Final Document, supra note 157, para. 15
(recording conference's agreement on thirteen "practical steps for the systematic and
progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty."); see REACHING CRITICAL WILL,
supra note 130, at 6 (summarizing steps taken in pursuit of 64-point Action Plan agreed at
the 2010 NPT Review Conference and assessing NWS performance as disappointing on
nuclear disarmament); see Mukhatzhanova, supra note 158, at 21 (noting that the rate of
implementation of the disarmament actions has been so disappointing that some NWS "are
bound to ask whether the action plan only creates the appearance of progress and whether a
new approach is needed.").
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nuclear weapons against the state (or its allies); other caveats might be
added, too. 162
Related are two types of security assurances. A "negative"
security assurance ("NSA") is a promise that the offeror will refrain
from using nuclear weapons against a particular state (or collection of
states), typically subject to provisos such as the condition that the
offeree refrain from pursuing or possessing nuclear weapons itself and
that it not engage in warfare against the offeror in alliance with another
NWS. 163 A "positive" security assurance ("PSA") is an avowal to come
to the aid of a state that is victimized by another state's use of nuclear
weapons; again, it could be subject to a variety of non-proliferation or
other conditions. 164
All of these NFU, NSA and PSA declarations could be issued in
the context of the NPT, as part of another treaty, or independently.
They could be extended to all states or they could privilege NPT
members (in order to provide an additional incentive for outliers to join
that treaty). 165

162. Harold A. Feiveson & Ernst Jan Hogendoom, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,
10 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 90 (summer 2003); see Scott Sagan, The Case for No First
Use, 51 SURVIVAL 163 (2009); see generally London Conference on No First Use of
Nuclear Weapons, PUGWASH CONFERENCES ON SCIENCE & w. AFFS. (November 18, 2002),
available at http://pugwash.org/?s=no+first+use (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (collection of
scientific and political papers on NFU).
See JEFFREY w. KNOPF, SECURITY ASSURANCES AND NUCLEAR
163.
NONPROLIFERATION (2012); Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162; Bunn & du Preez,
supra note 158; JAMES D. FRY, LEGAL RESOLUTION OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
DISPUTES 88-96 (2013).
164. S.C. Res. 984, U.N. Doc. SIRES/ 984 (Apr. 11, 1995), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/984 ( 1995) (last visited Dec.
18, 2014) (expressing intention to assist states victimized by aggression with nuclear
weapons or the threat of nuclear weapons); S.C. Res. 255, U.N. Doc. S/RES/255 (June 19,
1968),
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=S/RES
/255(1968) (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
165. 1995 RevCon decision, supra note 160, at 54-55; MOHAMED SHAKER, THE
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION 1959-1979, at 471552 (Oceana, vol. II 1980); Richard H. Ullman, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, 50
FOREIGN AFF. 669, 679-80, (1972); George Bunn & Roland M. Timerbaev, Security
Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States, NONPROLIFERATION Rev. 11, 16-17 (1993)
(suggesting a U.N. Security Council resolution as a mechanism for promulgating security
assurances); see also Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's
Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. N491765
(Dec. 19, 1994), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=N49/
765 (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (NSA and PSA extended by United States, Russia, and
United Kingdom to Ukraine, when Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons and joined the NPT);
G.A. Res. 68/58, U.N. Doc. NRES/68/58 (Dec. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=NRES/68/58 (last visited Dec. 18,
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The strategy behind NFU, NSA and PSA undertakings is the
calculation that NNWS are more likely to be content in their perpetual
"second class citizenship" if they are reassured that their own national
security will not unduly suffer thereby. If they are protected against the
NWS threat or use of nuclear weapons, then eschewing the opportunity
to acquire weapons on their own should be a more tolerable path.
NNWS have therefore sought these commitments as a part of the NPT
quid pro quo, and a frequent point of contention, at NPT review
conferences and elsewhere, has been the precision, comprehensiveness
and reliability of those NWS oaths. 166
Outside the NPT context, the NWS have a checkered history with
these commitments. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union issued a
broad NFU pledge in June 1982, and challenged the United States to
reciprocate. In contrast, because NATO feared that its conventional
forces might then be insufficient to stem an envisioned Warsaw Pact
invasion of Western Europe, the United States insisted that it might,
2014) (requesting the commencement of negotiations on a treaty to prohibit the threat or use
of nuclear weapons under any circumstances).
166. See John Simpson, The Role of Security Assurances in the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime, in KNOPF, supra note 163 (surveying effectiveness of NSAs as a
non-proliferation tool); Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 91, 95-96 (noting that at
the 1995 and 2000 NPT review conferences, NNWS strongly argued in favor of the NWS
providing rigorous, legally binding NSAs and PSAs); New Zealand et al., Security
Assurances (James Martin Ctr. for Nonproliferation Studies and King's Coll. Ctr. for Sci.
and Sec. Studies, Working Paper J-4, 2003), in Prepatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
NPT/CONF.2005.PC.II/WP.l l
(May
1,
2003),
available
at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP. l l
(last
visited Dec.18, 2014) [hereinafter CSSS Briefing Book]; REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra
note 130, at 12, 52-54 (assessing NWS progress on 2010 commitments regarding security
assurances); 1995 RevCon decision, supra note 160, at 25, 50-64; Gerson, supra note 149,
at 42; Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 157, at 11, 13; Thomas Graham & Leonor Tomero,
"Obligations for Us All": NATO & Negative Security Assurances, 49 DISARMAMENT DIPL.
(2000), available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/49nato.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(tracing the evolution of NSAs in the NPT context); Leonard S. Spector & Aubrie Ohlde,
Negative Security Assurances: Revisiting the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Option, 35 ARMS
CONTROL
TODAY
13
(Apr.
2005),
available
at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_04/Spector_Ohlde (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); A New
Look at No First Use, STANLEY FOUND. 4 (Apr. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/NoFirstUsePDB708.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014 ); see also David S. Jonas, General and Complete Disarmament: Not Just for
Nuclear Weapons States Anymore, 43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 587 (2012) (arguing that NPT article
VI imposes obligations on all parties, not only the NWS, to pursue complete disarmament);
G.A. Res. 68/28, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/28 (Dec. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=AIRES/68/28 (last visited Dec. 18,
2014) (reaffirming the urgent need for effective NSAs); Philipp C. Bleek & Eric B. Lorber,
Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation, 58 J. CONFLICT Resol. 429 (2013).
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indeed, be the first to use nuclear weapons, if that were the only
remaining bulwark against aggression. After the dissolution of the
U.S.S.R., however, it was Russia, with its greatly diminished military
prowess that felt the need for "strategic ambiguity" in its nuclear
posture, and in 1993 it rescinded the no first use declaration. 167
The U.S. NFU posture has likewise evolved. In the 1950s, the
official policy explicitly endorsed the possibility of a first use, but by
the 1970s, the tum of phrase favored an emphasis on restraint, subject to
certain exceptions; these statements have been episodically tweaked and
refined by successive administrations. 168 Under the current iteration,
expressed in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report (the
Department of Defense's highest-level strategy document), the United
States "will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty ("NPT") and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation
obligations." 169
The most nearly concerted NWS position on NFU and NSAs came

167. See Beatrice Heuser, Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 1970s and 1980s:
Findings in the East German Archives, 12 COMP. STRATEGY 437 (1993); Feiveson &
Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 92; Ullman, supra note 165, at 670-72; Yuri Fedorov,
Russia's Doctrine on the Use of Nuclear Weapons (Pugwash Meeting No. 279, Working
Paper, 2002).
168. See Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 90-91 (highlighting the 2002
statements of the George W. Bush administration, reserving "the right to respond with
overwhelming force - including through resort to all our options" to another state's
aggression, and the 1953 policy of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration that "In the
event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for
use as other munitions."); Bunn & du Preez, supra note 158; Bundy et al., supra note 149;
John Steinbruner, Looking Back: Carter's 1978 Declaration and the Significance of Security
Assurances, 38 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 57 (Oct. 2008), available at
http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2008 _ l 0/lookingback (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); Gerson,
supra note 149.
169. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, supra note 126, at 15-16 (The report does
not identify what the reference to "nuclear non-proliferation obligations" might consist of,
other than the NPT. It also stresses that, while U.S. conventional forces would ordinarily be
sufficient to respond to other severe provocations, such as an enemy's use of chemical or
biological weapons, it is difficult to foresee how the catastrophic potential of bio-weapons
might evolve in the future, so "the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment
in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological
weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat." The report also explains that the
United States is not prepared at the present time to adopt a comprehensive NFU policy, "but
will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted."); see
also Securing Britain in an Uncertain Future: The Strategic Defence and Security Review
(Oct. 2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/systern/uploads/
attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2014); see also Gerson, supra note 149.
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on April 6, 1995, in connection with the extension of the NPT. There,
all five NWS issued national statements; four of these were basically
identical, promising not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties
to the NPT, "except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on
[the particular NWS], its territory, its armed forces or other troops, or
against its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment,
carried out or sustained by such a State in alliance or association with a
China alone was considerably more
nuclear-weapon State." 17
generous, undertaking "not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any
time or under any circumstances" and "not to use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weaponfree zones at any time or under any circumstances." 171 The contents of

°

170. Letter from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations
at
available
1995),
6,
(Apr.
Secretary-General
the
to
Addressed
http://globe.blogs.nouvelobs.com/media/O 1/01 /40968903 .pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014 ).
Substantially identical, contemporaneous letters (also including PSA commitments) were
authored by Russia (Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to
the United Nations (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
atf/cf/% 7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Disarm%20S 1995261.pdf
(last visited Dec. 1, 2014)); the United Kingdom (Letter from Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations (Apr. 6,
1995), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D274E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9% 7D/Disarm%20S 1995262.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2014))
and the United States (Letter from the Permanent Mission of the United States ofAmerica to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (Apr. 6, 1995), available at
http://globe.blogs.nouvelobs.com/media/O 1/00/1336803625.2.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2014)); 1995 RevCon decision, supra note 160, at 51-64; see also CSSS Briefing Book,
supra note 166, at 1-3 (excerpting prior NSAs from NWS).
171. Letter from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary-General (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.pir
center.org/media/content/files/10/13590930390.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). China's
NFU and NSA commitments have traditionally been broad, but outsiders are sometimes
skeptical about the sincerity of the undertakings. See CSSS Briefing Book, supra note 166,
at 1; REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra note 130, at 31-32; Kelsey Davenport & Marcus
Taylor, Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Updated Report
at
available
(2010-2013),
Ass'N
CONTROL
ARMS
Card,
http://www.armscontrol.org/files/ACA_2013_Nuclear_Report_Card.pdf (last visited Dec.
18, 2014) [hereinafter Assessing Progress]; see Jeffrey Lewis, China's Nuclear
Idiosyncrasies and Their Challenges 17-18 (IFRI Security Studies Center Proliferation Paper
47, Nov.-Dec. 2013), available at www.ifri.org/downloads/pp47lewis.pdf (last visited Dec.
18, 2014); Ullman, supra note 165, at 669; Annual Report to Congress on Military and
Security Developments involving the People's Republic of China in 2014, U.S. DEP'T DEF.
at 28, available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_ DoD_China_Report.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014); see Gregory Kulacki, Chickens Talking with Ducks: The US-Chinese
Nuclear Dialogue, 41 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 15 (Oct. 2011 ), available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_10/U.S._Chinese_Nuclear_Dialo
gue (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); see Rebecca Heinrichs, China's Strategic Capabilities and
Intent (Heritage Foundation Issue BriefNo. 4111, Dec. 18, 2013); see also Bill Gertz, Guess
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the various NFU and NSA postures of the NWS have ebbed and flowed
since then. 172
Similar drama has sometimes attended the NFU postures of other
states, too. India, for example, has long asserted a declaration of no first
use, either in blanket form or subject to limitations. 173 The maintenance
of that tradition was briefly, but excitedly, called into question in April
2014, when the hardline Bharatiya Janata Party ("BJP") was poised to
win the national election and seemed to equivocate about nuclear
policy. Following a flare-up of adverse international reaction, however,
the BJP election manifesto backpedaled, and reaffirmed the country's
accustomed stance. 174
In contrast, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine has expressly reserved the
right to use nuclear weapons first, and it has reportedly threatened to do
so against India on at least four occasions. 175 Israel and North Korea are
not known to have issued authoritative NFU policy statements. 176

Who's Coming to Dinner, Chinese General Who Threatened Nuclear Strike on US. Visits
Washington This Week, WASH. FREE BEACON (2013) (quoting Chinese generals threatening
to use nuclear weapons against the United States in a conflict over Taiwan).
172. REACHING CRlTICAL WILL, supra note 130, at 53-54; Simpson, supra note 166, at
69-75; Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at 6, 12; Bunn & du Preez, supra note 158.
173. P.M. Karnath, Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Arming to Disarm, in NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROGRESS 63, 65 (2013) (reporting that India
had pledged not to use nuclear weapons "against states which do not possess nuclear
weapons, or are not aligned" with other nuclear weapons states; subsequently, India
modified the pledge to say "if a non-nuclear power uses biological or chemical weapons
(BWC), India will keep the option of using nuclear weapons open."); Prime Minister
Proposes No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons, INDIAN EXPRESS (Apr. 2, 2014, 2:26 PM),
available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/prime-minister-proposes-nofirst-use-of-nuclear-weapons/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Manmohan Singh, Inaugural
Address on a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: From Conception to Reality (Apr. 2, 2014);
India Call for Global "No First Use" Nuke Policy, GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE (2010),
available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/india-calls-for-global-no-first-use-nuke-policy/
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 92; Assessing
Progress, supra note 171, at 29-30.
174. Indian Party Backpedals on Provocative Nuclear Policy Remarks, GLOBAL SEC.
NEWSWIRE (Apr. 9, 2014), available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/indian-partybackpedals-provocative-nuclear-policy-remarks/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014); BJP Puts NoFirst-Use Nuclear Policy in Doubt, TIMES INDIA (Apr. 7, 2014), available at http://
newsindiatimes.com/bjp-puts-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-in-doubt/ (last visited Dec. 18,
2014); P.R. Chari, India 's Nuclear Doctrine: Stirrings of Change, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
INT'L PEACE (June 4, 2014), available at http://camegieendowment.org/201
4/06/04/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-stirrings-of-change (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
175. See Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 92; but see Assessing Progress,
supra note 171, at 35 (discussing Pakistani NFU pledge).
176. See Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 92; Assessing Progress, supra
note 171, at 38 (noting North Korean nuclear threats).
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Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.
Another important forum in which NSAs have been expressed has
been a series of regional "nuclear weapon free zones" ("NWFZs").
Typically, a zone of this sort is established by a treaty among the states
in a particular geographic area; it reinforces the NPT by fostering
additional non-proliferation undertakings that may be more precisely
tailored to conditions in the particular region, and by engrafting
additional, more intrusive verification arrangements that might be more
acceptable among states that already know and trust each other
relatively well. 177 Five such zones are currently in place, for Latin
America (1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco); 178 the South Pacific (1985 Treaty
of Raratonga); 179 Southeast Asia (1995 Treaty of Bangkok); 180 Africa
(1996 Treaty of Pelindaba); 181 and Central Asia (2006 Treaty of
Semipalatinsk). 182
D.

177. See generally U.N. Report of the Disarmament Commission, U.N. Doc. A/54/42;
GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No, 42 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/54/42(SUPP) (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (identifying
criteria for establishing a regional NWFZ); Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, U.N. OFFICE FOR
DISARMAMENT AFFS., available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/
NWFZ.shtml (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Comprehensive Study of the Question ofNuclearWeapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects, G.A. Res. 3472 (XXX) (1975), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3472(XXX)&Lang=E&Area
=RESOLUTION (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones at a Glance,
ARMS CONTROL Ass'N (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/
print/2567 (last visited Oct. 24, 2014); Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, NUCLEAR AGE PEACE
FOUND., available at http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/treaties/nuclear-free-zones/
trty_nuclear-free-zone-index.htm# (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); NPT, supra note 153, art.
VII (noting explicitly the parties' rights to develop regional non-proliferation measures);
Jozef Goldblat, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment,
NONPROLIFERATION Rev. 18 (1997); Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at 6, 12;
REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra note 130, at 12, 56-66; csss Briefing Book, supra note
166, at sec. F; 1995 RevCon decision, supra note 160, at 25, 65-87.
178. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967,
634 U.N.T.S. 326 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco].
179. South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S.
177 [hereinafter Treaty of Raratonga].
180. Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635
[hereinafter Treaty of Bangkok].
181. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, Apr., 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698
[hereinafter Treaty of Pelindaba]; 1995 RevCon decision, supra note 160, at 67-72.
182. Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of
Semipalatinsk), Sept. 8, 2006, No. 51633 available at http://disarmament.un.org/
treaties/t/canwfz/text (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). In addition, Mongolia has declared itself to
be a nuclear weapons free zone, and the leading nuclear weapons states have formally
acknowledged that status. See Daryl G. Kimball, Mongolia Recognized as Nuclear-Free
Zone, 42 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 6 (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.
armscontrol.org/act/2012 _ 1O/Mongolia-Recognized-as-Nuclear-Free-Zone%20 (last visited
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Each of the NWFZ agreements also includes protocols 183 in which
the NWS are invited to affirm (in text that varies somewhat from treaty
to treaty) that they will respect the non-nuclear status of the region, such
as by not stationing or testing nuclear weapons in the area. In addition,
these protocols ask the NWS to declare robust NSAs promising that
they will not use nuclear weapons against states that have joined the
relevant treaty. In the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for example, the relevant
protocol passage asserts "[t]he Governments represented by the
undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America." 184
In joining that protocol in 1971, however, the United States
appended an understanding or declaration 185 that "the United States
Government would have to consider that an armed attack by a
Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state,
would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding
Dec. 18, 2013). A proposal to make the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass
destruction has also been developed. Mukhatzhanova, supra note 158, at 22; Kelsey
Davenport, No Date Set for Middle East Zone Meeting, 43 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 32 (Nov.
2013), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_11/No-Date-Set-For-Middle-EasZone-Meeting (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). In addition, at least some nuclear weapons
activities have been banned by treaty from Antarctica. See, e.g., Antarctic Treaty, art. V,
Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; outer space (Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, art. IV, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S. 205); and the ocean floor (Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, art. I, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115,
T.I.A.S. No. 7337).
183. Under international law, there is no distinction between a treaty denominated as a
"protocol" and any other. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 97,
(defining "treaty," noting that any "particular designation" is immaterial). Often, the term
"protocol" is applied to a document that is attached to, or otherwise associated with, some
other treaty; what is unusual in the NWFZ context is the fact that in each instance, the treaty
and the protocol have completely non-overlapping sets of parties. See generally Marco
Roscini, Negative Security Assurances in the Protocols Additional to the Treaties
Establishing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, in OBAMA AND THE BOMB: THE VISION OF A
WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 129 (Heinz Gartner ed., 2011 ).
184. Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Treaty of Tlatelolco, art. 3, Apr. 1,
1968, available at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/tlateloco_p2/text (last visited Jan. 9,
2015).
185. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S.Prt.106-71, TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (2001),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-106SPRT669
22.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (noting different types of reservations, understandings,
declarations and other conditions the Senate might assert in its consideration of a treaty; the
vocabulary has been applied inconsistently).
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obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty." 186 With this reservation, the
United States significantly restricted the scope of the original NSA,
apparently excluding from the pledge a possible first use of nuclear
weapons against an NNWS who was aligned in war with an NWS. 187
Other NWS have likewise sometimes reined in the scope of their NSA
commitments in other NWFZ instruments. 188 The United States Senate
is now considering providing advice and consent to the ratification of
the protocols for the Pelindaba and Raratonga NWFZ treaties; it
remains to be seen whether additional reservations to the NSA
statements in those documents will be appended. 189
E.

Assessment of the Non-Use Declarations.

Although the population of NFU, NSA, and PSA statements is now
rather large, their overall efficacy is quite restricted. First, they are far
from comprehensive or uniform in content. The United States and other
NWS have frequently inserted distinct national caveats and subtle
disclaimers that have undercut the potentially bold reach, reserving the
186. GRAHAM, JR. & LAVERA, supra note 13, at 57 (quoting Richard Nixon,
Ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America (1971)).
187. The content of this 1971 condition is somewhat more restrictive than the current
global U.S. NSA policy, as reflected in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, supra note
126. See Bunn & du Preez, supra note 158.
188. See Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS.,
available at http://www.un.org/disarmament!WMD/Nuclear/NWFZ.shtml (last visited Dec.
18, 2014) (collecting NWS statements attached to ratification of protocols to NWFZ
treaties); Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at 14, 17, 20, 22; see also Spector & Ohlde,
supra note 166 (arguing that NWFZ protocols are superior to unilateral NSAs for
entrenching legal protections); Roscini, supra note 183, at 134-38.
189. Peter Crail, The Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty Protocols and U.S. National
Security, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N ISSUE BRIEF, May 20, 2011; see also Feiveson &
Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 96 (discussing U.S. 1996 statement upon signing protocol
to Treaty of Pelindaba). Notably, NWFZs seem to be one of the few arms control topics on
which the NWS have recently been able to collaborate effectively, despite their other
ongoing political difficulties. Regarding the Central Asia zone, for example, the leading
countries had long been irreconcilably divided regarding one provision of the Semipalatinsk
Treaty which appeared to give Russia a right to re-introduce nuclear weapons into the
region. After five years of frustrated negotiations among the NWS, a solution to the
problem was suddenly developed in April 2014, and the protocol was quickly signed by all
five states. See Rachel Oswald, Five Powers Agree to Respect Central Asian Nuclear-Free
Zone,
GLOBAL
SEC.
NEWSWIRE
(Apr.
30,
2014),
available
at
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/five-nuclear-powers-agree-sign-protocol-central-asian-nuclear
-free-zone/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014 ); Office of the Spokesperson, United States Signs
Protocol to Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, U.S. DEPT. ST. (May 6,
2014), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225681.htm (last visited Dec.
18, 2014).
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right to use nuclear weapons first, even against an NNWS, in openended circumstances. 190 Second, many of the commitments are not
global; they apply only to states in specified geographic regions, or who
otherwise meet the designated criteria. 191
Third, the NWS statements are of contested legal status. The
NSAs inscribed in an NWFZ protocol are authoritative for the countries
that have joined the instrument, but the pledges extended in the context
of NPT review conferences are more dubious. NNWS contend that the
commitments are key elements of a bargained-for exchange, but the
NWS have waffled. 192 Fourth, the assurances consist solely of words on
papers - there is no "operationalization" of the commitments, no
concrete steps that the NWS must undertake to validate the seriousness
of the undertakings. When nothing has to change in the real world
regarding the number, status or treatment of the nuclear forces, the
NNWS cannot be fully confident in reliability of the declarations.
Certainly, even a naked verbal commitment counts for something, but it
is equally clear that such a declaration is, as a practical matter,
unverifiable and subject to being swiftly revised or even ignored as
circumstances demand in extremis.
As a result, the existing NFU, NSA, and PSA statements have not
been fully satisfactory to the NNWS. The undertakings have not
provided sufficient reassurance that it is reliably safe to forego a
possible nuclear weapons option, and have therefore not achieved the
non-proliferation value the NWS anticipated. Viewed differently, the
heavily qualified NFU, NSA and PSA rhetoric has not succeeded in
communicating any diminished future importance for nuclear weapons.
The NWS sought to convey a message of restraint, suggesting that
nuclear weapons are not to be forever "the coin of the realm," not the
indelible badge of first-class national status in the world. But their
collective slipperiness in declining to offer comprehensive assurances
seems to implant precisely the opposite signal. If the NWS are
unwilling to overtly and unconditionally agree not to use nuclear
weapons first, why should the NNWS not emphasize and perhaps

190. Simpson, supra note 166, at 64 (reporting dissatisfaction among NNWS because
the NSAs were not uniform or issued jointly by all the NWS).
191. Spector & Ohlde, supra note 166 (comparing NWFZ and NSA approaches; also
noting that the non-parties to the NPT (India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan) are not
allowed to join the protocols to the NWFZ treaties).
192. See Bunn & du Preez, supra note 158; Simpson, supra note 166, at 64; Feiveson
& Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 96; New Zealand Working Paper, in CSSS Briefing
Book, supra note 166, at J-4; Graham & Tomero, supra note 166; Spector & Ohlde, supra
note 166.
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pursue those arms, too? If the NWS, with their enormous conventional
weapons capabilities and elite army, navy, air force, and Marines, report
that they cannot entirely dispense with the possibility that it might be
necessary to use nuclear weapons first, how could other, smaller and
less well-defended states ignore that same hawkish logic? 193
In fact, nuclear weapons remain firmly lodged in a priority position
relations. People sometimes observe that these arms
international
in
have not been used since 1945, but in another, deeper sense, they are
"used" every day- to deter, coerce, and intimidate - even without being
detonated. And the United States has quite frequently considered the
possibility of using nuclear weapons in the explosive sense, too. By one
count, on at least twenty-five occasions, the U.S. leadership seriously
contemplated a first application of the awesome power. 194 Sometimes,
the perpetual threat of nuclear weapons is made overt, such as by
communicating the ominous suggestion that "all options are on the
table" for a response to a particular crisis - nothing could be a more
vivid reminder that the United States retains the physical capacity and
the legal right to flex its strongest muscles at will. 195
Finally, it must be observed that the NWS are certainly not acting
193. Feiveson & Hogendoorn, supra note 162, at 95 (stating that "the continued
reliance on hedged no-first-use policies by the United States and other nuclear powers is
often one of the rationales nuclear weapons advocates from non-nuclear-weapons states
offer as justification for abandoning NPT commitments and developing their own nuclear
weapons."); Bunn & du Preez, supra note 158; Gerson, supra note 149, at 41-42 (arguing
that U.S. retention of the option to use nuclear weapons first ''undermines the NPT regime
by signaling that even the world's most affluent and powerful nation continues to believe
that nuclear weapons are important instruments of national power."); see Graham &
Tomero, supra note 166.
194. See Daniel Ellsberg, Roots of the Upcoming Nuclear Crisis, in THE CHALLENGE
OF ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 45, 52-53 (David Krieger ed., 2009) (listing twenty-five
occasions from 1948 to 2008 when the United States threatened or considered the first use
of nuclear weapons).
195. Id. at 47 (citing examples of U.S. leaders emphasizing that "all options are on the
table," clearly including nuclear weapons); id. at 56-57 (highlighting the unspoken, but
clear, threat to use nuclear weapons against Iraq in 1991 if Saddam Hussein used chemical
weapons); see also Jeremy Bender, The US is Conducting a Massive Nuclear Arms Drill
Days After a Russian Nuclear Exercise, Bus. INSIDER (May 12, 2014), available at
http://www.businessinsider.com/us-conducting-a-massive-nuclear-arms-drill-20
14-5 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (noting that in the midst of the 2014 crisis over Ukraine,
both the United States and Russia conducted nuclear weapons exercises); Assessing
Progress, supra note 171 , at 26 (noting that President Obama asserted that he "will take no
options off the table" in responding to Iran's nuclear program); see also Russian General
Calls for Preemptive Nuclear Strike Doctrine Against NATO, Moscow TIMES (Sept. 3,
2014), available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-general-callsfor-preemptive-nuclear-strike-doctrine-against-nato/506370.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(recent Russian rhetoric about preemptive military strike).
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as if they intend to get out of the nuclear weapons business at any point
in the foreseeable future. Even while the numbers of deployed,
operational nuclear weapons are falling or stable for some of the nine
possessing states, 196 there are other indicators of an emerging nuclear
bull market. Russia is undertaking a substantial modernization of its
strategic weapons, investing in new generations of land- and sea-based
missiles. 197 China, India, and Pakistan are building up, too. 198 In the
United States, there is no ongoing construction of additional nuclear
weaponry, but medium-term plans call for a massive recapitalization of
all three legs of the "triad" (land-based missiles, submarine-based
missiles, and long-range bombers), and the imperative for indefinitely
sustaining the infrastructure that supports, maintains, and operates the
nuclear establishment is routinely stressed. 199
196. See sources cited supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
197. REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra note 130, at 34; Watts, supra note 149, at 44-45;
Kristensen, supra note 130; Pavel Podvig, Russian Federation, in Assuring Destruction,
supra note 130, at 59-66.
198. Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at vi, 29, 35; Hui Zhang, China, in Assuring
Destruction, supra note 130, at 17-26; M.V. Ramana, India, in Assuring Destruction, supra
note 130, at 34-43; Zia Mian, Pakistan, in Assuring Destruction, supra note 130, at 51-58;
Tim Craig & Karen DeYoung, Pakistan Is Eyeing Sea-Based and Short-Range Nuclear
Weapons,
Analysts Say, WASH. POST (Sept.
21,
2014),
available at
http://www. washingtonpost.corn/world/asia_paci fic/pakistan-is-eyeing-sea-based-and-shortrange-nuclear-weapons-analysts-say/2014/09/20/ I bd9436a- l l bb-11 e4-893626932bcfd6ed_story.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
199. Amy F. Woolf, Nuclear Modernization in an Age ofAusterity, 44 ARMS CONTROL
TODAY 20 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/
Nuclear-Modernization-in-an-Age-of-Austerity (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (quoting
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel regarding U.S. plans to "invest in the modernization we
need"); Jon B. Wolfshtal et al., The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Nuclear
Modernization Over the Next Thirty Years, JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION
STUD. 28 (Jan. 2014), available at http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/140107_trillion_dollar_
nuclear_triad.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (concluding that the United States plans to
spend approximately one trillion dollars maintaining its current nuclear missiles,
submarines, bombers and other weapons, procuring replacement systems, and upgrading
existing bombs); William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, U.S. Ramping up Major Renewal in
Nuclear Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014), available at http://www.ny
times.corn/2014/09/22/us/us-ramping-up-maj or-renewal-in-nuclear-arms.html?_ r=O
(last
visited Dec. 18, 2014); Andrew Lichterman, United States, in Assuring Destruction, supra
note 130, at 89-111; REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra note 130, at 38-39; Kristensen &
Norris, US Nuclear Forces, supra note 127; Acheson, supra note 130; Tom Z. Collina, U.S.
Nuclear Arms Spending Set to Rise, 44 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 31 (Apr. 2014), available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_04/U-S-Nuclear-Arms-Spending-Set-to-Rise%20 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014); Kristensen, supra note 130. But see Al Mauroni, A Rational
Approach to Nuclear Weapons Policy, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Apr. 28, 2014), available at
http ://warontherocks.corn/2014/04/a-rational-approach-to-nuclear-weapons-policyI
(last
visited Dec. 18, 2014) (arguing that a U.S. reinvestment in nuclear weapons is overdue and
affordable).
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IV. A PROPOSED NEW TREATY
This section presents the draft text of a proposed new treaty, 200
together with annotations that explain the provisions and highlight key
precedents. It is styled as a "Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact," and
attempts to provide the "nuts and bolts" that can build upon some of the
lessons identified in Section II and address the problems highlighted in
Section III.
Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact
General Treaty for the Renunciation of Nuclear War as an
Instrument of National Policy
The States Parties to this Treaty,

Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of
mankind· 201
'
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all
mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort
to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the
security of peoples; 202
Sharing the view that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never
be fought; 203
Acknowledging the obligations contained in article VI of the 1968
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
200. Compare the proposed treaty with N.Z., New Agenda Coal., Security Assurances
J-4 to -6 (Prep. Comm. for the 2005 Review Conf. of the Parties to the Treaty on NonProlif. of Nuclear Weapons, Working Paper, 2003), in CSSS Briefing Book, supra note 166,
at J-5 (describing a draft treaty "on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons"), and Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 165, at 18 (presenting brief draft
declaration and U.N. Security Council resolution on NSAs).
201. This paragraph copies the first preambular paragraph of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1.
202. This paragraph copies the first preambular paragraph of the NPT. NPT, supra
note 153; see also sources cited supra note 124.
203. This passage comes from Ronald Reagan's Third State of the Union Address in
1984. Reagan, supra note 151. It is reflected in the preambles to the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers Agreement, supra note 82, 1530 U.N.T.S 387; second preambular
paragraph and the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, supra note 83, 27
I.L.M. 1200.
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effective international control"; 204
Recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice of July 8, 1996, which affirmed that in view of the widespread,
long-lasting and severe effects of nuclear weapons, the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, and that nuclear weapons
are generally subject to the same rules of international law applicable to
all other weapons; 205
Recalling also that, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and
maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with
the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic
resources ; 206
'
Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of
nuclear war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the
end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their
peoples may be perpetuated; 207
Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another
should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful
and orderly process and that no Party should promote its national
interests by resort to nuclear war; 208
Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of
the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the
present Treaty as soon as it comes into force, bring together their
peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the
nations of the world in a common renunciation of nuclear war as an
instrument of their national policy; 209

204. NPT, supra note 153, art. VI.
205. See ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 139, at 266.
206. This paragraph is taken from the twelfth preambular paragraph of the NPT. NPT,
supra note 153.
207. This paragraph is adapted from the second preambular paragraph of the original
Kellogg-Briand Pact. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1. The comment about "peaceful
and friendly relations now existing" is probably about as true today as it was in 1928.
208. This paragraph is adapted from the third preambular paragraph of the original
Kellogg-Briand Pact and modified to avoid the 1928 treaty's insistence upon reciprocity;
this document is intended to have global coverage. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note l.
209. This paragraph is adapted from the fourth (final) preambular paragraph of the
original Kellogg-Briand Pact. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1.
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Have agreed as follows:
Article I. Renunciation
The Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective
peoples 210 that they condemn and renounce recourse to nuclear war 211
for the solution of international controversies, 212 as an instrument of
national policy, or for any other reason. 213
Article II. Dispute Resolution
The Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or
conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which
may anse among them, shall never be sought except by pacific
means. 214

210. This reference to the "peoples," instead of solely to the states or their
governments, reflects the populist anti-war sentiment propelling the 1928 negotiations; it
was included in the 1928 agreement, Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, but is no longer
customary; cf U.N. Charter, supra note 2, at preamble (stating that "We the peoples of the
United Nations" are determined to achieve specified objectives; and "Accordingly, our
respective Governments" establish the U.N. organization).
211. Like the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, this proposed treaty does not confine the term
"war" to the sense of formally declared war; it applies to all uses of nuclear weapons in
international and non-international armed conflict. Note that the U.N. Charter, supra note 2,
art. 2 para 4, refers to a ''use of force," in order to avoid any suggestion that states might
escape some legal responsibility simply by fighting without officially declaring war. See
also Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. 1.
212. This sentence omits "in their relations with one another" from the 1928 treaty, in
order to ensure that the protections of the nuclear treaty are applicable to all countries,
regardless of whether they join the agreement, as well as to non-state actors or any other
target. This proposed treaty thus also exceeds the coverage of the existing Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone treaties and associated protocols, supra notes 178-89, which provide non-use
guaranties only to states in particular geographic regions.
213. See Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. 1. This sentence re-works the syntax
of the original Kellogg-Briand passage, and adds "or for any other reason," to avoid the
criticism that the 1928 agreement might have been interpreted to permit a recourse to war
that was somehow construed not to be "for the solution of international controversies" or "as
an instrument of national policy." Id.; see also sources cited supra note 25.
214. See Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. 2. This article is substantively
identical to article II of the 1928 treaty. It does not specify any particular pacific means for
settling or solving international disputes or conflicts, and neither this accord nor the 1928
original establishes any new institutions or organizations for those purposes. In the interwar
period, the League of Nations and multiple other institutions contributed to peaceful
resolution of disputes. See League of Nations Covenant, supra note 36. Today, the United
Nations family offers even more possibilities. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2; see also
sources cited supra note 11 (organizations created by arms control treaties). Unlike the
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Article III. Declarations
Each Party shall declare, upon entry into force of this agreement
for it, that it renounces any right to use nuclear weapons 215 absolutely,
under any circumstances, at any time, and against any target, or that it
reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, subject to the laws of armed
conflict, 216 in response to a first use of nuclear weapons against it, its
armed forces, or its allies. 217 The Party may rescind or modify this
Covenant of the League of Nations, this agreement does not specify a "cooling off period"
for use of alternative dispute resolution forums prior to a recourse to force. See League of
Nations Covenant, supra note 36, art. 12.
215. The treaty might offer a definition of the term "nuclear weapon," to exclude socalled "dirty bombs" (which use nuclear materials, but do not involve a nuclear explosion)
and "peaceful nuclear explosions" (which would use nuclear explosive power for civil
engineering purposes).
216. Many believe that, in view of the devastating power and long-term effects, a use
of nuclear weapons can never conform to the law of armed conflict principles of
discrimination and proportionality, but the ICJ has been unable definitively to reach such a
conclusion. See ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 139, para.
105(2)(E).
217. The text of the 1928 treaty does not contain any overt limitation or exemption
from the broad prohibition against recourse to war, but the negotiating history clearly
establishes a distinction between aggressive or offensive war vs. defensive or responsive
war. See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text. This proposed text makes the
distinction explicit between "first use" of nuclear weapons and "second use," and allows
each party to reserve the right to respond in kind against an attacker's initiating the use of
nuclear weapons. Presumably, the NNWS parties to the NPT, who have given up the right
to possess nuclear weapons, would opt for the "absolute" renunciation of nuclear weapons,
while the NWS might retain the legal right to use nuclear weapons responsively. The
distinction between aggressive and defensive conventional war can be quite elusive; the
facts about who shot first or which state committed the first offensive action could be
uncertain and contested under the 1928 Kellogg-Briand structure. In contrast, the linedrawing required by this proposed nuclear treaty should be simpler-it should ordinarily be
relatively easy to determine whether a nuclear weapon has been used, and against whom,
releasing a victim state from its formal renunciation of nuclear weapons. In some
circumstances, perhaps, attribution of the nuclear explosion to a particular user might be
contested. See Understanding Nuclear Forensics in 5 Questions, INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY
AG ENCY (2014 ), available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/forensics0707 l 4_ O.pdf
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (discussing problems of determining the origin of nuclear
materials and steps to improve that capability).
Under this proposed treaty, even a single use of one nuclear weapon would release the
victim state from its non-use pledge. But that would not imply that there would then be "no
limits" on its legally permitted nuclear response; the traditional law of armed conflict
requirements (necessity, proportionality, discrimination, avoidance of unnecessary
suffering) would still apply. See generally, GARY D. Sous, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR (2010); MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2009); The

White House, Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States,
19, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

WHITE HOUSE (June
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declaration at any time by providing notification to the Depositary. 218
Article IV. Threats
No Party shall, directly or indirectly, threaten a first use of nuclear
weapons. 219 No Party shall engage in military or other preparations for
the first use of nuclear weapons. 220
Article V. Security Assurances
Each Party shall provide or support immediate, meaningful
assistance to any state victimized by a first use of a nuclear weapon. 221
Each Party shall resist and reject any first use of a nuclear weapon by
any state. 222

office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states
(last
visited Dec. 18, 2014) (official U.S. government statement that all plans for the possible use
of nuclear weapons must be consistent with the fundamental principles of the law of armed
conflict). The proposed treaty text would also prohibit any "pre-emptive" use of a nuclear
weapon, even in circumstances of "anticipatory self-defense," in which it was clear that an
enemy was preparing to launch an imminent attack.
218. The states possessing nuclear weapons have occasionally altered their respective
statements about "no first use" and "negative security assurances." See supra Section III.C.
219. See ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 139, para. 47
(concluding that a threat to use force in an illegal manner is itself a violation of the U.N.
Charter). Of course, the mere continued possession of nuclear weapons constitutes a type of
ongoing tacit "threat" to use them. This provision is intended to bar overt threats, as well as
implicit threats, such as an assertion that "all options are on the table" to respond to a
particular crisis. See sources cited supra note 194-95.
220. Cf CWC, supra note 8, art. I.l(c) (prohibiting military preparations to use
chemical weapons). Note that some acts undertaken in preparation for a possible second use
of nuclear weapons can be indistinguishable from acts that would be undertaken in
anticipation of using those weapons first; treaty negotiators would have to assume the
burden of drawing delicate lines in this area.
221. This provision is deliberately vague, not specifying the manner or extent to which
the assistance must be provided. It is a weak form of Positive Security Assurance, not
requiring, for example, any automatic use of armed force to defend the state victimized by a
first nuclear strike. The assistance may consist of political, diplomatic, medical, scientific,
humanitarian, or other aid.
222. This provision is likewise vague; it requires parties to oppose any first use of
nuclear weapons, but does not specify the form in which that opposition will be registered.
National decisions and U.N. Security Council measures containing particular reactions to
any first use of nuclear weapons will depend heavily upon the immediate facts. Some have
argued that the Kellogg-Briand Pact rendered the concept of "neutrality" moot, requiring all
states to unite against aggression. See Baratta, supra note 43, at 702-03.
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Article VI. Accidents
The Parties shall cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent
the possibility of nuclear war arising by accident, misunderstanding,
miscalculation, unauthorized action, or in any other way. 223
Article VII. Consultations
The Parties shall consult, on an urgent and high-level basis, in the
event of any accident, incident, or event that might lead to a threat or
first use of nuclear weapons. They shall make every effort to resolve
the problem without recourse to force. 224
Article VIII. Public Statements
Each Party shall moderate its official public statements 225 about
223. See Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War
Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, U.S.Russ.,
narrative,
Sept.
30,
1971,
22
U.S.T.
1590,
available
at
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4692.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (observing "[t]he very
existence of nuclear-weapon systems, even under the most sophisticated command-andcontrol procedures, obviously is a source of constant concern. Despite the most elaborate
precautions, it is conceivable that technical malfunction or human failure, a misinterpreted
incident or unauthorized action, could trigger a nuclear disaster or nuclear war."); see
generally Patricia Lewis, Heather Wlliams, Benoit Pelopidas & Sasan Aghlani, Too Close
for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, CHATHAM HOUSE (Apr.
2014), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/199200 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014) (studying several cases of miscommunication, technical failure, or
accidents that could have escalated into nuclear confrontation).
224. Cf supra notes 78-86 (for a list of confidence-building treaties that require
consultation during crises).
225. It is unusual for a treaty to commit the parties to constrain the rhetoric in their
public policy statements. Partial precedents include the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 20, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 386, which prohibits
propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 2,
660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966), which commits parties not to "sponsor, defend or
support" racial discrimination. See Steven E. Miller, The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and
the
Strategy
of
No-First-Use
(Nov.
15,
2002),
available
at
http://pugwashconferences. files.wordpress.corn/2014/05/200211 _ london_nws_paper_miller.
pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (arguing that changes in public rhetoric alone will not
convince the world that a no first use policy is firmly in place, but they can help send the
message); see also Russian General Calls for Preemptive Nuclear Strike Doctrine Against
TIMES,
(Sept.
3,
2014,
5:40
PM),
available
at
NATO,
Moscow
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-general-calls-for-preemptivenuclear-strike-doctrine-against-nato/506370.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (illustrating
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nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare, to emphasize the Parties'
collective judgments that nuclear war must never be fought; that nuclear
weapons must never be used; that nuclear weapons are categorically
different from all other weapons; and that the only valid purpose for any
continued possession of nuclear weapons is deterrence of a nuclear
attack. 226
Article IX. Defense Plans
Each Party that possesses nuclear weapons shall modify its defense
policy guidance, plans and doctrine 227 to eliminate the concept of
launching a first use of nuclear weapons; to reduce or eliminate the
concept of launching its nuclear weapons "on waming"; 228 to eliminate
any automatic or immediate reliance upon a doctrine of massive

the kind ofunhelpful recent rhetoric that this provision would restrict).
226. Each of these judgments reflects an effort to stigmatize nuclear weapons as being
beyond the pale of what states tolerate, even in the extreme case of armed conflict, and to
reinforce the longstanding international taboo against their use. See NINA T ANNENW ALD,
THE NUCLEAR TABOO: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE
1945 2997 (2008); Daryl G. Press, Scott D. Sagan, & Benjamin A. Valentino, Atomic
Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear
Weapons, AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 1 (Feb. 2013), available at http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/24013/FINAL_APSR_Atomic_Aversion.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2014) [hereinafter Press et al.]; PERKOVICH, supra note 136, at 73-78 (arguing to strengthen
the taboo against use of nuclear weapons); see also supra text accompanying notes 147-51
(summarizing debate about the usability ofnuclear weapons).
227. Different countries have different types of military planning documents. For the
United States, see Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States, Specified in
Section 491 of JO US.C., U.S. DEPT. DEF. (June 19, 2013), available at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section
491.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of
the
United
States,
WHITE
HOUSE
(June
19,
2013),
available
at
http://www. whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2013/06/ 19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employ
ment-strategy-united-states (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (announcing that the United States
will "examine and reduce the role of launch under attack in contingency planning");
National
Security
Strategy,
U.S.
Gov'T
(May
2010),
available
at
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review Report, supra note 126; see also G.A. Res. 68/40, U.N. Doc. AIRES/68/40 (Dec. 5,
2013), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/40
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (calling for review of nuclear doctrines).
228. The concepts of "launch on warning," "launch under attack," and related
doctrines are imprecise, but can be clarified in the negotiating history of the agreement. See
Arbatov et al., supra note 133, at 193-96 (discussing doctrines of launch on warning and
launch under attack; noting that only the United States and Russia have adopted these
concepts); Actions Report, supra note 86, at 4-5 (declaring that the United States will reduce
the role of launch under attack in nuclear planning).
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retaliation; 229 and to emphasize reliance upon non-nuclear options. 230
Article X. Alert Status
Each Party that possesses nuclear weapons shall reduce the
ordinary readiness and alert status of its nuclear weapons. 231
229. Sometimes, the doctrine of avoiding a full-scale, automatic, immediate nuclear
response to a first strike is referred to as "no early second use." Miller, supra note 225.
230. These elements are designed to promote movement away from any first use of
nuclear weapons, as well as to signal a reduction in the overall importance, salience, and
usability of nuclear weapons, and to diminish any sense that a use of nuclear weapons would
automatically or inevitably follow from certain provocations. They also help promote
additional time for mature reflection and consideration of non-nuclear options, even in a
crisis or war. See id. (arguing that a policy of no first use "cannot be real if militaries
develop war plans that include, or even depend upon, the expectation of first-use of nuclear
weapons."); Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States, supra
note 227 (discussing efforts toward "reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our security
strategy.").
231. This provision attempts to reduce the "hair trigger" status of nuclear weapons, to
increase the decision-making time before they could be used. See REACHING CRITICAL
WILL, supra note 130, at 39 (reporting that the United States and Russia have about 1800
strategic nuclear warheads on high alert on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles; France
and the United Kingdom have respectively 80 and 48 of their weapons on submarines fully
operational, but at a lower level ofreadiness than U.S. and Russian weapons; China does not
maintain its weapons in fully operational status); Hans M. Kristensen & Matthew McKinzie,
Reducing Alert Rates of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH
(2012); Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at 5, 12 ((assessing readiness of states' nuclear
weapons), 13 (China), 16 (France), 18 (Russia), 21 (United Kingdom), 25 (United States),
29 (India), 31-32 (Israel), 35 (Pakistan)); see also Karnath, supra note 133, at 66 (describing
steps to reduce alert status of weapons, to make a "no first use" pledge more reliable, such
as removing warheads from missiles or pinning open the submarine missile ignition
switches); 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, supra note 157, para. 90 (calling
for reductions in operational status of nuclear weapons, to enhance confidence and diminish
the role of nuclear weapons); Kulacki, supra note 171; John Burroughs, A Global
Undertaking: Realizing the Disarmament Promise of the NPT, MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE
BRIEFfNG
PAPER
(Jan.
21,
2010),
available
at
http://www.middlepowe
rs.org/pubs/Atlanta_Briefing_Paper_ 201 O.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014 ); Actions Report,
supra note 86, at 4 (describing U.S. decision to continue the practice of keeping nuclearcapable bombers off day-to-day alert); Arbatov et al., supra note 133, at 196-204 (providing
examples of steps that could be taken to reduce the readiness and alert level of nuclear
weapons); Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems, G.A. Res.
67/46, U.N. Doc. NRES/67/46 (Dec. 3, 2012).
This provision does not specify how much reduction is required in alert status, nor does
it require that all weapons be held at the same (lowered) level of alert; treaty negotiators will
have to assume the challenge of working out these terms in additional detail. The provision
applies to the weapons' "ordinary" status, allowing a country to increase the alert status of
weapons during a crisis or war. Some may object that increasing the response time before
nuclear weapons could be used would increase a state's vulnerability to a surprise "bolt
from the blue" attack; others would respond that this type of instantaneous attack is now
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Article XI. De-Targeting
Each Party that possesses nuclear weapons deployed on ballistic or
cruise missiles shall alter the deployments so that ordinarily a missile
contains no targeting codes or is targeted by default toward unpopulated
ocean areas. 232
Article XII. Training Exercises
Each Party that possesses nuclear weapons shall refrain from
undertaking any military or other training exercises related to launching
a first use of nuclear weapons. 233
Article XIII. Arms Reductions
The Parties that possess nuclear weapons shall cooperatively,
promptly, and significantly reduce the number of nuclear weapons they
possess and deploy. 234 They shall particularly reduce or eliminate the
vanishingly unlikely, and that the contrary dangers of an accidental, unauthorized, or
imprudent use of nuclear weapons now pose the greater threat. See PD! Live Debate 5: Dealerting, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
(last
http://csis.org/event/pdi-live-debate-5-john-steinbruner-walter-slocombe-de-alerting
visited Dec. 18, 2014); Peter Huessy, Should the US. De-Alert its Nuclear Missiles?
at
available
AM),
4:30
2012,
10,
(Aug.
INST.
GATESTONE
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3266/us-nuclear-missiles-alert (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
232. See Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at 13, 16, 21, 25 (assessing states'
practices in maintaining active targeting of nuclear missiles); Actions Report, supra note 86,
at 4 (explaining that the United States will continue the practice of "open-ocean targeting"
of all deployed strategic nuclear missiles); Kristensen & McKinzie, supra note 231, at 18-19
(noting de-targeting steps by United States, Russia, and China).
233. The purpose of this provision is to reinforce the previous measures by ensuring
that parties do not practice or train to undertake the actions they have agreed not to do. See
Miller, supra note 225 (noting the aphorism that militaries fight the way they train, so a
NFU regime should ban military exercises that include practicing a first use of nuclear
weapons). Many of the provisions of this proposed treaty are not subject to external
verification of compliance, as most modem arms control treaties are, but fidelity to this
provision can be at least partially corroborated, as remote sensors can observe large-scale
training exercises.
234. The concept behind this provision is that countries will not need so many nuclear
weapons, if the function of those systems is confined solely to the role of deterring the threat
of a nuclear strike. Reductions of excess nuclear weapons could be undertaken unilaterally
or pursuant to formal or informal agreements. The depth of NNWS dissatisfaction with
NWS compliance with article VI of the NPT, supra note 153, requires that any "good faith
negotiations" in this area should be brought to a successful conclusion quickly. Note also
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types of nuclear weapons that would be most suitable for a first use or
whose use would be incompatible with the law of armed conflict. 235
Article XIV. Nuclear Disarmament
1. The Parties shall accelerate their efforts in pursuit of the total
elimination of nuclear weapons. 236 They shall undertake immediate
steps 237 toward that goal, and shall promote in a joint enterprise 238 the
objective of the permanent, global, comprehensive, and verifiable
abolition of all nuclear weapons. 239
that nuclear arms reductions can save parties a great deal of money. See DAVID KRIEGER,
THE CHALLENGE OF ABOLISHfNG NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2009) (estimating that the United
States has spent $7.5 trillion on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems); Atomic Audit:
The Costs and Consequences of US. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940, BROOKINGS INST. (June
29, 1988), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/1998/atomic (estimating
the cost of the nuclear arsenal at $5.5 trillion through 1998) (last visited Dec. 18, 2014);
Dana Priest, Aging US. Nuclear Arsenal Slated for Costly and Long-Delayed
Modernization, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2012).
235. See Miller, supra note 225 (arguing that under a no first use regime, countries
would require far fewer weapons; forward-based and shorter-range nuclear forces would be
unnecessary; and the key criterion would be the survivability of nuclear weapons, not their
ability to be used immediately). Under this structure, countries would be especially
encouraged to divest themselves of vulnerable systems that would be subject to "use it or
lose it" calculations, forward-based systems that would be used very early in a war, weapons
that would be intended to attack hardened or deeply buried command bunkers, and large,
inaccurate weapons that would target population centers in a disproportionate or
indiscriminate way. See, e.g., B61-l I Earth-Penetrating Weapon Tested for First Time in
Seven Years, HOMELAND SEC. NEWSWIRE (Jan. 15, 2014), available at
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140115-b61 l l-earthpenetrating-weapontested-for-first-time-in-seven-years (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); US. Deploys Two More
Nuclear-Capable Bombers to Europe, GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE (June 9, 2014), available at
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-deploys-two-more-nuclear-capable-bombers-europe/ (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014); Barry Blechman & Russell Rumbaugh, Bombs Away: The Case/or
Phasing out US. Tactical Nukes in Europe, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 163 (July/Aug. 2014).
236. Parties to the NPT are already committed to pursue negotiations in good faith
toward this objective. See supra text accompanying notes 153-61.
237. See Shultz et al., supra note 132 (arguing that both a long-term goal of nuclear
disarmament and a series of practical, short-term steps in pursuit of that goal are necessary,
"Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the
actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.").
238. See generally Max M. Kampelman & Steven P. Andreasen, Turning the Goal of a
World without Nuclear Weapons into a Joint Enterprise, in REYKJAVIK REVISITED, 429,
429-47 (George P. Shultz, Steven P. Andreasen, Sidney D. Drell, & James E. Goodby eds.,
2008); see James Goodby, A World Without Nuclear Weapons is a Joint Enterprise, 41
ARMS CONTROL TODAY 23 (May 2011), available at https://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2011_05/Goodby (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) (arguing that all states, not just the United
States and Russia, must participate in the effort to pursue nuclear disarmament).
239. See David A. Koplow, What Would Zero Look Like? A Treaty for the Abolition of
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2. The Parties that possess nuclear weapons shall maintain the
safety and security of those weapons for as long as they exist, but shall
not consider this to be a permanent function. 240

Article XV. Final Provisions 241
1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by all states
indefinitely. 242
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory states
according to their respective constitutional processes.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of
instruments of ratification by twenty states. 243 For any state depositing
Nuclear Weapons, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. 683, 712-15 (2014) (presenting a draft of a nuclear
weapons abolition treaty, specifying the "mantra" of criteria such an instrument must
satisfy).
240. Preservation of the safety and security of nuclear weapons is critical. See Barack
Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by President Barack Obama at Hradcany
Square in the Czech Republic, supra note 134 (promising that as long as nuclear weapons
exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal), but the point of
this provision is to underscore that the goal of nuclear disarmament is not simply an
impossibly-distant goal and that nuclear weapons should not be a perpetual fact of life.
241. These provisions are traditionally split into several separate articles; they are
combined here simply for convenience. For comparison, see START I, supra note 8, arts.
XVII-XIX; CWC, supra note 8, arts. VIII-XXIV; and CTBT, supra note 8, arts. VII-XVII.
242. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact was initially open for a select group of parties,
whose participation was required before the treaty could come into force; other states were
also invited to join. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. In this proposal, the
nuclear treaty would be open for all states on an equal basis.
243. There are several possible formulas for the entry-into-force provision of this
treaty. As drafted, the instrument will become operational as soon as any twenty countries
join. An alternative would be to require a higher number, and perhaps to require the
participation of some or all nine countries currently possessing nuclear weapons, thereby
ensuring a strong degree of consensus among the most affected states. However, the most
demanding approach would also, in effect, give each nuclear weapons possessing country a
"veto" over the treaty's entry into force for any state. That sort of provision has proven
highly problematic for the CTBT, which names 44 countries whose ratification is required
to bring the treaty into force. CTBT supra note 8, art. XIV.I, Annex 2. This provision has
had the effect of blocking the treaty's execution, despite the ratification by 161 states. See
The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers, ARMS
CONTROL Ass'N (2014), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ctbtsig (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014). Alternatively, the nuclear treaty could establish a high threshold for
entry into force, but also allow individual states to waive that requirement, bringing the
Treaty into force sooner for them. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 178, art. 28.2.
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an instrument of ratification thereafter, the Treaty shall enter into force
thirty days after the deposit.
4. This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations that are
incompatible with its object and purpose. 244
5. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 245
6. This Treaty shall be subject to amendment as follows 246 : Any
Party may propose an amendment, which shall be submitted to the
Depositary for prompt circulation to all Parties. If one-third or more of
the Parties notify the Depositary within sixty days after its circulation
that they support further consideration of the proposal, it shall be
considered at an Amendment Conference. If the proposed amendment
is adopted at the Amendment Conference by a majority vote of all
Parties, with no Party casting a negative vote, the amendment shall enter
into force for all Parties ninety days after the deposit of instruments of
ratification by a majority of all Parties.
7. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the
right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests. 247 It shall give ninety days' advance notice 248 of such
244. A "tougher" alternative would be to prohibit all reservations, or to permit some
types of reservations, but not those that would be attached to the most important provisions.
See, e.g., CWC, supra note 8, art. XXII; CTBT, supra note 8, art. XV.
245. Some arms control treaties are of unlimited (permanent) duration. See, e.g.,
CWC, supra note 8, art. XVI.I; CTBT, supra note 8, art. IX. I. Others have fixed terms.
See, e.g., New START, supra note 152, art. XIV.2; NPT, supra note 153, art. X.2
(specifying an initial term of twenty-five years, after which a conference of parties
determined an indefinite extension).
246. Modem treaties contain multiple variations regarding amendment; some also
permit modification of technical or administrative provisions pursuant to an accelerated
process. See, e.g., CWC, supra note 8, art. XV; CTBT, supra note 8, art. VII; see also
Natural Res. Def. Council vs. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 464 F.3d 1, 9, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(limiting ability to modify an international agreement via a process that does not involve
presidential decision and Senate agreement).
247. This is the standard "supreme interests withdrawal" clause, common to arms
control treaties. It provides an "escape hatch" from the obligations, making it safer for
states to enter the agreement in the first place. See CWC, supra note 8, art. XVI; CTBT,
supra note 8, art. IX; New START Treaty, supra note 152, art. XIV.3. Withdrawal from an
arms control treaty has been rare, with only the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the SALT I
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 2003 North Korean withdrawal from the NPT as
precedents. Christer Ahlstrom, Withdrawal from Arms Control Treaties, STOCKHOLM INT'L
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withdrawal, including a statement of the extraordinary events it regards
as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
8. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as in any way limiting
or detracting from the obligations of the Parties under other
international law. A Party's withdrawal from this Treaty shall not in
any way affect its obligations under other international law, including
other arms control or disarmament treaties. 249
9. Seven years after the entry into force of this Treaty, and at seven
year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall assemble in a Review
Conference to assess the operation and effectiveness of the Treaty, with
a view to ensuring that the object and purpose of the Treaty are being
realized. 250
10. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby
designated as the Depositary of this Treaty, and shall perform all
appropriate duties, including registering this Treaty pursuant to Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 251
11. The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts of this Treaty are equally authentic. 252
In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized to that
effect, have signed this Treaty.

PEACE
RESEARCH
INST.
YEARBOOK
763,
764
(2004),
available
at
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2004/19 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). Alternatively, the treaty
could depart from precedent and prohibit withdrawal (except, perhaps, in the case of
material breach of the treaty by another party).
248. Alternatively, the time period specified for withdrawal could be shorter or longer.
See START I, supra note 8, art. XVII.3 (six months); eTBT, supra note 8, art. IX.3 (six
months); ewe, supra note 8, art. XVI.2 (ninety days). A longer notification period
provides other parties additional time to react to the impending withdrawal, but in the case
of nuclear weapons, parties may feel the need for an ability to respond very quickly to the
most severe challenges.
249. This provision is designed to ensure the continuation in force of the 1928
Kellogg-Briand Pact. Cf ewe, supra note 8, art. XVI.3 (specifying that withdrawal from
the ewe would not affect a party's status under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, supra note 54).
250. See, e.g., eTBT, supra note 8, art. VIII (providing for review conferences every
ten years); ewe, supra note 8, art. VIII.22 (providing for review conferences at five year
intervals).
251. eTBT, supra note 8, art. XVI. I; ewe, supra note 8, art. XXIII.
252. eTBT, supra note 8, art. XVII; ewe, supra note 8, art. XXIV.
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Done at (place) on (date).

V. CONCLUSION
The underlying goal of this article, and the purpose of the extended
thought exercise in drafting a nuclear version of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, is to try to prompt a social psychic shift. The treaty-makers in
1928 succeeded in that type of grand enterprise; they midwifed an
important, lasting alteration in the predominant paradigm of
international warfare. Now it's time for governments and populations
around the world to exert a similar bit of radically creative fresh
thinking about nuclear war, in particular.
In today's security environment, we should no longer think of
nuclear weapons as a normal, inevitable part of the global architecture;
we should not contemplate them as "ordinary," usable implements in
the military toolkit that can lawfully be wielded as a matter of unilateral
national choice. Likewise, we should not deem nuclear weapons to be
inherently essential to our national well-being, and we should definitely
not perpetuate them as permanent fixtures in the defense firmament or
as indelible badges of big power status. 253
Instead, people in the United States, in the other NWS, and around
the world, should appreciate that the era of nuclear weapons is
historically anomalous and that the hypertrophy of sizes, types, numbers
and sophistication of nuclear explosive devices was an artifact of the
bizarre circumstances prevailing during World War II and the cold war.
That absurd explosive Sword of Damocles need not hang over
humanity's head forever; we can progress to a safer, more modem
global society in which nuclear warfare no longer occupies a central
place. 254
The rationales for adopting a nuclear Kellogg-Briand today spring
from multiple sources:
-Legally, almost any first use of nuclear weapons would violate
the accepted conventional and customary law of armed conflict. The
ICJ, in its 1996 nuclear weapons advisory opinion, was not quite able to
conclude categorically that all uses of nuclear weapons would be per se
253. See Berry et al., supra note 139, at 41-58 (emphasizing the importance of
delegitimizing nuclear weapons and stigmatizing their use).
254. See Schell, supra note 128, at 30 (offering the comparison that "[i]fl carry a rifle
on my shoulder during a war, it means one thing. Ifl continue to carry the rifle after the war
has ended, it means something very different.").
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illegal, but it is clear that in virtually all realistic applications,
considerations of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination would
rule out a legitimate first use. 255
-Militarily, the United States no longer needs to dangle the threat
of crossing the nuclear threshold; for all credible scenarios, the array of
conventional munitions would suffice, without engaging the "overkill"
of atomic power. 256
-Strategically, abandonment of first use scenarios could reinforce
deterrence, by making it perfectly clear that the nuclear armada has
precisely one function: to deter a first use of nuclear weapons by anyone
else; that the nuclear arsenal should be optimized to perform only that
specified mission; and that conventional forces must be made adequate
for all other types of applications. 257
-Politically, retaining the existing strategic ambiguity undercuts
our vital non-proliferation efforts, by degrading Article VI of the NPT;
the NNWS want comprehensive, binding NSAs in order to validate their
continued adherence to the most vital cornerstone of international
security. 258
-Financially, reducing and simplifying the nuclear weapons
infrastructure would save untold billions. 259
-Prudentially, de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons
would further reduce the likelihood of hair-trigger accidental or

255. Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 94 (arguing that "a nuclear response
to chemical or biological weapon use would in most instances be out of all proportion to the
initial attack, and thus politically and morally indefensible"); PERKOVICH, supra note 136, at
49 (whether nuclear weapons could be used in compliance with international legal standards
"remains highly problematic").
256. Gerson, supra note 149; Bundy et al., supra note 149. But see PERKOVICH, supra
note 136, at 9 (arguing for retaining the option of first use in selected circumstances).
257. Gerson, supra note 149, at 39-40; Graham and Tomero, supra note 166, at 4
(arguing that "Threatening to use nuclear weapons against an NPT non-nuclear-weapon
state party undermines the credibility of a strong US and NATO conventional deterrent, and
may incite proliferation by emphasizing our sole strategic vulnerability.").
258. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, supra note 126, at 7 (asserting that U.S.
compliance with NPT article VI can help persuade NNWS to adopt measures needed to
reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime); Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 91
(arguing that "the use of nuclear weapons by the United States or another nuclear weapon
state could shatter the NPT regime and lead to the rapid spread of nuclear weapons to
several more countries"); Graham & Tomero, supra note 166, at 4 (arguing that maintaining
the option to use nuclear weapons first "reduces US leverage to stem the proliferation of
nuclear weapons").
259. See sources cited supra, note 234 (regarding the financial costs of nuclear
weapons programs).
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unauthorized nuclear war. 260
-Reciprocally, refraining from threatening to use nuclear
weapons first would reinforce the global taboo against those arms,
diminishing the portrait of them as weapons that are necessary and
usable including potentially usable against us. 261
-Most of all, psychologically, creating and promoting a nuclear
Kellogg-Briand could help shift global public and elite opinion away
from the notion that these are "normal" weapons. Even if there is only
an indirect, unreliable connection between public policy
pronouncements and physical actions in the real world, where we have
the possibility of nudging things in a safer direction, we should act. 262
The version of a nuclear Kellogg-Briand presented here has some
important similarities and as well as differences from the concept of the
1928 original, as those features were highlighted in Section 11.D. In the
realm of "lessons learned," or at least analogies selected, the proposed
nuclear treaty, like the template, would be legally binding, multilateral
and public. It would also be, essentially, a "no first use" promise,
although the difficulty of drawing lines between first and second uses
should be appreciably simpler in the nuclear context. Like the original,
the nuclear variant would reinforce parties' commitment to non-violent
means of alternative dispute resolution, although it would not, on its
own, create new judicial, arbitral, or other institutions. Continuing with
the similarities, the nuclear treaty would be permanent (but would have
provisions for amendment and for "supreme interests" withdrawal) and
would not deal with criminal prosecution of individuals or states.
Regarding the salient differences, the proposed nuclear treaty
would include "operational" provisions, running well beyond a simple
declaration of renunciation and condemnation, to include specific
national action obligations. Notable among these undertakings would
be de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear missiles; revision of national war
plans, training exercises, and rhetoric; and a renewed commitment to
immediate and long-term measures of disarmament. And unlike the
paterfamilias, the undertakings in the proposed nuclear treaty would be
global in scope, not confined by reciprocity.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact was, of course, a flawed instrument. Its
authors' ambition and rhetoric far exceeded their grasp; the treaty left as
many questions unanswered and problems unaddressed as it resolved.
260. See Lewis, supra note 171.
261. See Sagan, supra note 162, at 175 (arguing that "U.S. [behavior], including
nuclear posture and doctrine, is in fact highly influential.").
262. See Tannenwald, supra note 226; Press et al., supra note 226.
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In such a concise format, it could hardly have succeeded as a lasting
macro-scale reformation in international political affairs. KelloggBriand gained barely fifteen minutes of fame, and perhaps did not
deserve much enduring influence after the cataclysm of German, Italian,
and Japanese aggression and World War II.
This article's proposed draft treaty, likewise, is far from complete;
it is hardly a ready-for-signature outlawry instrument. In particular, the
absence of meaningful provisions on verification is highly contestable the draft has none of the obligations regarding data reporting,
inspections, enforcement, and the like, which have become de rigueur
in modem arms control treaty practice. In fact, many of its provisions
are so "internal" to each state's military structures that they are
inherently unverifiable - the required revisions of war plans and
national policy statements, for example, or the de-alerting and detargeting of nuclear missiles, are probably not reliably subject to
external corroboration. Moreover, the proposed document does not
address fundamental political questions about how to persuade possibly
reluctant NWS to jump aboard this bandwagon, or whether and how the
United States and any "coalition of the willing" should proceed
immediately with less than unanimous initial participation.
Most fundamentally, this proposal, like the original KelloggBriand, is subject to the valid criticism that there could be an important
gap - perhaps a yawning chasm - between a country's publiclyannounced "declaratory policy" and its possibly-covert "action policy."
That is, regardless of whether a sovereign says it renounces war in
general, or nuclear war in particular, it may in practice still resort to the
forbidden avenue when the chips are down. Public postures and
unregulated treaties do not physically constrain countries - as long as a
state possesses nuclear weapons, it may elect to employ them at will. 263
Just as Kellogg-Briand failed to prevent World War II, this article's
version cannot guarantee that no state would be willing to pay the price
263. Feiveson & Hogendoorn, supra note 162, at 97 (arguing that this continuing
uncertainty about the reliability of a non-use pledge can be a benefit, providing an additional
element of deterrence to the regime); Ullman, supra note 165 at 680-81 (arguing that a NFU
pledge is "self-enforcing," because if one nation violates its promise, the others are released
from theirs); Gerson, supra note 149, at 45 (arguing that "Skeptics of the believability of
NFU underestimate the international and domestic audience costs incurred by a clear NFU
commitment."); Sagan, supra note 162, at 177 (arguing that "declaratory policy is not about
making 'promises' about future restraint; it is about signaling intent and therefore shaping
the expectations of allies and adversaries alike."); Pierce S. Corden, Ethics and Deterrence:
Moving Beyond the Just-War Tradition, in ETHICS AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY? 156, 177
(Harold P. Ford & Francis X. Winters eds., 1977) (addressing ethics and strategy of
declaratory and action policies).
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of violating the nuclear agreement. Indeed, there are strong indications
that the Soviet Union, for example, was acting in bad faith when it
offered its "no first use" pledge during the cold war; it was cynically
prepared to abandon that puffery at a moment's notice, if need be. 264
Still, that type of hypocrisy has its price, and a declaratory policy
can make a difference. Public presentations, especially when clad in the
garb of binding international treaty law, do help shape attitudes about
what is legitimate, about how honorable people and countries behave.
World public opinion is hardly all powerful, especially when dealing
with authoritarian regimes, but it can exert influence. 265 Likewise, the
proposed treaty's "operational" provisions, going beyond the structure
of Kellogg-Briand by engrafting additional required behaviors, such as
progress toward nuclear abolition and constraints upon military plans
and exercises, can play a role. Complex organizations will do best at
the routines they have repeatedly practiced, and inhibitions upon
training algorithms can have meaningful impact in functional
settings. 266
Certainly, there are risks from eschewing nuclear weapons, and a
policy to legally abandon any possible first use of those arms can have
potential costs. But there are risks on the other side of the ledger, too.
In particular, our collective clinging to nuclear arsenals and our
continued emphasis upon those arms as essential, indispensable
components of our security posture, carry the inevitable danger of
proliferation. The NNWS have made it clear that they will not
permanently tolerate a two-tiered world in which a privileged few
possess nuclear weapons that the vast majority of have surrendered; if
the NWS fail to redeem the promise of Article VI of the NPT, the
dangers will accelerate. A nuclear Kellogg-Briand, helping to move the
world an important step away from nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and
the fetish of all things nuclear, can make a contribution to that long-term
264. Heuser, supra note 167; Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 92. Some
skeptics likewise doubt the sincerity and reliability of China's NFU commitments. See
Rachel Oswald, China's New Defense Paper Causes Stir Over No-First-Use Nuke Policy,
GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE (Apr. 24, 2013); Kulacki, supra note 171; China Reaffirms "No
First Use" Nuke Rule, GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE (Jan. 6, 2011); Stephanie Spies, China 's
Nuclear Policy: (No) First Use?, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, available at
http://csis.org/blog/chinas-nuclear-policy-no-first-use (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
265. See Iriye, supra note 34, at 68 (noting that the notion of "'world public opinion'
was a typically Wilsonian concept," connoting the existence of a moral force emanating
from people everywhere, rather than from their leaders, which could be mightier than armed
power and provided the best safeguard of peace and stability).
266. A New Look at No First Use, supra note 166, at 2 (emphasizing the importance of
cultivating a "culture of nonuse" of nuclear weapons within the military).

Published by SURFACE, 2014

197

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1

2014]

A Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact

191

pursuit of security and stability.
To some, the Kellogg-Briand Pact may seem obsolete, an antique
remnant of a long-distant past. But in reality, it wasn't that long ago.
The 1928 negotiation of Kellogg-Briand is closer to the 1968 NPT and
the 1969-1972 negotiation of SALT I (both indisputably central
elements in the modern cannon of arms control) than the NPT and
SALT I are to us today. And even if Kellogg-Briand were "ancient
history," sometimes there's something to be gained from "repurposing"
those hoary sources.
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Although cooperatives have long been a fixture of the world
economy, the 2008 financial crisis sparked renewed interest in
cooperatives as a democratic and sustainable alternative to conventional
business forms, and the United Nations named 2012 the "International
This renewed enthusiasm for
Year of [the] Cooperatives." 1
cooperatives has taken many forms, including the "Bank Transfer Day",
also known as "Move Your Money" day, which led to an influx of new
members at credits unions. 2 For its part, Germany has not only been the
1. See generally Julian B. Heron, Jr. & David B. Friedman, Retrospective: New
Challenges for California Agriculture in World Export Markets, 1 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L.
REV. 1, 30 (1991) reprinted in 20 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 239, 268 (2011) (suggesting
transnational agricultural cooperatives as a method of securing access to markets for
Californian agricultural goods); U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS DIV. FOR Soc. PoL'Y
&
DEV.,
INTERNATIONAL
YEAR
OF
COOPERATIVES
2012,
available
at
http://social.un.org/coopsyear/uncoops.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
2. David Dayen, Move Your Money: Hundreds of Thousands of Transfers from Big
Banks to Small in the Last Three Months, FIREDOGLAKE (Feb. 3, 2012, 7:35 AM), available
at
http:!/news.firedoglake.com/2012/02/03/move-your-money-hundreds-of-thousands-oftransfers-from-big-banks-to-small-in-last-three-months/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). The
effort led to over 5 million new members at credit unions and small banks. Id.
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site of an economic boom in recent years 3 but has also witnessed an
exponential increase in the number of cooperatives being organized. 4
The proliferation of renewable energy cooperatives has received the
most sustained media attention, but agricultural, housing and even beerbrewing cooperatives have been a part of this upsurge. 5
While the upswing in cooperative development in Germany is
notable in its own right, of even greater significance is the application of
a new organizational model to cooperative projects, which both
facilitates the growth of democratic enterprises and organizes them in
cohesive networks. 6 Pioneered by the Mietshauser Syndikat in over
eighty established projects across Germany, the use of limited liability
companies held jointly by the local residents and a larger network has
proven both effective as an engine of growth and compatible with the
democratic and constitutive ideals so closely identified with
cooperatives. 7 Notably, the organization is entirely democratic yet has
discarded the standard cooperative model as too inflexible and
overburdened by regulation to operate in an economy of scale. 8
This note argues that the Mietshauser Syndikat model can be repurposed from the development of housing cooperatives to the
development of networks of democratic enterprises in both civil and
common law jurisdictions. Furthermore, it argues that the Mietshauser
Syndikat model offers considerable advantages over conventional
cooperatives because of its relative flexibility and ability to guarantee
democratic management. As such, the Mietshauser Syndikat is better
3. See Regierung sieht deutsche Wirtschafi vor starkem Aufschwung, DIE ZEIT (Oct. 23,
2013 I :06 PM), available at http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2013-10/wachstumsprognosedeutsche-wirtschaft (last visited Nov 16, 2014).
4. See Christiane Grefe, Und jetzt a/le - Gemeinsam Strom erzeugen, Hauser bauen,
Banken besitzen: Genossenschafien haben wieder Zulauf, DIE ZEIT (Apr. 23, 2012, 7:51
PM), available at http://www.zeit.de/2012/ 17 /Genossenschaften (last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(detailing the uptick in the number of cooperatives founded since the tum of the century).
5. See generally id.; see also Nina Anika-Klotz, No Offence, liebe Biertrinker!, DIE
ZEIT (July 25, 2013, I :47 PM), available at http://www.zeit.de/lebensart/essentrinken/2013-07/craft-beer-vagabund-brauerei (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Nadine
Oberhuber, Mein Strom, dein Strom, DIE ZEIT at 28 (October 23, 2014), available at
http://www.zeit.de/2014/44/emeuerbare-energien-strom-energiewende
(describing
the
advantages of investing in green energy cooperatives, described by experts as particularly
stable entities with a bankruptcy rate ofO. l %).
6. See Anika Kreller, Vom Hausbesetzer zum Hausbesitzer, DIE ZEIT (June 25, 2012,
3:39 PM), available at www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2012-06/immobilien-berlin (last visited Nov.
15,2014).
7. See
Standortkarte,
MIETSHAUSER
SYNDIKAT,
available
at
http://www.syndikat.org/de/standortkarte/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
8. See
Die
Verbundbausteine,
MIETSHAUSER
SYNDIKAT,
available
at
http://www.syndikat.org/de/syndikat/verbundbausteine/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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suited to stimulating sustainable, democratic and equitable economic
development than any other existing large-scale cooperative models.
Thus, while other prominent cooperative enterprises sacrificed aspects
of their democratic character in the name of economic necessity, the
Mietshauser Syndikat has successfully persevered in maintaining direct,
large-scale, consensus-based democracy. This model will make it
possible to establish networks of democratic enterprises that are
sustainable, geared for growth and operable in both common law and
civil law jurisdictions.
To evaluate and test the applicability of the Mietshauser Syndikat's
model to other national contexts this note will consider two examples of
cooperative development: the famed Mondragon Cooperative network
based in Spain and the Evergreen Cooperatives in Cleveland, Ohio. 9
For contextual purposes, Parts I through III will examine the legal and
regulatory practices in Germany, Spain and the United States with
regard to limited liability companies ("LLCs"), cooperatives and nonprofit entities. While the background on these three countries' law and
regulation will inform the reader's understanding of each enterprise's
development and operations, Spain and the U.S. will also serve as
theoretical stand-ins for other civil and common law countries,
illustrating the reproducibility of the Mietshauser Syndikat model in
other jurisdictions. Part IV will then focus on the two established
cooperative enterprises of scale, Mondragon and Evergreen, noting their
prominent features and characteristics. Finally, Part V will examine the
Mietshauser Syndikat, compare it with the enterprises discussed in Part
IV and consider the applicability, merits and advantages of the
Mietshauser Syndikat's model in the development of democratic
enterprises.

I. GERMAN LAW, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES

In Germany business entities are generally termed "stock
corporations." 10 Within this category there exist several corporate

9. See generally MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/ENG.aspx?language=en-US (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); EVERGREEN
COOPERATIVES, available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014);
Field Study No. 2: The Evergreen Cooperatives, CAPITAL INST. , available at
http://www.capitalinstitute.org/sites/capitalinstitute.org/files/docs/FS2Evergreen%20full%20article.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Evergreen Field
Study] (independent study and evaluation of the Evergreen Cooperative); MIETSHAUSER
SYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
10. Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative Analysis
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forms, the most common of which is the Limited Liability Company
("GmbH"). 11 The GmbH is the single most important entity utilized by
the Mietshauser Syndikat and serves, in democratized form, as a
replacement for the cooperative. 12 Cooperatives are governed by
substantially different laws and regulations, although the names and
duties of officers are often identical to a GmbH's. 13 The principal nonprofit entity in Germany is the Verein (Association), which serves a
range of charitable and service functions. 14

A. The GmbH: The German LLC
GmbHs are the single most common business entity in Germany. 15
The process of founding a GmbH requires €25,000 in starting capital, 16
half of which must be on hand at the time of registration, 17 an operating
agreement for the GmbH, and identification of the company's officers. 18
GmbHs with fewer than 500 employees are permitted to operate under a
single manager, whereas larger GmbHs must employ the dual
governance structure where a board of directors oversees management
on behalf of the shareholders. 19 As such, GmbHs are especially suitable
for smaller or closely-held enterprises. 20 However, there are also a
number of so-called "GmbH giants," often local affiliates or

of German and US. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INTL'L & COMP. LAW 555, 555 (2000)
(German: "Aktiengesellschaften").
11. See id. at 556 n. l (German: Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung).
12. See Die Verbundbausteine, supra note 8.
13. See
Gesets
betreffend
die
Erwerbs-und
Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften
[GENOSSENSCHAFTSGESETZ] [GenG] [Cooperatives Act], May I, 1889, BGBL. as amended,
§ 9 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/geng/gesamt.pdf
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Cooperatives Act].
14. See Bilrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ
UNO FUR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (Aug. 18, 1896), as amended,§§ 21-22 (Ger.), available at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/BJNR001950896.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014)
[hereinafter Civil Code].
15. See Ingrid Lynn Lenhardt, The Corporate and Tax Advantages of a Limited
Liability Company: A German Perspective, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 552-54 (1996); see
Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung [GMBHG] [Limited Liability
Companies Act], (Apr. 20, 1892), as amended (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/gmbhg/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Limited Liability Companies
Act].
16. See Limited Liability Companies Act§ 5 (Ger.).
17. See id. § 7(2).
18. See id. § 8.
19. See Lenhardt, supra note 15, at 557-58 (smaller GmbHs may opt for dual
governance if they so desire).
20. See id. at 562 (the GmbH is also the entity of choice for sole proprietors and
partnerships).
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subsidiaries of foreign corporations. 21

B. German Cooperatives
The history of modern cooperatives in Germany dates to the
Cooperative Act of 1889. 22 Legal changes in 1933 and 1973 moved the
Cooperative Law in the direction of increasingly limited liability,
including cooperatives where members bore no liability whatsoever. 23
In 2006, further amendments resolved issues concerning the
management and supervisory boards, permitting, for example, oneperson management boards in cooperatives with few members. 24
German law distinguishes cooperatives from other business entities
on three bases: cooperatives do not pursue "corporate" profit, instead
seeking profit and advantage for their members; 25 they are not closed in
terms of membership, which may fluctuate; 26 and finally, their
democratic administration. 27 Contemporary German legal scholars tend
to place greater emphasis on the last aspect, which contrasts with the
typical "top-down" structure of corporations. 28
The Cooperative Law requires that every cooperative have a
management board. 29 It also requires a supervisory board, on which at
least three persons must serve without compensation. 30 Members of

21. See id. at 553 (two examples noted are Bosch GmbH and IBM Deutschland
GmbH).
22. See Cooperatives Act (Ger.) (stating the date of issue as May 1, 1889).
23. See Udo Kornblum, Das Weiterleben der Genossenschaft, IN RECHT, GERICHT,
GENOSSENSCHAFT UND POLICEY: STUDIEN ZU GRUNDBEGRIFFEN DER GERMANISTISCHEN
RECHTSHISTORIE, 168, 174 (1986) (noting the [West] German legislature's express intent to
permit cooperatives without member liability); see also Christoph Bernhardt, Wir bauen
eine neue Stadt - Im Verein gegen die Wohnungsnot, DIE ZEIT (June 25, 2012, 3:39 PM),
available at http://www.zeit.de/2013/22/geschichte-baugenossenschaften-wohnen (last
visited Nov. 16, 2014) (detailing the genesis of housing cooperatives from the nineteenth
century to the present).
24. Cooperatives Act§§ 24, 36 (Ger.).
25. Id. § 24(3).
26. See Wolfgang Kohte, Die Genossenschaft- eine Rechtsform mit Zukunft? - neue
Impulse aus Brussel fur eine alte Rechtsform, 12 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 905,
906 (1991).
27. See id.; Cooperatives Act§ I (Ger.).
28. See Volker Beuthien, Die eingetragene Genossenschaft als verbundenes
Unternehmen, in DAS GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT DER KONZERNE IM INTERNATIONALEN
VERGLEICH, 133, 135 (1991) (contrasting the top-to-bottom 'command path' of conventional
business entities with the collective, democratic decision-making process in cooperatives);
Kornblum, supra note 23, at 168.
29. Cooperatives Act§ 9 (Ger.).
30. Id. §§ 9, 36. (German: "Aufsichtsrat"; cooperatives with under twenty members are
allowed one-person management boards).
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both boards must also be members of the cooperative. 31 Although
recent amendments to the law have expanded supervisory and
management board members' power to act on behalf of the cooperative,
the General Assembly remains the main decision-making body of
cooperatives. 32 Indeed, the law expressly prohibits investor vetoes of
members' decisions. 33
The Cooperative Law also specifies that the investment
contributions made by members to obtain membership must comprise at
least a tenth of the cooperative's total assets. 34 In keeping with the
principle that cooperatives serve to benefit their members, the
Cooperative Law provides for a default procedure in the distribution of
profits that all cooperatives must follow absent an explicit procedure set
out in the cooperative' s charter. 35 However, even where cooperatives
develop their own procedures, profits are paid out to members in
portions equal to their shares-cooperatives may regulate how profits
are disbursed, but not the amount. 36
The 1973 and 2006 amendments to the Cooperative Law have
permitted the acquisition of more than one share by members, although
the rule of "one man, one vote" still defines cooperative governance. 37
A cooperative' s charter may even require members to purchase more
than one share, but only if the requirement is enforced on an equal basis
for all members. 38 Dissolution of a cooperative requires a three-quarters
majority vote of its members. 39
Probably the single most defining feature of the Cooperative Law
in comparison to other countries is its placement of regulatory power in
private, non-state hands. 40 All cooperatives are required to join a
Cooperative Auditing Association ("CAA"), which acts as a quasiCooperatives with less than
governmental regulatory agency. 41
31. Id.§ 9.
32. Id. § 8(2).
33. Id. ("the Charter may provide for ... the admittance of investing members [but]
must insure through appropriate bylaws that investing members are in no instance able to
overrule [the decision of] other members").
34. Cooperatives Act§ 7 (Ger.).
35. See id. § 19 (for example, a cooperative ' s charter may provide that profits flow into
financial reserves instead).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 7(a); see Kornblum, supra note 23 at 168 (cooperatives may also restrict the
acquisition of additional shares in any way they see fit).
38. Cooperatives Act§ 7(a) (Ger.).
39. See id. § 78.
40. See id. §§ 53-55.
41. See id. § 54 (German: "Prtifungsverband").
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€2,000,000 in assets must submit to inspection every two years, while
those with more undergo yearly inspections. 42 This is a fairly invasive
process in which an inspector from the CAA receives full access to
ledgers, financial statements, financial instruments and even the
cooperative' s goods and wares. 43

C. German Non-Pro.fit Entities
Non-profit entities typically take the form of registered or
Within each category
unregistered associations in Germany. 44
associations are further divided between for-profit and non-profit
associations. 45 Registered associations, as their name implies, are
registered with a local court agency, which approves or rejects its
charter. 46
Unregistered associations may become active almost
immediately without registration. 47 Both registered and unregistered
associations may acquire interests in LLCs, even as non-profits,
although in practice local court agencies have been loathe to allow
unregistered associations to do so. 48 In all other respects, such as the
liability of an association's officers, associations are generally treated
like other corporate entities. 49

II. SPANISH LAW, REGULATIONS, AND PRACTICES
Spanish law provides for LLCs and the relevant laws are
comparable to those of Germany and the U.S.50 By contrast, the

42. Id.§ 53.
43. Cooperatives Act§ 57 (Ger.).
44. Civil Code §§ 21-22, 54 (Ger.) (German: "Verein"); see MI ETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT,
HANDBUCH 5 (2013) (handbook of the Mietshauser Syndikat, on file with author)
[hereinafter HANDBUCH].
45. See Civil Code §§ 21-22, 54 (Ger.) (non-profit associations enjoy several
advantages, chief among them favorable tax treatment).
46. Id. (German: "Amtsgericht"); see HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 5 (identifying
language that is decisive in a local court agency's determination of whether an association is
for-profit or not-for-profit).
47. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 5.
48. See id. at 5 (identifying language that is decisive in a local court agency's
determination of whether an association is for-profit or not-for-profit).
49. See Civil Code §§ 31-31 b (Ger.) (liability of an association for its representatives
and personal liability of board members); Limited Liability Companies Act§§ 13, 15 (Ger.).
50. See CODIGO DE COMERCIO [C. COM. 1889] [Commercial Code] art. 125, 145
(Spain), available at http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1885-6627 (last visited
Sept. 15, 2014); Limited Liability Companies Act §§ 5-7 (Ger.); UNIFORM LTD. LtAB. Co.
ACT (1994) (amended 2006), available at http: //www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/limited%20liability°/o20company/ullca_ final_ 06rev. pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2014 ).
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Spanish Cooperative Law is much more flexible than its counterparts,
providing for the organization of cooperatives in larger "second-degree"
cooperatives and permitting legal entities to acquire interests in
cooperatives. 51 Spanish non-profit entities, like those in Germany and
the U.S., are also permitted to acquire interests in other entities and may
be organized democratically. 52
A. The Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada: The Spanish LLC
Limited liability companies in Spain are founded through
execution of a deed in the presence of a public notary and registration
with the Mercantile Registry. 53 Spanish law requires €3,000 starting
capital and LLCs are not permitted to issue shares but instead divide
their capital into "participation interests," which non-partner investors
may acquire. 54 LLC partners bear no personal liability for company
debts and directors are liable solely to the partners and the holders of
participation interests. 55 The partners and participation holders elect the
directors and may remove them. 56 Other entities, whether businesses or
non-profits, may acquire interests in Spanish LLCs. 57
B. Spanish Cooperatives

Cooperatives were not a prominent component of the Spanish
economy until the second half of the 20th century. 58 The earliest modem
legislation concerning cooperatives was the Associations Act of 1887
and the Farm Unions Act of 1906, which provided a legal framework
for agricultural cooperatives and led to the rapid proliferation of farm
unions. 59 This process continued during the Second Republic 60 and the
51. Cooperative Law arts. 8, 12 (B.O.E. 1999, 27) (Spain), available at
https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1999-15681 (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
52. See id. art. 5(2).
53. Commercial Code art. 125, 145 (Spain).
54. See id. art. 125; Limited Liability Company Law art. 4 (B.O.E 1995, 2) (Spain),
available at https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/03/24/pdfs/A09181-09206.pdf (last visited
Nov. 16, 2014) (the text of the law still lists the amount in pesetas, so the amount of 3,000 €
is an approximation).
55. Commercial Code arts. 127, 147 (Spain).
56. See id. art. 125.
57. Limited Liability Company Law art. 87 (Spain) (defining when an LLC is
considered "dominant" in relation to another).
58. See Juan Francisco Julia Igual & Sergio Mari Vidal, Farm Cooperatives and the
Social Economy: The Case of Spain, 30 J. RURAL COOPERATION 119, 121-22 (2002),
available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/59573 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
59. See id. at 121-22; WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE & KATHLEEN KING WHYTE, MAKING
MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX 18-19
(2d ed. 1991) (noting that the first recorded consumer cooperative was in 1880, preceding
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Spanish Civil War, only to be abruptly altered following the victory of
the Falangistas under Francisco Franco. 61 Nevertheless, the role of
cooperatives in the Spanish economy continued to grow and during the
transitional years of the Third Republic, two legislative acts 62 shifted the
focus to actively fostering business development. 63
The prominence of cooperatives in Spain's economy is largely due
to the Mondragon Cooperatives, founded in 1956. 64 This initial workerowned and -managed enterprise flowered into an extensive and highly
variegated cooperative network, discussed in detail below. 65 In terms of
its influence on the Spanish economy, Mondragon demonstrated that
worker cooperatives were economically viable and could serve as
engines of prosperity. 66 As an example of cooperatives' present role in
the Spanish economy, at the dawn of this century in the agricultural
sector alone there were nearly 4,000 cooperatives with over a million
members. 67
Spanish cooperatives are governed by the country's Cooperative
Law, although the Commercial Code also applies under certain
circumstances. 68 The Cooperative Act provides for two types of
cooperatives: first- and second-degree cooperatives. 69 A first-degree
the Cooperative Act by some seven years).
60. See Igual & Vidal, supra note 58, at 122 (the 1931 Cooperatives Act also provided
for a cooperative registry maintained by the Ministry of Labor that would give cooperatives
legal standing); WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 18-21.
61. See George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia, LIBCOM.ORG 3-4 (1938), available at
http://libcom.org/files/Homage%20to%20Catalonia%20-%20George%200rwell.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2014) (containing the famed author's first-hand account of the economic
changes undertaken during the Spanish Civil War); see also Igual & Vidal, supra note 58, at
122 (the 1942 Cooperatives Act enabled the official trade union to veto candidates in
cooperative elections).
62. The Cooperatives General Act of 1974 and the Regulations for Cooperative
Societies, passed in 1978. See lgual & Vidal, supra note 58, at 122.
63. See id. at 122.
available at http://www.mondragon64. See MONDRAGON CORPORATION,
corporation.com/eng/co-operative-experience/history/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (relating
the significant early dates in the cooperatives' development).
65. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 32-35.
66. See id. at 46-48; Christopher S. Axworthy, Worker Co-Operatives in Mondragon,
the UK. and France: Some Reflections, UNIVER. SASKATCHEWAN CENTRE FOR THE STUDY
OF Co-OPERATIVES: OCCASIONAL PAPERS 3 (1985).
67. lgual & Vidal, supra note 58, at 123. Moreover, in 1996 agricultural cooperatives
were responsible for 45% of Spain's fruit produce, 15% of vegetable produce, 27% of milk
production and 20% of its cereal production. Id. at 125.
68. Cooperatives Law art. 1 (Spain) ("[L]as cooperativas de producci6n ... quedaran
sujetas a las disposiciones de este C6digo cuando se dedicaren a actos de comercio extrafios
a la mutalidad.").
69. See id. arts. 1, 7-8, 12.
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cooperative is constituted by at least three persons (natural, juridical or
both), while a second-degree cooperative consists of two or more
cooperatives organized in a network. 7° Founding both types requires
execution of a public deed registered with the local Registry of
Cooperatives. 71 The deed must contain a number of key pieces of
information, including by-laws, identification of members, as well as
evidence that they have invested the funds necessary to become
members. 72
Under the Spanish Cooperative Act, all members of the
cooperative have the right to participate in the decision-making process,
although it permits unequal influence on the basis of unequal
investment. 73 A member of a first-degree cooperative may not obtain
more than a third of the voting share. 74 Cooperatives may also establish
special voting regimes for certain situations, e.g. total voting equality
among members when deciding whether to dissolve. 75 To alter the
cooperatives by-laws, dissolve or merge with another cooperative, or
convert the cooperative into another entity, a two-thirds majority of
votes is required by law. 76
With regard to second-degree cooperatives, legal entities other than
cooperatives may attain membership. 77 Non-cooperative entities may
not make up more than 45% of the membership, although in contrast to
first-degree cooperatives member entities are permitted to acquire more
than a 30% capital interest in the second-degree cooperative. 78
However, the relationship between first- and second-degree
cooperatives is not merely constitutive under Spanish law, but is instead
conceived as a hierarchical relationship in which the second-degree
cooperative commands and controls the first-degree cooperative. 79

70. See id. arts. 8, 12.
71 . See id. art. 7 (Spanish: "Registro de Sociedades Cooperativas").
72. Id. art. 10; see also FERNANDO POMBO, DOING BUSINESS IN SPAIN § 12.04[2] (2012).
73. Cooperative Law art. 1, 26 (Spain).
74. See id. art. 26 ("[L]os Estatutos fijaran con claridad los criterios de
proporcionalidad, sin que el numero de votos de un socio pueda ser superior al tercio de los
votos totales de la cooperativa").
75. See id. art. 26(7) ("[L]os Estatutos deberan regular los supuestos en que sera
imperativo el voto igualitario").
76. Id. art. 28.
77. See id. art. 77 ("Tambien pueden integrarse en calidad de socios otras personas
juridicas, publicas o privadas y empresarios individuales, hasta un maximo del cuarenta y
cinco por ciento del total de los socios").
78. See Cooperative Law art. 77 (Spain).
79. See id. art. 17, 78( l ).
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C. Spanish Non-Profit Entities

The standard non-profit entity in Spain is the non-profit
association. 80 Spanish non-profit associations must show at the time of
incorporation that they have a social purpose, e.g. the defense of human
rights, the promotion of volunteerism or advancing the "social
economy." 81 Such associations must use at least 70% of their corporate
income for that stated purpose. 82 Although formally subject to
corporate taxes, a number of types of income are exempt, including
donations and any dividends from interests in other entities. 83 The
process of incorporation is largely identical to that of other corporate
entities except that the entity is entered into a separate registry for such
non-profit associations. 84

III. U.S. LAW, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES
In the Republic's early history, corporations were relatively
unimportant, there being only 317 at the dawn of the 19th century by one
count. 85 This changed rapidly, however, and by the end of the 19th
century the U.S. boasted some of the largest and most successful
corporations in the world. 86 This development has continued into the
present, with the LLC representing a recent addition to U.S. business
entities. 87 As in Europe, U.S. cooperatives can trace their roots back to
early 1800s but did not attain any economic significance until the 20th
In contrast to their counterparts, however, worker
century. 88
80. Law on the Fiscal Regime for Non-Profit Entities and Charitable Incentives,
Declaration
of
Motives
II
(B.O.E.
2002,
49)
(Spain),
available
at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/12/24/pdfs/A45229-45243.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(Spanish: "entidad sin fines lucrativos").
81. See id. art. 3(1) ("de fomenta de la economia social").
82. See id. art. 3(2).
83. See id. art. 6(2) ("Estan exentas ... los dividendos y participaciones en beneficios de
sociedades").
84. See id. art. 3(7).
85. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 300 (1990).
86. See MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN
CAPITALISTS 1861-1901, at 253-64, 284-87 (Transaction Publishers 2011) (1934). This
classic of American history offers a particular focus on the titans of industry that helped
make the U.S. "in very short order the premier industrial nation of the world." Id. at 254.
87. Prefatory Note, UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (1994) (amended 2006), available at
http://www. uni formlaws. org/shared/docs/limited%20 liabi l it)%20company/ul lea_final_ 06re
v.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
88. See Christine A. Varney, The Capper-Volstead, Agricultural Cooperatives and
Antitrust Immunity, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1-3 (Dec. 2010), available at
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cooperatives are often defined narrowly, precluding the acquisition of
an interest by another legal entity, and state laws often make no
provision for a cooperative network. 89 U.S. non-profits generally enjoy
the same powers as their European counterparts, including the
acquisition of interests in business entities and determination of their
own structure and by-laws. 90
A. US. Limited Liability Companies

State legislatures have been the primary agents in the creation and
spread of the LLC as a legal entity. 91 The first state to introduce this
particular form was Wyoming in 1977 but by the time the Uniform Law
Commission promulgated its Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
in 1996 a majority of state legislatures had provided for LLCs. 92 The
LLC is meant to provide the "pass-through" tax advantages of a
partnership (from which the form is derived) and the liability
advantages of a corporation. 93
The federal structure of the United States affords a high degree of
sovereignty to individual states such that the regulation of LLCs across
the country is subject to variation. 94 As a result, the focus here will be
on federal regulation and those requirements common to most, if not all,
states so as to offer a general impression of LLC formation and
regulation in the U.S. 95
Limited Liability Companies are formed by filing articles of
organization, often with the local secretary of state. 96 The articles of
organization must indicate the name of the LLC, its location and
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ aba/pub lishing/antitrust_source/Dec I O_Varney 12
_21.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (summarizing the early growth of
agricultural cooperatives and attendant legislation).
89. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157A, § 7 (West 2014).
90. See generally 26 U.S .C. § 501(c) (2014).
91. See Prefatory Note, UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT 1 (1994) (amended 2006),
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability°/o20company/
ullca_final_06rev.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
92. See id. at 2.
93. See id. at 1-6.
94. See generally Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence
favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1800-02, 1812-17
(2002) (noting the variety and effect of state anti-takeover statutes in retaining in-state
corporations and attracting out-of-state corporations).
95. The Uniform Law Commission's revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
will figure prominently here. See UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT (1994) (amended 2006),
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/
ullca_final_06rev.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
96. See id. § 201.
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identify stakeholders. 97 Many state laws set as a default equal
distributions by the LLC to its members but all permit unequal
distribution schemes by agreement. 98 An LLC is prohibited from
making distributions that would hinder its ability to satisfy outstanding
debts. 99 The Uniform Act also provides that an LLC is a membermanaged entity unless the operating agreement explicitly provides
otherwise. 100 While state taxation of Limited Liability Companies
vary, 101 the IRS will generally treat LLC members as partners and
affords them a partnership's income "pass-through" advantage,
preventing the "double-taxation" that standard corporations
experience. 102
B. U.S. Cooperatives

The earliest U.S. cooperatives were developed in the agricultural
sector and continued to increase in influence until by the mid-20th
century cooperatives were mainstays of farming, husbandry and foodproduction. 103 These were the first cooperatives to receive any
legislative treatment at the federal or state levels, notably the provisions
of the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 that immunized agricultural
cooperatives from anti-trust legislation. 104 Another common example is
the cooperative credit union, which was introduced to the United States
from Germany via Quebec, with the first cooperative credit union in the
U.S. opening its doors in Manchester, New Hampshire in 1908. 105 Over
97. See id. (the Uniform Act provides for the formation of an LLC even when no
members are yet named).
98. See id. § 405 .
99. See id.
100. See UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§ 407 (1994) (amended 2006), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability<>/o20company/ullca_ final_ 06re
v.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (this section also contains detailed provisions for the
appointment and removal of managers, as well as the effects of dissociating a member who
is also a manager).
101. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, available at
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Lim ited-LiabilityCompany-LLC (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
102. See id. (single-member LLCs are deemed entities that are not separate from the
owner for income tax, but separate for employment and some excise taxes).
103. See Varney, supra note 88, at 1.
104. See id. at 1, 4; 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (2010) (providing for administrative action
against cooperatives that restrain trade in the place of judicial action). Pending class action
suits may re-define some cooperative's immunity to anti-trust actions. See In re Fresh &
Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106666, 6-7 (D. Idaho July 27,
2012).
105. See W ENDELL V. FOUNTAIN, THE N EW EMERGING CREDIT UNION WORLD: THEORY,
PROCESS, PRACTICE CASES & APPLICATION 9 (2d Edition 2012). An excellent summary of
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the next decades credit unions spread across the country, culminating in
the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, a national regimen for chartering
and supervising credit unions. 106 Workers' cooperatives, by contrast,
long operated without specific statutory provision until the advent of
Massachusetts' General Law 157A in 1982. 107
As in Europe, regulations concerning cooperatives followed their
spread through the United States. 108 Among the states there is some
variation: some address only agricultural cooperatives and treat others
more or less the same as other corporate entities, 109 but a few have
established specific legal regimens for cooperatives. 110 Incorporation of
a cooperative mirrors that of a corporation in many respects: the
prospective founders file a certificate of incorporation with the relevant
agency, usually the secretary of state, which includes all essential
information concerning contact information, the identity of the interestholders, whether and in what amounts stock will be offered, etc. 111
the early genesis of credit unions is available from the NATIONAL CREDIT UNION
ADMINISTRATION, available at http://www.ncua.gov/about/history/Pages/CUHistory.aspx
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014). La Caisse Populaire, Ste-Marie is still an active credit union in
Manchester, NH, available at http://www.stmarysbank.com/about-st-marys-bank/ourhistory.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
106. Specifically, the Federal Credit Union Act provided for the creation of the
National Credit Union Administration with the power to charter credit unions, collect fees,
provide share insurance for members and ensure credit unions' compliance with regulatory
directives. Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1752a, 1755, 1781, 1785,
1790d (2013).
107. See David Ellerman & Peter Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New
Worker Cooperative Statute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 441, 44243 (1983).
108. See Sean Flynn, A Short History of Cooperative Law and Regulation Reform in
Developing Countries, in U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ENABLING
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES FOR LEGAL REFORM 43 (2006) (noting that
cooperatives in North America and Europe developed in a bottom-up fashion and that "laws
generally followed and recognized the initial development of a cooperative sector").
109. This has sometimes forced would-be cooperators to form a corporation with
altered by-laws. MGL J57a, the Massachusetts Statute for Employee Cooperative
Corporations, AM. COOPERATIVE WORKER (Jan. 29, 2011, 10:57 AM), available at
http://www.american.coop/node/275 (last visited Oct. 28, 2014); see Lynn Pitman, Limited
Cooperative Association Statutes: An Update 2 (Univ. of Wis. Ctr. for Coops., Staff Paper
No. 7, April 2008).
110. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-111 to -118 (2013); North Carolina Co-op Law
Information,
Co-OP
LA w.ORG,
available
at
http://www.cooplaw.org/statebystate/northcarolina/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (commenting
on the North Carolina Cooperative Associations Statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157A
(West 1982).
111. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 155 (West 2004) (general corporate law providing
for incorporation of all "business corporations"); N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 54-113 (last amended
1985); N.Y. CooP. CORP. LAW arts. 2, § 11, 15 (McKinney 2013) (indicating the required
contents of the certificate and filing with the secretary of state).

Published by SURFACE, 2014

213

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1

208

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 42:1

However, some states provide for particular protections for
cooperatives, a common one being prohibitions on the use of the word
"cooperative" in the name of any entity not conforming with the
statutory definition. 112 Some states also require that only members have
the power to amend a cooperative's by-laws, excluding non-member
stockholders from management decisions. 113 Furthermore, states that
have specific provisions for workers cooperatives often preclude legal
entities from acquiring a voting share in the enterprise. 114
Under federal tax law cooperatives are categorized as "Farmers'
Tax Exempt Cooperatives" or "Non-Exempt Cooperatives," meaning
that non-agricultural cooperatives must pay corporate income tax. 115
However, like LLCs, cooperatives are permitted to "pass through"
corporate income to their members without paying corporate income
tax. 116 State taxation can vary but cooperatives are usually taxed at the
same rate as other corporate entities. 117 Yet, in some cases, states tack
closely to federal law, exempting some types of cooperatives entirely. 11 8

C. U.S. Non-Profit Entities
Although non-profits are incorporated at the state level, Federal
law plays an outsized role in their foundation and operation because
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157, § 8 (West 2014) (providing that any corporate
entity using the word "co-operative" that is not structured in accordance with the statutory
requirements for cooperatives "shall forfeit to the commonwealth not more than ten dollars
for every day ... such name or title is so used" and potentially face injunctions against
continued operation); N.Y. COOP. CORP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2014) (requiring
cooperatives to use the word "cooperative" in their names).
113. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 157A, § 7 (West 2014) ("No capital stock other
than membership shares shall be given voting power in an employee cooperative."); N.H.
Rev. STAT. ANN. § 301-A:1 (2014) (defining consumer cooperatives as entities in which
"each member has one and only one vote" and in which "voting by proxy is prohibited.").
114. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 157A, § 7 (West 2014).
115. See Instructions for Form 1120-C, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVIC E 7 (2013),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/il 120c.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); 26
U.S.C. § 521 (2004).
116. See 26 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (2014) (this income is termed "patronage").
117. For example, North Carolina taxes cooperatives at the same rate as other corporate
entities, although it applies federal deductions for patronage dividends. Tax Rate and Basis
for
the
Tax,
N.C.
DEP' T
REVENUE,
available
at
http://www.domc.com/taxes/corporate/rate.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Form CD-418,
N.C. DEP'T REVENUE, available at http://www.domc.com/downloads/cd418.pdf (last visited
Nov. 16, 2014).
118. See Corporate Excise Tax, MASS. DEP'T REVENU E, available at
http://www.mass.gov/dor/businesses/current-tax-info/guide-to-employer-taxobligations/business-income-taxes/corporations/corporate-excise-tax.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2014) (exempting from income tax all corporations organized under Section 501 of the
Internal Revenue Code, including some cooperative corporations).
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they are subject to a special federal tax regimen. 119 As such, most nonprofit entities are identified by their exemption category under the U.S.
Code, e.g. 501(c)(3), 501(c)(6), etc. 120 The statute covers a variety of
entities, including civic leagues, business leagues, and mutual insurance
funds, among others. 121
If an organization qualifies as a 501 (c) entity and receives approval
by the IRS, its corporate income is generally tax-exempt. 122 This status
is subject to section 503(b), which lists prohibited transactions resulting
in denial of tax-exempt status, including overcompensation for personal
services or making the organization's services available on a
preferential basis. 123 Income from trade or business unrelated to the
entity's purpose remains taxable. 124 Important for this article is that
Federal tax law does not distinguish between tax-exempt entities on the
basis of their form of organization, nor does it prescribe any particular
organizational format. 125

IV. ESTABLISHED LARGE-SCALE COOPERATIVE MODELS:
MONDRAGON AND EVERGREEN

A. The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation
The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation grew out of a vocational
school founded by the Catholic priest Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta in
the town of Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain. 126 A number of
Arizmendiarrieta's students, who had moved on to positions in private
enterprises, were dissatisfied with the stratified and adversarial
environment in which they were employed. 127 After unsuccessful
efforts to convince company managers and government officials to
permit worker ownership of enterprises, they turned to their former
teacher for advice. 128
119. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2014).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2014); 26 U.S.C. § 503 (2014).
123. See 26 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2014).
124. See 26 U.S.C. § 513(a) (2014).
125. See 26 U.S.C. § 503 (2014).
126. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 28-31.
127. See id. at 32.
128. See id. at 33; Fernando Molina, The Spirituality of Economics: Historical Roots of
Mondragon, 1940-1974, in BASQUE COOPERATIVISM 13, 20 (Baleren Bakaikoa & Eneka
Albizu eds., 2011) (relating police suspicion of Arizmendiarrieta, resulting in interference
even with Catholic Youth pilgrimages organized by the priest).
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Arizmendiarrieta and the small group of students chose to form
their own cooperative enterprise and, after prodigious community fundraising and overcoming bureaucratic hurdles, the five students founded
Ulgor and obtained a license to produce home appliances. 129 From 1956
to 1959 the number of "worker-shareholders" increased from 10 to
143. 130 However, the defining act that set the Mondragon project on the
path to success was the founding of the "Caja Laboral Popular" in 1959,
a cooperative banking institution founded specifically to finance the
foundation and operation of worker cooperatives. 131 With the help of
credit extended by this institution, dozens of new worker cooperatives
were established during the 1960s. 132 The Mondragon Cooperative
Corporation continued to grow at a steady pace, numbering 160
cooperatives with 19,000 members by 1985. 133
At present the Mondragon group includes 289 enterprises with
over 80,000 employees. 134 The Mondragon Corporation as a whole is a
highly centralized organization, 135 with several intermediary layers
between the individual cooperatives and the Caja Laboral. 136 For ease
of understanding, the rest of this section moves from the 'bottom' of the
hierarchy (at the level of the individual cooperative) to the 'top' (at the
level of the Caja Laboral).

1. Basic Cooperative Structure
The individual cooperatives have their own internal governance
structure, in which the General Assembly of all cooperative members is
the highest decision-making organ. 137 The General Assembly elects the
Governing Council, which acts as a Board of Directors. 138 The
129. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 34; Molina, supra note 128, at 23.
130. Molina, supra note 128, at 23.
131. Id. at 23-24.
132. Id. at 24.
133. Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3.
134. MONDRAGON
CORPORATION,
available
at
http ://www.mondragoncorporation.com/eng/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (noting that Mondragon enterprises are
present on five continents, including numerous branches in North and South America).
135. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 11.
136. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 36, 59-61.
137. Id. at 35 (Spanish: "Asemblea General"); Governance - Organization,
MONDRAGON
CORPORATION,
available
at
http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/eng/about-us/governance/organization/ (last visited Nov. 15 , 2014).
138. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 35-37 (Spanish: "Junta Rectora"); see
Governance
Organization,
MONDRAGON
CORPORATION,
available
at
http://www.mondragon-corporation. com/eng/about-us/ governance/organization/ (last visited
Nov. 16, 2014) (contrasting boards of directors at other private firms to the Governing
Council, made up exclusively of member-employees of the cooperative).
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Governing Council also appoints the manager of the cooperative and
oversees their activities. 139 All cooperatives also have an Audit
Committee, which monitors the finances of the enterprise, a
Management Council consisting of a cooperative' s manager and
department heads, and the Social Council, which serves as an ersatz
union, advising the Management and Governing Councils on subjects as
varied as compensation plans, working conditions and employment
decisions. 140 These councils facilitate the operations of the cooperative
while also keeping one another in check. 141

2. Intermediate Organizations & "Second-Degree Co-operatives"
Within the Mondragon group individual cooperatives are organized
in second-degree cooperatives. 142 Long-standing examples include the
Caja Laboral Popular (the group's financial institution), Iker/an
(research) and Lagun Aro (social and medical services), but there are
Formally, the
also other industrial or regional organizations. 143
governing structure of these second-degree cooperatives mirrors that of
the individual cooperatives: each cooperative has a single, equal vote
and the cooperatives elect a Governing Council, which appoints the
General Management 144 that coordinates commercial policies. 145 One
significant difference is that persons employed directly in the seconddegree organization are also considered members of that cooperative
and have a right to elect delegates to represent their interests. 146
139. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 37 (supporting both managers and
members of the Governing Council are subject to term limits).
140. See id. at 39-40 (discussing that while the General Council is elected at-large, the
constitution of the Social Council follows a different procedure, one designed to ensure that
it is not dominated by managers or the Governing Council: First, members of the Social
Council are elected from within the departments of the cooperative; second, any member of
the Governing Council drawing the lowest pay grade is automatically a member of the
Social Council, which is meant to ensure that less-skilled or newer members are not unduly
disadvantaged). Social Council, which is meant to ensure that less-skilled or newer
members are not unduly disadvantaged. Id.
141. See id. at 41 (describing how, if a serious disagreement arises between the Social
Council and the Governing Council, the former may refer the issue to the General Assembly
for all cooperative members to decide).
142. See id. at 59-60. I have chosen to use the term "second-degree cooperative"
because it is the most direct translation from the Spanish term and is common in both the
relevant laws and in most scholarly works. See id.
143. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3 (explaining the individual cooperatives are also
linked to Eroski, the consumers' cooperative).
144. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 60 (Spanish: "direcci6n general").
145. See id. at 60.
146. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3 (this includes the Caja Laboral, discussed in
greater detail in the next section).
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Another is that the second-degree cooperative management both enjoys
significant latitude in directing the actions of member cooperatives and
is largely insulated from the individual cooperatives' control. 147
Second-degree cooperatives also pool profits and losses across their
members and facilitate labor transfers among cooperatives, reducing
redundancies or expanding workforces as needed. 148
3. The Caja Laboral Popular as a Managing Entity

In theory, all second-degree cooperatives enjoy equal standing, but
in practice the Caja Laboral Popular is the nerve center of Mondragon,
holding member equity, managing savings accounts and making loans
to member cooperatives. 149 Although nominally just the Mondragon
"bank," the Caja wields considerable influence through its
"Entrepreneurial Division," which controls the expansion and
development of the entire group. 150 The Caja is headed by a governing
council of twelve members, eight drawn from the individual
cooperatives and four from Caja employees. 151 The representatives
from the cooperatives are usually top management figures from the
larger and more influential enterprises. 152
The Caja's Entrepreneurial Division assesses all proposals for new
cooperatives, which take the form of loan applications by the
prospective cooperative members to the Caja. 153 If the Caja deems the
project a worthy addition to the group, the new cooperative enters into a
"contract of association." 154 This contract not only governs the
cooperative's relationship with the Mondragon group but also
prescribes a specific organizational framework. 155 For example, the
contract mandates democratic control by cooperative members and lays
out the procedures for making decisions. 156 The cooperative is barred
from discriminating on the basis of political association, religion or
gender and obligated to stay under a maximum ratio of non-member to
147. Cooperative Law art. 17, 78(1) (Spain).
148. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 61.
149. See id. at 52.
150. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3; WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 69.
151. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 68.
152. See id. at 68 (quoting a conversation with then-chairman of the Caja, Alfonso
Gorrofiogoitia, as indicating that the "top industrial leaders of the complex ... usually
dominate the council").
153. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 5.
154. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 69.
155. See id. at 36, 69 (referring to the chart on page 36 that represents the typical
structure of a Mondragon cooperative).
156. See id. at 69-70.
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member employees. 157
The contract of association compels the
cooperative to submit to audits every four years and to maintain a twoto-one ratio in capital reserves versus borrowed capital. 158
The contract of association also grants the Caja considerable power
to intervene in the internal affairs of individual cooperatives. 159 All
Mondragon cooperatives must deposit a portion of their surplus income
with the Caja, enabling it to offer loans to prospective cooperatives at
better rates. 160 If a cooperative fails to make loan payments or fulfill
any of its obligations under the contract of association, the Caja may
intervene directly, even appointing a manager on its own authority. 161
While at times essential to ensuring the financial health and stability of
the Mondragon group as a whole, such intrusive power suggests that the
formally democratic Mondragon structure is tempered by a heavy dose
of patemalism. 162 Furthermore, descriptions of the Caja's working
culture indicate that many Caja employees treat Mondragon as a
business that happens to consist of cooperatives, rather than a group of
cooperatives doing business. 163

B. The Evergreen Cooperatives
The Evergreen Cooperative Corporation ("ECC") is the product of
an effort by Cleveland area institutions to create sustainable living-wage
jobs in low-income areas. 164 In 2009 the first two cooperatives,

157. See id. at 69-70 (noting that in the 1980s non-members were not permitted to
make up more than 10% of a cooperative's workforce. With the rapid expansion of
Mondragon since 1992, this principle has given way to greater numbers of non-member
employees, the bulk of which are located outside the Basque country); see Co-operative
Experience - FAQs - How Many of Your Employees are Cooperative Members and How
Many are Not?, MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/eng/co-operative-experience/faqs/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (noting that
the company's figures put the global proportion of member-employees at about 33%,
although a plan for extending membership to all Eroski employees foresees 75% global
membership within three years).
158. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 70.
159. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6; WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 179-80.
160. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6.
161. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 178-81.
162. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 7, 11-12 (noting that the attitude and bearing
among Caja employees "was aloof and [they] appeared not to be part of the workforce." He
also noted that Caja employees referred to other cooperative workers "as being uneducated,
glad of a job, not very knowledg[ e]able about the business of their co-operatives, even [as]
peasants.").
163. See id. at 7; WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 178-81 (demonstrating that the
Intervention Department, which oversees the restructuring and management of cooperatives
in financial distress, is a salient example of the technocratic character of the Caja).
164. See The Evergreen Cooperatives Story, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012),
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Evergreen Cooperative Laundry and Ohio Cooperative Solar, opened
for business. 165 Green City Growers, the largest urban hydroponic food
production greenhouse in the U.S., began operations in 2011 and made
its first harvest in early 2013. 166 The ECC acts as a "holding company"
that manages the cooperatives and guides business development, with a
long-term goal of creating "a robust network" of enterprises that
emphasizes environmental sustainability and "green collar" jobs. 167
During the planning leading up to the foundation of the ECC,
representatives from the participating institutions visited Mondragon
cooperatives in Spain and actively adopted a number of its
organizational aspects. 168 The single greatest similarity is the presence
of an "umbrella organization, modeled on Mondragon's [Caja Laboral],
to be the keeper of its 'vision' and a source of continuity for all of its
cooperative enterprises." 169 The following description of the ECC's
structure will start at the top and move down to the ground-level
organizations.
1. The Evergreen Cooperative Corporation
A fifteen person Board of Directors governs the ECC and includes
representatives from the founding "anchor institution[ s,]" investors and
representatives from the individual cooperatives. 170 Parallel to the ECC
and answering to the Board of Directors are an Executive Committee
and an Audit and Finance Credit Committee. 171
Directly under the ECC are the Evergreen Cooperative
Development Fund, the Evergreen Land Trust, the Evergreen Business
Services LLC and the cooperatives themselves. 172 The ECC is the sole
available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/evergreen-story/ (last visited Oct. 23,
2014) (noting the institutions include the Cleveland Foundation, local hospitals, Case
Western Reserve University and the city government); see also Sara Tonnesen, Note,

Stronger Together: Worker Cooperatives as a Community Economic Development Strategy,
20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 187, 195 (2012).
165. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 7.
166. See id.; see also Green City Growers Cooperative: The Third Evergreen Company
is Open for Business!, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (Feb. 28, 2013), available at
http://evergreencooperatives.com/2013/02/green-city-growers-cooperative-the-thirdevergreen-company-is-open-for-business/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
167. See Vision & Broad Goals, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), available at
http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/mission-goals-and-principles/ (last visited Oct. 24,
2014).
168. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 6.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 14.
171. See id.
172. See id.
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member of the Evergreen Cooperative Development Fund, whose
director belongs to the ECC management staff. 173 The ECC also has
sole control over the Evergreen Land Trust, whose aim is the
acquisition of "logistically advantageous sites for future enterprises"
and the preservation of manageable start-up costs for new businesses. 174
The Evergreen Business Services LLC is also controlled directly by the
ECC, focusing on "driving revenue, profitability, and new business
growth through existing and new Evergreen related enterprises." 175
None of these LLCs are cooperatives and there is no provision for the
representation of these entities' employees on the ECC board of
directors. 176 The ECC also has direct representation in each individual
cooperative as well as a 20% stake in the enterprise. 177 In contrast to
Mondragon, the ECC currently appoints managers for the individual
cooperatives. 178
2. The Structure of the Individual Evergreen Cooperatives

The individual cooperatives, currently three in number, 179 were
conceived as democratic institutions. 180 Enfranchisement comes with
full membership, which requires acceptance by the majority of current
members and then the purchase, in installments, of an equal share in the
cooperative. 181 However, this represents the extent of the public
information concerning the individual cooperatives' govemmg

173. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 14; see also Structure & Leadership,
EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/
about/structure-leadership/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014 ).
174. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 17.
175. Businesses - Evergreen Business Services, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012),
available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/businesses/evergreen-business-services/ (last
visited Oct. 24, 2014 ).
176. See generally Structure & Leadership, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012),
available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/structure-leadership/ (last visited Oct.
24, 2014).
177. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 14.
178. See Structure & Leadership, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), available at
http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/structure-leadership/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014)
(describing that the managers of the three cooperatives are staff employed directly by the
ECC).
179. Id. (Evergreen Cooperative Laundry, Evergreen Energy Solutions and Green City
Growers Cooperative).
180. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 22.
181. See Introduction to the Evergreen Cooperatives 2.0, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES
(Oct. 15, 2011), available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/201 l/10/new-videointroduction-to-the-evergreen-cooperatives-2-0/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (promotional
video produced by the Evergreen Cooperatives presenting the ECC model).
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structure. 182
The ECC has published no information regarding the ratio of
member to non-member employees, although the stated goal of the
organization is to rapidly increase both the number of employees and
members. 183 In its publications and presentations, the ECC has been
silent concerning the cooperatives' governance, by-laws and decisionmaking process. 184 This contrasts sharply with its general affirmations
of workplace democracy, which figure prominently in its public
message. 185 The ECC's vagueness about the implementation of
democratic management is especially odd given its willingness to
regularly present business and accounting information to the public. 186
Financial transparency is itself both welcome and necessary, given that
the ECC is funded and continues to be guided by several large partner
organizations. 187 Yet, a significant part of the ECC' s appeal is that it
envisions not only job creation but also democratic economic
development. 188 The dearth of information on this subject can only
stimulate speculation and provoke questions as to the extent of the
ECC 's commitment to workplace democracy. 189
182. See id.
183. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 8 (the Evergreen Laundry employed 21
people as of 2011 but aims to employ 50 once it reached full operational capacity).
184. The only specific detail yielded in the various ECC materials was the statement by
one employee-owner that cooperative members voted on whether to grant membership to a
probational employee. Introduction to the Evergreen Cooperatives 2.0, EVERGREEN
COOPERATIVES (Oct. 15, 2011), available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/201 l/10/newvideo-introduction-to-the-evergreen-cooperatives-2-0/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
185. Id.; Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 22 (Ted Howard, co-founder of the
Democracy Collaborative, one of the principal institutions involved in the development of
the ECC: "The way our economic system works today at all levels, you go to work and hang
your democratic rights at the door. . . . The Evergreen model is about people determining
together whether they give themselves a raise, how much goes into their pocket today and
how much goes for the future."); About, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVE LAUNDRY, available at
http://evergreencooperatives.com/business/evergreen-laundry/about/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2014) (the Evergreen Cooperative Laundry web site introduces its CEO, apparently
appointed by the ECC, followed by a brief mention of the "worker-owners," described as
the "heart of the company").
186. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 8, 11-12 (publishing the lending
arrangements as well as providing information concerning the actual and projected
performance of each cooperative).
187. See id. at 4.
188. The novelty of democratic enterprises of scale has attracted considerable attention,
including a prominent place in the documentary SHIFT CHANGE (Moving Images 2012), in
Now: Fixing the Future (PBS broadcast Nov. 17, 2010) and Al-Jazeera, Fault Lines:
Working through the US Jobs Crisis (Aug. 29, 2010), available at,
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/faultlines/2010/04/2010481251991166.html
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2014).
189. SHIFT CHANGE (Moving Images 2012) in Now: Fixing the Future (PBS broadcast
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V. THE MIETHAUSER SYNDIKAT MODEL

A. History and Development
Germany's post-war history has been plagued by housing
shortages of varying urgency. 190 Starting in the 1960s, residential
buildings in large numbers were occupied by squatters, both to secure
living space and to protest the inflation of living costs through real
estate speculation. 191 The occupation of many of these buildings
continues today, some 'legitimized' by purchase or alternative means, 192
while others are still the focus of intense struggles. 193 Many of the
individual housing projects now organized in the Mietshauser Syndikat
were former "squat houses" that had persisted for years or even decades
in organizational isolation. 194

Nov. 17, 2010).
190. See FED. RESEARCH DIVIS., GERMANY: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsten ed., 1996)
available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.390 l 5039072544;view= 1up;seq= 1
(last visited Oct. 27, 2014) ("Housing" chapter).
191. See generally Klaus Pokatzky, "Noch vie/ mehr Polizei!", DIE ZEIT (Oct. 18,
1985), archived version available at http://www.zeit.de/l 985/43/noch-viel-mehrpolizei/seite-l (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (describing the tensions in the city ofFreiburg in
connection with several housing projects, which served as a nexus for the student left and
the punk scene). The fall of the Berlin Wall led to the reunification of the city and spread
the squatters' movement from west to east, where East Berliners sought both political
change and resisted the incursion of West German investors. See Geschichte - Die
Hausbesetzerlnnenbewegung in Ost-Berlin, Teil
l, SQUATTER, available at
http://www.squatter.w3brigade.de/content/geschichte/die-hausbesetzerbewegung-ost-berlinteill (last visited on Nov. 16, 2014).
192. One example is the "Pferdestall" in Frankfurt am Main, now a community center.
See AKTIONSGEMEINSCHAFT WESTEND E.V., available at http://www.aktionsgemeinschaftwestend.de/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
193. One such 'hot-spot' is the Rote Flora house in Hamburg, whose legal owner
threatened to finally clear the house of squatters after decades of occupation. See Jorg
Ziercke, BKA-Chefwarnt vor Gewalteskalationen wie in Hamburg, DIE ZEIT (Jan. 23, 2014,
18: 12), available at http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-01/hamburg-krawalle-bkachef-wamung-gewaltspirale (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). This in tum led to considerable
social unrest in late 2013 and early 2014, including street battles between Hamburg police
and demonstrators.
See Kersten Augustin, Mit dem Fingerspitzengefiihl eines
Polizeiknuppels,
DIE
ZEIT
(Jan.
14,
2014,
15:43),
available
at
http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2014-01 I gefahrengebiet-hamburg-kommentar
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (opinion piece condemning the mayor of Hamburg's policing
policies as having "the tact of a billy club"). At the time of writing the Rote Flora's fate
remained uncertain. See Christoph Twickel & Marc Widmann, "Wir machen das ": Die
Rote Flora gehohrt jetzt der Lawaetz-Stiftung; Was hat sie damit vor?, DIE ZEIT (November
6, 2014, 12:00) available at http://www.zeit.de/2014/46/rote-flora-lawaetz-stiftung (last
visited Dec. 17, 2014) (describing the purchase of the property by a third party that hopes to
mediate between the activists and the city).
Linie
206,
MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT,
available
at
194. See
http://www.syndikat.org/de/projekte/linie206/ (last visited Dec. 17 2014) (description of a
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The Mietshauser Syndikat was founded in Freiburg in 1992. 195
The Syndikat was the product of efforts by members of the "Grether"
housing project, a former metal foundry that was converted into housing
units in 1988 and became the Syndikat's first member project. 196 The
aim of the founders, as stated by one member, was to capitalize on the
success of the Grether Project to finance similar efforts and use the
members' collective experience to aid such projects. 197 The Syndikat's
goal is to help groups obtain affordable housing outside the
conventional tenancy relationship. 198 The Syndikat's guiding principles
are self-organization, solidarity, and the "neutralization of property," i.e.
freeing residential property from speculative influence. 199
Starting in the mid-1990s, the Mietshauser Syndikat aided in the
foundation of several housing projects, which continues at the steady
pace of about one to three new projects a year. 200 At present there are
eighty-four projects and twenty-eight initiatives in development. 201
While some of the member projects pre-date the Syndikat, the vast
majority of the projects were founded with the Syndikat' s assistance. 202
Out of all the initiatives organized in cooperation with the Syndikat only
a handful have failed, twice due to being outbid by another prospective
purchaser of a building and once because the owner of a building
refused to sell to the Syndikat. 203 Three other initiatives have
voluntarily dissolved without ever attempting to purchase a building. 204
Of the completed projects only one has ever experienced insolvency. 205
Berlin project originally occupied by squatters in 1990).
195. MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, Presentation in Barcelona, Spain: Das MietshiiuserSyndikat - The Tenement Syndicate at Slide 7 (July 7, 2013) [hereinafter Presentation]
(unpublished PowerPoint, on file with author) (power point presentation delivered by
members of the Syndikat in July of 2013 to potential member-investors in a project in
Barcelona, Spain).
196. ARD Ratgeber Bauen + Wohnen (ARD television broadcast May 10, 2009).
197. Id. (the Grether Project members found it important to "provid[e] know-how to
other projects so that they wouldn't have to re-invent the wheel").
198. ALTOTTINGER MIETER KONVENT E.V., Flyer: Wohnen geht auch anders! (2009)
(unpublished tlyer)(on file with author) [hereinafter AMK Flyer] ("We would like to
establish self-determined and self-organized free spaces for all residents and thereby
dissolve traditional power relations between renters and lessors.").
199. Presentation, supra note 195, slides 12-13.
200. Presentation, supra note 195, slide 7.
201. Standortkarte, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 7 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(increase of three new projects over the prior year).
202. See Linie 206, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 194.
203. See
Chronik,
MIETSHAUSER
SYNDIKAT,
available
at
www.syndikat.org/de/syndikat/chronik/ (last visited on Nov. 16, 2014).
204. See id.
205. See id. (the project in question was the "Eilhardshof' Project in Neustadt-an-der-
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There are now nearly 2,000 residents living within almost 60,000 square
meters of living space in Syndikat projects. 206 Since its inception the
Syndikat has invested over €60,000,000 in housing projects. 207
1. Organization and Structure

The Mietshauser Syndikat represents a formal, hierarchical
constellation of several entities. 208 At the apex stands the non-profit
Mietshauser
Syndikat
Association
(hereinafter
"Syndikat
Association"), 209 which is the sole proprietor of the Mietshauser
Syndikat LLC (hereinafter "Syndikat LLC"), 210 the entity that manages
the finances related to the various projects and assists in their formation
and administration. 211 The Syndikat LLC is in tum a forty-nine percent
stakeholder in each individual project's LLC, with the local non-profit
"Residents' Association" 212 controlling the remainder. 213 However, the
Residents' Associations also become members of the Syndikat
Association, resulting in a constitutive feedback loop unique among the
entities discussed here. 214 Beyond guaranteeing the residents a seat at
the table of their local LLC they are offered control over the entire
Syndikat organization through their Association, ensuring that no
decisions are made over their heads. 215
Also notable is that the Syndikat' s individual project entities are
not cooperatives but LLCs. 216 The founders of the Mietshauser
Syndikat initially intended to use cooperatives. 217 They discovered,
WeinstraBe).
206. Linie 206, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 194.
207. Presentation, supra note 195, slide 9.
208. An excellent organizational chart is available on the Mietshauser Syndikat
website.
See The Joint Venture, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at
http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/joint_venture/ (last visited on Dec. 17, 2014).
209. Id. (German: "Mietshauser Syndikat e.V.").
210. Id. (German: "Mietshauser Syndikat GmbH").
211. Id.; see also AMK Flyer, supra note 198 (explaining the role of the Syndikat in
the AMK project).
212. The Joint Venture, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 208 (German:
"Hausverein").
213. Presentation, supra note 195, slides 14-15; AMK Flyer, supra note 198
(explaining that in any project the Syndikat and Residents' Association are the sole owners
of the LLC that formally owns a given property and that each has a single, equal vote).
214. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29 (membership qualifications of the
Syndikat Association); see id. at 30 (copy of the Syndikat Gmbh's charter, listing the
Syndikat Association as the sole interest holder); see Presentation, supra note 195, slide 1415.
215. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29.
216. See id. at 29.
217. See Die Verbundbausteine - Keine Genossenschaft, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT,

Published by SURFACE, 2014

225

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 1

220

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 42:1

however, that there would be almost no effective way to bind a series of
individual housing cooperatives together. 218 At the same time, a single
large-scale cooperative encompassing all the housing projects would be
unwieldy and severely limit the autonomy of the individual projects. 219
This prompted the use of LLCs, which provided control to prevent sale
of the properties while also being flexible enough to permit democratic
management. 220

2. On the Ground: The Project LLCs and Residents' Associations
The first step for those seeking to found a new housing project or
associate an existing one with the Syndikat is to form a non-profit
association. 221 Once the formalities for the association are complete, 222
the new Residents' Association may apply to the Syndikat Association
for membership and to the Syndikat LLC for practical assistance. 223
Once approved by the Members' Assembly 224 of the Syndikat
Association, the Residents' Association is granted membership and the
process of founding the housing project LLC begins. 225 The Syndikat
LLC acquires a forty-nine percent interest and while the Residents'
Association is technically the majority interest-holder, the operating
agreement of each LLC provides that the Syndikat LLC enjoys absolute
voting parity with the Residents' Association on questions of alienation
of the property or its privatization. 226 In this way the Syndikat may
available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. Civil Code§§ 21-22 (Ger.).
222. For registered associations this requires the presentation of the charter and some
other documentation to a local court agency (German: Amtsgericht). Id.
223. See MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16,
2014); see also HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29, 32-34 (explaining the conditions and
advantages of membership in the Syndikat Association, as well as offering an example of a
cost-sharing agreement between the Syndikat LLC and one of the House Project LLCs).
The Members' Assembly of the Syndikat Association decides on the admission of all
members. HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29.
224. HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 10, 29 (German: "Mitgliedversammlung").
225. Id.
226. Presentation, supra note 195, slides 14-15; AMK Flyer, supra note 198;
HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28. Other requirements concern non-discrimination policies
in the acceptance of new resident members and the adoption of transparent accounting
practices and democratic governance. Lending agreements include separate, further controls
related to the repayment of loans but terminate once these debts are satisfied. See
HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28, 32-34. Although further requirements are not formally
included in the individual project agreements, the Members' Assembly of the Syndikat
Association is able to engage in a process of selection: while it affirms the need for diversity
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ensure that the Residents' Association does not subvert the original
Beyond these fundamental concerns,
purpose of the project. 227
however, the Syndikat LLC has no role in an individual housing
project's daily affairs. 228 As a result, all decisions concerning house
rules, maintenance, renovations or any other house-specific activities
are left entirely to the discretion of the residents themselves. 229
After the formation of the project LLC, that entity and the Syndikat
LLC sign a "Cost-Sharing Agreement" 230 , which is virtually identical
for all projects and obligates the project LLC to pay a progressively
increasing "Solidarity Transfer" 231 to the Syndikat LLC. 232 This
payment begins at ten Eurocents per square meter of living space per
month. 233 It rises by 5% per year from the previous year, a pace
calculated to ensure continued funding for the Syndikat LLC's activities
but low enough to give individual projects the time needed to pay down
debts incurred at foundation, usually scheduled for a forty year
period. 234 However, an absolute maximum for the Solidarity Transfer is
set at 80% of the local average rent, ensuring both that established
housing projects are not unduly burdened to the benefit of newer
projects and that the projects can all continue to offer affordable
in living arrangements, "this does not mean that there are no limits." Das Syndikat in
Betrieb, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16
2014). The Members' Assembly decides on the acceptance of each individual project,
whereby some may be "totally rejected," such as commercial projects, "anti-emancipatory
projects of a cult or, even more extreme, that of a Neonazi group." Id.
227. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28, 32-34.
Verbundbausteine, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at
228. See Die
www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); AMK Flyer, supra note 198 ("In all other
affairs the Residents' Association generally has the sole say: Who moves in? How will we
renovate? How high will the rent be? The decisions and their execution belong solely to
those who live in the house.").
229. The 51 % share of the local association in the project LLC provides sufficient
interest to allow for local control. This simplifies the operating agreement, which provides
for special voting rules on the questions described above but by default leaves all other
decisions in the hands of the local association. Die Verbundbausteine, MIETSHAUSERSYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Flyer, supra note
198.
230. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 34-35 (German: "Vereinbarung zur
Kostenbeteiligung").
231. Id. (German: "Solidartransfer").
232. See id. (copying an actual Cost-Sharing Agreement between the Syndikat LLC
and the Templerhaus LLC, a project in Weinheim, Germany).
233. See id.
234. See id.; see Presentation, supra note 195, slide 20 (graphically representing a
typical payment scheme, where the contributions to the "Solidarity Fund" increases as the
payments for financing debt decreases); see Solidarfonds, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT,
available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16 2014).
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housing. 235 As consideration for this payment, the Syndikat LLC aids
the local project in its development, including acquisition of financing,
community fund-raising, advertising and questions of tax and corporate
law. 236
3. The Big Picture: The Mietshiiuser Syndikat e. V. & Mietshiiuser
Syndikat Gmbh
The Syndikat Association is governed by the Members'
Assembly. 237 The Members' Assembly has two main functions: first, to
appoint and oversee the officers of the Syndikat LLC; second, to decide
which projects to take on and accept as members of the Syndikat
Association. 238 Each member has an equal vote and while members are
encouraged to invest beyond the minimum amount, additional
investment does not increase voting power. 239
The Syndikat LLC's primary function is to advise new and
continuing projects on subjects as varied as finance management,
repayment of debts, tax law and possible strategies for improving their
buildings. 240 The LLC also administers the "Solidarity Fund," out of
which the individual project LLCs are capitalized. 241 The Syndikat
Association's Board of Directors, elected by the Members' Assembly,
oversees the Syndikat LLC's day-to-day activities. 242
It is worth noting that there are no paid positions in the Syndikat
LLC and most consulting is conducted on a pro bono basis by members
of existing projects with specialized knowledge or experience. 243
235. The relevant statistics, "Mietspiegel" in German, are produced by local municipal
and state governments and contain comprehensive rent rate information. See Mietspiegel,
SENATSVERWALTUNG
FOR
STADTENTWICKLUNG
UND
UMWELT,
available at
http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/wohnen/mietspiegel/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
236. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 34-35.
237. See id. at 29-30 (the Members' Assembly operating on the basis of a democratic
consensus-building).
238. See id. at 28-30; Skype Interview with Marcel Seehuber, Member, AMK e.V. ,
Mietshauser-Syndikat (Nov. 2, 2013) (membership is also open to individuals and other
organizations, which helps in engaging local residents or community groups in the
development process; current members must vote to confer membership, which is a
prerequisite for the Syndikat's assistance); see also HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29.
239. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29; Interview with Marcel Seehuber, supra
note 238.
240. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 32-33.
241. See id. (German: "Solidarfonds").
242. See Das Syndikat in Betrieb, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at
http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/operation/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (outlining
the role of the LLC in relation to the Syndikat Association).
243. See id. ("[T]he counseling and supervision of a house initiative be provided free of
charge by committed volunteers from existing projects.").
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Regular workshops and information exchanges take place at the same
time as the meetings of the Members' Assembly, furthering this 'do-ityourself ethos. 244
B. Applicability and Advantages of the Mietshauser Syndikat Model

The Mietshauser-Syndikat's model offers considerable advantages
in the development of workers' cooperatives outside of Germany. The
Syndikat model is not dependent upon any peculiarities of German law,
but is almost fully transferable to any jurisdiction that provides for
LLC-type entities.245 Although differences exist between the operations
of housing cooperatives and workers' cooperatives, these do not
undermine the inherent strength and resilience of the Syndikat model,
which can be adapted to the particular needs of these enterprises.
Finally, this organizational format is the best for fostering workplace
democracy and democratic economic development, an oft-touted ideal
of the cooperative movement at large and rhetorically prominent in the
self-representations of the Mondragon and Evergreen cooperatives. 246
The following discussion sketches how a Syndikat-type network of
workers' cooperatives could be formed and organized in civil law
(Spain) and common law (the United States) jurisdictions to promote
effective and democratic economic development.
1. Applicability to Workers' Cooperatives

The Mietshauser-Syndikat's purpose is to expand affordable,
quality housing and neither it nor its member organizations engage in
manufacturing or provide services. 247 Nevertheless, with slight
modification this model would lend itself well to the development of
244. See id. (the Members' Assembly "[i]s always scheduled on a weekend, leaving
room for the exchange of information, counseling, workshops, mutual help and the
opportunity to meet people from other projects.").
245. See generally Lenhardt, supra note 15, at 551-52; see Larry E. Ribstein, A
Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 311, 314-15 (1995)
(noting the near universality of the LLC in the U.S. as of the mid-l 990s ); see THE LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY CENTER, available at http://www.limitedliabilitycompanycenter.com/
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (providing a brief history of the development of LLCs in all 50
states).
246. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 14-16, 30, 33 (relating Mondragon
founder Arizmendiarrieta' s commitment to democracy and insistence on worker
empowerment); see EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES, Evergreen Businesses, available at
http://evergreencooperatives.com/businesses/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (including an
explicit endorsement of increased democracy in the workplace).
24 7. In fact, beyond the initial capitalization of the individual project LLCs, the
Mietshauser-Syndikat does not provide any financing at all, even for housing projects. See
HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28.
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both individual worker-managed enterprises and a network of such
entities.
The primary difference between the Mietshauser Syndikat and a
hypothetical "Worker Cooperative Network" (termed "Co-op Network"
for convenience) would be one of focus: instead of acquiring capital for
the purchase of real estate, the network would raise funds to found
enterprises and instead of examining the feasibility of purchasing or
converting a building, the network would assess the prospects and
sustainability of a proposed enterprise. 248 A parallel entity to the
Syndikat LLC would aid in the organization and financing of worker
cooperatives. 249 The individual enterprises would be members in the
Co-op Network's executive non-profit entity, where a Members'
Assembly would elect the non-profit's board, appoint the Co-op
Network LLC directors and oversee its activities. 250 The individual
enterprises would still enjoy considerable autonomy in day-to-day
operations, but the Co-op Network's LLC would possess an interest
sufficient to prevent sale or conversion of the enterprise into a
"conventional" business. 251
2. Transferring the Mietshiiuser Syndikat Model to Other Jurisdictions
To ease administration by the Members' Assembly, an umbrella
non-profit entity with full control of the Co-op Network's LLC is
essential. 252 The Co-op Network LLC would then share ownership of
the individual enterprises with their worker-owners. 253 In many
jurisdictions, the for-profit nature of the individual enterprises may

248. The Mietshauser Syndikat engages in such vetting and planning in all its housing
projects, often working with residents through a long process of project development. See
Das Syndikat in Betrieb, supra note 242.
249. In this respect, certain comparisons could be drawn between the roles of
Mondragon's Caja Laboral and the Syndikat LLC. See AxwoRTHY, supra note 66, at 5;
WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 69; Das Syndikat in Betrieb, supra note 242.
250. See Das Syndikat in Betrieb, Organigramm, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, available
at http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/operation/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (the
Organigramm page flow chart is probably the clearest depiction of the constitutive nature of
the Syndikat).
251. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28 (among the conditions set for the Syndikat's
assistance is "the exclusion of any private property interest in the building"). It should be
noted that while the Syndikat possesses a little less than a half-interest in each project LLC,
the principle of voting parity on issues of sale or privatization rests in the LLC's formation
agreement itself, allowing the Syndikat greater control than its proportional interest would
otherwise allow.
See Die Finanzierung, MtETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, available at
http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/funding/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
252. See Das Syndikat in Betrieb, supra note 242.
253. See id.
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preclude formation of a non-profit entity that would represent the
worker-owners in both the individual LLC and the Members'
Assembly. 254 This is not an insurmountable hurdle, however: on the
ground level, voting parity with the Co-op Network LLC can be
achieved through the enterprise LLC 's operating agreement255 and the
executive non-profit's by-laws can facilitate representation by the
worker-owners. 256
In the U.S., there are a few types of entities that would be
compatible with the democratic decision-making process of the
Mietshauser-Syndikat. 257 One option would be the Benefit Corporation,
which would permit the Co-op Network to pursue socially-driven
economic development while founding essentially for-profit
enterprises. 258 The Members' Assembly would consist of shareholders
in the Benefit Corporation, whose articles of incorporation would
govern both membership and the decision-making process, preserving
the constitutive qualities of the Syndikat Association. 259 However, a
central component of the Syndikat model is absolute voting parity
within the Members' Assembly, which may be difficult to maintain in
an entity where votes are formally tied to shares. 260 This would require
254. See id.; Non-Profit Entities Law, B.O.E. n. 307 art. 3(6) (Spain), available at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/12/24/pdfs/A45229-45243.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2014).
255. See generally UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§§ 201, 405, 407 (1994) (amended 2006),
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/limited%20liability°/o20company/ullca_final_06rev.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
256. 26 U.S.C § 503 (2014).
257. As detailed above, the highest organ in the Mietshauser Syndikat is a registered
association, a non-profit organization. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29 (reproduction
of the Syndikat Association's articles of incorporation).
258. See Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A

Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for
the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM . & MARY Bus. L. REV. 639, 697-701 (2013) (offering a good
overview of the characteristics of the Benefit Corporation as compared to other American
and European social enterprise entities) [hereinafter "Social Enterprise Revolution"]; cf
Anne E. Conaway, What we can Learn from Other Statutory Schemes: Lessons to be

Learned: How the Policy of Freedom to Contract in Delaware's Alternative Entity Law
Might Inform Delaware's General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 792-93
(2012) (detailing the characteristics of the "B Corporation," which is privately certified and
regulated by the non-profit B Labs) [hereinafter "Conaway, Alternative Entity Law"]; see
also, Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for
Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 773, 779 (2012) (suggesting
utilizing hybrid-purpose LLCs for the pursuit of both profit and social benefit in Great
Britain).
259. See Social Enterprise Revolution, supra note 258, at 697-98.
260. Each member, whether a Syndikat-sponsored project, a community organization
or a natural person, receives only one vote, with no possibility for the acquisition of more.
See Interview with Marcel Seehuber, supra note 238; HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 14;
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some mechanism by which large numbers of shares are held in reserve
for distribution to new members or which proportionally reduces
existing member shares with each addition. 261
Also, Benefit
Corporations are very new entities whose contours and duties have not
yet been tested by courts or extensive real-world practice: to date, only
thirteen U.S. states have passed statutes permitting Benefit
Corporations. 262
A 'tried-and-true' entity may be preferable to experimenting with a
new one and forming a 501(c) non-profit presents itself as the safer
option. 263 One potential hurdle would be that the Co-op Network nonprofit would, through its LLC, have an interest in profit-generating
enterprises. 264 However, I.R.C. § 50l(c) includes a wide array of
organizations and sets as its primary requirement that any entity
organized under its aegis neither seek private profit nor distribute any to
private shareholders. 265 A 501(c)(6) "business league" formed in the
U.S. along the lines of the Mietshauser Syndikat would almost certainly
meet these criteria. 266 Either a Benefit Corporation or a 501(c)(6),
properly organized or approved by the IRS, 267 would avoid potential
regulatory issues and permit democratic governance. 268
In Spain, by contrast, the Syndikat Association could be
reproduced on an almost one-to-one basis. 269 Spanish non-profit
Social Enterprise Revolution, supra note 258, at 696-97 (describing the structure and legal
requirements for Benefit Corporations).
261. See Social Enterprise Revolution, supra note 258, at 696-97.
262. See id. at 697.
263. See 26 U.S.C. § 50l(c) (2010).
264. By comparison, all the projects of the Mietshauser Syndikat seek no profit but
instead benefits for their resident members. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28.
265. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2010) (permitting the organization of tax-exempt
"[b ]usiness leagues, chambers of commerce ... [and] boards of trade ... not organized for
profit and no part of the net earnings of which insures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.").
266. The members of the Mietshauser Syndikat e.V. receive no profits or dividends
whatsoever and because the Syndikat does not finance projects but instead merely
capitalizes the initial project LLCs, there is also no possibility of indirectly profiting through
decisions of the Members' Assembly. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28.
267. A 50l(c) organization must file IRS Form 1023 to acquire recognition as a taxexempt entity.
See Form 1023, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fl 023. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014 ).
268. See 26 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2011) (identifying "prohibited transactions" that would
serve as grounds for denial of exemption); Conaway, supra note 258, at 792-93 (describing
the "triple bottom-line" purpose ofB Corporations).
269. See Anthony C. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On Adopting a
Comparative Approach to Reforming the US. International Tax Regime, 35 V AND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1105, 1210-11 (2002) (summarizing the requirements for non-profit
associations in Spain); Non-Profit Entities Law, Exposition of Motives II (B.O.E. 2002, 49)
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associations are permitted to own interests in other entities, so long as
they do not pass on any proceeds to private persons. 270 Spanish law
would also permit the democratic organization of an association and
membership criteria like those of the Mietshauser Syndikat. 271 The
second-degree cooperative groups provided for under Spanish law could
in principle unify the functions of the Syndikat Association and LLC. 272
However, the Cooperative Law mandates a structure that lacks both the
same democratic character that the Syndikat model offers and adequate
safeguards against alienation. 273 Cooperative groups are defined as
having a "head entity that exercises authority or communicates
instructions that are binding on the grouped cooperatives," 274 while
having only limited means to prevent members from leaving the
organization. 275 As such, to acquire the advantages of the Mietshauser
Syndikat model in civil law jurisdictions it would be best to parallel the
Syndikat structure as closely as possible rather than attempt to adapt
local cooperative forms.
As noted above, one of the unique aspects of the Mietshauser
Syndikat is its status as a network organized in the "cooperative spirit"
which has declined to use the cooperative form in favor of
democratically-structured LLCs. 276 In jurisdictions where business
entities may become members of cooperatives and can acquire an
interest sufficient to prevent the sale or conversion of the enterprise, one
could use the cooperative form without giving up any of the advantages

(Spain), available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/l 2/24/pdfs/A45229-45243 .pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2014) (permitting non-profit entities to "freely acquire interests in
commercial enterprises" and including non-profits that "promote the social economy,"
respectively); Civil Code§ 21-22 (Ger.).
270. Non-Profit Entities Law art. 3(6) (B.O.E. 2002, 49) (Spain) available at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/12/24/pdfs/A45229-45243.pdf(last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(prohibiting even the reversion of assets to a founder or their heirs in the event of the nonprofit's dissolution).
271. Organizational Law art. 2(5) (B.O.E. 2002, 1) (Spain), available at
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/03/26/pdfs/Al 1981-11991.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2014) ("The internal organization of associations ... shall be democratic.").
272. Cooperative Law arts. 77-78 (Spain).
273. Id.
274. Id. art. 78(1 ).
275. Id. arts. 17, 77(6) (providing that member cooperatives in a second-degree
cooperative enjoy all the same rights as members of a first-degree cooperative, which under
Article 17 includes the right to leave the cooperative at any time, limited only by the
cooperative's right to demand notice ofup to one year).
276. See Verbundbausteine - Keine Genossenschafi, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT,
available at http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/building_blocks/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2014).
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of the Syndikat model. 277 However, where such an arrangement is not
legally possible 278 or carries significant regulatory burdens, 279 aligning
individual enterprises in LLCs using the Mietshauser Syndikat model
would open the way to the development of democratic enterprises of
scale. 280
In the U.S., some states limit membership and ownership interest
in a cooperative to persons employed by the cooperative, precluding any
permanent ownership interest by the Co-op Network. 281 Because such
an ownership interest is the simplest and most effective way for our
hypothetical Co-op Network to ensure that a democratic enterprise is
not later sold or converted into a standard business, the use of LLCs
would be required. 282 Fortunately, founders of LLCs enjoy great
latitude in crafting operating agreements, such that provisions for
democratic governance and safeguards against sale or conversion may
be inserted easily. 283
In Spain, by contrast, mixed membership cooperatives are possible,
meaning that a Co-op Network could be a member in a cooperative
alongside natural persons. 284 However, no cooperative member is
permitted to control more than 30% of the votes. 285 As such, a
Syndikat-style Co-op Network LLC would lack sufficient voting power
to prevent the sale or conversion of individual cooperatives. 286 Spanish

277. The "second-degree cooperative" in Spain leaves open such a possibility, albeit
with the issues described in this section. Cooperative Law arts. 77-78 (Spain).
278. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157A, § 6 (West 2014) ("No person may be
accepted as a member unless employed by the employee cooperative." "An employee
cooperative shall issue a class of voting stock [and] [e]ach member shall own only one such
membership share, and only members may own such shares.").
279. See Verbundbausteine - Keine Genossenschaft, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT,
available at http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/building_blocks/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2014) (another reason the Syndikat rejected the cooperative as an entity was because
operations were made more difficult by the "continuous reporting requirements" of the
Cooperative Auditing Association).
Chronik,
MIETSHAUSER
SYNDIKAT,
available
at
280. See
http://www.syndikat.org/de/syndikat/chronik/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (a timeline
detailing the rapid growth of the Syndikat in the last two decades).
281. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 157A, § 6 (West 2014).
282. Id.
283. UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 110 (1994) (1994)(amended 2006), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability<>lo20company/ullca_final_ 06re
v.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
284. Cooperative Law art. 12 (Spain).
285. Id. art. 26.
286. Id. art. 64(2) (under the law a two-thirds majority is prescribed for transforming a
cooperative enterprise or merging it with another cooperative enterprise and this cannot be
changed in the by-laws).
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LLCs, like U.S. LLCs, offer great latitude in determining the decisionmaking process. 287 As such, the LLC recommends itself as a format
flexible enough to allow for hard-wiring democratic governance into an
enterprise while still permitting the necessary degree of control on the
part of the Co-op Network as parent LLC. 288

3. Advantages over the Mondragon and Evergreen Models
The advantages of the Miethauser Syndikat over the Mondragon
Corporation and the Evergreen Cooperative Corporation are two-fold.
First, the Syndikat model represents a more thoroughly democratic
approach to enterprise development and management than either
Mondragon or the ECC. Second, the Syndikat's development process is
highly sustainable, in part due to the fact that its democratic structure is
eminently suited to stable, organic growth.
While the Mondragon Corporation is regularly cited as the greatest
success story in the history of cooperatives, it is not without flaws. 289
The essentially top-down management structure, with the Caja Laboral
as the unofficial apex entity, casts serious doubt on the paeans praising
Mondragon as a ready-made template for economic democracy. 290 As
members of the Mondragon Caja themselves have often admitted,
Mondragon is an otherwise conventional business that happens to
consist of cooperatives. 291 Mondragon's recent history of investing in
businesses that do not offer membership to employees also feeds the
suspicion that, in order to generate profits, Mondragon is ready, willing
and able to engage in the same practices that its proponents find so
objectionable about "conventional" businesses. 292
The Evergreen Cooperative Corporation, explicitly modeled on the
Mondragon Corporation, has done nothing to address these issues. 293
Indeed, its management structure is even more technocratic than that of
Mondragon and it remains uncertain at this early stage what degree of
287. Id. art. 125.
288. Id.
289. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 11.
290. See id. at 7; see generally WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 296-97.
291. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 7.
292. See FAQs, MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragoncorporation.com/eng/co-operative-experience/faqs/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (noting at
least one program under which a significant number of non-members are to be
enfranchised); Contradictions in Paradise, WORKERS' PARADISE (Jan. 31, 2011, 7:00 AM),
available at http://www.cooperativeconsult.com/blog/?p=490 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014)
(discussing a strike over low wages and poor working conditions by workers at a
Mondragon-owned factory in Poland).
293. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 3, 5.
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autonomy the individual cooperatives will enjoy and how constitutive
the ECC's executive organ will become. 294 As the project is still in its
infancy, one could excuse the current technocratic methods as necessary
expediencies on the path to a more democratic future. 295 If it persists in
the same vein as present, however, the sponsoring "anchor enterprises"
will dominate the ECC at the highest level, with cooperative members
wielding little control over its future. 296
The Mietshauser Syndikat model addresses such eventualities
through an absolute institutional commitment to democratic decisionmaking and mandatory admission of member projects in the governing
Members' Assembly. 297 Although allowed significant autonomy, the
individual projects would have to extend membership to all
constituents, who would have representation in the Members'
Assembly. 298 The operating agreements of the project LLCs would
enable the Co-op Network LLC to check any effort to sell or convert a
project. 299 Similarly, it is unlikely that a proposal to invest in
'conventional' enterprises, i.e. ones that would not become members,
would find sufficient support in the Members' Assembly. 300 Even if it
did, the by-laws of the Co-op Network non-profit can be crafted to
preclude such an outcome.301
One could make the argument that the undemocratic aspects of
both Mondragon and the ECC merely reflect the economic necessity of
speedy, centralized decision-making without which these enterprises
would fail. 302 This argument bears a striking resemblance to a common
argument against cooperatives in general: too much democracy
paralyzes decision-making and hobbles a business. 303 This latter
position has been sufficiently disproved by the success of Mondragon
cooperatives, which operate on a largely democratic basis in their dayto-day operations. 304 In fact, enhancing democratic structures can
294. See id. at 14.
295. See generally id.
296. See id. at 5, 14.
297. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29 (describing membership policies and
identifying the Members' Association as the executive body).
298. See id. at 28.
299. See id. at 14 (§ 5 of the sample LLC operating agreement).
300. See id. at 28.
301. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29 (If the "purpose of the association is
fundamentally altered, the assets [thereof] must be used for the original purpose,"
administered by a trustee).
302. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6-7.
303. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 3.
304. See id. at 3-4.
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actually stimulate and ensure sustainable growth, improving the stability
of a Co-op Network as a whole.
The Mondragon Corporation has experienced severe contractions
in the course of its history, when cooperatives were forced to merge or
failed entirely. 305 The Caja Laboral's policy of developing cooperatives
with an eye toward existing enterprises' supply and service needs has
had positive synergistic effects but left Mondragon as a whole
susceptible to chain reactions of bankruptcies. 306 The concentration of
power in the hands of the Caja Laboral also means that business
development draws not on the wide base of experience and knowledge
of its members, but instead solely on that of a small number of
conventionally-trained technocrats. 307
Likewise, the central ECC non-profit is in full control of all
business development. 308 While this institution's members certainly
possess expertise that is essential to developing new cooperatives, this
model could also foster a degree of group-think. 309 One way to avoid
this outcome is to increase the knowledge and experience base of the
decision makers, which can be achieved by allowing for the
participation of all cooperative members.
The Members' Assembly of the Mietshauser Syndikat makes all
decisions concerning the acceptance of new projects, although the
implementation of that decision is delegated to the Syndikat LLC. Far
from hampering growth, the Mietshauser Syndikat continues to accept
new projects on a yearly basis. More importantly, all but one of the
projects developed in cooperation with the Syndikat have been
successful, a truly remarkable record of sustainability and stability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is not to deny the success of the
Mondragon Corporation or to deride the efforts of the Evergreen
Cooperative Corporation, as each represent an inspiring success story
and a welcome initiative in the history of cooperative economic
development. Rather, the concerns and issues surrounding those two

305. See id. at 177-78, 188-89.
306. See id. at 47, 177-78.
307. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6-7.
308. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 14 (the Evergreen Cooperative
Development Fund and Business Services LLC are also involved but are entirely controlled
by the ECC non-profit).
309. See id.
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enterprises are pointed out to illustrate that the goal of promoting
democratic economic development may be hampered and not helped by
The Mietshauser Syndikat
the use of non-democratic methods.
demonstrates that it is possible to develop democratic enterprises,
organize them in a network and ensure sustained growth of both
enterprise and network utilizing exclusively democratic structures,
without resort to the top-down organizational schemes of conventional
businesses. In pursuing a more prosperous, equitable and democratic
economy, the means are inseparable from the ends and the Mietshauser
Syndikat represents a model in both methods and results.
Moreover, the Mietshauser Syndikat's structure, a constellation of
LLCs under the umbrella of a non-profit governing entity, can be
replicated in both civil and common-law jurisdictions. As such it
should be possible to re-purpose the Mietshauser Syndikat's model for
worker-managed enterprises and to repeat its success across the globe.
Indeed, the Mietshauser Syndikat itself is beginning to venture outside
the borders of Germany and develop projects in other European
countries. 310 As those efforts will surely show, the day of international
networks of democratic enterprises is approaching and with it a more
prosperous future.

310. Interview with Marcel Seehuber, supra note 238; Presentation, supra note 195,
Slide 17.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has a long tradition of facilitating child adoption
campaigns after disengaging from major war efforts. 1 As the plight of
orphaned children overseas made itself more visible to Americans
following World War II, a campaign emerged encouraging them to
partake in intercountry child adoptions from post-conflict countries,
such as Germany, Austria, Japan and Italy. 2 This inspired the
Christian
globalization of the modem child adoption market. 3
organizations, such as the League for Orphan Victims in Europe
("LOVE") and the American Joint Committee for Assisting Japanese
American Orphans, played a vital role in promoting the post-World War
II adoption campaigns. 4 Intercountry adoptions were handled under
refugee and displaced persons acts and decrees, including a pivotal 1945
'Directive on Displaced Persons' by President Harry Truman allowing
World War II orphans into the U.S. under the premise that they were
under grave humanitarian emergency. 5
Intercountry adoptions were once again encouraged after the
Korean War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1954-75). 6 The adoption
campaign beginning after the Korean War paved the way for the
world's largest intercountry adoption program. 7 Further, as its military
efforts in Vietnam dwindled, the U.S. government launched an
intercountry adoption campaign that lifted 2, 700 children out of
1.
International Adoptions, ADOPTION
HIST.
PROJECT,
available at
http://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/topics/intemationaladoption.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2015).
2. International Adoptions, supra note 2; Stephanie Zeppa, Note, "Let Me in,

Immigration Man": An Overview of Intercountry Adoption and the Role of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 161, 164-65 (1998).
3. See International Adoptions, supra note 2.
4. Id
5. See generally History of International Adoption, INT'L ADOPTION FACTS & INFO.,
available
at
http://www.intemational-adoption-facts-and-information.com/history-ofintemational-adoption.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
6. See Capsule History of International Adoption, BRANDEIS U. SCHUSTER INST. FOR
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
(last updated
Feb.
23,
2011),
available at
http://www.brandeis.edu/investigate/adoption/history.html#2 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); see
also Jodi Kim, An "Orphan" with Two Mothers: Transnational and Transracial Adoption,
the Cold War, and Contemporary Asian American Cultural Politics, 61 AM. Q. 855, 870
(2009), available at https://ethnicstudies.ucr.edu/publications_ media/kim/Transnational
Adoption.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2014) (explaining that on April 2, 1975, President Ford
announced that $2 million would be used to fly Vietnamese orphans to the U.S. for adoption
by American families).
7. See Kim, supra note 7, at 865 (explaining how "[a] huge international relief effort
began," after the Korean war ended and in 1955, "[t]ens of thousands of orphans" were sent
to Europe and the U.S. for adoption).
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Vietnam. 8 It appears that the post-Afghanistan war context 1s the
exception to American tradition and modem practice. 9
Thirteen years have passed since the start of the war in Afghanistan
and even though the US is no longer waging an active military
campaign, 10 there has been no campaign to adopt children from this
theater. 11 It is not because there are no children that need to be adopted
in Afghanistan, as there are close to two million orphans in
Afghanistan. 12 The gridlock exists partially because intercountry child
adoption concepts, as defined in American federal laws, come into
direct conflict with Afghanistan's Child Guardianship Law, newly
Furthermore, the National Assembly's
enacted in April 2014. 13
(Afghanistan's Parliament) 14 stance is that its Muslim orphans 15 should
8. See id. at 870; Paul J. Buser, Habeas Corpus Litigation in Child Custody Matters:
An Historical Mine Field, 11 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM . LAW. 1, 29 (1993).
9. The adoption of Iraqi orphans in the post-Iraq war context is also the exception to
American tradition. However, only Afghanistan will be examined as a case study for the
purposes of this paper. See generally, Alice Richards, Bombs and Babies: The Intercountry
Adoption of Afghanistan 's and Iraq's War Orphans , 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 399,
400, 404 (2013). There are currently 4.5 million orphans in Iraq. See Iraq: The Human
Cost, MIT CTR. FOR INT'L STUDIES, available at web.mit.edu/humancostiraq (last visited
Jan. 14, 2015).
at
available
2014),
26,
(Oct.
BBC
Profile,
Afghanistan
10.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia- l 2024253 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
11. See Kevin Sieff, Interview: Karzai Says 12-Year Afghanistan War has Left Him
Angry at US. Government, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interview-karzai-says-12-year-a fghanistan-war-hasleft-him-angry-at-us-govemment/2014/03/02/b831671 c-a21 a-11 e3-b86538b254d92063 story.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
12. Richards, supra note 10, at 404. Note: U.S. responsibility in Korea and Vietnam in
part came from heavy interaction between US soldiers and local women, where soldiers
fathered many babies, however, in Afghanistan, there is no evidence that US soldiers
interacted with Afghan women similarly. See generally Marilyn T. Trautfield, America's
Responsibility to Amerasian Children: Too little, Too Late, IO BROOK. J. INT'L L. 55 (1984);
Arissa Oh, A New Kind of Missionary Work: Christians, Christian Americanists, and the
Adoption of Korean GI Babies, 1955-1961, 33 WOMEN'S STUD. Q. 161 (2005); TRIN
y ARBOROUGH, SURVIVING TWICE: AMERASIAN CHILDREN OF THE VIETNAM w AR (Potomac
Books, Inc., 2005); Nick Turse, Rape was Rampant During the Vietnam War. Why Doesn't
US History Remember This ?, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 19, 2013, 2:03 PM), available at
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/03/rape-wartime-vietnam (last visited Jan. 14,
2015).
13. See infra Part I and Part II.
14. Isaac Kfir, Feminist Legal Theory as a Way to Explain the Lack of Progress of
Women's Rights in Afghanistan: The Need for a State Strength Approach, 21 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 87, 135 n.343 (2014) ("The Afghan Parliament is bicameral" with "a lower
house- Wolesi Jirga (Council of People)- and an upper house- Meshrano Jirga (Council
ofElders ).").
15. Many Afghan orphans are Hazara, an ethnic minority, which has been heavily
persecuted by the Taliban and with the Taliban resurgence; they are one of the main targets.
See generally Massoud Hossaini, Kabul's Forgotten Kids VICE (July 1, 2007), available at
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only be placed with "good" Afghan Muslim families, creating
additional hurdles for intercountry adoptions. 16 Non-Muslim 17 children
may be adopted by qualifying Non-Muslims. 18
The gridlock also exists because the American public is unwilling
to work with Islamic legal systems, 19 such as the legal system that is
perceived20 to govern Afghanistan. This may be based on the belief that
acceptance of Islamic jurisprudence will lead to the renouncement of
U.S. domestic laws, causing public policy concems. 21 For example, the
word "sharia" sparks emotive responses in U.S. public discourse

http://www.vice.com/read/kabul-v14n7 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); Resurgent Taliban
Targets Afghan Hazara as Australia Sends them Back, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/20 l 4/dec/17 I
resurgent-taliban-targets-afghan-hazara-as-australia-sends-them-back (last visited Jan. 17,
2015) ("The Taliban are back. So Hazara are leaving. Dozens of Hazara in Kabul tell
Guardian Australia they are preparing to leave Afghanistan, by legal means or otherwise.").
16. Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy (Mohammad Yusuf trans., Feb. 24,
2014); Kimberly Mills, P-I Focus: No future in sight/or Afghan children, SEATTLE PI (Dec.
22, 2001, 10:00 PM), available at http://www.seattlepi.com/local/opinion/article/P-I-FocusNo-future-in-sight-for-Afghan-children-1075181.php#page-2 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015)
("The even more daunting obstacle to the adoption of Afghan children is Islamic law, which
doesn't sanction children born in the faith being reared by non-believers."); see Child
Guardianship Law, No. 1130, THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF AFGHANISTAN, Apr. 12, 2014 (on
file with author).
17. The Afghan population is divided as such: "Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%,
[and] other 1%." The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (last updated June 24,
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world2014),
factbook/geos/af.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
18. See Child Guardianship Law, supra note 17.
19. Bans on Sharia and International Law, ACLU, available at https://
www.aclu.org/religion-belief/bans-sharia-and-international-law (last visited Jan. 14, 2015)
("f A lnti-Muslim bigotry has recently crept into state legislatures around the country. Several
states have passed or attempted to pass laws designed to prevent courts from applying
Islamic or 'Sharia' law, as well as 'foreign' or 'international law."'); ACLU, Muneer Awad
v. Paul Ziriax, Oklahoma State Board of Elections, et al., ACLU (Aug. 15, 2013), available
at https://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/muneer-awad-v-paul-ziriax-oklahoma-state-boardelections-et-al (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) ("State legislators in Oklahoma placed an
unprecedented, discriminatory proposal to amend the Oklahoma Constitution to target the
religious practices of Muslims ... the amendment tramples the free exercise rights of a
disfavored minority faith, restricting the ability of ... Muslims in Oklahoma to execute
valid wills, assert religious liberty claims under the Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act, and
enjoy equal access to the judicial system.").
20. The legal system in Afghanistan is actually a perversion of Islamic Law, especially
given the presence of "contrived cultural and religious norms that surface out of misreading,
misunderstandings or manipulation of the Qur'an." Kfir, supra note 15, at 93. However,
laws regarding transfer of child guardianship strictly follow the Hanafi School of
Jurisprudence in Islamic Law. See infra Part I.
21.
See generally Nothing to Fear, ACLU (May 2011), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Nothing_To_Fear_Report_FINAL_MAY_2011.pdf (last
visited Jan. 14, 2015).
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because the American media often associates it with graphic news
stories covering corporal and capital punishments, such as stoning for
adultery and hand cutting for theft. 22 However, Islamic jurisprudence is
a firmly established source of law for many legal systems in the Middle
East, Central Asia and South Asia, which promotes public policies
similar to those found in Western civil and common law systems. 23 For
example, Islamic jurisprudence also advocates for the family law
maxim considering the "child's best interests" in custody
determinations through the concept is/ah, which means to "repair, heal,
and make good." 24 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Child ("CRC"), which Afghanistan has signed and ratified, also
provides that the child's best interests are the primary considerations
when carrying out intercountry adoption procedures. 25
There are strong humanitarian concerns driving the need to create
federal statutory wiggle room to facilitate an American intercountry
adoption plan for Afghan orphans because there is a need to provide
orphans of this war-tom country with safe homes and permanent
guardians to nurture them with love, welfare and support. 26 First, an
estimated 8,000 orphans are forced into military service by fighting
factions in Afghanistan. 27 Second, a rising number of Afghan children
22.
Whose Law Counts Most, ECONOMIST (Oct. 14, 2010), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/l 7249634 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
23. See generally Angela Tang, Comparative Analysis of Certain Criminal Procedure

Topics

in

Islamic,

Asian,

and

Common

Law

Systems,

available

at

http://law.wm.edu/academics/intellectuallife/researchcenters/postconflictjustice/documents/
AnalysisofCertainCriminal.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); see generally CHIBLI MALLAT,
INTRODUCTION TO MIDDLE EASTERN LAW (2007).
24. See Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, MUSLIM WOMEN'S SHURA COUNCIL 4, 11 (Aug. 2011), available at
http://www.wisemuslimwomen.org/images/activism/Adoption_(August_201 l)_Final.pdf
(last visited Jan. 14, 2015); MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 667
(Joseph W. Meri ed., 2006) (defining islah). The author points out that the Sunni Hanafi
school oflslamic jurisprudence (which Afghanistan adopts) grounds its decisions regarding
a child's welfare in "public policy considerations of the public interest" and the child's best
interest much like states do in America. Faisal Kutty, Comment, Islamic Law and
Adoptions, in ROBERT L. BALLARD ET AL., THE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION DEBATE:
DIALOGUES ACROSS DISCIPLINES (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, 2014) (forthcoming 2014)(manuscript at 28)(on file with author), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2457066 (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
25. See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3. The United States has signed but has not ratified the Convention on the Rights
of the Child.
26. See Richards, supra note 10, at 404. This paper focuses on Afghanistan instead of
Iraq because due to the heavier influence of Islamic law, Afghanistan's system of
governance is a more restrictive one.
27. Richards, supra note 10, at 404 ("More than 9,000 street children live in
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are sexually abused due to a practice called bacha bazi, or 'a boy for
pleasure,' a form of pederasty, 28 where wealthy Afghan men sexually
exploit underage boys, ages nine to fifteen. 29 Homeless children and
orphans are susceptible to this practice, because they lack protection. 30
The affected boys 31 are often festooned in women's garments to dance
at male-only parties, are regarded as property, and can be sold or rented
for "tens of thousands of dollars. " 32 When the boys eventually begin to
grow beards, a sign of adulthood, they are tossed aside and either
partake in the harrowing cycle of becoming pimps themselves or tum to
poverty ... Often, these children work at opium farms under the supervision of drug lords.
Western aid to these orphans has met very little success."); see also Maria Bucci, Young,
Alone, and Fleeing Terror: The Human Rights Emergency of Unaccompanied Immigrant
Children Seeking Asylum in the United States, 30 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 275, 299-300 (2004) ("Unaccompanied children are particularly vulnerable to
military recruitment ... children can be recruited in some countries when they are under the
age of ten."); Malalai Farooqi, The Collateral Imprisonment of Afghan Children: An
Obstacle to Building the Afghan State, 32 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 329-30 (2011) (Badam
Bagh, a women's prison in Kabul, Afghanistan, houses roughly 90 inmates, some of whom
are mothers who "due to lack of any alternatives, are forced to bring their children with
them to prison.").
28. Pederasty, FREE DICTIONARY, available at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/
pederasty (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) (defining pederasty as homosexual relations between
men and minor boys).
29. Joel Brinkley, Afghanistan's Dirty Little Secret, SF GATE (Aug. 29, 2010, 4:00
AM), available at http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/brinkley/article/Afghanistan-s-dirty-littlesecret-3176762.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); see also Ernesto Londoflo, Afghanistan Sees
Rise in 'Dancing Boys' Exploitation, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afganistans-dancing-boys-are-invisiblevictims/2012/04/04/glQAyreSwS_story.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) (Bacha bazi has
flourished "in Pashtun areas in the south, in several northern provinces and even in the
capital."); Chris Mondloch, Bacha Bazi: An Afghan Tragedy, FOREIGN PoL'Y (Oct. 28,
2013), available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/28/bacha-bazi-an-afghan-tragedy/ (last
visited Jan. 14, 2015) (In the early 1990s the Taliban tried to eradicate the bacha bazi
practice and men who engaged in it did so in secret.
In 2001,
former mujahideen commanders came into power after the Taliban's "ouster" and brought
back the practice. "[T]hese empowered warlords serve in important positions, as governors,
line ministers, police chiefs, and military commander." Afghan families with too many
children often "provide a son to a warlord or government official - with full knowledge of
the sexual ramifications - in order to gain familial prestige and monetary compensation.").
30. Barat Ali Batoor, The Exploitation of Afghanistan's 'Dancing Boys ', WASH. POST
(Apr. 4, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-exploitation-ofafghanistans-dancing-boys/2012/04/04/gIQAV8oRwS _gallery.html#photo=8 (last visited
Jan. 14, 2015).
31. They are also known as bacha bereesh, boys without beards. Pul-E Khumri,
Afghan Boy Dancers Sexually Abused by Former Warlords, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2007, 11 :08
PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2007 /11 /19/us-afghan-dancingboysidUSISLl 848920071119 (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
32. Londofto, supra note 30 ("Mohammed Fahim, a videographer who films the lavish
weddings in the capital, estimated that one in every five weddings he attends in Kabul
features dancing boys.").
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drugs or alcohol. 33
American Muslims who may want to adopt children do not want to
violate tenants of their faith while doing so. 34 The challenges in
adopting Afghan children deal with the lack of harmony between
American laws and Islamic laws regarding child adoption. 35 First,
traditional closed adoption 36 violates Islamic law, which emphasizes the
importance of lineage and maintaining one's birth name. 37 However,

33. Id. (Pederasty is a crime in Afghanistan, however considering how widespread this
crime is, it is not being prosecuted enough.); see Decisions of Courts (2009), AFGHANISTAN
http://supremecourt.gov.af/Content/
at
available
CT.,
SUPREME
Media/Documents/jozjanE181201 l 13192085.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); see also
available at
SUPREME CT.,
AFGHANISTAN
(2009),
of Courts
Decisions
http://supremecourt.gov.af/en/documents/category/decision-of-courts?page=2 (the Supreme
Court of Afghanistan prosecuted only 13 cases in 2009) (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
34. Mills, supra note 17; see Asra Q. Nomani, Anti-Adoption Traditions in the Muslim
World Benefit Al Qaeda Recruiters, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/31 /anti-adoption-traditions-in-the-muslimworld-benefi t-al-qaeda-recruiters.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); Rachel Zoll, Muslim
Orphans Caught Between Islam and the West, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2011 ), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/31 I
AR2010123103723.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) ("The problem was a gap between
Western and Islamic law.... Refugee children from Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere are
being resettled here. Muslim couples who can't conceive want to adopt but don't want to
violate their faith's teachings."); Ali Muhammad Latifi, The Challenges of Adopting Afghan
Children, GENERATION PROGRESS (Aug. 11, 2010, 7:48 PM), available at
http://genprogress.org/voices/2010/08/ 11I155 80/the-chal lenges-of-adopting-afghanchildren/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); Eugene Volokh, Adoption of Muslim Children,
at
available
PM),
5:13
2010,
30,
(Nov.
CONSPIRACY
VOLOKH
http://www.volokh.com/2010/l l /30/adoption-of-muslim-children/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2015); see Kutty, supra note 25 (manuscript at 6)(quoting Alexander D. Gonzalez, The
Hague Intercountry Adoption Act and its Interaction with Islamic Law: Can an Imperfect
Enforcement Mechanism Create Cause/or Concern?, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 437, 460 (2007)
("Shari'ah is very much present in the hearts and minds of Muslims throughout the world.
Even where it is not the formal legal system, Shari'ah has a powerful influence on Muslim
attitudes and policies in most Muslim countries.")); see infra Part I.
35. Kutty, supra note 25 (manuscript at 4)(citing ASHLEY DAWN HARVEL, THE MYTH
OF THE UNKNOWN CHILD: CREATING A NEW FACE FOR ADOPTION IN AMERICA 11 (2006)
("The legal creation of a parent-child relationship, with all the responsibilities and privileges
thereof, between the child and adults who are not his or her biological parents with the ...
permanent severing all of connections and relationships with the biological parents.")); see
infra Part I and Part II.
36. See Open Adoption; Cooperative Adoption, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
2009) ("closed adoption. An adoption in which the biological parent relinquishes his or her
parental rights and surrenders the child to an unknown person or persons; an adoption in
which there is no disclosure of the identity of the birth parents, adopting parent or parents,
or child. Adoptions by stepparents, blood relatives, and foster parents are exceptions to the
no-disclosure requirement. - Also termed confidential adoption.").
37. See Shabnam Ishaque, Islamic Principles on Adoption: Examining the Impact of
Illegitimacy and Inheritance Related Concerns in Context of Child's Right to an Identity,
INT'L J. L. PoL'Y & FAM. 22, 393-420 (2008); Kutty, supra note 25 (manuscript at l 7)(citing
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the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") provides that a child's
bloodline is relinquished upon adoption. 38 Second, many U.S. state
intestacy laws dictate that a child's right to inherit from the birth family
must be severed upon adoption. 39 These laws directly contradict
Islamic law, where a child must maintain that right. 40
Third, the legal structure governing Afghanistan's child
guardianship procedures41 provides an alternative model for children
needing care, called a kafala system, or guardianship system, that most
resembles permanent foster care. 42 An analogous system does not exist
in the U.S. yet, although there is an increasing trend toward permitting
"open" adoption and there is a firmly established intrastate foster care
Moreover, "guardianship,"
system in most states in the U.S. 43
according to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"),
is "deemed insufficient" for accomplishing a child's entry by
immigration into the U.S. 44 Fourth, the international adoption process,
difficult to navigate in any foreign country, was even murkier in
Afghanistan. 45 Previously, the Afghanistan Children's Court handled
child guardianship transfers on a case-by-case basis, utilizing a number
of criterions, providing no codified law on the subject matter. Since the
Child Guardianship Law (2014) has passed and promotes more
transparent procedures, a higher placement rate of Afghan orphans
should take place. 46
Even against this backdrop it is not a quixotic and starry-eyed
Qur'an 33:4-5 ("a child's pedigree must be traced-back to the biological father") and
providing according to fiqh, "the creation of fictive kinships is strictly forbidden as it
disturbs filial continuity.")).
38. Mills, supra note 17.
39. See generally William E. Taibl, Inheritance "By, Through and From" an Adopted
Person Under the New Wisconsin Statute, 56 MARQ. L. REV. 119 (1972); see infra Part I and
Part II.
40. Zoll, supra note 35.
41. Although many interpretations of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence are perverted in
Afghanistan, particularly those pertaining to women's rights, laws regarding orphans' rights
by and large follow the Hanafi School. See infra Part I.
42. Id.; Kutty, supra note 25 (manuscript at 29-30)(Kafala is essentially '"legal
fostering' .... It tries to achieve a balance between raising the child as your own all the
while ensuring the adopted child's identity is not absorbed into the identity of the adoptive
family. Negation of the biological identity would be considered haram or forbidden.").
43. See infra Part I; see also Alison Fleisher, The Decline of Domestic Adoption:
Intercountry Adoption As A Response to Local Adoption Laws and Proposals to Foster
Domestic Adoption, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 171, 181-84 (2003).
44. Latifi, supra note 35; see Richards, supra note 10, at 399, 409-11.
45. See Latifi, supra note 35.
46. See Skype Interview with Qazi Rahima Rezae (Mohammad Yusuf trans., Feb. 21,
2014) (regarding Child Guardianship Procedure in Afghanistan).
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notion that a successful Afghan adoption campaign is possible if Islamic
law and U.S. public policy is recognized and followed. It is possible
with the execution of the following changes. First, amendments must
be made to current federal legislation on intercountry adoptions,
namely, the INA and the Intercountry Adoption Act ("IAA"), to allow
for a kafala scheme. Second, the U.S. and Afghanistan should enter
into an intercountry adoption treaty, outlining the procedure for
American Muslims seeking to adopt a child from Afghanistan.
Although Afghanistan's Constitution declares that Islam is the state's
religion, requiring that Islamic law be followed to effectuate the first
stage of guardianship procedure, this does not violate the U.S.
Constitution's Establishment Clause. 47 Amendments to the INA and
IAA and the creation of an intercountry permanent guardianship treaty
would simply craft a special relationship with Afghanistan based on its
domestic laws on child guardianship.
The U.S. has entered into intercountry adoption plans with several
countries with legal systems different than its own. 48 The U.S.
Department of State's website provides that Vietnam's Central
Adoption Authority will accept a limited number of applications from
U.S. Hague-accredited adoption service providers only for children with
special needs, as defined by Vietnamese law. 49 The United States, with
the execution of this paper's proposed permanent guardianship plan, is
not endorsing Islam any more than it endorses Vietnam's system of
governance. Finally, American Muslim guardians and birth families
should enter into legally binding agreements enforcing Islamic legal
rights, afforded to children by their birth families, despite transfer of
guardianship. 50 This paper will demonstrate that accepting children
from Afghanistan will not violate public policy; rather, the program
would be in line with American history and tradition in promoting postwar adoption schemes. 51

47. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REP. OF AFGHANISTAN, arts. 2-3 (2004).
See generally lntercountry Adoption, U.S. DEP'T ST., available at
48.
http://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en.country-information.html (last visited Jan.
14, 2015).
49. See Vietnam, U.S. DEP'T ST., available at http://travel.state.gov/content/
adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-a-country/vietnam.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2015).
50. See Mills, supra note 17.
51. Moreover, the U.S. and Afghanistan have the same stance when it comes to
children's cases, namely, that the child's best interests are paramount. See generally Child
Welfare Information Gateway, Determining the Best Interests of the Child, U.S. DEP'T
at
available
2012),
(Nov.
SERVS.
HUMAN
&
HEALTH
(last
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/best_interest.cfm
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Part I is devoted to a discussion of Islamic Law concerning child
guardianship in Afghanistan, focusing on the public policy rationales
behind it. It also examines children's rights under the Hanafi School of
Sunni Islamic jurisprudence, which the Afghanistan Children's Court
applies in its opinions, and Afghanistan's Child Guardianship Law
(2014). Part II examines U.S. federal legislation that directly governs
intercountry child adoptions, pointing to relevant language in the INA
and the IAA to highlight the obstacles in adopting orphans from
Afghanistan. Part III focuses on U.S. policies promoting intercountry
child adoption in post-conflict countries, post-World War II. It sheds
light on negative implications that arose from these policies and
explains why federal legislation in adoption law was reformed. Part IV
provides an overview of state laws that govern issues arising under child
custody. Part V provides a background of how other countries model
their intercountry child adoption policies and laws, making room for
Islamic kafala models to flourish. It also offers an overview of relevant
international conventions concerning intercountry child adoptions. Part
VI suggests amendments to current U.S. federal legislation to facilitate
It provides
the creation of the proposed adoption campaign.
recommendations for the construction of certain provisions in a legal
agreement between birth parents and potential permanent guardians to
ensure that permanent guardians promote Islamic children's rights.

I. AFGHANISTAN'S SOURCE FOR CHILD GUARDIANSHIP

LAW
Afghanistan follows the Hanafi 53 madhhab, or school oflaw, 54 in
52

visited Jan. 14, 2015) (detailing a list of countries the U.S. has intercountry adoption plans
with); Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy (Mohammad Yusuf trans., Mar. 3, 2014).
52. Kfir, supra note 15, at 111 n.167 (citing Lawrence Ziring, From Islamic Republic
to Islamic State in Pakistan, 24 ASIAN SURVEY 931 (1984) ("An Islamic State is understood
as a state that places Islam at its epicenter." An Islamic Republic (Muslim State) and an
Islamic State differ where the former "separates religion from politics and government as it
stresses the need for a secular, constitutional government and society, while an Islamic State
governs along Islamic precepts, rejecting the values that the Islamic Republic espouses.")).
53 . Kfir, supra note 15, at 136 n.350 (stating the Hanafi School "started in Iraq" and
"[i]ts influence expanded eastward" making it "the dominant school in Central Asia and the
Subcontinent."); id. at 135-36 (citing Ashraf Ghani, Islam and State-building in a Tribal
Society of Afghanistan: I880-1901, 12 MODERN ASIAN STUD. 269 (1978)) ("Islam and
culture are intertwined in contemporary Afghanistan, making it difficult to identify where
culture begins and religion ends. Years of conflict, external interventions and a faith in
religious solutions have linked Afghan cultural norms with militant interpretations of
Islam.").
54. After the death of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), many schools of Islamic
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Islamic Law. 55 Therefore, a Hanafi analysis of legal principles on child
adoption is necessary. 56 Adoption under Islamic law is different from
the American concept in that it does not sever the blood relationship
between a child and biological parents. 57 Under Islamic law, the
relationship with adopting parents is seen as a guardianship rather than
parenthood. 58 This is based on the belief that a child's lineage and
heritage cannot be erased or replaced with adoption. 59 Afghanistan's
Civil Code (1977) includes statutory provisions for family laws and has
its foundation in the Hanafi School of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. 60
Followers of the Hanafi School comprise almost eighty percent of the
population. 61 Policy imperatives under the Hanafi School provide that a
child should retain his or her birth name and should maintain
inheritance rights from the birth family, even if guardianship is
transferred. 62
jurisprudence developed. Islamic philosopher and legal scholar Muhammad Iqbal provides:
"From about the middle of the first century up to the beginning of the fourth, not less than
nineteen schools of law and legal opinion appeared in Islam. This fact alone is sufficient to
show how incessantly our early doctors of law worked in order to meet the necessities of a
growing civilization." MUHAMMAD IQBAL, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT
IN ISLAM 165 (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf ed., 1977) (1930).
55. "No law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in
Afghanistan." CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REP. OF AFGHANISTAN, art. 3 (2004).
56. See Orzala Ashraf Nemat, Comparative Analysis of Family Law in the Context of
Islam, AFGHAN INDEP. HUM. RTS. COMMISSION 44-45 (Aug. 15-17, 2006), available at
http://af.boell.org/downloads/English_Family_Law.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); Kutty,
supra note 25 (manuscript at 15)(citing David Powers, The Abolition of Adoption in Islam,
Reconsidered, 4 DROIT ET RELIGIONS ANNUAIRE 97, 98 (2009-10) ("Notwithstanding the
diversity and legal pluralism in Islamic law, it appears that when it came to adoption,
classical Sunni jurists consensually posited that adoption as commonly understood today in
the West (and practiced in pre-Islamic Arabia and known as al-tabanni) is prohibited or

haram.")).
57. Richards, supra note 10, at 399, 409-10.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 399, 408 (quoting Family Structures and Family Law in Afghanistan, A
Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Afghanistan January-March 2005, MAX PLANCK
INST. FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE L. & PRIVATE INT'L L., at 10, available at
http://www.mpipriv.de/files/pdt3/mpi-report_on_family_structures_and_family_
law_in_afghanistan.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015)); see also Family Structures and Family

Law in Afghanistan, A Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to .Afghanistan January-March
2005, supra ("According to the deputy of the head of the high court of the province of
Badakhshan, in practice uncodified classical hanafi law is considered the main source of
law, superior to any statutory law.").
61. Family Structures and Family Law in Afghanistan, A Report of the Fact-Finding
Mission to Afghanistan January-March 2005, supra note 61, at 8.
62. See Christie S. Warren, The Hanafi School, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES, available at
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390 l 55/obo9780195390155-0082.xml (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) ("The Hanafi School is one of the four
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More than just a religion, Islam "is an all-encompassing way of
life."63 The Qur'an is the first and most important source of Islamic
law, which is "comprised of the verbatim words of Allah (God)" and is
regarded as "the most authoritative guide to how Muslims should
conduct themselves." 64 While the Qur'an contains 6235 ayat, or verses,
"only approximately 600 ayat are legal rules. " 65 Thus, the Sunnah,
which contains the Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) 66 conversations,
monologues and practices, codified in hadith, or reports, is the
secondary source to look for guidance on Islamic law. 67 Next, one must
look to:
ijma (consensus of opinion), which is based on rational proof and
reasoning that come from divine revelation; the qiyas, which use
analogical reasoning to extend the application of sharia to new
situations and ideas; and urf (custom), the collective practice of a
group of people, which complements rules that the Qur' an does not
fully explain. . . . Islam's strong emphasis on communitarian values
adds further complexity. 68

Islamic jurisprudence promotes child fosterage, however certain
legal guidelines need to be met to facilitate legal transfer of
guardianship. 69
These guidelines stem from policy criteria of
major schools of Sunni Islamic legal reasoning and repositories of positive law. It was built
upon the teachings of Abu Hanifa (d. 767) ... Abu Hanifa himself relied extensively on
ra 'y (personal opinion) ... Hanafi doctrines have always been considered among the most
flexible and liberal in Islamic law, including in the areas of... marriage and
guardianship . . . . The Constitution of Afghanistan privileges Hanafi jurisprudence as a
residual source of law in the absence of explicit legislation or other constitutional
provisions.").
63. Kfir, supra note 15, at 113 (citing JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS To
KNOW ABOUT ISLAM 3, 16-17, 158-59 (2nd ed. 1990)).
64. Id. at 114 (citing Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment
of Women: An Incomplete Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 311, 312
(1995)).
65. Id. at 114 (citing Sayeh & Morse, Jr., supra note 65, at 312).
66. PBUH denotes "Peace and Blessings Be Upon Him." This is something Muslims
are required to say after mentioning Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) name.
67. Kfir, supra note 15, at 114.
68. Id. at 114-15 (citing Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion, and Rights: The
Future Legal Status of Palestinian Women, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 149, 152-53 (1994) and
W AEL B. HALLAQ, AN INTRODUCTION To ISLAMIC LA w 26-28 (2009); Helena Malikyar,

Development of Family Law in Afghanistan: The Roles of the Hanafi Madhab, Customary
Practices and Power Politics, 16 CENT. ASIAN SURV. 389, 390 (1997); Christie S. Warren,
Lifting the Veil: Women and Islamic Law, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 33, 38 (2008); and
M. M. Slaughter, The Salman Rushdie Affair: Apostasy, Honor, and Freedom of Speech, 79
VA. L. REV. 153, 165 (1993)).
69. Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 4; see id. at 12 ("Taking care of orphans is an act of piety in Islamic
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compassion, transparency and justice. 70 Taking care of orphans is
encouraged in Islam, however the Islamic concept of adoption most
resembles permanent foster parenting. 71 Unlike "closed" adoption
practices commonly exercised in the U.S., where the biological parents'
identity is hidden by adoptive parents, under Islamic law, a child's
bloodline cannot be changed and neither should his or her birth name. 72
Where the lineage and familial ties of an orphan are known, a few
Islamic legal elements need to be satisfied during adoption procedures. 73
A. Lineage and Naming Rights Under Islamic Law
Lineage and naming rights are two sides of the same coin. Islamic
law provides that a child's genealogical line shall never be severed, nor
can an artificial line be created with another family. 74 Naming rights,
under Islamic law, deal with a child's right to maintain his or her birth
name, or identity, which represents his or her father's genealogy. 75 A
father's family name attaches to his child upon birth, to attach parental
responsibility to him, so he is accountable to provide for the child
financially and to provide inheritance shares. 76 In "closed" adoptions,
children are not informed of their adoption and have no way of tracing
biological kin, which violates a basic tenant of Islamic law. 77 Under
Islamic law, a person is entitled to his or her lineage, birth name, and
family background because identity is a sacred notion needing
protection. 78 The complete 'erasure of natal identity' is contrary to the
teachings of the Qur' an and Sunnah. 79

thought. The Quran, the primary source of guidance for Muslims worldwide, repeatedly
emphasizes the importance of taking care of orphans ... with equity (4: 127) and a sin to
wrong them (93:9).").
70. See Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 4.
71. See Mills, supra note 17. The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was an orphan
himself.
72. See id; see infra Part I.
73. See Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 16.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 5, 16.
78. See Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 16.
79. Kutty, supra note 25 (manuscript at 2l)(citing JAMILA BARGACH, ORPHANS OF
ISLAM: FAMILY, ABANDONMENT, AND SECRET ADOPTION IN MOROCCO 27 (Rowman &
Littlefield, 2002)); Ishaque, supra note 38, at 393.
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B. Guardianship Scheme Under Islamic Law
Islamic jurisprudence does not mirror adoption in the Western
sense but it permits a system of kafala, or guardianship, which most
resembles permanent foster-parenting. 8° Kaja/a is the vow to
voluntarily take care of a minor's welfare and education, in the same
way a parent should for a natural child. 81 It constitutes 'a gift of care'
for a child, and is not a way to relinquish a child's lineal descent. 82
Unlike foster-parenting in the U.S., kafala serves as a permanent
arrangement for a minor. 83 Like foster parenting and adoption, kafala is
regulated by the state. 84 This particular practice arose to act on "the
particular care and concern for the maintenance and upbringing of
orphans and foundlings inherent in Islamic teachings." 85
Mas/aha, or public policy, is a driving factor in Islamic law, which
heavily influences fiqh 86 rules governing an orphan and Al-laqit, or the
foundling, an abandoned child. 87 Early Hanafi scholars recognized that
a complete parental relationship is in the child's best interest and society
at large, in the case of foundlings and orphans. 88 The Hanafi fiqh
manual al-Hidaya states, "' [r ]emoving a foundling from the street is
strongly recommended because saving its [i.e. the child's] life is
involved" and when the child's life is in danger, the removal becomes
obligatory. 89 Anyone who finds an abandoned child and takes him into
their care is considered the child's parent, "'but only to the extent that

80. Ishaque, supra note 38, at 394.
81. Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 6.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Kutty, supra note 25 (manuscript at 30)(citing Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, 'The Islamic
View of Adoption and Caring for Homeless Children' in ADOPTION FACT BOOK III
(Washington: National Council for Adoption 1999); Qur'an 5:32 ("Whoever saves a human
life, it is as though he has saved humanity in its entirety."); Qur'an 4:127 ("[A]nd
concerning the children who are week and oppressed: that you stand firm for justice to
orphans ... "); Qur'an 4:127 ("Serve God ... do good- to parents, kinfolk, orphans, those in
need, neighbors who are near, neighbors who are strangers, the companion by your side, the
wayfarer (ye meet), and what your right hands possess.")).
86. Fiqh, or "understanding" is Islamic jurisprudence and juristic law. It is
interpretation of Islamic law. Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the
Best Interests of the Child, supra note 25, at 6.
87. Id. at 9-10 (A foundling is a child whose lineage is unknown due to parents' death,
disappearance, or abandonment).
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting BURHAN AL-DrN AL-FARGHANI AL-MARGHINANI; AL-HIDAYA, vol. 2, at
466-67 (Lebanon Dar al-Arqam, n.d.)).
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such a claim benefits the foundling. "' 90
Children raised under the kafala system also maintain 91 inheritance
rights from their biological parents. 92 Qur'anic verses explain orphans'
financial rights, providing, "And give the orphans their property....
And consume not their property with your own property. Truly this has
been criminal, a hateful sin."93 However, Islamic law does not prohibit
kafala guardians from giving their assets to orphans. 94 According to
Sunni fiqh, a person can bequeath a maximum one-third of his or her
property to anyone who is not a blood relative. 95
C. Historical Policy Concerns Behind Islamic Law on Children
Historical policy concerns led to the formulation of Islamic
children's rights, deriving from the Qur'an and Sunnah. 96 Like U.S.
legislation, Islamic law also bases its laws on public policy. 97 The
policy reason behind treating adoptions as permanent guardianships,
instead of parenthood in the Wes tern sense, is also based on historical
events. 98 However, while American history is fairly recent, Islamic
history dates back to 610 A.D. 99 Drawing similarities between Western
90. Id. at 10 (quoting M.S. Sujimon, The Treatment of the Foundling (al-Laqit)
According to the Hanajis, 9 ISLAMIC L. & Soc'y 358 (2002)); see also Kutty, supra note 25
(manuscript at 26)(citing Ella Landau-Tasseron, Adoption, Acknowledgement of Paternity
and False Genealogical Claims in Arabian and Islamic Societies, 66 BULL. SCH. ORIENTAL
& AFR. STUD. 169 (2003)("a. that the acknowledged person have no known father [majul alnasab]; b. that there be no obvious reason to disbelieve the statement [an yulad mithluhu /imithlihi] so, for example, a person cannot acknowledge as his son another person who is
older than himself.")).
91. There is a caveat here. Although Islamic inheritance rights are extended to both
boys and girls, in practice, girls' rights are lost in translation. See generally Amrita Pande,
The Paper that You Have in Your Hand is My Freedom: Migrant Domestic Work and the
Sponsorship (Kaja/a) System in Lebanon, 47 INT'L MIGRATION Rev. 414 (2013); Shipra
Saxena, Young Migrant Women from South Asia in the UAE: Negotiating Identities Under
the Kaja/a System (Nov. 2012)(unpublished M.A. thesis, Inst. Social Studies).
92. See Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 17.
93. Qur'an 4:2; Qur'an 4:2-10.
94. Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 17.
95. Id.
96. See ASAF A. A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW I (4th ed. 1974)
("Islamic law is not a systematic code, but a living and growing organism ... this system
cannot be studied without a proper regard to its historical development.").
97. See generally Kutty, supra note 25.
98. Id.
99.
Timeline
of
Islam,
PBS,
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/muslims/timeline.html (last visited Jan. 14,
2015).
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policy objectives and Islamic ones is important. Since the driving
forces behind American policy and Islamic policy are essentially the
same, namely, that the child's best interest is paramount, both countries
can make the proposed campaign work.
In pre-Islamic Arabia, adopted children were usually male because
they were a great source of wealth and prestige. 100 They were given
most, if not all inheritance rights by their biological parents. 101 People
mainly adopted to secure an heir, add additional warriors to their tribe
and/or usurp an orphan's inheritance share. 102 If the adopted child did
not have a large inheritance share, there was still incentive to adopt him
because he could grow to accumulate wealth for his adoptive family. 103
Many times adoptions were also linked to enslavement, where
individuals would gain custody of children, under the pretense of giving
them care, while actually stripping them of their birth identities. 104 This
was done to appropriate children into their families only to service
them. 105 Islamic legal norms specifically condemned this practice and
restricted the practice of dissimulation through naming. 106 The Qur' an
speaks specifically about orphans: "Call to them by the names of their
fathers. That is more equitable to God." 107 This verse was revealed after
the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) adopted a freed slave named Zayd Ibn

l 00. Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 7; Amira al-Azhary Sonbol, Adoption in Islamic Society: A
Historical Survey, in CHILDREN IN THE MUSLIM MIDDLE EAST 45, 46 (Elizabeth Warnock
Femea ed., 1995); see also Shaheen Sardar Ali, Rights of the Child Under Islamic Law and
Laws of Pakistan: A Thematic Overview, 2 J. ISLAMIC ST. PRAC. INT'L L. l, 8 (2006).
101. Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 7.
l 02. Id.; Zoll, supra note 35 (stating adoption looked more like slavery in pre-Islamic
Arabia. "Men would take in a boy, then erase any ties between the child and his biological
family. The goal was to gather fighters as protection for the tribe. Orphans' property was
often stolen in the process. As a result, Muslims were barred from treating adopted and
biological children as identical in naming or inheritance, unless the adoptee was breast-fed
as a baby by the adoptive mother, creating a familial bond recognized under Islamic law.").
103. See Sonbol, supra note 101 , at 46.
104. Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 7.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 7-8 (Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) adopted a boy named Zayd Ibn Haritha,
safeguarding his best interests as in a conventional case of adoption today); see also
Richards, supra note 10, at 399, 409-11; Shaheen Sardar Ali, Rights of the Child under
Islamic Law and Laws of Pakistan: A Thematic Overview, 2 J. ISLAMIC STATES PRAC. INT'L
LAW 2 (2006) (Pre-Islamic Adoption practices were outlawed to "contain and in certain
cases root out social evils.").
l 07. Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children: Islam and the Best Interests of the
Child, supra note 25, at 8 (quoting Qur 'an 33:4-5).
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Haritha and renamed him Zayd Ibn Muhammad. 108 When these verses
were revealed, Zayd's name was changed back to his given name. 109
The Pre-Islamic practice also perpetuated a system of gender
discrimination where only males were adopted. 110 Given that the advent
of Islam brought forth a movement to eradicate Pre-Islamic gender
discrimination and violent practices, such as female infanticide, one
may-and very well should--deduce, that banning Pre-Islamic adoption
practices was aimed to lessen gender inequality over time. 111
D. Afghanistan's Child Guardianship Law

The U.S. Department of State incorrectly provides, "U.S. citizens
considering adoption of an Afghan child must obtain guardianship for
the purpose of emigration and adoption in the U.S. from the Afghan
Family Court that has jurisdiction over the prospective adoptive child's
place of residence." 112 The head judge of Afghanistan's only Family
Court, Qazi Rahima Rezae, stated, "We (Afghanistan) deal a lot with
children's guardianship cases but the Family Court doesn't have the
authority to deal with guardianship. The Supreme Court has written
that it is the [Afghanistan] Children's Court that has guardianship
authority." 113 No other traditional courts or religious courts have the
jurisdiction to handle child guardianship cases. 114
The Afghanistan Children's Court's Head Judge, Homa Alizoy,
shed some light on a "Child Guardianship Law Draft" proposed to the
National Assembly, which passed as good law in April 2014 with most
articles intact. 115 The Child Guardianship Law was passed by the
National Assembly, signed by the President, and published in
Afghanistan's Official Gazette. 116 This law allows Afghan Muslims

108. MUHAMMAD B. AHMAD AL-QURTUBI, AL-JAMI LI-AHMKAM AL-QUR'AN 118-19
(1967).
109. See Kutty, supra note 25 (manuscript at 17).
110. Id. at 20.
111. Id. at 20-21 (citing Shaheen Sardar Ali, Rights of the Child under Islamic Law
and Laws of Pakistan: A Thematic Overview, 2 J. ISLAMIC ST. PRACTICE IN INT'L LAW 2
(2006); Qur'an 17:31 ("When the female (infant) buried alive, is questioned- For what
crime she was killed" Qur'an 81 :8-9; "Do not kill your children for fear of poverty; it is We
Who provide for them as well as for you. Killing them is surely a grave sin.").
Afghanistan,
U.S.
DEP'T
ST.
(Jul.
1,
2013),
available
at
112.
http://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/leam-about-acountry/afghanistan.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
113. Skype Interview with Qazi Rahima Rezae, supra note 47.
114. Id.
115. See Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 52.
116. Child Guardianship Law, supra note 17.
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living abroad to adopt abandoned, orphaned or abused Afghan
children. 117 The National Assembly believes that Afghan children must
only be placed with Afghan guardians. 118 Judge Alizoy conversely
provided that she would like to see more Muslims taking children under
their care, regardless of their ethnicity, but Afghanistan's Parliament is
not open to the idea. 119
The National Assembly's hesitation may be due to reported cases
of children "taken out of Afghanistan and sold into human trafficking in
[the United Arab Emirates] and Kuwait." 120 If the National Assembly is
assured that only American Muslims with good intentions will have
child guardianship, the law may be amended to allow American
Muslims in general to apply. Nevertheless, this law should make it
easier to effectuate the proposed adoption campaign. The law lays out
who may apply and which children are eligible. 121 It provides the
procedure for gaining permanent guardianship, thus promoting
transparency. 122 This ensures that legal determinations will be based on
statutory law and not solely by a judge's discretion. 123 This will
encourage more individuals to engage in the permanent guardianship
process in Afghanistan.
For example, the Child Guardianship Law provides that a
permanent guardian must: be at least 30 years old; have no convictions
of trafficking crimes, drugs, begging, terrorism and crimes against
children; not suffer from incurable diseases; be able to perform
administrative tasks and; not use drugs or alcohol. 124 Further, a child is
eligible for transfer of guardianship if he or she is under age eighteen
and is an orphan where none of the parents are alive, available or where
the parents are absent or abandoned the child by submitting him or her
to a charity or another institution where at least one year has lapsed
since the parents have visited or the child has parents who cannot
financially provide for him or her. 125
Guardianship priority is first given to blood relatives, then to
couples with no children and last to guardians who have experience
117. Id.
118. See Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 17.
119. Id.
120. Latifi, supra note 35.
121. See Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 17; see also Skype
Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 52; Child Guardianship Law, supra note 17.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Child Guardianship Law, supra note 17, art. 4.
125. Id. art. 5.
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providing kafala care to children. 126 The law also provides that "[i]n
any case, benefit and best interests of the child take precedence over
other matters to be considered." 127 Article 17 provides, the Children's
Court can authorize the child's withdrawal from Afghanistan if it is in
the child's best interests. 128 The court may terminate guardianship if the
guardian subjects the child to physical and mental abuse, bars the child
from education or job training, exposes the child to drugs or alcohol,
forces the child to beg or subjects the child to sexual exploitation or
child pomography. 129
The law cites to Sunnah that encourages taking care of orphans, 130
providing there are great public policy reasons necessitating this law,
including a need to "eradicate corruption, reduc[ e] the rate of juvenile
delinquency, and improv[ e] access to education for children" and urgent
care for children who lost their parents during the war. 131 It provides
that the family is "the most natural and most suitable environment for
the growth and development of children. Therefore, as far as possible,
children should not be deprived of this right." 132
Many times children are abandoned in hospitals and doctors
informally transfer guardianship to desiring guardians. 133 The Child
Guardianship Law outlaws this practice. 134 Transfer of guardianship
must go through a formal process even if birth families agree to transfer
guardianship outside of court. 135 This is problematic for women who
want to anonymously relinquish their parental rights. For example, rape
victims who have children out of wedlock are under the threat of
adultery laws, which imprison women for extramarital affairs, unless
proven that the aggressor committed zinna bi/ Jahr, or sex by force. The
burden is on the victim to produce three male witnesses to corroborate
the defense. 136
126. Id. art. 6.
127. Id. art. 9.
128. Id. art. 10.
129. Child Guardianship Law, supra note 17, art. 17.
130. Id. at conclusion (citing Muhammad al-Bukhari, Sahih Bukhari Volume 007,
Book
063,
Hadith
Number
224,
HADITH
COLLECTION,
available
at
http://hadithcollection.com/sahihbukhari/96-Sahih%20Bukhari%20Book%2063.%
20Divorce/5868-sahih-bukhari-volume-007-book-063-hadith-number-224.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2015)).
131. Child Guardianship Law, supra note 17, at conclusion.
132. Id.
133. Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 17.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Jeremy Kelly, Afghan Woman to be Freed from Jail After Agreeing to Marry
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The law took several years to pass because the draft contained a
contentious article, providing that if a male guardian raises a girl, he
may not marry her. 137 The Civil Society of Afghanistan supports this
article; however, the National Assembly argues that if the daughter
grows up and gives her consent to marry the male guardian, there
should be no obstacle. 138 The judges and lawyers who drafted the
proposed legislation refused to remove this article. 139 However, the law
passed without this provision instead providing in Article 8 that
guardians cannot take any formal decision on who the female child will
marry until the child reaches the age of majority, age eighteen, and
gives full consent about her engagement and marriage. 140 The term
maqasid al shariah, or objectives of Islamic law, should be used to
criticize this provision's omission. 141 The law must be amended to
promote Qur' anic verses prioritizing child welfare rather than excluding
rules to maintain status quo of men at the expense of child safety and
mental well-being. 142
Subsequent to adopting Zayd, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
arranged to marry Zayd's ex-wife and Qur'anic verses confirmed this
was permissible. However, there is no example in Sunnah permitting
marriage to an adopted daughter and this particular issue was never
discussed in hadith. Since the Sunnah is silent on the matter one must
look to principles contained in the Qur' an. There are pitfalls to
removing this article because, although a "formal decision" shall not be
made before the female child turns eighteen, the male guardian may
coerce the child into making informal decisions. This heightens the risk
of exploitation. Qur'anic verses on child welfare should be cited as

Rapist,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
l,
2011 ),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011Idec/01 /afghan-woman-freed-marry-rapist
(last
visited Jan. 14, 2015).
137. Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 17.
138. Id; Kfir, supra note 15, at 87, 94, 140-41 (providing "in Afghanistan misogynistic
and discriminatory practices stems from contrived cultural and religious norms," "a
misogynistic orthopraxy linked to Islamism, a perversion of Islamic law" and the Ministry
of Women's Affairs' ("MoWA") "ineffectiveness can also be attributed to the difficult
conditions under which it operates. Mo WA has to contend with a fickle president and
political system that does not value MoWA's efforts to empower women, treating it instead
as a tool to appease the international community. Although President Karzai publicly
supports the empowerment of women, he works with conservatives who oppose women's
empowerment to ensure his political survival.").
139. Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 17.
140. Child Guardianship Law, supra note 17, art. 8.
141. See Kutty, supra note 25 (manuscript at 39).
142. Id. at 36-39.
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basis to include the omitted provision. 143 Any practices that promote
exploitation of women and children are unacceptable under Islamic
law. 144 This begs the question, if Afghanistan stresses the importance of
applying Islamic law, why was the contentious article omitted? Note:
When the state is incapable or unwilling to represent the interests of
members of society, the importance of family and kinship relations is
inflated. Consequently, any challenges to patriarchal authority in the
domestic sphere-including but not limited to challenges to the use of
violence-can be construed as threatening to the family as an
institution. This, in tum, lends itself to the idea that increasing the
rights of women would corrode and menace the family, and, by
extension, the social order. ... Islam is not the reason why women in
Afghanistan endure discriminatory practices. Rather, discrimination
stems from contrived cultural and religious norms that surface out of
misreading, misunderstandings or manipulation of the Qur'an.
Accordingly, in claiming the existence of contrived cultural and
religious practices, it is argued that these norms are synthetic and their
purpose is to uphold traditional authority and/or support an
anachronistic power system. By devising norms and exhibiting them
as cultural or religious, the proponents do so in reference to idyllic
community, allowing them to further defend these indefensible social
restrictions. 145

"[T]he Afghan constitution and shari 'a, both of which have the
means to end discriminatory practices," should be examined to make
amendments to the law to include provisions ensuring that girls are not
exploited. 146 Article 22 of the Constitution "emphasizes that every
Afghan citizen-man and woman-has equal rights before the law" and
since Afghanistan social structure is already permeated with inequality
and oppression against women, the omitted provision is necessary to
include in the Child Guardianship Law. 147 This is to ensure female
children are treated equally as well as their male counterparts.
Afghanistan ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979), the CRC

143 . See generally Nusrat Choudhury, Constrained Spaces for Islamic Feminism:
Women 's Rights and the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMrNISM 155,
175-76 (2007).
144. See generally id.
145. Kfir, supra note 15, at 92-94 (quoting Lisa Hajjar, Religion, State Power, and
Domestic Violence in Muslim Societies: A Framework for Comparative Analysis, 29 LA w &
Soc. INQUIRY l , 31 (2004)).
146. Kfir, supra note 15, at 96.
147. Kfir, supra note 15, at 98 n.72 (citing CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REP. OF
AFGHANISTAN, art. 22 (2004)).
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(ratified Apr. 27, 1994) and its optional protocols on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, among sixteen
international human rights conventions. 148 In August 2009, Afghanistan
adopted the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW),
codifying protections for women and girls to help ensure Afghanistan
meets its obligations under CEDAW. 149 The law, in particular,
criminalizes child marriages and forced marriages, however, application
of the law is sparse 150 highlighting "the continued pervasiveness of
misogyny and contrived cultural values." 151
To ensure proper
application of the law, EVAW needs supporting legislation like the
Child Guardianship Law to ensure equal protection for girls.
In Afghanistan, there are two ways guardianship rights are
First, the Child Guardianship Law lays out the
transferred. 152
procedure, which provides that if children are abused by their parents,
guardianship may be transferred to a family that will better care for
them. 153 One must prove either that the child was abandoned or abused
by the parents. 154 The other legal procedure involves the voluntary
transfer of guardianship. 155 When child guardianship is willingly
transferred, the birth family must first appear before the Children's
Court and confess their wish to transfer guardianship. 156 Second, the
court makes a wasiqah, or a legal document that notes transfer of
custody and provides stipulations protecting Muslim children's rights,

148. Kfir, supra note 15, at 143; Ch. IV: Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS: TREATY
COLLECTION,
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&
subid=A&lang=en (last visited Jan. 14, 2015)).
149. Kfir, supra note 15, at 143 ; CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REP. OF AFGHANISTAN art. 22
& 27 (2004) (providing Afghanistan must ensure its international obligations are met).
150. UN Officials in Afghanistan Urge Ratification of Law to Eliminate Violence
UN
NEWS
CTR.
(May
20,
2013),
available
at
Against
Women,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44950#.VH5hwWRdWiO (last visited Jan.
14, 2015); see also Marisa Taylor, Afghan Law Barring Violence Against Women Stalls, UN
ALJAZEERA:
AM.
(Dec.
8,
2013 ,
10:58
PM),
available
at
Says,
http://america.alj azeera.com/articles/2013/ 12/8/afghan-law-barringvio lenceagainst
womenstallsunsays.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015) ("The report showed that 650 incidents
of violence against women and girls were reported to authorities across 18 different Afghan
provinces between October 2012 and September 2013." However, EV AW was only applied
to "109 of those reported incidents ... representing a meager 2 percent increase from the 15
percent of reported cases to which EVAW was applied the year before.").
151. Kfir, supra note 15, at 144.
152. Child Guardianship Law, supra note 17.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 52.
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including naming rights and inheritance rights from the birth parents. 157
Potential guardians must follow preliminary procedures to gain
They must appear before the Afghanistan
guardianship rights.
Children's Court to apply for permanent guardianship. 158
Approximately one to five children are adopted and emigrated to the
U.S. every year. 159 If the legislation was amended, allowing American
Muslims to apply generally, the number of children adopted and
emigrated could increase. The Children's Court heard two cases on
child guardianship recently, dealing with foreign potential guardians. 160
Judge Alizoy shared a case regarding an Afghan-American woman
who petitioned the court for guardianship of two abandoned children
found by hospital staff and placed in a temporary guardian's care. 161
Judge Alizoy first had to ensure that the children were in fact
foundlings. 162 She ordered the General Attorney's Office to conduct
further investigation on the children's background. 163 The Office then
followed up with the Ministry of Social and Public Works to ensure that
the petitioner exercised proper legal procedures to obtain the children
and their social worker consented to the transfer. 164 Further, Judge
Alizoy ordered the social worker to provide her with a letter confirming
that the children were foundlings and that she transferred guardianship
to the petitioner. 165 Subsequently, Judge Alizoy began processing the
legal work for the case. 166
The Court requires potential guardians to show competency to
raise a child and that they are: of Afghan descent; "good" Muslims; able
to financially support the child and; able to provide for the child's
welfare. 167 Judge Alizoy further explained that the guardian must be of
good character, "a respectable person," and has to care deeply about the
child." 168 The guardian must show the Court that he or she was raised
according to Islamic ideals to demonstrate the ability to take care of the
157. See id.
158. See id.
See Afghanistan Country Profile, U.S. DEP'T ST., available
159.
http://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/leam-about-acountry/afghanistan.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
160. See Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 17.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 52.
166. See id.
167. See Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 17.
168. See id.
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child with Islamic values in mind. 169
When a permanent guardian wishes to move the child abroad there
are additional procedural steps. 17 First, the Children's Court must send
its decision to the Supreme Court for review. 171 Next, the Supreme
Court reviews the case, files and confirms the authenticity of the court
documents. 172 Third, the Supreme Court translates the documents into
English to send to the Foreign Ministry. 173 The Foreign Ministry
registers the documents, stamps them and provides the permanent
guardian( s) with written permission to take the child abroad. 174
The 1977 Civil Code codifies inheritance laws according to the
Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence. 175 Article 1993 of the Civil
Code provides that a deceased person's personal property and real
property shall be transferred to his heirs in accordance with Islamic
rules on inheritance. 176 Although there are laws on inheritance,
Afghanistan lacks a sufficient legal system due to several decades of
conflict causing lack of resources to address inheritance issues. 177 Since
Afghanistan's court system is projected to improve in the future, the
adopted child may claim inheritance shares upon reaching age eighteen,
by providing the Children's Court records which evidence the child's
lineage. 178 This is important to consider in ensuring the adopted child's
inheritance shares are maintained despite transfer of guardianship. 179

°

169. Id.
170. See Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 52.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Bruce Etling, Legal Authorities in the Afghan Legal System, HARVARD L.
SCHOOL, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/etling.pdf (last
visited Jan. 14, 2015); Land Rights in Crisis, ELDIS (2014), available at
http://www.eldis.org/assets/Docs/13485.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); Afghanistan: Food
Security and Land Governance Fact Sheet, LAND GOVERNANCE FOR EQUITABLE &
SUSTAINABLE
DEV.
1,
2
(Apr.
2011),
available
at
http://www.landgovemance.org/system/files/Afghanistan%20Factsheet%20landac%20april
%202011.pdf(last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
176. Colin Deschamps & Alan Roe, Land Conflict in Afghanistan, AREU 18 (Apr.
2009), available at http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/9 l 8E-Land%20Contlict-IPweb. pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
177. Id.
178. See Inheritance Form, AFG. EMBASSY, WASH., D.C. (2007), available at
http://www.embassyofafghanistan .org/sites/default/fl les/forms/02. 07.2007Inheritance. pdf
(last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
179. See infra Part III and Part V.
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II. UNITED STATES FEDERAL LAW ON INTERCOUNTRY

CHILD ADOPTIONS
In 1961, the INA incorporated provisions regulating the
intercountry adoption process to improve its screening. 180 The 1978
amendment to the INA declares, when a child is released for
immigration and intercountry adoption to the U.S., the prior parent shall
not be accorded any right, privilege or status, with respect to the
child. 181 In 2000, the U.S. enacted the Intercountry Adoption Act
("IAA"). 182 The INA and the IAA define key terms such as "parent,"
"child," and "orphan." 183 The USCIS, the Department of Homeland
Security and the Board of Immigration Appeals declared that obtaining
guardianship status alone is insufficient to facilitate the immigration of
an adopted child into the U.S. under the INA, requiring parenthood
status instead. 184 Under the INA, a birth parent is not considered a
parent if he or she has irrevocably released the child for emigration and
adoption. 185
The IAA allows American parents to adopt children from nonConvention 186 countries, as long as the child qualifies as an adopted
child or an orphan under the INA. 187 According to the INA, a child is
an unmarried individual under the age of twenty-one. 188 Under the
INA, the adopting parent(s) must personally observe the child during
adoption proceedings in the sending country. 189 The U.S. cannot
recognize adoptions unless the adoptive relationship is authorized by
180. Stephanie Zeppa, "Let Me in, Immigration Man": An Overview of lntercountry
Adoption and the Role of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 161, 164-65 (1998) (amendments were made to the INA to "create a permanent
provision for the immigration of adoptable children" which laid out a regulatory framework
for intercountry adoption. Prior to that, Congress enacted the Displaced Persons Act (DPA)
in 1948 [after World War II] that included in it a provision "to admit, regardless of their
country's immigration quota, 3,000 displaced orphans" from Germany, Austria and Italy.
Congress only intended for the DP A to serve as a "temporary solution to the immediate
welfare problems in Europe after the war.").
181. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 95-417, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1978).
182. Richards, supra note 10, at 413.
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952); 42 U.S.C.A. § 14901 (2000).
184. Richards, supra note 10, at 411.
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952); see Definition of Child and Parent in !NA, AM. IMMIGR.
L. CENTER, available at http://www.ailc.com/services/INADEFS.pdf (last visited Jan. 14,
2015).
186. Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 14901 (2000).
188. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952); see Definition of Child and Parent in !NA, supra note
186.
189. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952).
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local custom or religious practice, which is recognized by a court of law
there. 190 Additionally, the relationship must hold all the usual attributes
of child adoption, according irrevocable rights to adoptive parents with
respect to the child. 191
The INA lays out the groundwork for criteria that needs to be met
to facilitate intercountry adoption. If adopting parents cannot fulfill the
requirements under INA 101 (b )(1 )(E), which provides that an adopted
child must qualify as an "orphan" under INA 101 (b )(1 )(F) in order to
emigrate to the U.S., they must have legal child custody and reside with
the child for at least two years before U.S. immigration can occur. 192
An "orphan," under the INA, is a child that lacks parent(s) because of
their death or disappearance, abandonment, or separation from him or
her. 193 A child is also an orphan if the sole or surviving parent cannot
provide him or her with proper care. 194 The IAA also requires proof
that a child's natural parent(s) are deceased to qualify as an "orphan,"
by obtaining proper paperwork from the sending country. 195 The sole or
surviving parent must also, in writing, irrevocably release the child for
purposes of U.S. emigration and adoption. 196 To reiterate, the INA does
not consider someone a parent if he or she has, in writing, irrevocably
released the child for emigration and adoption. 197 The USCIS assesses
and approves prospective adoptive parents and determines whether the
child qualifies as an "orphan" under the INA. 198
In order to facilitate adoptions between the two countries, the U.S.
will need to make amendments to the INA and the IAA. While this may
seem like plenty to change, only a few phrases need to be updated in
order to allow a kafala, or "permanent guardianship," scheme to work in
the U.S. The changes would not upset the policy rationale underlying
190. US. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 9 Visas-9 FAM 42.21
Notes, U.S. DEP'T ST. 9 (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/87531.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015). Adoption is "[t]he creation of a parentchild relationship by judicial order between two parties who usu[ ally] are unrelated; the
relation of parent and child created by law between persons who are not in fact parent and
child." Adoption, BLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY 55 (9th ed. 2009).
191. US. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 9 Visas-9 FAM 42.21
Notes, supra note 191 , at 9-10.
192. Id. at 10.
193 . 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952).
194. Id.
195. Richards, supra note 10, at 399, 414-16.
196. US. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 9 Visas-9 FAM 42.21
Notes, supra note 191, at 15.
197. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952).
198. William Giacofci, Curbing Intercountry Adoption Abuses Through the Alien Tort
Statute, 18 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 110, 115 n.34 (2013).
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intercountry adoption laws, because permanent guardians would have
full and permanent custody of the children, barring the birth families
from reclaiming their custody rights in the future. 199

III. POLICY REASONS FOR SWEEPING INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION LAW REFORM
Today, child adoptions within the U.S. are more standardized than
the pre-1950s. 200 State systems have social workers that conduct a
home study of the adopting parents during a probationary period before
adoptions are finalized, even if the child was adopted abroad. 201 This
process involves background checks, reference checks, and follow-up
visits. 202 However, intercountry child adoption laws were not always so
stringent. 203 Beginning in the late 1950s, there was a massive federal
policy shift toward increasing regulations governing intercountry
adoption procedures in the U.S. for several reasons. 204 The main
reasons behind the shift were negative effects resulting from
intercountry adoption procedures during the end of the Korean War and
the Vietnam War as discussed below. 205

A. America's lntercountry Adoption Scheme Post-World War II
First, individuals successfully adopted children from Japan,
Germany and Korea post World War II through a process called "proxy
adoptions," allowing U.S. citizens to hire a proxy agent to adopt a child
on their behalf and transport him or her to the U.S. 206 Domestic
adoptions were subject to state regulations, which assessed the
prospective parents' competency to provide for the adopted child's
welfare, by way of investigation and supervision. 207 However, the
199. See discussion Infra Part VI.
200. See History of International Adoption, supra note 6.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.; Proxy Adoption of Foreign Children has Many Abuses, MILWAUKEE J. at
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=
at
available
1958),
27,
(Aug.
13
UQiqAAAAIBAJ&sjid=miYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4367%2C3295730 (last visited Jan. 14,
2015).
205. Pam Connell, "Proxy Adoptions" from Other Countries, FAMILIES, available at
http://www.families.com/blog/proxy-adoptions-from-other-countries (last visited Jan. 17,
2015).
206. History of International Adoption, supra note 6; Proxy Adoption of Foreign
Children Has Many Abuses, supra note 204.
207. Connell, supra note 206.
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domestic regulatory scheme exempted international adoptions due to the
"proxy adoption" loophole. 208 This loosely regulated process had
negative implications because it thwarted state and federal regulations,
allowing adoptive parents to neglect, sexually abuse, and physically
abuse adopted children, because they were not screened for competency
to parent. 209
A public outcry ensued after child agencies made public the Child
Welfare League of American and International Social Service's study of
"proxy adoptions."210 Public policy sentiments of the time regarding
"proxy adoptions" is best exemplified by a Milwaukee Journal article
written in 1958 which stated:
Corrective action clearly needs to be taken. Unfortunately, it cannot
be done by state or local governments; they only bear the burden when
proxy adoptions "go bad." The federal government must act either
through tightening immigration procedures or perhaps by special
treaty arrangements with countries in which proxy adoptions are most
easily arranged. 211

"Proxy adoptions" revealed the inadequacy of federal policy in
dealing with intercountry child adoptions. The public's outrage
encouraged the onset of regulations to reform intercountry adoption
procedures to avoid human rights abuses. 212 The 1961 amendment to
the INA finally incorporated international adoption. 213
B. America 's lntercountry Adoption Practices Post- Vietnam War

A second series of events, prompting tighter intercountry adoption
regulations, occurred at the end of the Vietnam War. While the
Vietnam War was winding down, the U.S. government launched a
campaign called "Operation Babylift" to "save the children" in
Vietnam, airlifting more than 2,000 "orphans" out of Vietnam.2 14
Unbeknownst to adoptive parents, many children were not orphans,
allowing their Vietnamese parents to reclaim approximately 200 of
them. 215 The initiative carried children out of Vietnam, under the false

208. Id.
209. See Proxy Adoption of Foreign Children Has Many Abuses, supra note 204.
210. Seeid.
211. Id.
212. History of International Adoption, supra note 6.
213.
Proxy
Adoptions,
ADOPTION
HIST.
PROJECT,
available
http://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/topics/proxy.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
214. Kim, supra note 8, at 870.
215. Id.
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pretense that they were orphans needing the care of adoptive parents. 216
The Babylift campaign was particularly controversial because many
children's documents were often forged or inaccurate. 217 Many critics
defamed this program using the pejorative "Operation Babysteal."218
Cross-national problems resulted from the corrupt processes
carried out in "Operation Babylift" because many Vietnamese parents
and guardians never fully and knowingly relinquished their rights to
their children. 219 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, heard an action brought on
behalf of three Vietnamese children in the U.S., who were never legally
released for adoption, with living parents desiring their return in
Vietnam. 220 The Court ordered an investigation of the children's
records to identify and locate their natural family to facilitate
repatriation with their parents. 221
Given the historical context, it makes sense that the U.S. would
tighten the grip on immigration and intercountry adoption laws and
procedures. Reforms were necessary to prevent children from ending
up in the hands of unfit parents. Federal legislation was changed to
provide that a potential parent must personally observe the child in the
sending country so that its government can assess whether the child is in
good hands. 222 There is also a pertinent legal objective to avoid
emigrating children illegally to the U.S., constituting child trafficking.
Another policy concern raised in Vietnam's case is the lack of finite
relinquishment of the birth family's custody rights. Though some
children in Vietnam were orphans under the U.S.' standard, namely,
they were missing one or both parents, many of the extended families in
Vietnam wanted to care for these children, as their cultural norms
dictated, and did not "recognize the Western concept of being an
216. Id.; Buser, supra note 9, at 29-31.
Operation
Babylift,
PBS,
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/itvs
217.
/preciouscargo/babylift.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014); Allison Martin, The Legacy of
Operation
Baby/ift,
ADOPT
VIETNAM,
available
at
http://www.adoptvietnam.org/adoption/babylift.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
218. Kim, supra note 8, at 870; see generally Christine Lai, The Orphans of Vietnam,
DARTMOUTH (Nov. 19, 2013, 4:21 PM), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu
/-hist32/History/S30%20-%20The%200rphans%20of%i20Vietnam.htm (last visited Jan.
14, 2015).
219. Operation Baby/ift, supra note 218.
220. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissenger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1975); Buser, supra
note 9, at 29-31.
221. Buser, supra note 9, at 29-31; Nguyen Da Yen, et al. v. Kissinger, CTR. FOR
CONST. RTS, available at https://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/past-cases/nguyen-da-yen,-et-al.-v.kissinger (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
222. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 lOl(b)(l)(F) (1952).
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orphan. " 223
Current federal legislation is more comprehensive and stringent
because the U.S. cannot allow any new adoption campaign to resemble
the failed campaigns in Korea and Vietnam. However, amending
current legislation will not undermine public policy. This campaign
will be successful if the U.S. engages in policies sensitive to
Afghanistan's traditions and public policy concerns. The U.S. can
avoid a host of litany, similar to the ones stemming from "Operation
Babylift," even if it amends the INA and IAA to afford a religious
exception. If the U.S. allows for a kafala scheme, severing the birth
family's custody ties permanently to facilitate the intercountry adoption
of Afghan children, this will ensure that the birth family cannot regain
custody of the child. Additionally, the amendments would only provide
legroom for a kafala scheme, and would not affect American
intercountry adoption procedures with other countries. This means that
the amendments will only apply to countries adhering to Islamic law.
IV. ST ATE LAWS ON CHILD CUSTODY AND CHILD ADOPTION
To carry out a successful intercountry adoption campaign with
Afghanistan, American Muslims must be willing to enter into a
guardianship contract including provisions requiring them to maintain
the child's given name. Contractual stipulations in written child
adoption agreements are generally upheld by approximately twenty-six
states, even where they require specific performance. 224 These are
upheld as long as the court finds they are in "the child's best interests
and are designed to protect the safety of the child and the rights of all
the parties to the agreement." 225 For example, in open adoption cases,
the birth family may require the adopting family to: deliver birthday
cards from them to the child and mail pictures of the child until the
child turns eighteen. 226 The written contract between the families "can
223. Nguyen Da Yen, et al. v. Kissinger, supra note 222.
224. See Open Adoption and Post-Adoption Contact Agreements, FCA ADOPTIONS,
available at http://www.fcadoptions.org/adoption-options/open-adoption-and-post-adoptioncontact-agreements.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2014); see generally Sample Open Adoption
Agreement,
FCA
ADOPTIONS,
available
at
http://www.fcadoptions.org/
files/Sample_Open_Adoption_Agreement.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); Postadoption
Contact Agreements Between Birth and Adoptive Families, CHILD WELFARE (May 2011),
available
at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes
/cooperative.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
225. Postadoption Contact Agreements Between Birth and Adoptive Families, supra
note 225, at 3.
226. Seeid.
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clarify the type and frequency of the contact or communication and can
provide a way for the agreement to be legally enforced." 227 However,
the agreements are only enforceable if they are "approved by the court
that has jurisdiction over the adoption." 228
Parties can make an adoption agreement that enforces Islamic legal
principles about naming and delegate disputes arising under that
agreement through religious arbitration in the U.S. 229 This contract can
be upheld under general contract law. 230 A majority of state courts
uphold specific performance arising under open adoption contracts. 231
Thus, states can also uphold an intercountry adoption agreement
between American Muslim guardians and Afghan birth families or
guardians, stipulating that the child must retain his or her birth name in
accordance with Islamic law. Further, since the birth name shall be
agreed upon at the start of the child's life with the permanent guardian's
consent, it will not repeatedly interfere with the permanent guardian's
ability to raise the child.
American state laws govern a child's inheritance rights. 232 For
example, Maryland's Estates and Trusts Code eliminates the adopted
child's right to inherit from natural parents or their genealogical line. 233
Maryland's law is reflective of some states laws regarding this issue. 234
Maryland case law provides, child adoption does not provide a child
with more rights, namely, inheritance from two separate genealogical
lines, or "double inheritance."235 However, some other states allow an
adopted child to inherit from adoptive parents, natural parents and their
families. 236 For example, Pennsylvania embraces a flexible approach

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
See discussion infra Part VI.
Id.
See generally Postadoption Contact Agreements Between Birth and Adoptive
Families, supra note 225.
232. Matthew Izzi, The Law of Inheritance, LEGAL MATCH, available at
http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/the-law-of-inheritance.html (last visited Jan.
14, 2015).
233 . See Mo. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §1-207(a) (LexisNexis 2014); Hall v.
Vallandingham, 540 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Md. 1988).
234. See generally Unsel v. Meier, 972 S.W.2d 466, 472 (Mo. 1998) ("To grant dual
inheritance, the child adopted would be given the inheritance of a natural child and allowed
an additional one. The law intended to give the child adopted the same rights and
advantages of a natural child as far as possible. It was never intended to give the child of
adoption more."); see generally JESSE DUKEMfNIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES (8th ed. 2009).
235. Hall, 540 A.2d at 1164.
236. See DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LrNDGREN, supra note 235, at 94-95.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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where an adopted child may inherit from the birth family if a
relationship is maintained with the birth family. 237 State laws on
"double inheritance" deal with property transfers only within the U.S.
Questions about the child's Islamic inheritance rights can be deferred to
Afghanistan's government, since the inheritance shares afforded to the
child are in Afghanistan. 238 Inheritance can be transferred to the child at
the age of majority, should the child decide to claim it in Afghanistan. 239

V. MODELS FOR REFORM
International law promotes the idea of Western legal systems
respecting the Islamic kafala model. The Hague Convention on
parental responsibility and protection of children provides if a child is
placed in kafala care by his or her State of origin and the guardian
wishes to take the child abroad, the State will first consult the latter
State's central authority and provide it with a report on the child and
reasons for the kafala placement. The latter State must consent to the
placement, in light of the child's best interests before the child may be
brought abroad. 240 The U.S. signed this convention but has not ratified
it and Afghanistan has not signed it. 241 To ensure the success of the
proposed campaign, the U.S. and Afghanistan must ratify the
convention to create a working kafala scheme. If there is international
recognition that both countries are accountable in promoting the kafala
scheme the campaign will be more successful.
Moreover, Article 20 of the CRC recommends states to take into
consideration the adopted child's religion when looking for compatible
adoptive families. 242 The U.S. signed but has not ratified this
convention, while Afghanistan has signed and ratified it. 243 The U.S.
must ratify this convention to ensure Afghanistan's policies are
respected. This will encourage Afghanistan's government to enter into
an intercountry adoption treaty with the U.S., facilitating a successful
237. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 2108 (West 2014).
238. See discussion infra Part IV; Deschamps & Roe, supra note 177.
239. See discussion infra Section IV.
240. Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and
Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of
Children, art. 33(1), Oct. 19, 1996, 2204 U.N.T.S. 503.
241. Id.
242. U.N. DEP'T ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, CHILD ADOPTION: TRENDS AND POLICIES, at
45, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/292, U.N. Sales No. E.10.XIII.4 (2009), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/adoption2010/child_ado ption.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 14, 2015).
243. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
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campaign for American Muslim guardians and Afghan children. First,
the treaty will outline the procedures guardians must follow in
Afghanistan to effectuate guardianship transfer. Second, it will outline
American procedures guardians must follow to effectuate the child's
U.S. emigration. Third, it will provide that the guardians must comply
with local U.S. state procedures on adoption to ensure the adopted child
is placed in a safe and stable home. 244
Western countries that encourage Muslim families to adopt
children in accordance with Islamic law are the best models to examine
to reform American intercountry adoption laws and facilitate the
proposed adoption campaign. For example, the New South Wales
province of Australia promotes a campaign encouraging Muslim
individuals to adopt Muslim children. 245 Australia's common law legal
system, similar to the American legal system, allows children to retain
their birth family's last name and inheritance rights from their birth
family by way of a will. 246 This is legally enforceable under a mutually
agreed upon 'Adoption plan. ' 247
Many Muslim-majority countries, such as Jordan and Morocco,
permit foreign adoption that allows the transfer of kafala to Muslim
guardians in other Western countries on a case-by-case basis. 248 Turkey
is an interesting model to examine because it allows for full legal
adoptions, where biological parents can transfer guardianship
permanently, while providing safeguards in its legal code, preventing
the violation of Islamic law. 249 In Turkey, "[a]doption gives full
inheritance rights to the child from the adoptive family. In addition, the
adopted child can also inherit from the biological family. However the
adoptive parents cannot inherit from the adopted child."250 This ensures
the applicability of Islamic Law, in the sphere of children's rights,
preventing adoptive parents from usurping the child's inheritance

244. See Afghanistan Country Profile, supra note 160.
245. See Adoption in NSW: Information for the Muslim Community, NSW DEP'T
(2007), available at http://www.community.nsw.gov.au/
SERVICES
COMMUNITY
docswr/_assets/main/documents/adoption_muslim_ broch.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
246. Id. at 4.
247. Id.
248. See Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children, supra note 25, at 10-11 (citing
FAQ: Adoption of Children from Countries in which Islamic Shari'a Law is Observed, US
http://adoption.state.gov/adoption_process/faqs/
at
available
ST.,
DEP'T
adoption_of_children_countries_islamic_sharia_observed.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2015)).
249. See Adoption and the Care of Orphan Children, supra note 25, at 11 (citing
Adoption, ADALET HUKUK, available at http://www.adalet-hukuk.com/yeni_sayfa_7.htm
(last visited Jan. 14, 2015)).
250. Id.
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shares.
The European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"), in Harroudj v.
France, heard a child adoption dispute illustrating how an equitable
remedy can be achieved where two legal systems, France under a
Western civil system and Algeria under an Islamic legal system are in
conflict. 251 There, Zina Hind was born in Algeria and abandoned
immediately by her biological mother; her biological father was
unknown. 252 Zina became a ward of the Algerian State and the Court of
Boumerdes granted a 42-year-old unmarried applicant the right to have
permanent kafala of the child. He also authorized Zina Hind to leave
Algeria and settle in France." 253 After arriving with the child in France,
the applicant applied for full adoption, arguing it was in the 'best
interests of the child,' invoking Article 3 § 1 of the CRC and the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption. 254
However, the Lyons Tribunal De Grande Instance dismissed her
application, noting that kafala gave her sufficient parental authority to
make decisions in the child's best interest. 255 The court held, kafala
gave the child all the protections she was entitled to under international
conventions. 256 The court reasoned that, under Article 370-3 of the
French Civil Code, a child could not be adopted if the sending country's
law prohibited adoption, which Algeria did. 257 The ECHR upheld
France's decision, holding the child "was already under her care and
control, pursuant to the Islamic kafalah guardianship system," fully
enabling the applicant to make decisions in the child's best interest. 258
The court provided, under the CRC "the kafalah model is accepted and
defined as 'alternative care,' which it deemed on par with adoption." 259
The court noted, kafala is recognized under international law and was

251. See Harroudj v. France, App. No. 43631/09, para. 1 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-113819 (last visited
Jan. 14, 2015).
252. See id. para. 5.
253. Id. para. 7.
254. Id. para 10.
255. Id. para. 11.
256. See Harroudj v. France, App. No. 43631/09, para. 11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-113819 (last visited
Jan. 14, 2015).
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. Faisal Kutty, Islamic Law, Adoptions and Kaja/ah, JURIST (Nov. 6, 2012, 4:40
PM), available at http://jurist.org/forurn/2012/11 /faisal-kutty-adoption-kafalah. php (last
visited Jan. 14, 2015).
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fully accepted in French law and States must accommodate kafala in its
domestic law where applicable. 260 This ECHR decision promotes
positive groundwork for accommodating Islamic adoptions in Western
countries. 261
European States are starting to embrace kafala and the U.S. can
too. Spanish family law has provisions that accept kafala, allowing
guardians to have custody of a child without "creating a relationship of
filiation as would be the case with adoption, which the Koran
forbids. " 262 English law also provides a similar legal scheme. The
Adoption and Children Act 2002 makes room for a special guardianship
court order, which accommodates minority groups who wish to transfer
guardianship to a permanent family but "have religious or cultural
difficulties with adoption as it is set out in law." 263 The U.S., like its
Western counterparts, can build in its legislation, room for a kafala
scheme to flourish.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL AFGHAN
ADOPTION CAMPAIGN
The INA and IAA must be amended to state that a birth parent's
parental rights are not fully relinquished upon adoption if they are from
countries adhering to Islamic law. The INA and IAA should provide a
religious exception clause, creating wiggle room for a kafala scheme for
"permanent guardians" adopting from Islamic countries. Currently, the
USCIS, the Department of Homeland Security and the Board of
Immigration Appeals have declared that guardianship status alone is
"insufficient" for the purposes of immigration under the INA. 264 This is
partially because there is a need to ensure that parental rights are
relinquished, leaving no room for birth families to regain custody of
their natural child.
However, parental rights need to be relinquished only to the extent
that the child cannot be returned to the biological parent. "Permanent
guardianship" status should be sufficient to facilitate immigration of
adopted children from Islamic countries, because the INA and IAA

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Andrea Buchler, Islamic Family Law in Europe? From Dichotomies to Discourse
- or: Beyond Cultural and Religious Identity in Family Law, 8 INT. J.L. CONTEXT 196, 202
(2012).
263. Id.
264. Richards, supra note 10, at 411.
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amendment would define "permanent guardians" as individuals with
full and permanent custody rights to the child. This will ensure that the
child's sole and primary caretakers are the "permanent guardians," to
avoid repeating the failures of "Operation Babylift." 265 To successfully
adopt a child and for permanent guardianship to follow suit in the
Afghanistan Children's Court, the child must be accorded certain rights
under Islamic Law, namely the child's ability to retain his or her lineage
and naming rights. 266 This can be ensured if the adopting parents and
the biological parents, enter into a contract honoring Islamic lineal and
naming rights, by providing a clause that states that the child shall retain
his or her birth name. 267
The adoption agreement should also provide that if permanent
guardians break a clause in the adoption contract by changing the
child's birth name, the remedy to explore is private Islamic arbitration
in the U.S. 268 A religious arbitration agreement between the Muslim
families may "refer to a religious venue or use religious language to
explain the terms of the arbitration proceedings." 269 Further, "parties
must mutually agree on the arbitrator in order for the arbitration to be
successful." 270 Religious arbitration is a way for parties to submit a
dispute to a religious tribunal and seek enforcement of the tribunal's
decision in state or federal court. 271 The Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA") only minimally regulates arbitration proceedings, stating that a
court may vacate an award where there is a finding of fraud during the
proceedings and/or misbehavior by one of the parties leading to the
other party being prejudiced. 272
To ensure that the settlement of a dispute arising from changing the
child's birth name is settled through Islamic arbitration, the adopting
family and the birth parent(s) must include a provision in the written
agreement providing for this protection. The provision must provide
265. Kim, supra note 8, at 870.
266. Skype Interview with Judge Homa Alizoy, supra note 17.
267. See generally Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48
STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996).
268. It is worth noting that after conducting extensive research on the Westlaw
database, there was no Australian case law on disputes arising between Muslim birth
families and guardians over a birth name change.
269. Amanda M. Baker, A Higher Authority: Judicial Review of Religious Arbitration,
V ERMONT L. REV. 157, 165 (2012).
270. Charles P. Trumbull, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic
Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. R EV . 609, 645 (2006).
271. See Baker, supra note 270, at 157-59.
272. See id. at 160, 163, 171 (an example: "The Parties agree to arbitrate all existing
issues among them ... according to the Islamic rules oflaw by Texas Islamic Court.").
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that disputes arising from the agreement shall be settled through Islamic
arbitration, ensuring that civil courts lack jurisdiction to hear issues
arising from the adoption contract. 273 If the adopting family changes the
child's surname, the birth family may petition the court to enforce the
agreement through arbitration. The court must find that there was a
"valid arbitration agreement to order the parties to arbitrate the dispute
based on the terms of the agreement. " 274
However, to ensure the arbitration clause is enforced and an
arbitrator's specific performance order is upheld, there needs to be an
assurance to public courts that the arbitration remedy is not contrary to
"public policy," which provides that the child's best interest is
paramount. 275 State courts give great deference to parents when
determining the child's best interests. 276 However, it is important to
note that public policy in the U.S. is ever changing. Recently, leading
behaviorists and psychologists have promulgated the view that "open
adoption" is in the child's best interests. 277 American courts may find
these experts' views persuasive in determining what is in the child's
best interest, coupled with the importance of upholding private
contracts, especially those involving clauses based on religion, to avoid
any constitutional issues. 278 The U.S. Constitution's First Amendment
provides constraints for public courts, "referred to as the 'church
autonomy doctrine,' [that] has gained traction in debates over religious
arbitration and dramatically limits the extent to which courts will review
the decisions ofreligious tribunals." 279 Civil courts circumvent dealing
with religious arbitration to avoid entanglement in religious affairs,
since "agreement to arbitrate before a religious tribunal will often use
religious language or terms that do not have clear secular analogies." 280
See generally id.
See id. at 160.
Baker, supra note 270, at 163; see generally Hall, 540 A.2d at 1162-65.
See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
Research about the Impact of Openness on Adoptees, INDEP. ADOPTION CENTER,
available at http://www.adoptionhelp.org/open-adoption/research (last visited Jan. 14,
2015); Kutty, supra note 25 (manuscript at 4) (providing an acceptable definition of
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

adoption from an Islamic perspective where "[t]he legal creation of a family relationship
analogous to that of parents and child between a child and adults who are not the biological
parents while not severing or negating the child's biological connection.").
278. Baker, supra note 270, at 197; see generally ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, ANNETTE
BARAN & REUBEN PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED
R ECORD AN ADOPTEES, BIRTH PARENTS, AND AooPTIVE PARENTS (1978); see generally
Kevin Noble Maillard, Rethinking Children as Property: The Transitive Property, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 225 (2010).
279. Baker, supra note 270, at 172.
280. Id. at 176.
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In order to avoid a constitutional problem, namely entanglement with
religion, the court could defer
the determination of Islamic law to a mutually agreed arbitrator ....
Furthermore, the court would not unconstitutionally endorse one
school's interpretation of Islamic law over another school's
interpretation. The court, in fact, would not endorse any particular
view because the parties choose the arbitrator, and in effect, the school
of thought. 281

Since Afghanistan's government endorses Hanafi jurisprudence,
parties can delegate a learned individual in that school of thought to be
the arbitrator of a decision based on that law. 282 Thus, private Islamic
arbitration can pass constitutional muster. A religious clause in a
contract can only be securely upheld if the language is clear and if
Islamic law specifically backs the rule, leaving no room for
ambiguity. 283 If a Qur'anic verse states a rule clearly, there is little
room to dispute the meaning of the rule presented in the adoption
agreement. 284 The Qur'an clearly states that a child must retain his or
her biological father's name; if the adoption agreement provides that
this Islamic law should be enforced through Islamic arbitration, the
adoption contract should be upheld. 285 If permanent guardians and birth
families provide an Islamic arbitration tribunal with jurisdiction to
uphold the contract, it can be upheld without violating American public
policies or legal principles. If disputes between the contract parties
were settled through private arbitration, applying principles of Hanafi
Islamic Law, Afghanistan's legal mechanisms may ensure more
openness to facilitating intercountry adoptions.

CONCLUSION
There are numerous hurdles involved in facilitating a successful
campaign to provide Afghan children with safe and loving homes.
First, Afghanistan's Parliament does not wish to extend guardianship
criteria to Muslims in general. Further, the omitted article forbidding
permanent guardians from marrying their adoptive daughters needs to
be reinstated to ensure that Afghan children are placed in safe and stable
homes. This legislation gives hope that more individuals will adopt
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Trumbull, supra note 271, at 642-43.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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because the guidelines are codified, making the procedure clearer and
the process less strenuous in the future. The second hurdle involves
convincing the American public and legislators to amend federal
legislation on intercountry adoption laws in order to incorporate room
for a kafala scheme from Islamic sending countries.
An even bigger obstacle is to convince the Afghan government, its
people, and American Muslims that a U.S. campaign facilitating the
adoption of Afghan children will not thwart Islamic legal principles and
laws.
If Afghan children are raised by American Muslims in
accordance with Islamic values and their Islamic children's rights are
upheld, the Afghan government may be persuaded to embrace this
campaign. An intercountry adoption treaty between the U.S. and
Afghanistan will serve well in ensuring this because it will provide that
American Muslims must follow Afghanistan's laws before considering
bringing the child abroad.
Just as Christian organizations promoted intercountry adoption
campaigns after World War II, it is important that Muslim organizations
lead the one proposed in this paper. Currently Islamic Relief USA, a
50l(c)(3) tax-exempt charitable organization, is involved in providing
American Muslims with the opportunity to make donations towards
Afghan orphans' healthcare and education. It would be beneficial to
receive this organization's endorsement for the proposed campaign,
because of its well-established dedication to the care of Afghan
children. 286
Afghanistan's government has a great interest in the well-being of
its people, especially its children. The importance of taking care of
orphans is well established in Islamic law and the notion that the
"child's best interest is paramount" is discussed extensively in Western
legal matters and Islamic ones. The intercountry adoption of Afghan
children is possible 287 with the utilization of these parallel public policy
concerns as inspiration to make a positive change.

286. See Afghanistan: About the Situation , ISLAMIC RELIEF USA, available at
http://www.irusa.org/countries/afghanistan/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2015); see also Orphans
FAQS, ISLAMIC RELIEF USA, available at http://www.irusa.org/islamic-reliefusa/answers/orphans-faqs/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
287. If the right to receive permanent guardianship of Afghan children extends to
American Muslims generally, they must ensure that the children learn about their Afghan
heritage, history and language. See generally Transracial Parenting in Foster Care and
Adoption,
IOWA
FOSTER
&
ADOPTIVE
PARENTS
Ass'N ,
available
at
http://www.ifapa.org/pdf_ docs/Tr
ransracialParenting. pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2015).
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